Final Report on Bilateral Cooperation

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Changing Multilateralism: the EU as a Global-regional Actor in Security and Peace, or EU-GRASP in short, is an EU funded FP7 Programme. EU-GRASP aims to contribute to the analysis and articulation of the current and future role of the EU as a global actor in multilateral security governance, in a context of challenged multilateralism, where the EU aims at “effective multilateralism”. This project therefore examines the notion and practice of multilateralism in order to provide the required theoretical background for assessing the linkages between the EU’s current security activities with multi-polarism, international law, regional integration processes and the United Nations system.

Partners

EU-GRASP is coordinated by the United Nations University – Comparative regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS). The other partners of EU-GRASP are based worldwide and include: University of Warwick (UK), University of Gothenburg (Sweden), Florence Forum on the Problems of Peace and War (Italy), KULeuven (Belgium), Centre for International Governance Innovation (Canada), University of Peking (China), Institute for Security Studies (South Africa) and Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (Israel).

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Final Report on Bilateral Cooperation

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Introduction

To evaluate the successes and failures of the EU as a global actor in security and peace requires an analysis of EU action at multiple levels of security governance. As a result EU-GRASP set out to “map” a wide range of EU relations on six security issues at multiple levels of security governance; terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflict, migration, human rights, and energy security in the context of climate change. Once this was undertaken, EU-GRASP partners consulted on conducting case-study research that focused on deepening our understanding of specific cases; that is to say, that a multiple case study approach was adopted which focused on exemplifying cases identified through mapping and consultation exercises. This was done in such a manner as to allow for the coordinated selection of case studies, intended to cover transversal issues, whilst also allowing a significant degree of synchronisation between case-studies.

By conducting multiple case study analysis, EU-GRASP is able to draw cross-case conclusions. This will allow EU-GRASP to draw contingent generalisations and demonstrate transferability of issues where applicable. This current EU-GRASP exercise undertakes this task, by drawing together issues at multiple levels of security governance, with the objective of later identifying if the working theory behind EU-GRASP needs to be modified, and to allow for a holistic picture that will allow further policy implications to be identified (see Figure One). As such, this paper is part of a larger effort to draw together implications for EU policy by focusing on the global, interregional, regional and bilateral levels of EU-Security Governance. Thus, it is to evaluating the EU at the bilateral level, across six core security issues to which we now turn.
Figure 1: Case Study Method
(Modified from Yin, 2009: 57)
Terrorism and Bilateral Cooperation

The objective of this section is to summarise the areas in which bilateral cooperation has been important or absent in EU security governance. It will take into account both EU-GRASP’s mapping exercise and five terrorism case studies.

Discourse and Security Governance

EU discourses over terrorism issues has varied according to the nature of the location of the terrorist organisation and offences, although there are of course a series of common principles. This is highly evident from Oz Hassan’s bilateral mapping exercise, and is also born out in Stuart Crofts Report on Terrorism for Work Package Four. These reports demonstrate there is a very particular discourse underlying “terrorism” as a security issue, even if the manner in which this discourse is applied to specific bilateral cases means that it is somewhat modified by the EU to fit the bilateral context. That is to say, at the level of bilateral cooperation on the issue of terrorism, the EU is a strategically selective actor, that is shaped by and constructs a particular discourse, working within a strategically selective context. This has a direct impact at the bilateral level of security governance, where the issue of terrorism is securitised and comes to bare on particular bilateral relations. Indeed, as figure two identifies, this is particularly the case with EU relations with Afghanistan, Chechnya, Egypt, Israel and the Palestinian territories, Russia and Turkey. Significantly, figure two also illustrates that this has been the case largely as a result of the events of September 11 2001, where terrorism significantly rose up the EU security governance agenda. Nonetheless, the manner in which terrorism is dealt with in bilateral relations is case specific, and balanced with other EU interests; in particular trade.

Common tensions are however evident in EU security governance praxis. Notably the level of cooperation can vary greatly depending on:

A. The extent to which the US is involved and acting in a leading role in the relationship – e.g. Afghanistan and Pakistan.
B. The extent to which Member States are willing to defer the issue to the EU.
C. There are tensions in European Security Governance between European Integrational and Atlantic solidarity.
D. EU bilateral relations are greatly affected by the extent to which other countries are willing to accept the EU as a legitimate actor.

E. The EU uses its external bilateral action on terrorism to enhance inter-relational, integration and identity objectives.

Figure 2: Terrorism Research Tag Cloud: Top 100 words by proportion of use.
Impact and the Future

The impact of points A-E makes EU bilateral relations too highly contingent, which in and of itself lowers the impact of EU Security governance. Indeed, in all too many cases, the EU is marginalised in its external bilateral relations, and overly reliant on declaratory policy, demonstrating an emphasis on civilian power over military power.

It is the clear conclusion from both the mapping exercise and the case-studies that there is an urgent need for a review of EU policy in the area of terrorism. The approach developed since 9/11 has, after a decade, a track record of failure in a large number of areas. Consequently in the future the EU should consider:

A. Reappraising the framing of terrorism as a security issue - Terrorism became securitised at the highest levels through the EU narrating itself into the war on terror, and choosing to assert solidarity with the US.
B. The EU should be more cautious in accepting the US narrative, and in assert governance framework that is more balanced and in line with the EU's emphasis on multilateralism.
C. The EU's emphasis on democratic values can at times inhibit its ability to resolve conflicts associated with terrorist violence. The EU needs a governance framework that is less tied to identity and instead focuses on conflict resolution; at time by adopting a more prominent role as an honest peace broker.

WMD and Bilateral Cooperation

The objective of this section is to summarise the areas in which bilateral cooperation has been important or absent in EU security governance. It will take into account both EU-GRASP’s mapping exercise and three WMD case studies.

Discourse and Security Governance

EU discourses on WMD proliferation issues is somewhat more stable and consistent than other security issues, such as terrorism. Identity is a core feature of the discourse, with Iran, North Korea and Pakistan being attributed problematic characteristics - illiberal, irrational, dangerous, unstable, etc. On the other hand, the US, Britain, France, China and Russia as signatories of the NPT are largely not problematised, whilst democratic India has been awarded the status of an exception to
the NPT, and full civil-nuclear cooperation has followed. As such, the distinction between intentions and capabilities is central in EU discourses. This is highly evident from Oz Hassan's bilateral mapping exercise, and is also born out in Stuart Crofts Report on WMD for Work Package Four. Notably, the EU's securitisation of this issue grew to prominence in 2003, and was once again aroused in the aftermath of the A. Q. Khan network discoveries (see figure 3). Yet, the EU discourse on WMD is unapologetically multilateral in its emphasis, which does limit the extent of EU bilateral security governance. Unlike for example terrorism, the EU's reliance on multilateral governance structures limits the extent to which the EU is involved in this area. Indeed, where the EU has engaged in this security issue at the bilateral level, it has largely been indirect, focusing on the ‘root causes of instability’ attempting to redress ‘political conflicts, development assistance, reduction in poverty and the promotion of human rights’. Indeed, whilst the EU has had the opportunity to get more involved at a bilateral level, for example in the Kashmir issues, the EU has neglected to do so. EU security governance praxis at a bilateral level is therefore limited by the following:

A. The EU's desire to emphasis the multilateral over the bilateral on this issue.
B. The tensions within the Union between Nuclear Weapons States and Non-Nuclear Weapons states.
C. The EU's historical ties, or lack of, to various regions.
D. The EU's ability to navigate inter-relational, integration and identity objectives.
Impact and the Future

The EU's discursive choices made with regards to WMD, self-evidently limit the scope of bilateral cooperation. The decision to manage this issue through multilateral fora within the Union inhibits successful bilateral engagement on this issue. The case studies reveal that there is a clear case to be made that the EU should broaden the security governance technologies it is willing to utilise at multiple levels, and come to recognise the bilateral impact it could have in the context of security
dilemmas; for example in South Asia, and the tensions between India, Pakistan, China and Afghanistan.

**Regional Conflict and Bilateral Cooperation**

The objective of this section is to summarise the areas in which bilateral cooperation has been important or absent in EU security governance. It will take into account both EU-GRASP’s mapping exercise and three regional conflict case studies.

**Discourse and Security Governance**

EU discourses on regional conflict issues is somewhat more stable and consistent but clearly attempts to address the specifics of each regional conflict. That is to say, that the EU is a strategically selective actor, that is shaped by and constructs a particular discourse, working within a strategically selective context. Notably, however, the EU often defines regional conflicts, or identifies the selective context, in terms such as ‘spill over’, ‘systems’ or ‘security complex’. Notably such terms are structural, framing the issues in such a manner as to make the solutions appear overly structural at times; relying on the security-development nexus, and focus on state fragility, at the expense of a focus on the political. As such, the EU’s security governance is focused on stabilisation, and an emphasis on human security. This form of security governance has been prominent since the EU adopted the European Security Strategy in 2003, and learned various lessons from its experiences in Afghanistan (see figure 4). This provides a common core to the manner in which EU security governance is practiced, and allows the EU to construct a normative identity, seeing itself as:

A. A significant actor regarding humanitarian and development assistance.
B. A force for stabilisation and reconstruction.
C. Assistance provider.
D. Direct bilateral actor.
E. Peace mediator and diplomatic actor.
F. Guarantor of human security.
Consequently, the EU has proved itself adept as an actor in security and peace in this area. Unlike in the area of WMD, a wider range of governance levels are used by the EU in this area which does include the bilateral level in cases such as the African Great Lakes region and the DRC.

Figure 4: Regional Conflict Research Tag Cloud: Top 100 words by proportion of use
Impact and future

The success or failure of EU bilateral relations in regional conflict are highly contingent. Indeed, if impact is defined as ‘the primary and secondary, direct and indirect, positive and negative, intended and unintended, immediate and long-term, short-term and lasting efforts of the effort’, then it is clear that in some cases the EU succeeds in having more of an impact than in others. A significant factor in this however, is the extent to which EU missions have been under the Common Security and Defence Policy, and designed as short-term interventions. These are often assessed positively, whilst long-term, ill-focused regional strategies are often considered problematic. The latter’s long-term perspective and broader mandate often lead to less efficient and less successful missions. Indeed, the EU must be wary of the problems this can cause, highlighting that:

A. Interventions can lead to negative side-effects.
B. That broadening interventions to include liberal peace assumptions, and striving towards democratisation, human rights, liberal market economics and the integration of societies can prove problematic and ultimately marginalise the EU’s impact

The overall message here is that the EU must develop the ability to formulate clear strategies for intervention in regional conflicts, whether short-term or long-term, and it must, in particular, learn to join up its institutional actions to do this effectively.

Migration and Bilateral Cooperation

The objective of this section is to summarise the areas in which bilateral cooperation has been important or absent in EU security governance. It will take into account both EU-GRASP’s mapping exercise and four migration case studies.

Discourse and Security Governance

The EU’s security discourse on migration is distinctive in its focus on:

A. Illegal migration should be kept under control to preserve the European space of freedom, security and justice
B. Illegal migration can be related to organized crime and terrorism
C. Saving the lives discourse
Moreover, it is clear that the EU identifies particular referent objects within its discourse:

A. European society/citizens.
B. European and transit countries security (capability of the state to protect from physical threats).
C. Migrants.

In terms of tracing the creation of this discourse, it is clear that the ratification of the treaty of Amsterdam, the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001, and the London and Madrid bombings, are significant, and 2004 is particularly important in regards to EU construction (see figure 5). Notably these factors manifest themselves in EU security governance, considerably at the bilateral level, with the case studies identifying a wide range of EU actions in North Africa in particular; EU-Libya, EU-Morocco Action Plan, EU-Tunisia Action Plan etc.
Impact and future

The comparative case study analysis of EU bilateral relations on migration demonstrates that EU policy is problematic, in its:

A. Scant attention to human rights implications of irregular migration management.
B. Ineffectiveness of policies in terms of prefixed aims and prioritization problems.
C. Externalization processes.
D. Discrimination practices.
As a result, it is recommended that the EU considers various factors that impact directly on bilateral cooperation:

A. Understand migration as a complex and multi-faceted issue, the security approach of which is just one of the possible framing processes.
B. Consider the impact that relations with third countries may exert on neighbor partners, insisting on multilateral frameworks for discussion debating humanitarian and development issues.
C. Carefully monitor the actions undertaken by Member States when these may be contrary to EU position as human right promoter and to a more far-sighted approach to the matter, and voice disappointment loudly through its institutions according to the Lisbon Treaty.
D. Consider the ‘saving the lives discourse’ as paramount to put at center stage the security of migrants and reflect on and reconsider the restrictive measures often adopted and ignited by this discourse.
E. Balance the aim at reducing irregular flows with implications in terms of human rights protection arising from the policies undertaken to meet that aim.
F. Keep promoting for the short term programs aimed at improving third states standards on human rights and improving conditions in detention centers. International Organizations do not contest these efforts, which are paramount, but want to make sure that they are not seen as the shortcut to externalize asylum procedure in Europe.
G. Discuss thoroughly matters regarding asylum seekers, refugees and their protection, return matters, technical assistance to third countries with neighboring states, candidate states and strategic partners;
H. Exchange positions, best practices and improve venues for cooperation at a regional and multilateral level with other actors while avoiding as much as possible the undertaking of measures that, through profiling and screening processes are likely to discriminate between the EU or the EU and the US and the Rest.

**Human Rights and Bilateral Cooperation**

The objective of this section is to summarise the areas in which bilateral cooperation has been important or absent in EU security governance. It will take into account both EU-GRASP’s mapping exercise and four Human Rights case studies.
Discourse and Security Governance

The EU’s security discourse on human rights is distinctive in its focus on:

A. Justice vs. impunity  
B. Humanitarian aid  
C. Rule of law  
D. Democratic participation  
E. Civilian conflict management

Moreover, the EU’s security governance can be limited at the bilateral level even though the EU seeks to adopt a more multilateral approach. Consequently, the EU is often left relying on the following as a method of governance:

A. Public statements  
B. Targeted sanctions  
C. Aid policies

Consequently, the comparative case studies have identified that although EU discourse seems to be coherent in its aspirations for a human security doctrine, the instruments and policies it adopts are problematic; laying the EU open to claims of a double standard syndrome in the pursuit of realpolitik concerns.
Impact and future

The impression that the EU is pursuing double standards on human rights damages its impact at the bilateral level of cooperation. Indeed, invariably its credibility is limited, and claims that the EU is a normative defender of human rights are often dismissed.

Energy Security, Climate Change and Bilateral Cooperation

The identification of transversal issues in this area is problematic. However three case studies have been conducted in this area, even though they do not appear to have used the common theoretical
framework applied by the other partners. If anything can be drawn from such case studies it is the tensions between the bilateral actions of Member States, and the EU’s multilateral efforts, in particular in relation to energy.

**Figure 7: Energy Security and Climate Change Research Tag Cloud: Top 100 words by proportion of use**

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**The Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on Bilateral Cooperation**

The Lisbon Treaty has been received in a plethora of ways. Whilst some regard it as revolutionary, others have come to see it as an evolutionary step. Nonetheless, it outlines the manner in which
Member States are considered to have ultimate authority over their national security interests, and the issue of unanimity in CFSP affairs remains in place. The Lisbon Treaty does however place an emphasis on trying to push EU policy towards greater coherence, and this will, if enacted, have the potential to transform the EU’s cooperation at the bilateral level. Indeed, the manner in which it seeks to create an enabling framework will no doubt contribute in this endeavour. Indeed, with Article 21 (2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) setting out objectives such as:

- to foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty;
- to help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development;
- to assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or manmade disasters;
- to promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance.¹

Perhaps the most dramatic impact the Lisbon Treaty will have on bilateral relations, however, is through the creation of new institutional posts. Indeed, the appointment of Catherine Ashton as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is proving fruitful in clarifying EU bilateral relations. With the occupancy of the Vice-president of the European Commission, supported by diplomatic staff and the European External Action Service, this post has added a level of clarity to the EU’s external relations. This has been further strengthened by the occupancy of the President of the European Council by Herman Van Rompuy. However, with these posts only being filled in late 2009, the full impact they will have on bilateral cooperation cannot be fully evaluated.

EU-GRASP

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