Final Report on Interregional Cooperation

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**EU-GRASP**

Changing Multilateralism: the EU as a Global-regional Actor in Security and Peace, or EU-GRASP in short, is an EU funded FP7 Programme. EU-GRASP aims to contribute to the analysis and articulation of the current and future role of the EU as a global actor in multilateral security governance, in a context of challenged multilateralism, where the EU aims at “effective multilateralism”. This project therefore examines the notion and practice of multilateralism in order to provide the required theoretical background for assessing the linkages between the EU’s current security activities with multi-polarism, international law, regional integration processes and the United Nations system.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is to analyse the EU’s interregional relationships around the world, focusing on the six security issues emphasised in the EU-GRASP project: regional conflict, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, migration, energy and climate change, and human rights. Although some security issues certainly involve more interregional cooperation than others, interregional cooperation can seldom be properly understood in isolation from other forms of cooperation, especially bilateral and multilateral cooperation. It is therefore important how regions and interregionalism are conceptualised and also situated within a broader multilevel framework. Conceptualisation will be discussed in the next section, which in turn also draws attention to relevance of the transversal workpackage of the EU-GRASP project.

In terms of counterpart regions, there is a long history of a rather loose form of interregionalism between the EU and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) group of countries, and this interregional policy has been partly revised under the new Cotonou Agreement and other recent frameworks. Although interregionalism is not explicitly mentioned as an objective in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), it is deeply rooted in the European Commission’s and the EU’s foreign policies and external relations with most regions (Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004; Hänggi, Roloff, and Rüland 2006; Söderbaum and van Langenhove 2006). Indeed, particularly since the 1990s interregional cooperation has been further developed as a key feature of the EU’s foreign policies with other counterpart regions, at least in official declarations. Indeed, we are witnessing a trend whereby the European Commission and other European policymakers seek to promote interregional cooperation with other regions around the world, albeit not always with a consistent formulation (Söderbaum and Stålgren 2010). The report covers EU’s interregional relations with Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Mediterranean.
2. CONCEPTUALISING INTERREGIONALISM

There is some ambiguity surrounding the concept of interregionalism. In its broadest sense, interregionalism refers to the process whereby two specified regions interact as regions, that is, region-to-region relations. The most institutionalised form of interregionalism, so-called "pure interregionalism", develops between two clearly identifiable regions within an institutional framework (for instance EU and the African Union). Pure interregionalism captures, however, only a limited part of present-day interregional cooperation. This is because many “regions” are dispersed and porous, without clearly identifiable borders, and demonstrate only a low level of regional agency. In other words, regional organisations are not discrete actors, which can be isolated from classical intergovernmental cooperation between nation-states (i.e. classical bilateralism). It is widely contested among scholars even to what extent the EU (sophisticated as it is) should be considered a discrete actor. This means that the actoriness and agency of other counterpart regions are even weaker.

In spite of the fact that the agency and autonomy of regional organisations are widely contested, a significant part of the literature on interregionalism has a tendency to emphasise “pure interregionalism”. This is unsatisfactory and appears to be connected to the same bias as in much of the study regionalism, which is heavily geared towards the study of regional organisations and “visible” formal and inter-state frameworks. Our premise in this report is that a broader conceptual toolbox is required in order to understand the emergence and logic of interregionalism, as well as how this phenomenon is linked to multilateralism and classical bilateralism. The concepts of hybrid interregionalism and transregionalism are useful in this regard (Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004).

“Hybrid interregionalism” refers to a framework where one organised region negotiates with a group of countries from another (unorganised or dispersed) region. For instance, in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) the Mediterranean countries negotiate individually with the EU. Similarly, referring specifically to commercial relations, Aggarwal and Fogarty take the Lomé Agreement as an example of hybrid interregionalism, whereby the EU is unified and has trade relations with a set of countries that are not grouped within their own customs union or free trade agreement. Hänggi goes beyond formal frameworks and refers to hybrid interregionalism, in which a region, such as the EU, interacts bilaterally with single powers. Formally, this can be thought of as a “region-to-state” (or “region-to-country”) relationship, but it may also come close to or give way to interregional relations in those cases where the single state has a dominant position in its own region, for example, the United States in North America, India in South Asia, or China in Asia.
(Hänggi 2000: 7; 2006: 41ff). Needless to say, such region-to-state relations are not unequivocal, and as Karen Smith (2006) correctly points out, under certain conditions such relations may also prevent interregionalism from emerging.

“Transregionalism” has been employed as a concept in order to go beyond the narrow region-to-region processes between two institutionalised regions within a formal and mainly intergovernmental framework (i.e. pure interregionalism). Transregionalism is even more open-ended than hybrid interregionalism and refers to region-to-region relations where both regions are dispersed and have weak actorship. Hence, where an accord links countries from two regions whilst neither of these two regions negotiates as a region/regional organisation, this can be referred to as transregionalism, for example Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Transregionalism has also been used in order to cover so-called transnational (non-state) relations, again for the purpose of moving beyond conventional state-centrism: “Any connection across regions — including transnational networks of corporate production or of nongovernmental organisations — that involves cooperation among any type of actors across two or more regions can in theory also be referred to as a type of transregionalism” (Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004:5).

Perhaps more important, transregionalism draws attention to a more flexible understanding and conceptualisation of region/regional organisation, and that the close links to other forms (levels) of cooperation, such as bilateralism as well as multilateralism.

The generic concept of bilateralism describes an interaction between actors. This concept is of course related to a broader discussion of what is (and is not) an “actor.” Conventionally, bilateralism is above all used to denote activities between two nation-states, but if the EU is perceived as a part in a bilateral relationship, it is per definition seen as an actor, and then it becomes part of interregionalism/transregionalism or hybrid interregionalism. In this context it is also worth considering that being an actor, or having “actorship” (or “actorness”), is not necessarily the same for a region as for nation-states, although there are of course certain similarities. The fundamental issue is instead whether regions have the capacity to act and to pursue coordinated, coherent, and consistent policies toward the outside world while having a significant impact on the external environment and the behaviour of other actors.
3. EU-AFRICA INTERREGIONAL COOPERATION

Interregional relations between Europe and Africa are a patchwork of relationships. There can be a pluralism of pure interregionalism, between the EU and Africa/AU, between EU and sub-regions (Regional Economic Communities, RECs) and also the hybrid, even “imagined”, interregionalism (see Holland 2005) between the EU and the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (the ACP group). This section starts out with a general description of broad interregional frameworks, before moving into the six security issues.

3.1. The Cotonou Agreement and The Joint Africa-EU Strategy

A key interregional instrument in EU-Africa relations is the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA 2000) between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of states (ACP group), which was concluded for a 20-year period in 2000 and entered into force in 2003, and revised 2005 and 2010. The CPA replaced earlier cooperation structures under the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions. The historical focus in the EU-Africa partnership has been on a special aid-trading relationship with former colonies. Even if earlier interregional accords were officially designed to promote development, the results were not convincing. The new Cotonou Agreement has three pillars: (1) development cooperation, (2) economic and trade cooperation, and (3) the political dimension. The CPA differs from earlier cooperation frameworks at least in terms of the following (Brolin 2007):

- More emphasis on political dialogue, including on matters such as conflict and peace building, human rights, good governance and the rule of law;
- A more participatory approach, looking to include civil society and private sector actors in dialogue and implementation to a larger extent;
- A strengthened focus on poverty reduction;
- A new framework for economic trade cooperation, through the regional negotiation of Partnership Agreements, with increasing emphasis on reciprocity and the full integration of ACP countries into the world economy in conformity with WTO provisions;
- A reform of financial cooperation, decentralising parts of the administrative and financial responsibilities towards the receiving countries, and introducing performance-based criteria into development cooperation.
The European Development Fund (EDF) is the main funding instrument for development cooperation under the Cotonou Agreement, although ACP states are also eligible for DCI thematic instrument funding. The EDF is in turn funded by the EU Member States (it is not “budgetised” within the EC). The 10th EDF covers the 2008-2013 period, with a total of €22.7 billion (a substantial increase compared to the 9th EDF, with its initial allocation of €13.8 billion for 2000-2007). Regional integration is an increasingly important goal of EU-ACP cooperation. Under the 10th EDF, the regional cooperation envelope almost doubled to €1.78 billion. In terms of regional integration among ACP countries, the Commission has called on the EU to support the five priorities of strengthening regional institutions; building regional integrated markets; supporting business development; connecting regional infrastructure networks; and developing regional policies for sustainable development (CEC 2008d; see also CEC 2008a and 2008e).

Over the last few years, intercontinental dialogue and cooperation between the EU and the AU has become an increasingly important feature of interregional relations. An important step in this development was the EU’s own Strategy for Africa (CEC 2005d). This strategy was criticised for its European bias by African leaders, who were concerned that they had not been properly consulted on it. This led to the initiation, in February 2007, of talks on a joint strategy, to be developed and owned by both continents. The resulting Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) was adopted at the second EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon in December 2007, and now serves as the overarching policy framework for intercontinental relations, complementing rather than replacing other frameworks, such as the CPA and the Union for the Mediterranean (former Euro-Mediterranean Partnership). The AU and its commission has a central role in the strategy, and this is the first time that the EU has taken part in a framework dealing with Africa as a single continent.

The JAES is, in terms of its declared principles, based on a shared vision, aiming to “move away from a traditional relationship and forge a real partnership characterised by equality and the pursuit of common objectives” (point 9a). However laudable such an ambition may be, fundamental inequalities remain very persistent, due to the nature of the historical ties between the two continents, the EU’s tendency to prioritise its own interests when push comes to shove, and the very real differences in power and resources that still prevail. As long as one party funds the other, it is difficult to create a fundamentally equal partnership. Nevertheless, the JAES is significant in its intention to create a more overtly political relationship between the two continents. The strategy focuses on eight thematic so-called strategic partnerships, which reach well beyond the traditional spheres of aid and development. These are:
1. Peace and Security;
2. Democratic Governance and Human Rights;
3. Trade, Regional Integration and Infrastructure;
4. Millennium Development Goals;
5. Energy;
6. Climate Change;
7. Migration, Mobility and Employment; and

Each of the partnerships comes with a specific, jointly agreed Action Plan attached for the period 2008-2010. These list concrete measurable actions to be taken jointly by the Africa-EU Summit in Sirte, Libya in 2010. The JAES also has an elaborate institutional architecture that is designed to involve a wide range of stakeholders (parliaments, civil society and the private sector) on both continents in its governance and implementation, although there remains a substantial lack of clarity with regard to the exact modalities of their engagement.

A series of recurring interregional activities are to support the common implementation of the JAES and related agreements. The AU representation to the EU in Brussels and the EU delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa are to ensure a continuous dialogue. In an attempt to increase EU coherence at this level, the EU in 2007 appointed Koen Vervaeke as both EU Special Representative to the AU, representing the Council, and Head of the EC Delegation in Addis Ababa (see Council of the European Union 2007a).

So far, there have been two Africa-EU Summits at the Head of State level, but they are envisaged to be held every 3 years. In between, Africa-EU ministerial troikas are normally held twice a year:1 The European Commission and the African Union Commission hold annual College-to-College (C2C) meetings. Commissioners with similar portfolios also meet regularly. Twice a year, there are meetings with the Joint Africa-EU Task Force, where staff from both commissions review the JAES cooperation process at a more technical level. In March 2009, the Joint Task Force met in an enlarged format for the first time, involving AU and EU Presidencies, co-Chairs of Joint Expert

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1 On the EU side, the Troika consists of the current and incoming EU Presidency, the Commission and the Council Secretariat. On the African side, the Troika consists of the current and outgoing AU presidencies and the Commission, expanded to include chef de file countries at the expert and senior official level (Joint Africa EU Strategy, point 100).
Groups, observers from the Pan-African and European Parliaments and from civil society (see Joint Africa EU Task Force 2009a and 2009b).

Each of the eight partnerships in the JAES has a European and an African Implementation Team. In Europe, one Member State is normally designated as the “lead EU country” for a specific partnership, and is to coordinate the implementation efforts, working together with other interested EU countries and the Presidency (see Tywuschik and Sherriff 2009 for an overview of JAES responsibilities). For the sensitive (second pillar related) Peace and Security Partnership, the Council serves as lead institution, and for Trade and Regional Integration the Commission is the natural leader. The ITs from the two continents come together in so-called Joint Expert Groups (JEGs). The JEGs are informal fora where experts can discuss the implementation and financing of the JAES priority actions, and they are hailed by observers as an “exciting new tool” illustrating the ambition to jointly tackle global challenges and simultaneously to involve CSOs in the implementation and monitoring process (Tywuschik and Sherriff 2009). The JEGs met for the first time in October-November 2008, have spent time clarifying structures, and are expected to move onto more substantial debate during 2009, in order to establish roadmaps for the implementation points of each of the 8 partnerships (Africa-EU Ministerial Troika 2008).

It is clear that the challenge of the JAES lies in its implementation. The initial work has been mainly about setting up the joint structures necessary to make the strategy work. It remains to be seen to what extent it will deliver. A problem in this respect is the fact that the JAES suffers from “a critical lack of awareness of its existence, let alone its substance, architecture, processes and recent achievements” among key stakeholders (Tywuschik and Sherriff 2009). The strategy also remains underfunded, and key institutions remain reluctant to prioritise it as long as this is the case. The JAES is funded by previously existing instruments that were not set up for this specific purpose (EDF, DCI, ENPI, IFS), which may lead to synergy problems.²

Observers argue that there is a risk of a downward spiral, with actors waiting to see the JAES deliver before they make a serious commitment to it, thereby impeding progress (Tywuschik and Sherriff 2009). This is a particularly pertinent problem in light of the current financial crisis, which elicits questions about whether the EU will be able and/or willing to maintain its commitments on development assistance over the years to come.

² See http://europafrica.net/jointstrategy/#financing
Finally, it can also be mentioned that the EU is involved in dialogue and cooperation with a number of African Regional Economic Communities (RECs – see Appendix 2 for details). There is also a regional dimension to development cooperation. African Regional Strategy Papers and Indicative Programmes are negotiated with four regional groupings: i) the SADC; ii) the ESA-IO grouping (COMESA, EAC, IGAD and IOC) for Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean; iii) ECOWAS/UMEOA for West Africa, and iv) a Central African group composed of CEMAC countries plus DRC and São Tomé e Principe.

3.2. African-EU Peace and Security Partnership

The African-EU Peace and Security Partnership contains three priority actions:

1) to enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and security,
2) full operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and
3) predictable funding for African-led peace support operations.

As noted above, the Council is the lead institution on the EU side. In addition, different actors are leading the work on the different priority actions. The European Commission and the Presidency are leading the work on dialogue. As regards the APSA, France is leading on military aspects, and Italy on civilian and police aspects. As regards funding for PSO, the leaders are the Commission and the UK. The EU IT on peace and security began its work in 2008, whereas the thematic JEG planned to hold its second meeting in April 2009. On the African side, Algeria is the lead country, along with the AUC.

3.2.1. Enhancing Dialogue

The objective of the first priority action is phrased as to "reach common positions and implement common approaches on challenges to peace and security in Africa, Europe and globally" (Joint Africa EU Strategy 2007 p. 30). The priority action is, according to the action plan, expected to result in a deepened common understanding of cases and resolution of conflicts; strengthened cooperation on conflict prevention, management and resolution, including long-term reconstruction and peace building; improved coordination of initiatives; and increased EU and Africa cooperation and influence in international and global fora. The activities envisaged in the action plan related to this goal naturally focus on "systematic and regular dialogue on all issues related to peace and security, at technical, senior official and political levels", focusing on issues such as terrorism, SALW, ERW, APM, trafficking and conflict analysis. During the first JAES year,
according to the joint progress report adopted by the Africa-EU ministerial troika in November 2008, political dialogue has been significantly strengthened, with regular exchanges of information between the AUC and the EC/Council secretariat. The first Africa-EU defence ministers' troika took place in November 2008. It was preceded by the first joint meeting between the AU PSC and the EU PSC. The next such meeting is envisaged before September 2009. The action plan opens up for joint assessment missions and initiatives where appropriate, and joint assessment missions are planned for 2009 to the Central African Republic, Burundi, Comoros and Somalia (Mackie et al 2008). The Sahel region has been selected for a first informal joint assessment in the field of collective security and preventive diplomacy (CEC 2008a).

3.2.2. Full operationalisation of the APSA

The second JAES priority action is the full operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The creation of the APSA was formally authorised through the adoption of the 2002 Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. Its set of institutions are central to the efforts of the AU and the African RECs to increase coordination and harmonisation in the field of peace and security at the continental level.

The AU has a stated objective of creating peace, security and stability on the continent (article 3 (f) of the AU Constitutive Act 2000), and a much stronger interventionist ethos than its predecessor, the OAU. It has a clear formal mandate to intervene in member countries "in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity" (Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act), although there remains a reluctance to invoke these provisions. For several of Africa's Regional Economic Communities (RECs), conflict prevention and management has likewise become an important issue over the last decade. SADC and ECOWAS were the first to develop peacekeeping capabilities, largely thanks to the efforts and financial resources of South Africa and Nigeria respectively. ECOWAS and IGAD were the first to put early warning and conflict prevention instruments in place. Others have had similar ambitions, but progress has been rather slow and patchy (Vines and Middleton 2008). A challenge for the RECs and the continent as a whole remains the overlapping memberships and responsibilities of the different organisations. The APSA aims to improve this situation, dealing with prevention, management and resolution of African conflicts, integrating continent-wide efforts under the auspices of the AU with the work of the RECs and the member states. Its political decision-making body is the 15-member AU Peace and Security Council.

3 For background, see also Assembly of the African Union (2004)
(PSC), which legitimises and coordinates the actions of all other elements of the APSA. The PSC is supported by an under-staffed Secretariat within the Peace and Security Directorate of the AU Commission. The PSC is, among other things, to decide on the deployment of the African Standby Force, a key component of the APSA. This rapid response capacity is to be composed of five regional brigades (3,500-5,000 troops each, plus a civilian component), and is to be available by 2010. At present, it is unlikely that this deadline will be met (Cilliers 2008). The PSC is to rely on a Continental Early Warning System, which is to integrate information from five regional early warning systems. It is also in control of the Peace Fund, which it has inherited from the OAU, and which will function as a pool fund where donors can make resources available in addition to the AU's regular budget. There is also a so-called Panel of the Wise (PoW), which is a consultative body composed of five highly respected individuals appointed for a 3-year period. The PoW is to provide opinions to the PSC on peace and security matters, and promote conflict prevention and resolution across the continent.

The EU has supported the development of the different APSA structures, mainly through the capacity building component of the African Peace Facility (APF). Funding for Africa-EU cooperation in the field of peace and security comes from many sources, including the AU Peace Fund, ENPI, DCI, Instrument for Stability and the CFSP budget. However, the APF is the main EU instrument for supporting African efforts in this field (Pirozzi 2009). It was established in 2004, following a request from AU leaders at their Maputo summit in 2003 for additional funding for Africa-led PSOs and capacity-building, rechanneling parts of 9th EDF funding for ACP states. The initial APF allocation was €250 million for the period 2000-2007, increased to €440 million by 2007. Only €34.5 million, 10 percent of the total amount, were allocated to capacity building efforts. It was envisaged that of these, €1 million would be used for African Standby Force workshops, €6 million for strengthening the role and leadership of the AU, mainly through financing Peace and Security Directorate staff, and €20 plus €7.5 million for reinforcing REC institution building, including administrative and financial staff; training; equipment for the EWS, ASF and Planning Elements; and improved AU - REC coordination through the establishment of REC liaison officers in Addis Ababa. However, out of the money allocated for capacity building, only some 10 percent have been used so far. There are major absorption difficulties both within the AU and the RECs. In the AUC, only 11

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4 The members of the first PoW were appointed in January 2007 and are Salim Ahmed Salim, former Secretary-General of the Organisation of African Unity; Brigalia Bam, Chairperson of the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa; Ahmed Ben Bella, former President of Algeria; Elisabeth Pognon, President of the Constitutional Court of Benin; and Miguel Trovoada, former President of Sao Tomé and Principé.
staff out of the 40 planned for have been recruited. Recruiting REC liaison officers has also proven a difficult process, and at present 3 out of 5 have been recruited (Pirozzi 2009). The absorption difficulties contribute to the risk of a funding deadlock for the JAES, as EU donors become more reluctant to commit additional funds in light of the difficulties to make use of the ones already available.

For 2009, ongoing assistance to AU political-military structures — the Peace and Security Directorate (PSD), the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) and its Strategic Planning and Management Unit (SPMU) — will continue, supported by the APF and the IfS. Since 1997, France has run the Reinforcing of African Peacekeeping Capacities Initiative (RECAMP). It started out as a 10-year military cooperation project between France and ECOWAS, offering training support at an individual and operational level, as well as equipment support. This initiative has now been regionalised, functioning as a framework for cooperation between the EU and Africa to offer both civilian and military strategic training in view of the operationalisation of the ASF by 2010. The ongoing intense EURORECAMP training cycle is known as AMANI AFRICA and was launched in November 2008, with France as the framework nation on the EU side, funded mainly by the APF and EU Member States. The Cycle is to culminate in a continental level Command Post Exercise (CPX) by March 2010. The AMANI AFRICA cycle is, in terms of declared principles, "an African project supported by EU and its partners rather than an European project given to Africa" (Gonnet 2008), but in practice, the project still bears a distinctly French and European mark. Throughout 2009 there will be several preparatory training courses for the CPX, as well as, for example, a strategic decision-makers' seminar and a politico-strategic seminar within the Cycle.\(^5\)

### 3.2.3. Predictable funding for Africa-led PSOs

The APF has made the European Commission the largest donor to African PSOs. The fact that the Commission, by virtue of this, is such an important player in a CFSP-related field is sometimes a source of legal and interinstitutional tension. For example, in 2004, when South Africa suggested that €7.7 million be reallocated from the development cooperation budget to finance capacity building under the APF, the Council argued that the Commission did not have the legal power to use budget appropriations for development co-operation to fund peace-support objectives. Although a one-off solution was eventually found, no further mechanisms along this line are envisaged (Pirozzi 2009). The fact that the APF is funded by the EDF thus implies constraints, both geographically and

with regard to how money is spent. In terms of geography, neither South Africa nor the North-African countries are parties to the Cotonou agreement and thus not eligible for EDF funding. Legal obstacles prevent these countries from contributing to the APF-funded efforts, and make it difficult to combine EDF funds with funds from other instruments, such as the ENPI or DCI. In addition, most crucially, while EDF resources can be used to fund costs related to African-led PSOs such as allowances, communication equipment, peace keepers’ per diem, medical facilities, civilian equipment, transport and logistics, they must under no circumstances be used for anything with lethal implications, such as any form of military hardware or training (CEC 2008f).

Within these constraints, 90 percent of the APF funds under the 9th EDF were used for the financing of African-led PSOs, with the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS) from 2004 to 2007 receiving the bulk of resources (€305.6 million). With its 7500 peacekeepers AMIS was the largest PSO undertaking of the AU to date. The rest was allocated to the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM, €15 million), the CEMAC mission to the Central African Republic (FOMUC, €33.4 million) and the AU mission in the Comoros (AMISEC, €5 million), for a total of €349.5 million (Pirozzi 2009).

For the period 2008-2010, the APF has been extended, with €300 million assigned under the Intra-ACP Indicative Programme of the 10th EDF. The proportion allocated to capacity building has somewhat increased (€65 million). Several changes have been made to the mechanism, such as a simplified approval process for additional contributions from Member States, and an early response mechanism to finance fact-finding missions, the preparation phase of missions, etc., with a shortened decision-making procedure (a €15 million envelope). However, the difficulties related to the limitations in use and geographic scope will remain, causing observers to claim that the provision of adequate resources for African peacekeeping is at risk (Pirozzi 2009). The long-term prospects for the APF are also unclear, in spite of another €300 million having been set aside in reserve for the period after 2010. In 2010, there will be a review of the mechanism, as requested by the Council.

### 3.3. Terrorism

The fight against terrorism is an issue in both the CPA and the JAES. In the Cairo Plan of Action (Africa-Europe Summit 2000) terrorism is dealt with in articles 83-85, where participants agree to “work together to improve international co-operation in the fight against terrorism with a view to eliminating such a phenomenon in all its forms and manifestations” (art. 83). This was followed up by an Africa-EU declaration on terrorism in the context of the September 11 events (Africa-Europe
Ministerial Conference 2001), condemning the attacks, declaring full solidarity with the USA, and expressing support for a Global Convention on Terrorism. The second Ministerial Meeting in Ouagadougou in 2002 likewise issued a Joint Declaration on Terrorism (Council of the European Union 2002), reiterating their commitment to the joint struggle against terrorism, highlighting work done by the parties in this field, and rejecting attempts to associate terrorism with any particular religion or culture.

At the request of the EU, provisions on the fight against terrorism were also included in the 2005 revised Cotonou Agreement (CPA 2005, art. 11a), whereby the parties agree to exchange information on terrorist groups and their support networks, and on means to combat terrorism.

In the JAES, enhancing cooperation in the fight against terror is among the activities listed under first priority action of peace and security partnership, as well as an objective of priority action 1 of the partnership on democratic governance and human rights. Current activities include cooperation with and support to the Centre Africain d’Etudes et de Recherches sur le Terrorisme (CAERT) of the AU Commission, which in turn functions in coordination with 45 National Focal Points and 7 RECs. Current funding is €1 million under MEDA, which will be complemented by IfS funding and followed by a 2009-2011 programme in support of the Sahel region. Another programme “with a wide regional scope in support of African countries’ capacities to fight organised crime/terrorism” (CEC 2008c) is foreseen for the same period (2009-2011).

3.4. WMD

In the EU strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Council of the European Union 2003), regional security constitutes an important dimension. According to this strategy, the EU is "determined to play a part in addressing the problems of regional instability and insecurity and the situations of conflict which lie behind many weapons programmes" and will therefore "foster regional security arrangements and regional arms control and disarmament processes." In this general sense, the EU is engaged in interregional cooperation against the proliferation of WMD, but this is then closely linked to the security issue of regional security.

WMD-related provisions are included in the revised CPA (CPA 2005). In article 11b, the parties "agree to cooperate and to contribute to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery", through relevant international instruments and effective

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national export controls. The provisions are defined as essential elements. It is noted that financing for this work will come from specific instruments and not from the general EC-ACP cooperation sources, and that political dialogue is to be established in this field. WMD are mentioned as an area of cooperation in the JAES, but similarly to the CPA, the language used is rather general and lacking concretization. It appears that WMD is not important as far as interregional cooperation is concerned.

3.5. Climate Change & Energy Security

The two themes of climate change and energy security coexist uneasily in the tension between development objectives, environmental concerns and Europe’s own strategic interest in African energy resources. Energy infrastructure and access has become an increasingly important theme in European development cooperation with Africa, while, at the same time, the EU has renewed its interest in energy imports from Africa. This is largely a result of the failure to conclude a cooperation and partnership agreement to formalise energy relations with Russia (Euractiv 2007). At present, the EU imports almost 15 percent of its oil and gas from Africa, a figure that could probably increase substantially in the future, if the necessary infrastructure investments are made. In addition, the idea of massive solar power installations in the Sahara to provide energy for the EU’s growing demand has received backing, if not yet funding, from certain Member States (Euractiv 2008).

Cooperation between the EU and Africa in the field of energy security has an interregional dimension within such frameworks as JAES, the EU-Africa Infrastructure Partnership, Cotonou/EDF, the EUEI and its Partnership Dialogue Facility, and the Euromed Partnership/Union for the Mediterranean. It is worth emphasising that one of the eight Africa-EU Partnerships within the JAES are on climate change. Yet, these processes of interregional cooperation do not necessarily treat climate change as a security issue, and it is managed as part of development cooperation.

The EU Energy Initiative was launched at the WSSD in Johannesburg in 2002 as a framework for policy dialogue and a platform for raising the profile of energy issues on the development agenda (rather than the security agenda). EUEI has been pushing for a focus on energy issues in European development cooperation, and has contributed to the creation of a more active energy dialogue between Africa and Europe. In the context of the EUEI, a number of financial instruments have been created. A key instrument is the ACP-EU Energy Facility, which was initiated in 2005 and set up in 2006, with a budget of €220 million (CEC 2004, 2006a). €198 million of these were allocated to a
call for proposals, the lion’s share of which went to down-stream access projects. CEMAC, ECOWAS and UEMOA were among the beneficiaries. €10 million outside the call were programmed for technical assistance and institutional support to the AU/NEPAD for capacity building support to the African Power Pools and the African Forum for Utility Regulators (AFUR), in line with the AU/NEPAD Action Plan’s objective of strengthening regional power networks. Under the EUEI, there is also a Partnership Dialogue Facility, set up by six Member States7 and the European Commission in 2005, initially planned to run for 3 years as a flexible, fast-response mechanism mainly funding up-stream activities such as strategy development and efforts to integrate energy access issues into existing development plans at national and regional level. The PDF has been extended twice, and is now to run until 2012. It has funded a number of regional projects, such as the development of the CEMAC Action Plan on Energy Access and the Interministeral Workshop on Energy Access for the Rural Poor; the development of the EAC Energy Access Strategy, and an ECOWAS study on the institutional design, responsibilities and potential sources of funding of the planned Regional Agency for Energy Access8.

Another important step in the development of interregional energy linkages was the creation of the EU-Africa Partnership on Infrastructure, in the context of the 2005 G8 Gleneagles declaration and EU Strategy for Africa. The Strategy for Africa identified regional infrastructure as an important means of interconnecting Africa, to contribute to economic growth, competitive trade and wider regional integration, and identified the AU and the RECs as the main interlocutors of the EU in this context. A total of €5.6 billion from the 10th EDF was allocated to support regional development in four priority areas—transport, energy, water, and ICT—combining national, regional and intra-ACP resources of the EDF. The Infrastructure partnership was launched in 2007, along an innovative EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund managed by the EIB, providing grants and long-term loan finance made available by financial institutions, for the benefit of cross-border and regional infrastructure projects in sub-Saharan Africa. Through the Trust Fund grant resources from the Commission and Member States can be blended with the lending capacity of the EIB and Member State development financiers. Energy (generation and interconnection) currently dominates the trust fund (CEC 2008b).

Climate change has become an increasingly important theme in EU development cooperation with the ACP. In 2003, the Commission recognised that climate change would significantly affect poverty

7 Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, UK
8 See list of projects at http://www.euei-pdf.org/projects.html
reduction efforts, and therefore needed to be an integral part of development cooperation activities (CEC 2003a). In 2004, the Council adopted an Action Plan for 2004 – 2008 to accompany the EU Strategy on Climate Change in the Context of Development Cooperation (Council of the European Union 2004) to be collectively implemented by Member States and the Commission. The Action Plan was conceived of as a tool to assist partner countries in addressing climate change and implementing the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, focusing on the four strategic objectives of raising the policy profile of climate change; supporting adaptation; supporting mitigation and low GHG development paths; and capacity development. The first biannual progress report of 2007 showed mixed results in prioritising these issues in development cooperation. A Joint ACP-EU Declaration on Climate Change and Development (Council of the European Union 2009a), dated May 2009, is the latest attempt at shared agenda setting on climate change issues.

In the context of the JAES, Energy and Climate Change are addressed in two different partnerships. This partly reflects natural divisions, as the two matters are not completely overlapping, but it also reflects the fact that climate change is not yet fully integrated into energy policy.

The energy partnership has three objectives:

- Effective Africa-EU dialogue on energy access and energy security;
- Improved access to reliable, secure, affordable, climate friendly and sustainable energy services for both continents; and
- Increased European and African investments in energy infrastructure in Africa, including promotion of renewable energy and energy efficiency.

On the EU side, Austria and Germany serve as lead nations for this partnership; on the AU side, the AUC is the lead institution. A high level meeting was held in Addis Ababa in September 2008, where commissioners Ibrahim, Michel and Piebalgs signed a joint statement on the main priorities and governance setup for the partnership (African Union Commission and European Commission 2008). The priorities include promoting regional integration of electricity markets in Africa, through, for example, launching preparatory work on an Electricity Master Plan for Africa; promoting an enabling environment for private investment; developing energy interconnections between Africa and Europe; and launching a Renewable Energy Cooperation programme. In terms of partnership governance, a High Level Africa-EU Energy Dialogue meeting will be held every two years—the first one during the second semester of 2009. In parallel with this meeting, there will be a recurring Africa-EU Partnership Forum, involving civil society, research institutes and private
sector actors.

The climate change partnership has two priority actions, the first of which is building a common agenda on climate change policies and cooperation. This is largely about enhancing dialogue and finding common approaches to climate change in relation to international negotiations, and strengthening adaptation and mitigation capacities. It is noteworthy that this partnership was the first to present a joint declaration, the Africa EU Declaration on Climate Change\(^9\), adopted at the November 2008 Troika meeting in Addis Ababa, in time for the UNFCCC conference in Poznan in December. Such efforts may increase in significance as Africa develops deeper cooperation and unity in this field. The further development of activities under this priority action will be closely linked with the development of the EU’s Global Climate Change Alliance, where pilot support actions are starting in Tanzania, to be followed by other African countries (CEC 2008c).

The second climate change priority action concerns cooperation to address land degradation and increasing aridity, including the Green Wall for Sahara Initiative, with the objective of combating desertification and improving livelihoods in the Sahara and the Sahel. Here, plans include a scoping study for the Green Wall Initiative, as well as initiatives to strengthen the AUC environmental section, support to the new “MEA African Regional Hub” within the AUC, and an enhanced dialogue on disaster risk reduction (CEC 2008c).

### 3.6. Human Rights

Human Rights are an increasingly important part of the EU’s external relations and development policy. They are systematically addressed within the political dialogue that the European Union conducts with third countries or regional groups in the framework of the CFSP. A broad range of tools is used to promote HR in third countries and also to initiate HR discussions and strengthen HR frameworks at the regional level. In 2001 the Council adopted the “European Union guidelines on Human Rights dialogues”. Based on these guidelines, structured human rights dialogues are to include discussions enhancing cooperation on human rights, registering the concern felt by the EU on the human rights situation in the country concerned, and endeavouring to improve the human rights situation there. When a structured EU-AU human rights dialogue was included as an integral part of the JAES in 2007, it was the first time that the EU as an entity entered into a structured human rights dialogue with a regional organisation (Oikarinen 2008).

Since the mid-1990s, a HR clause has been incorporated into almost all of the EU’s external agreements, conventions and treaties, except trade agreements with industrialised countries. The HR clause identifies respect for human rights and democratic governance as “essential elements” of the agreements. These agreements have created institutional mechanisms for the EU to conduct a political dialogue with its partners, including on the issue of HR. If HR abuses are established, trade benefits and development cooperation can be suspended, or other targeted sanctions may be imposed.

Originally the ACP-EU partnership focused solely on economic cooperation. Neither the EEC nor the ACP countries were ready to extend their cooperation to political issues. The initiative in doing so was taken by the EC in 1985, when it sought to introduce a human rights clause in the Lomé III Convention. At the time this was deemed by the ACP to be in contradiction to the principles of sovereignty and equal partnership (Laporte 2007).

With the ACP states, the essential element and non-compliance clauses were included in the revised Lomé IV Convention of 1995 (article 366a, which resulted in some two dozen cases). These clauses have been further developed in the Cotonou Agreement, which is considered “particularly strongly worded” (Reiterer 2005), with three general references to HR and democratic principles in the Preamble, as well as no less than 13 articles referring to concepts such as democratic values, human rights, good governance, the rule of law and gender equality. Article 9 defines the “essential elements” of the agreement in terms of respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, and good governance as a “fundamental element”. Article 8 caters for comprehensive political dialogue between the parties, amongst other themes, stating that “the dialogue shall encompass a regular assessment of the developments concerning the respect for human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance”. Article 96, “Essential elements: consultation procedure and appropriate measures”, provides for a consultation procedure in conflicting situations relating to the essential elements, where the political dialogue has not solved the problem between the parties. Such consultations aim to find a solution that is mutually acceptable. If this is not possible, if one party rejects consultation, or in “cases of special urgency”, “appropriate measures” can be taken. The measure of last resort would be suspension of the agreement.

Lomé IV 366a consultations were held on a number of occasions, such as with Togo regarding the presidential elections in 1998, after the coup d’état in Niger in 1999, after the outbreaks of violence in Guinea-Bissau in 1999, as well as with the Comoros and Côte d’Ivoire after the respective coups
in 1999. The EU also used the possibility of unilateral suspension of Lomé benefits with several ACP countries—in 1994, Community aid to eight ACP states was suspended or restricted “because of the security situation and the states’ failure to move towards democracy or observe human rights” (Miller 2004).

Table 1: Consultations and measures initiated under article 96/366a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>EU reasons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Violations of human rights, democratisation and rule of law; relations with neighbouring countries; terrorism; Sudanese peace process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Divergence on the political situation in the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Coup d’état</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Flawed electoral process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Coup d’état</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>Coup d’état</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>Coup d’état</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Flawed electoral process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>Coup d’état</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>Coup d’état</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>Lack of openness in elections and other developments during transition period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Violations of human rights, democratic principles and serious cases of corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Violations of human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Coup d’état</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Non-respect of the essential elements set out in Article 9 of the Cotonou agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>Coup d’état</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Democracy, respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.7. Migration

Migration is a new issue for ACP-EU development cooperation. It became part of the agenda as a result of EU Member States wishing to reduce immigration pressure, and wanting to use aid as a lever to guarantee the readmittance of irregular migrants or failed asylum seekers (Higazi 2005). In the Cotonou Agreement with the ACP states, migration is covered in article 13, according to which migration is to be a “subject of in-depth dialogue” within the partnership. The article provides a basis for EU-ACP migration cooperation, but deals primarily with the policing and management of migration (including readmission matters) and the rights of migrants, whilst only partly addressing migration in a development context. Critics argue that article 13 reflects narrow EU security concerns, as “there is no evident link between poverty reduction and the preventative migration policies that the EU is pursuing through readmission and technical assistance to strengthen border and visa controls” (ibid). There are also concerns among critics that article 13 may come to imply that migration matters will become an added conditionality issue in EU aid. However, there are no penalties for non-cooperation mentioned in the clause.

With regard to development cooperation, in the African RSPs/RIPs migration constitutes a recurring theme. It is particularly prominent in the West African RIP, which states “support to the formulation and implementation of a regional policy with regard to migration” as an explicit priority. This includes reinforcement of migration management capacity, including for legal migration (intraregionally and to the EU); prevention of illegal migration; and promotion of employment for young people to provide alternatives to economic migration. In the SADC RSP/RIP, migration issues are addressed in a specific annex, providing an analysis of its potential significance for regional development. In East Africa, the Aeneas programme is currently supporting IGAD’s work with the AU and the IOM to implement the IGAD migration route programme.
Migration, Mobility and Employment is one of the 8 partnerships in the JAES framework. This partnership has three priority actions: to implement the Tripoli Declaration; to implement the Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings; and to implement the 2004 Ouagadougou Declaration and Action Plan on Employment and Poverty Alleviation in Africa. Priorities defined so far include remittances, Diaspora and employment issues (Tywuschik and Sheriff 2009).

A second Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development was held in Paris in 2008. At this meeting, a three-year cooperation programme was adopted.\(^\text{10}\) The programme is non-binding. Actions include facilitating the emergence of legal migration opportunities; strengthening institutional cooperation and information on legal migration; establishing a comprehensive approach to the fight against irregular migration (including, \textit{inter alia}, national focal points, regular training sessions, cooperation in the area of illegal immigrants); improving the quality of civil status registries and combating documentary fraud; strengthening the control of borders, the fight against migrant smuggling and the fight against trafficking in human beings; improving readmission and promoting voluntary returns; supporting employment and social and economic development policies for the countries of origin; promoting migrant remittances and their use for development purposes, having full regard to their private nature; and promoting development by strengthening the links between diasporas, countries of origin and destination countries.\(^\text{11}\)

\section*{4. EU–ASIA INTERREGIONAL COOPERATION}

EU interregional relations with Asia have existed for many years, mainly within the framework of EU and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) dialogue. Interregional relations between Europe and Asia have grown in significance since the 1990s. The Commission Communication “Towards a New Asia Strategy” signified the growing importance placed on these relations on the EU side, and reflected its awareness of Asia’s increasing economic and political weight on the world stage (CEC 1994). The Asia Strategy focused mainly on trade and economic relations, but also included a political dimension, aiming to contribute to stability, the consolidation of the rule of law and human rights in Asia. An updated version of the strategy, “Europe and Asia: A

\begin{itemize}
  \item[10] The declaration can be downloaded from \url{www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/5/41912183.pdf} (2009-09-04)
  \item[11] There is also a regional dimension of the DCI thematic instrument for migration and asylum. The instrument distributes its funds according to a geographic approach, adjusted in light of the “migratory route” concept. See CEC (2007c)
\end{itemize}
Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships” (CEC 2001) was published five years later, stating its objective in terms of “strengthening the EU’s political and economic presence across the region, and raising this to a level commensurate with the growing global weight of an enlarged EU”.

In the field of development cooperation, a total of €775 million has been allocated for regional level assistance for the period 2007-2013. The EU-Asia Regional Strategy (CEC 2007a) identifies three priorities:

1. **Support to regional integration** (ASEM, South Asia/SAARC and South East Asia/ASEAN, €78 million 2007 - 2010);
2. **Policy and know-how-based cooperation**, including the fields of environment, energy and climate change, sustainable consumption and production (green growth), higher education and support to research institutes, and cross-border cooperation in animal and human health (€210 million 2007 – 2010);
3. **Support to uprooted people**, including relief, rehabilitation, reconciliation and development efforts (€112 million 2007 – 2010).

Another new development in the mid-1990s was the launch of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). A wide range of issues is included within the ASEM framework, but the agenda tends to be *ad hoc* and flexible. Over the years, the scope of dialogue within ASEM and through EU-ASEAN meetings has expanded to include an array of issues, such as concerns with human rights, international crime and terrorism, and environmental degradation. At the same time the EU has continued bilateral negotiations with individual Asian countries, particularly with China, Japan, and India. Today’s interregional efforts are mainly targeted towards ASEAN and the informal ASEM process, and to a lesser extent SAARC.

**4.1. The EU and ASEAN**

The EU's relations with Southeast Asia have gone through three phases (Grimm 2009). The first phase (1967-1980) was informal and loosely structured around ASEAN. The second phase (1980-1994) was largely driven by geopolitics, with aid relations with Southeast Asia increasing rapidly during these years. Internal and external events in the early 1990s again changed the relationship between the EU and Southeast Asia, from which emerged the EU's Asia strategy in 1994, and the establishment of the ASEM framework a few years later.
Informal relations between the European Economic Community and ASEAN date back to the early 1970s. In 1975, a joint study group was set up to investigate possible cooperation areas between the two regions. The first ASEAN-EEC Ministerial Meeting (AEMM) was held in Brussels in 1978. In 1980, at the second AEMM, the EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement was signed, under which objectives for cooperation in the commercial, economic and technical domains were established. A Joint Cooperation Committee was set up as a monitoring mechanism. The Cooperation Agreement at the time involved the EC member countries and Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

In 1994, cooperation was further deepened, following the 11th AEMM in Karlsruhe, Germany, where an ad hoc Eminent Persons Group (EPG) was appointed with the task of developing a comprehensive approach to future ASEAN-EU relations. It was also decided that a Senior Officials Meeting would become a recurring part of the interregional dialogue (Rüland 2001).

Protocols for the accession of Laos and Cambodia to the Cooperation Agreement were signed in July 2000, but Burma/Myanmar has not been allowed to accede due to the human rights situation in the country. This means that Burma/Myanmar cannot participate in EU-ASEAN cooperation activities.

The European Commission Communication “Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships” from 2001 identified ASEAN as a key economic and political partner of the EC, and indeed “the major focus of our political and security dialogue with South-East Asia” (CEC 2001). This importance is reaffirmed in the 2003 Communication “A New Partnership with South East Asia” (CEC 2003b). In the latter, six strategic priorities for interregional cooperation are identified: supporting regional stability and the fight against terrorism; human rights, democratic principles and good governance; mainstreaming justice and home affairs issues; injecting a new dynamism into regional trade and investment relations (through the Trans-Regional EU ASEAN Trade Initiative, TREATI); continuing to support the development of less prosperous countries; and intensifying dialogue and co-operation in specific policy areas (through the Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument, READI).

Over the decades, a “plethora of EU interregional cooperation initiatives” (Wiessala 2006) towards South-East Asia have evolved. In 2005, these initiatives towards ASEAN countries represented more than half of all EU-Asia cooperation initiatives (ibid). The majority of these programmes were sector-specific, ranging “from development cooperation, humanitarian aid and business internationalisation to information technology, intellectual property and energy issues”. An
overview of such initiatives and cooperation programmes towards Asia and ASEAN can be found in the Strategy Paper and Indicative Programme for Multi-Country Programmes in Asia 2005-2006 (CEC 2005b).

Contacts between the EU and ASEAN have generated a wide range of declarations and cooperation projects of varying substance. Many interregional declarations are mainly expressions of what Dent (2004) has called “multilateral deference”, recognising the importance of and subscribing to various multilateral initiatives without adding much to them. The 2003 ASEAN-EU Joint Declaration on Co-operation to Combat Terrorism (from the 14th EU-ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting) is a case in point. It has been said that anti-terrorism is still best described as a “potential” area of “comprehensive extension” in EU-Asia relations (Wiessala 2006).

2007 was a significant year in EU-ASEAN cooperation. The 16th AEMM, held in Nuremberg in March, resulted in the adoption of the Nuremberg Declaration12 and Action Plan13, seeking closer cooperation on political, security, economic, socio-cultural and development issues, as well as in the field of energy security and climate change/environment. In May, negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement were launched. This was followed by the ASEAN-EU Commemorative Summit in Singapore in November, celebrating 30 years of interregional cooperation, reiterating many of the commitments of intensified cooperation.

Examples of actions under the 2007 Action Plan include:

- deepened security cooperation in the framework of the ASEAN Regional Forum (see below);
- encouragement to co-hosting seminars on human rights issues, and other initiatives related to human rights protection at a regional level;
- implementation of the Joint Declaration on Terrorism and the instruments to which it refers;
- supporting efforts to strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation amongst regional counter-terrorism institutions and agencies;
- cooperation in the areas of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;

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13 Can be downloaded from [www.aseansec.org/21122.pdf](http://www.aseansec.org/21122.pdf) (2009-09-05)
- broad-range cooperation in the fields of energy and climate change, including but not limited to promoting energy security and multilateral measures to ensure stable, effective, open and competitive global energy markets; close cooperation in the promotion of energy saving, energy efficiency and conservation; building on the results of the EC-ASEAN Energy Facility Programme; policy dialogue on climate change, cooperation to achieve the goals of the UNFCCC, and to increase technology transfer; and cooperation in the management of forest resources, etc.

Following the entry into force of the ASEAN Charter in December 2008, the EU announced that Ambassadors of all 27 EU Member States and the European Commission would be accredited to ASEAN, that development cooperation would be expanded, and the Jakarta EC Delegation strengthened (European Union 2009).

### 4.1.1. Human Rights in EU-ASEAN relations

Human Rights are a contentious and sensitive issue in EU-ASEAN relations and have been said to live an “ambivalent life in the shadows” (Wiessala 2006) of political and diplomatic relations between the two regions. HR was recognised as an area for cooperation in the Joint Declaration of the first EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 1978, but the Cooperation Agreement of 1980 included no substantial developments on the issue. Human Rights disagreements over East Timor prevented the conclusion of an updated Cooperation Agreement in 1991. The failure to update the CA means that there is still no essential HR clause in the agreement. The conclusion of the Karlsruhe meeting in 1994 was slightly more positive and at least softly explicit on HR issues. Following the inclusion of Burma/Myanmar as an ASEAN member in 1997, the EU cancelled planned meetings with ASEAN because of concerns over the Burmese government’s poor human rights record. The resulting deadlock lasted for 3 years, until Foreign Ministers convened in Laos in 2000. Burma/Myanmar has remained a particularly contentious issue in EU-ASEAN relations.

A number of interregional cooperation initiatives between the EU and ASEAN countries have a more explicit HR dimension. These include initiatives on migration, urban living conditions, local government, higher education, and environmental awareness and protection (Wiessala 2006).
4.1.2. ASEAN Regional Forum

The ASEAN Regional Forum was established following the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 1993, and was launched the following year. Its objectives are to “foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern; and to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region” (as outlined in the first ARF Chairman’s Statement of 1994). A common interpretation of the establishment of the ARF is that it was “an attempt on the part of the ASEAN to maintain US military engagement in Asia while tactically promoting cooperative relations with China in the post-Cold War era” (Katsumata 2006). With a wide range of participants outside the inner circle of ASEAN member states, the ARF has both transregional and hybrid-interregional features. Within this framework, an annual forum focusing on security matters is held, as well as a number of seminars and other meetings on related topics in between. Critics hold that the ARF is a talk-shop type of institution with little ability to contribute to meeting the region’s security challenges. Nevertheless, the forum has gradually institutionalised numerous confidence-building measures among the member states (Kawasaki 2006).

Examples of meetings (non-exhaustive) held within the ARF framework are:

- in the field of peace keeping: workshops, training, experts’ meetings and exchanges of best practices;
- in the field of defence: officials’ meetings and dialogues, a yearly security policy conference since 2004, seminars on civil-military relations;
- in the field of preventive diplomacy: workshops on confidence-building measures;
- in the field of counter-terrorism: yearly intersessional meetings since 2002, workshops on terrorism prevention, financial measures, managing consequences of attacks and cyber-terrorism;
- in the field of non-proliferation: seminars on missile defence, export controls, WMD;
- in the field of energy security: two seminars (2006 and 2008).

14 Current participants are Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russian Federation, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor Leste, United States and Vietnam.
15 Source/further information: http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/PublicLibrary/ARFActivities/ListofARFTrackIActivitiesBySubject/tabid/94/Default.aspx
4.2. The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)

An international forum for strengthening Asia-Europe relations was first suggested by Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in 1994. Since then, seven summits and hundreds of seminars, workshops and other meetings have been organised within the framework of the ASEM process, including recurring cultural, economic, education, environment, finance and foreign ministers' meetings. Originally, the process involved the EU-15 and 9 ASEAN member states. In 2004, the 10 new EU Member States and 3 new ASEAN countries (Cambodia, Laos and Burma/Myanmar) became part of the process. In 2007, Bulgaria, India, Mongolia, Pakistan, Romania and the ASEAN Secretariat likewise became ASEAN partners. ASEM is dominated by state-to-state interaction. The EU is not, as in other interregional contexts, represented by the troika. Instead, the Commission is involved as a partner in its own right, while the Council and Parliament are not represented. The Member States largely pursue individual interests. This gives ASEM a special role in the EU's external relations (Tiilikainen 2008).

The ASEM process is characterised by a high level of informality and a loose, non-institutionalised structure. This has been viewed as both a strength and a weakness – on the one hand allowing for meaningful non-confrontational interaction on sensitive issues, but on the other hand leading to less than optimal efficiency, allowing for an uncontrolled proliferation of “initiatives” that often fail to materialise or are seriously downscaled once the Summits are over. As ASEM is a political and non-legal process, its outcomes are not binding. Although the many declarations and statements produced within the process arguably contribute to the formation of common positions, there is also a concern that the forum is unable to move beyond “declaratory” diplomacy (Keva and Gaens 2008).

The ASEM process is loosely structured in the form of three “pillars”:

- The political pillar, including dialogue on, for example, international and regional developments, the multilateral system, security and anti-terrorism cooperation, WMD and non-proliferation issues, human rights, environmental issues and migration;
- The economic pillar, including dialogue on, for example, trade facilitation, trade security, investment issues, trade and development, regionalism and multilateralism, and financial crisis management;
The social/cultural/intellectual pillar, including dialogue on, for example, cultural diversity and cooperation between cultures and civilisations. An important actor here is the Asia Europe Foundation, which remains the only permanent ASEM “institution” and has been active since 1997 in promoting intellectual, cultural and people-to-people exchanges between the two regions.

In reaction to the US hard power approach, ASEM has adopted a soft (non-military) security approach, both to traditional and non-traditional security threats, emphasising cultural and economic tools, dialogue, cooperation and confidence-building measures (Kivimäki 2008).

In the field of counter-terrorism, an ASEM Cooperation Programme in Fighting Terrorism (ASEM 2002) was adopted in Copenhagen in 2002. The programme includes activities such as the establishment of an informal ad hoc consultative mechanism among ASEM Coordinators and Senior Officials, as well as regular contacts between relevant regional and national agencies, long-term activities focusing on the elimination of cultural misconceptions, and the identification and elimination of the root causes of terrorism. To continue dialogue and implement the programme, eight ASEM Counter-Terrorism Conferences have been held to date, in Beijing (2003), Berlin (2004), Semarang (2005), Copenhagen (2006), Tokyo (2007), Madrid (2008), Manila (2009), and Brussels (2011). A 9th conference is to be hosted by Indonesia during 2011. As far as interregional cooperation on terrorism is concerned, the main focus is on sharing information and experiences, and the parties underlined the need to let the UN take on a leading role in the fight against terrorism. Indeed, a key issue on the ASEM security agenda is the support for multilateralism and the centrality of the UN system. This is reiterated in many declarations and working documents. However, it has remained difficult for ASEM countries to create consensus around more substantive proposals for UN reform.

Issues of WMD and non-proliferation are also regularly discussed in ASEM meetings on counter-terrorism, as well as in foreign ministers’ meetings and at summits. In addition, a specific Political Declaration on the Prevention of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Means of Delivery was agreed at the ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Bali in 2003. The declaration underlines the importance of the implementation of relevant international conventions.

Another important component of ASEM security agenda is the focus on technical solutions to non-traditional security threats (Kivimäki 2008). The political reality of US dominance in Asia has contributed to the fact that ASEM security cooperation largely focuses on non-traditional, non-
military threats. Such cooperation often follows a pattern where there is an initial common mapping of the technical aspects of a certain area, to be followed by official level initiatives, such as ministerial meetings and official declarations. Examples include the ASEM Anti-Money Laundering Initiative, the ASEM Initiative on Trafficking in Women and Children, the ASEM Symposium on Law Enforcement Organs’ Cooperation in Combating Transnational Crime, the ASEM Anti-Corruption Initiative, the ASEM Cooperation in Promoting Awareness in the Young Generation on the Drug Problem, the ASEM Cooperation on HIV/AIDS Control, and the ASEM Initiative for the Rapid Containment of Pandemic Influenza.

In the field of migration, the ASEM Ministerial Conference on Cooperation for the Management of Migratory Flows was initiated in 2000 by Spain, China and Germany, endorsed by the ASEM 3 Summit, and held in Lanzarote, Spain in April 2002. Since then, four ASEM meetings on management of migratory flows have been held at Directors-General level.

Energy security and climate change have been discussed at ASEM environmental and foreign ministers’ meetings over the years, but were recognised as major topics for future dialogue at the ASEM 6 Summit in Helsinki in 2006, which issued an ASEM Declaration on Climate Change. This topic was again high on the agenda at ASEM 7 in Beijing in 2008, where the Beijing Declaration on Sustainable Development was issued. A first ASEM Ministerial Conference on Energy Security was held in Brussels in June 2009, to discuss energy policy and possibilities for cooperation between Europe and Asia. Topics on the agenda were energy security choices, sustainable energy, and trade and investment in energy.16

Although this agenda is centred on what is often viewed as human security threats, Human Rights issues are not central to it. While the EU has pushed for a prominent place for political dialogue in ASEM, Asian participating countries have preferred an emphasis on the economy, culture, poverty reduction and environmental issues. ASEM’s non-confrontational and flexible way of functioning has meant that sensitive issues like human rights have been largely dealt with through informal track two-type dialogue, mainly in the framework of the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF). To date, nine Informal ASEM Seminars on Human Rights have been held within this framework.17 At the first ASEM Summits, human rights were dealt with only briefly and cautiously. The ASEM 3 Summit in Seoul in 2000 was something of a turning point, with clear references in the chairman’s statement

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16 More information on this meeting is available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/energy/events/sem_en.htm
17 See http://www.asef.org/index.php?option=com_programme&task=archive&id=13&Itemid=75 for details on the seminars
to international HR tools and conventions, and HR mentioned being in the new Asia-Europe Cooperation Framework known as AECF 2000 (ASEM 2000). However, the Framework simultaneously underlined the principle of non-interference in states’ internal affairs.

Burma/Myanmar has been a difficult issue within ASEM, albeit to a somewhat lesser extent than in EU-ASEAN relations. When Burma/Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1997, the EU took the position that ASEAN membership would not automatically grant access to the ASEM process. This was eventually accepted by the ASEAN partners, but became an issue again in 2002, when ASEAN partners expressed the view that there should be no political conditionality in ASEM, and that accession of new EU Member States would be linked to the accession of Burma/Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia. The resulting deadlock led to two cancelled ministerial meetings in 2004. However, cooperation continued at lower levels. In 2005, the Netherlands decided, based on the EU Common Position visa ban, not to issue a visa for the Economic Minister of Burma/Myanmar for the ASEM Economic Ministers’ Meeting in Rotterdam. As a result, the ASEAN Ministers boycotted the meeting. Since then, however, both parties seem to recognise the ASEM process as too important to be sacrificed over this issue (Keva 2008). Asian partners are also becoming more willing to discuss HR issues and less inclined to back up Burma/Myanmar. The ASEM 7 chair’s statement contains a number of references to HR, and encourages the Burma/Myanmar government “to engage all stakeholders in an inclusive political process in order to achieve national reconciliation and economic and social development. In this regard, they called for the lifting of restrictions placed on political parties and early further release of those under detention” (ASEM 2008).

4.3. The EU and SAARC

Dialogue of a more technical nature between the EC/EU and SAARC was first initiated in 1994 (see Bhargava 1998). Two years later the two organisations signed a memorandum of understanding as a basis for cooperation. The memorandum avoided sensitive political issues and focused on technical matters, with the purpose of promoting economic and social development in South Asia by means of EU expertise, advice and training. Since 1998, the EU and SAARC have been engaged in a more political dialogue, on matters such as health; the environment and the trafficking of people and drugs; and the implementation of the GSP. The relationship between the two has, however, largely remained of a donor – recipient type (Gilson 2005). Current development cooperation is focused on the areas of institutional capacity and mechanisms for implementation of the SAFTA agreement; support to SAARC sector dialogues; and regional level policy reform in the field of civil aviation (CEC 2007a). In 2007, the EC was granted observer status to the SAARC.
When it comes to discussions on traditional security issues the SAARC as a regional organisation is of less relevance. Most discussions are conducted on a bilateral basis with the two great powers in the region: India and Pakistan. Hence, there is little ‘pure’ interregional security cooperation, which is related to the irrelevance of SAARC. Yet, the EU is involved as a security actor, suggesting that it is possible to conceptualise it as hybrid interregionalism (South Asia is undoubtedly a regional security complex).

As far as conventional security threats are concerned, the EU’s talks and negotiations with India is rather developed (even if they are on a rather genera level). With the Action Plan of 2005 India and EU decide to have regular consultations on regional and global security issues, disarmament, and non-proliferation in order to increase understanding each other’s needs and identify areas of cooperation. With Pakistan talks have been less successful, and in particular around the issues of WMD. Pakistan who has not signed the non-proliferation treaty feels that is diplomatically pressured by the EU on this issue. However, some achievements have been reached since both parties have agreed that there is a shared interest to work towards the objectives of universal disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear materials, WMD, and technology. Hence, consultations between the two parties occur on a regular basis.

Neither is terrorism discussed within SAARC. The issue of terrorism in relation to Afghanistan and Pakistan is instead discussed on a bilateral basis. Non-traditional security issues, such as migration, climate and energy, and human rights issues are not managed or discussed on a systematic basis. Human rights are sensitive issues for SAARC members and the EU keeps a very low profile. All this shows that interregional cooperation is weak or underdeveloped between EU and SAARC (as a regional counterpart).

4.4. The EU and Central Asia

Stability in Central Asia is of growing concern to the EU for a number of reasons. With energy security among the top items on the European political agenda, in combination with concerns about overreliance on Russia, the potential of Central Asian oil and gas reserves is accorded increasing importance. Enlargement has brought the two regions closer together geographically, and the risk of conflict and instability spill-over effects is considered important, in combination with Central Asia as a potentially significant breeding ground for international terrorism and a key transit route for drug trafficking.
EU cooperation with Central Asian states is mainly bilateral in nature. Sovereignty being the principle around which Central Asian politics evolves, regional projects, where they exist, tend to lack substantial institutional content or effective enforcement mechanisms (Allison 2008). There is also a long-standing tension in EU policy towards central Asia between a regional perspective and focus on individual countries (International Crisis Group 2006). Under the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) programme, this was visible in the form of the three-track approach introduced in the 2002-2006 Regional Strategy Paper. Track 1 projects focused on regional cooperation in transport, energy networks and environmental projection, whereas Track 2 projects sought to provide a “regional support program… implemented via tailored national activities”. According to International Crisis Group (2006), ”most TACIS projects in Central Asia are said to be projects with a national orientation under a regional strategy rather than, as desired, regional projects with national implementation”.

The increasing importance of Central Asia to the EU was reflected in the Council’s adoption of the first Central Asia Strategy in 2007 (The EU and Central Asia – Strategy for a New Partnership, Council of the European Union 2007b). The strategy aims for “a balanced bilateral and regional approach”. However, “bilateral cooperation will be of special importance”. According to the strategy, a regional approach is particularly suitable for tackling common challenges such as organised crime, trafficking, terrorism, non-proliferation issues, inter-cultural dialogue, energy, environmental pollution, water management, and migration, as well as border management and transport infrastructure. Cooperation with regional organisations in Central Asia is discussed in very general terms: “The EU is prepared to enter into an open and constructive dialogue with regional organizations in Central Asia and to establish regular ad hoc contacts i.a. with EURASEC, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), CICA, CSTO, CAREC and CARICC.” The strategy joint progress report by the Council and the Commission of June 2008 (CEC 2008h) notes that the EU “pursued an open and constructive dialogue with regional organisations in Central Asia”, without further specification.

Development cooperation with Central Asia has been upgraded over the last decade, with financial assistance significantly increased under the 2007-2013 Regional Strategy, totalling €750 million (CEC 2007b). 30 percent of these resources are allocated to facilitating closer inter-state cooperation, both within Central Asia and between Central Asia, the South Caucasus and the EU. “Promotion of Central Asian regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations” is priority area 1 of the Strategy, and includes objectives related to network and market integration; environment;
border and migration management, the fight against organised crime and customs; and so-called people-to-people activities. Nevertheless, bilateral cooperation remains the priority, and the strategy as a whole remains relatively underfunded, indeed “the Cinderella of the Union’s Eastern policies” (Melvin and Boonstra 2008).

In practice, energy and security matters have been accorded the greatest importance and other issues have been downgraded in EU–Central Asia relations (ibid). The main tool for support to Central Asian energy projects and collaboration with international lending institutions is the INOGATE programme\(^\text{18}\). When INOGATE was created in 1995, the acronym stood for “Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe”, but the programme’s scope has since been enlarged, following the 2004 Energy Ministerial Conference in Baku, Azerbaijan, and the launch of the Baku Initiative, an energy and transport policy dialogue facilitating “the progressive integration of the energy markets of the region into the EU market as well as the transportation of the extensive Caspian oil and gas resources towards Europe” (CEC 2006b). Today regional dialogue is intensifying in this framework (CEC 2008h).

INOGATE’s scope was formally enlarged by the signing of the Astana Energy Ministerial Declaration in 2006. Today INOGATE covers the areas of oil and gas, electricity, renewable energy and energy efficiency, as well as the energy security strategies of the EU and partner countries. It has the objectives of converging energy markets, enhancing energy security, supporting sustainable energy development and attracting investment towards energy projects of common and regional interest. Activities include information, communication and networking between the EU and partner countries, and technical support to the partner countries.\(^\text{19}\) It needs to be pointed out that Southern Caucasus is included in the ENP.

### 5. THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP

As set out in the December 2003 European Security Strategy. “the neighbourhood” plays a central role in the EU’s security. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was developed in 2004 in order to avoid new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours, and to stabilise the neighbourhood. The neighbourhood is constituted by the Mediterranean region and parts of the

\(^\text{18}\) INOGATE partner countries are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian Federation (observer), Turkey (partner but not beneficiary), Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

\(^\text{19}\) For more information, see the portal at [www.inogate.org](http://www.inogate.org)
post-Soviet area (the European part and Southern Caucasia), and thus covers an enormous area. The general method involved in the stabilisation policy is an asymmetric partnership based on conditionalities, the prizes ranging from development assistance, to Association Agreements, to full membership. The basis of the ENP is the bilateral ENP Action Plans agreed between the EU and each partner. With regard to the post-Soviet space, the EU deals independently with Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova (the European part of the post-Soviet area) as well as countries in the Southern Caucasus. The EU’s relations with Russia are very delicate and are covered by a bilateral Strategic Partnership.

The ENP and the Action Plans are consistent with, and share the same basis as, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (also known as the “Barcelona Process”), that is, bilateral Association Agreements with countries in the region.\(^{20}\) Whereas the ENP provides for a bilateral approach of mutual commitments to implement reforms, the Euro-Med pursues a multilateral/interregional track. The Euro-Med was relaunched in 2008 as the Union for the Mediterranean. As noted, it is intended to provide a forum for regional cooperation, complementing the bilateral Association Agreements and ENP Action Plans. The Euro-Med Partnership goes back to the first Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Affairs Ministers in Barcelona in 1995. At the time, it involved the EU-15 and 12 Mediterranean countries. For the EU, the Barcelona Declaration was the first formulation of a comprehensive policy for the region. The declaration covers three areas of partnership:

- A political and security partnership, based on respect for democracy, human rights and sovereignty;
- An economic and financial partnership, aiming to establish a free trade area by 2010 and to support economic development;
- A partnership in social, cultural and human affairs, to promote understanding between people and cultures and civil society exchanges.

The subsequent Euro-Med summit was held in Barcelona in 2005, celebrating a decade of cooperation and adopting a new five-year work programme.\(^{21}\) This programme outlines four key areas for cooperation. In the political and security partnership, cooperation and dialogue should be

\(^{20}\) [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/faq_en.htm#1.6](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/faq_en.htm#1.6)

reinforced and a new facility should be set up to finance reform efforts. In the area of *sustainable economic development and reform*, focus is on the creation of jobs for young people through the realisation of a free trade area by 2010, including trade in agriculture and services. In the field of *education and sociocultural exchanges*, the focus is on access to education for all, lowering illiteracy and increasing completion rates. Finally, in the field of migration, social integration, justice and security, the 2005 work programme clearly expresses the need for a more strategic and comprehensive approach, increasing opportunities for legal migration to the EU while simultaneously intensifying cooperation in all aspects of the work to curb illegal migration.

Even if the Euro-Med Partnership is ambitious, it has been hampered by a number of limitations: asymmetric negotiating positions, conflicting interests within both the Middle East and the EU, and a lack of genuine trust within the EU of the Arab partners, arising from the commonly-held EU view of the region as notoriously unstable and as a cradle of international terrorism. Meanwhile, the Arab states have viewed the EMP as an instrument to promote EU interests rather than as a framework for a common security agenda (Lindholm Schulz 2009).

While a large part of the cooperation within the Euro-Med is of a bilateral nature, regional programmes financed mainly by MEDA (up until 2007) and the ENPI remain important components of support. The Euro-Med regional programme is one of three multi-country programmes of the ENPI, the other two being the Neighbourhood-wide regional programme and the regional programme for the Eastern neighbours. The priorities and allocations of the Euro-Med Regional Indicative Programme$^{22}$ for 2007 – 2010 (CEC 2007d) are presented below. A more detailed overview of regional Euro-Med programmes can be found in Table 2. To a large extent, these regional programmes can be said to be multi-national rather than interregional.

**Table 2. Priorities and allocations of the Euro-Med Regional Indicative Programme 2007 – 2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme heading</th>
<th>Programme title</th>
<th>Allocation 2007 – 2010, million €</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global allocation</td>
<td></td>
<td>31,9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Political, Justice, Security and Migration Cooperation

Confidence building measures: civil protection
Confidence building measures: Partnership for Peace
Justice, security and migration (JSM)
Policy analysis

Sustainable Economic Development

Investment promotion and reform
dynamisation to attract investment
Transport and energy cooperation
South-South regional economic integration
Environmental programme
Technical assistance and risk capital support for FEMIP
Development of the information society

Social Development and Cultural Exchanges

Gender equality and civil society
Information and communication II
Euro-Med Youth
Dialogue between cultures and cultural heritage

TOTAL

Source: CEC 2007d
5.1. Regional Conflict

The EU recognises the key role of the Israel–Arab conflict in general, and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in particular, for regional stability in the Middle East, and has viewed the Euro-Med Partnership as an arena for supporting and pushing the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians forward in a regional context. The EU underlines that the partnership “remains the only multilateral context outside the United Nations where all parties to the conflict can meet and work together on a range of issues” (CEC 2009). However, this has so far failed to provide the necessary impetus for a renewed peace process.

Among the regional programmes, the EU’s “Middle East Peace Process” programme aims at supporting civil society actions in peace building and conflict transformation, implementing “initiatives in areas which are likely to have a direct impact on peoples’ everyday lives and welfare, including practical activities to promote communication and understanding.” This programme can be said to be representative of the soft and indirect approach that has earned the EU a reputation of being a payer rather than a player in the Middle East. While some argue that such an approach offers important opportunities for the EU to contribute to the peace process (Schulz 2009), so far this has not been manifested. At the interregional level, the lack of progress with regard to the Israel-Palestinian issue rather stalls progress in other fields of the Euro-Med Partnership. In addition, the Arab League, which is a regional organization for the Arab world, has almost no relationship with the EU. It could have been used as a more efficient forum for dialogue between EU and the Arab world regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

5.2. Terrorism

The theme of terrorism and the measures to fight it have been present in the Euro-Med Partnership since the very beginning. The Barcelona Declaration states that the parties will “strengthen their cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism, in particular by ratifying and applying the international instruments they have signed, by acceding to such instruments and by taking any other appropriate measure”. The 2005 Summit adopted the Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism after “heated negotiations” (Euractiv 2005). The Arab partner countries wanted the document to state that nothing in it contradicted the “right of peoples under foreign occupation to strive to end it in accordance with international law”. The EU and Israel on the other hand argued that there must be nothing that could be understood as a justification for terrorism, and according to the final text partners will “condemn terrorism in all its manifestations without
qualification” and work together in all arenas to eradicate it. Support to regional cooperation on anti-terrorism issues is currently provided in the form of the Euro-Med Police II project, which holds specialist information sessions on police cooperation, offers police cooperation training for senior officers from specialised services in the partner countries, organises study visits and creates a secure intranet for better information exchanges.23

These security sector reforms have formally been declared as key tools of the ENP strategy in the Mediterranean area, however, in practice they have only been applied in Turkey and the Palestinian self-rule areas (Lecha 2007). It is very clear that ‘[f]or the EU, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains the key to peace and security in the region...’ (Biscop 2007:8), and this heavily influences the nature of interregional cooperation and the EU’s own agenda.

The EU civilian missions in the Palestinian Authority are important ingredients of the EU’s security policy. In 2005, the EU agreed to a civilian mission to assist the Palestinian Authority at the Rafah border crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. This mission is called the European Union Border Assistance Mission Rafah (EU BAM Rafah). Its mandate began in November 2005, and has been prolonged until the present day. A second civilian mission was the police mission for the Palestinian territories under the EU Police Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS). The mission started on 1 January 2006 and had a three years mandate. This mission’s main objective was to support the PA police to more professionally take responsibility for law and order. Both reforms should be seen as part of the EU neigboordhood strategy within the overall European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The EU views the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the core issue since the conflict has wider security ramification for the entire region.

5.3. WMD

In theory WMDs is an important security issue in the Euro-Med partnership, and has been so since its inception. The Barcelona Declaration states that the parties shall promote regional security by acting in favour of non-proliferation, will “pursue a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction”, and “consider practical steps to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons”. Indeed, the EU and Mediterranean partners have agreed about the need to develop regular consultations on non-proliferation of WMD in order to reach the necessary agreement on the terms of reference and modalities for the

23 For more information, see http://www.cepol.europa.eu/index.php?id=97 (2009-09-05)
organisation of the ad hoc meeting on WMD the Mediterranean region.\footnote{http://www.ces.es/TRESMED/docum/Conf_2005_Luxemburgo_en.pdf} As far as concrete cooperation is concerned however, WMD are not mentioned in the 2005 work programme. The activity level on this issue is not very high within the partnership. Again, this is partly due to the fact that the Israeli-Palestinian issue causes political restraints, and in particular when the Arab states want to lift Israel’s nuclear weapon capacity, the EU avoids the issue.

5.4. Energy

Key to the development of a Euro-Mediterranean energy policy have been the Euro-Med Energy Forum (at the level of general directors) and the energy ministerial meetings in Athens (May 2003), in Rome (December 2003), and in Limassol, Cyprus (December 2007). The policy is “based on the security of energy supplies and the objective of working towards a fully interconnected and integrated energy market through the implementation of subregional initiatives in the Maghreb, the Mashreq and between Israel and the Palestinian Authority” (CEC 2007d).

At the Limassol ministerial meeting, partners launched the new Euro-Mediterranean Energy Partnership including a Priority Action Plan on Euro-Med Energy Cooperation, 2008-2013, with three priority areas:

- Ensuring the improved harmonisation of energy markets and legislation and pursuing the integration of energy markets in the Euro-Mediterranean region;
- Promoting sustainable development in the energy sector;
- Developing initiatives of common interest in key areas, such as infrastructure extension, investment financing and research and development.

The partnership makes use of the Rome Euro-Mediterranean Energy Platform (REMEP) to provide tools for the development of energy scenarios and forecasts in the region.

The EU’s stated aim is also “to integrate the Sub-Saharan region into the Mediterranean energy market, with a view to the possible transit of Sub-Saharan energy resources to the EU” (CEC 2007d). In May 2011, the Euro-Mediterranean Energy Efficiency Forum was established. The Mediterranean partners agreed to have a forum in which policymakers, as well as NGO and
business leaders could participate and express their views on how energy and its usage could impact on the environment, national security and economic growth.

There are a number of regional programmes in the fields of energy, environment and transport.

5.5. Human Rights

Human Rights dialogue is mainly conducted in the framework of the bilateral Association Agreements, and managed in bilateral ENP Action Plans. Regional funds for HR-related projects are provided through the Anna Lindh Foundation, which provides project grants, and the Euro-Med Justice projects, which offer training and seek to enhance regional cooperation on justice issues “to build an open and modern justice system that will uphold the rule of law and the effective implementation of human rights” (EuropeAid 2007). Critics, however, argue that HR are given scant attention in the partnership, that it is biased in its focus on Mediterranean partner countries’ HR records only, and that migration management trends and the anti-terrorism agenda have an adverse affect on HR in the region (for example, Amnesty International 2005).

5.6. Migration

The double objective of curbing illegal migration while increasing opportunities for legal migration has been highlighted at several Euro-Med Summits and at the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Migration, held in Algarve, Portugal in 2007. In regional cooperation on migration issues, complementarity is sought between the DCI thematic instrument on migration and asylum, and the programmed regional funds (MEDA/ENPI). A current regional project that requires mentioning is Euro-Med Migration II, which organises training and study visits to set up mechanisms to promote opportunities for legal migration, to offer support for measures to promote the linkage between migration and development, to step up activities to stop human trafficking and illegal immigration, and to manage mixed flows.\(^{25}\)

Collaboration with countries of origin and transit is an important element of EU policy to curb illegal migration. From 2010 onwards, cooperation will be extended “as appropriate” (CEC 2007d) to the Sub-Saharan countries of origin, based on the clause of trans-regional cooperation in the relevant regional financing instruments.

\(^{25}\) For more information, see [http://www.euromed-migration.eu](http://www.euromed-migration.eu)
6. EU-LATIN AMERICAN INTERREGIONAL COOPERATION

Europe’s interregional relations with Latin America were intensified in the 1990s after a long period of neglect or simply focusing on individual countries, and Central America, where in the 1980s Europe clearly distanced itself from the US in its view of the regional conflict as being North-South rather than East-West. EU priorities towards Latin America are defined in the Commission Communication on a “Stronger Partnership between the European Union and Latin America” (CEC 2005c). Continued support to LAC regional and subregional integration is an important theme in the Communication, as is dialogue with regional/subregional organisations.

At a regional level, the annual EU-Rio Group foreign ministers meetings were institutionalised in the 1990s. These days, the EU/Rio Group ministerial meetings take place every two years, alternating with the EU-LAC Summits. Key issues of the declarations from the EU – LAC Summits 1999-2008 include:

1999 (Rio): “...to foster political, economic and cultural understanding between the two regions in order to develop a strategic partnership”.

2002 (Madrid): Developing “A Strategic Partnership for the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century” - a “solid bi-regional strategic partnership” in the political; economic; and cultural, education, scientific; technological, social and human fields.

2004 (Guadalajara): Multilateralism, social cohesion, enhanced bi-regional relations.

2006 (Vienna): Strengthening the bi-regional strategic association; democracy and human rights; peace, stability and the respect for international law; terrorism; drugs and organised crime; environment; energy; association agreements; regional integration; trade, growth and employment; poverty, inequality and exclusion; development cooperation and international financing for development; migration; etc.

2008 (Lima): “Addressing our peoples’ priorities together”: eradication of poverty, inequality and exclusion; sustainable development (environment, climate change, energy).

The EU is the most significant donor to Latin America, with a total of €2690 million allocated under the DCI 2007-2013. The Latin American Regional Strategy Paper for this period has three objectives. Two broad categories of programmed development assistance to Latin America have developed since the 1990s: financial and technical assistance, which is the largest Commission
budget line, and economic cooperation, which has only emerged in the last decade (Haglund Morrissey 2009). The latter includes a number of so-called horizontal programmes. See Appendix for data on interregional development cooperation both to Latin America as a whole and the specific programmes for Mercosur, the Andean Community and Central America.

The EU has developed interregional partnerships with most relevant subregions, such as the Andean region, Central America, and above all Mercosur.

The EU–Mercosur relationship is a case of pure interregionalism, as there exists an agreement between two regional organisations (the EU-Mercosur Interregional Framework Co-operation Agreement, EMIFCA, from 1995). This interregional framework is built on three pillars:

1. political dialogue,
2. substantive financial support to Mercosur’s institutional development
3. economic and commercial cooperation.

The origins of the partnership are in trade relations, and this aspect remains particularly strong, through an interregional free trade agreement, which maintains quotas only in agriculture and certain other sensitive goods. Gradually, interregional cooperation has spread to encompass other sectors, such as economic cooperation, development cooperation and political dialogue and common “values”. Santander (2010) highlights the fact that this interregional partnership takes shape in the context of economic globalisation and economic competition with the United States, not least because the EU’s aim is to become a global actor. It is intriguing that these factors both give rise to and undermine interregionalism at the same time.

Central American economic integration is progressing, but political integration is not yet very effective in practice, in spite of an ambitious set of regional institutions (Abrahamson 2008). Nevertheless, the EU’s relations with the Central American states are also moving towards pure interregionalism. Dating from the EU’s engagement in the CA peace process in the 1980s and the San José dialogue process, interregional dialogue has been increasingly institutionalised, through, *inter alia*, a Framework Agreement on Cooperation in 1993, a Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement to replace this in 2003, and ongoing negotiations for an Association Agreement since 2007, possibly to be finalised during 2009. FTA negotiations were temporarily interrupted in April 2009.
The relationship with the Andean Community is similar to that with the Central American States. Association Agreement negotiations are ongoing since 2007. Prominent dialogue themes over the last years have been regional integration and ways to strengthen relations between the two regions, the fight against drugs (through the Specialised High-level Dialogue on Drugs), the rule of law, migration and environmental issues (CEC 2008i).

6.1. Climate change and energy

At the subregional level, all agreements between the EU and Latin American countries/organisations include references to energy issues. The Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement with Mercosur talks of energy cooperation in the form of, inter alia, information exchange, technology transfer, technical training and energy policy dialogue (article 13). There is no reference to climate change in this agreement. The Cooperation Agreement with the Central American states talks about energy cooperation in key sectors such as hydroelectricity, electricity, oil and gas, renewable energy, energy saving technology, rural electrification and regional integration of energy markets (article 25). It also notes that cooperation may include the promotion of the application of the Kyoto protocol Clean Development Mechanism, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The article on sustainable development (article 38) mentions the importance of international instruments in the field of climate change. The Cooperation Agreement with the Andean Community has similar articles on climate change and sustainable development, but without reference to climate change.

Climate change and energy issues are of increasing importance in the interregional relations between the EU and Latin America. For example, the Euro-Solar programme adopted in May 2006 is to promote the use of renewable energy sources in the poorest LAC countries. The programme will install up to 600 facilities for sun and wind generated electricity (Haglund Morrissey 2009). Interregional discussions on climate change were held in the format of the Rio Group in 2007, and at the UNFCCC Bali Conference the same year. The declaration of the 2008 Lima EU-LAC Summit (5th Latin America and Caribbean-EU Summit 2008) focuses on climate change and energy, stating that the parties will continue such dialogue and “seek to facilitate joint initiatives in the area of climate change mitigation and adaptation to its adverse effects, including the strengthening of carbon market mechanisms” and introducing an ambitious set of cooperation projects.
6.2. Migration

Migration is also of increasing importance in EU-LAC relations and is a regular topic in interregional dialogue. The 2008 Lima Declaration also commits the two regions to further develop a structured and comprehensive dialogue in this field. Cooperation takes place under the Aeneas Programme and the DCI Thematic Cooperation Programme on migration and asylum. So far, three EU-LAC expert meetings on migration have taken place, in Quito (Ecuador) 2004, in Cartagena (Colombia) 2006 and in Brussels in 2008. The conclusions of these meetings have fed into the respective EU-LAC Summit Declarations.

While the ICFA (with Mercosur) does not deal with migration issues, the Cooperation Agreements with Central American states and the Andean Community both state that political dialogue shall cover migration issues. Article 49 in the respective agreements speaks of “a comprehensive dialogue on all migration-related issues, including illegal migration, smuggling and trafficking of human beings, and refugee flows” and states that “migration concerns should be included in the national strategies for economic and social development of the countries of origin, transit and destination of migrants”. The article also includes standard readmission agreements.

7. CONCLUSION

Our analysis of the EU’s interregional cooperation with Africa, Latin America and Asia reveals that the EU uses a variety of instruments and models of engagement to foster relations with countries and regional partners. As we have seen, EU-driven interregional cooperation tends to be multifaceted, with different issues and themes receiving different emphasis in different counterpart regions and in different security issues. Interregional policy is, therefore, not a fixed set of guidelines but rather is subject to adaptation. A comparative assessment suggests a variation in the way that the EU conducts its foreign policies towards different regions (also see Söderbaum and Stålgren, 2010).

This implies that the EU does not appear to have a specific preference for one particular model of cooperation. It is evident that the EU tends to be pragmatic in its various relationships with the rest of the world. In this regard, the EU increasingly behaves as an actor on a variety of levels in world affairs — having “a global strategy” (Farrell 2010; Söderbaum and Stålgren 2010). Far from being
locked into a specific foreign policy doctrine (such as interregionalism), the EU uses any type of policy that it has at its disposal and which appears to be most suited to a given objective.

It is useful to distinguish between security issues and other types of (non-security) issues, such as trade, aid and development. Needless to say, security and development may affect one another. Together forming the much-talked about security-development nexus. Yet, it is also relevant to point out that generally speaking interregional cooperation is quite often more developed in the field of trade, aid and development compared to security.

A general characteristic of interregional cooperation (both in the security and non-security sphere) is that issues are often dealt with through multi-country dialogues, summits and policy declarations. Interregionalism may therefore be criticised as rhetorical, symbolic and sweeping. In contrast, however, there is also evidence that interregionalism may provide a useful forum for dialogue and framework for enhancing cooperation at lower levels. In this way, interregionalism may reinforce bilateral collaboration, or may be a stepping-stone to multilateral cooperation. As a result it is not useful to analyse interregional cooperation in isolation from other forms of cooperation. There is a tendency that interregionalism sometimes is important even if it is not so well-developed or intense.

The report furthermore reveals that it is misleading to only concentrate on pure interregionalism, that is, institutionalised cooperation between two regional organisations. The more complex and pluralistic processes of transregionalism and hybrid interregionalism reveal that especially the counterpart regional organisations are more open-ended and ambiguous, implying that policies of regional organisations interact with policies of states/governments. Taken together, this leads to the possibility of an increasing number of (interacting) forms of collaboration on different “levels” (hence the relevance of transversal cooperation as an analytical device).

The report shows that there exists interregional cooperation on all the six security issues covered in the EU-GRASP project. Yet, as a direct consequence of the fact that interregional cooperation usually covers so many countries, it is often focused on multi-country dialogue and agreeing on general norms and principles which can then facilitate concrete actions on lower levels. This is evident regarding both the traditional and non-traditional security issues. But there is also variation in the degree of interregional cooperation across different counterpart regions.

The interregional model is perhaps most developed in the EU’s relationship with Africa, at least in the sense that interregional cooperation and partnerships exist in most issue-areas and with Africa
as well as all sub-regional organisations. Yet, it is very evident that EU-Africa interregional cooperation is dominated by the EU and to quite a large extent it depends on the EU's interests and agenda. This is however not equivalent to saying that asymmetric interregionalism is necessarily detrimental. Even if EU is leading the way, it may of course be very legitimate and important security concerns that are dealt with through interregional cooperation (also for the African partners). And it is not simply that EU dictates the agenda. For example, many observers would say that the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is African-driven and EU-Africa interregional cooperation is to a large extent designed in order to strengthen APSA and African management of its own security crises.

EU-Asia collaboration is at least partly different in terms of the degree of institutionalisation as well as the nature of the issues covered. For instance, terrorism and WMD are greater concerns in Asia than in Africa and Latin America, whereas Africa is heavily affected by a large number of regional conflicts. But interregionalism in Asia is clearly affected by the fact that ASEAN is more or less the only viable regional organisation. But the EU is not necessarily advocating in favour if increased pure interregionalism. On the contrary, while in the past the EU has combined pure interregionalism with forms of hybrid interregionalism, there is today a growing preference for hybrid interregionalism and more flexible solutions. “This may be explained in part by the difficulty of negotiating over very complex and politically contentious issues with disparate groups of countries. The EU has found that the difficulty of completing such negotiations, and the subsequent problems in implementation and compliance, make different forms of region-state treaties a more effective instrument for economic cooperation” (Farrell 2010). Hence, despite the many official declarations about the EU's preference for interregional relations, a closer empirical review reveals a complex pattern of intersecting, complementing and at times competing models of external relations — resulting in a mixture of bilateral, multilateral and interregional policies in a world with external and internal obstacles.

Our previous research (Söderbaum and STålgren 2010), as well as existing literature in this field of research, suggests that the EU's policy mix depends very much on who the counterpart is. We argue that this variation in interregional relations is often linked to questions of relevance and power. The EU cannot deny the contemporary relevance and power of key East Asian states, which results in partnerships that are symmetric in nature. This contrasts sharply with the EU-Africa relationship, which, although officially designated as an equal partnership, for now at least clearly remains
asymmetrical (CEC 2004: 9). Compared to the more flexible and pluralistic approach to Asia, the EU tend to emphasise the interregional and regional model much more strongly in the African context. A similar asymmetry, although not as one-sided, can also be detected in the EU's relationship with Latin America. This suggests that, while much of the EU's interregional relations are conducted under the pretext of mutual benefit, the distribution of these benefits appears to be a function of the power position of the EU relative to its counterparts. That is, the stronger the counterpart (in terms of power and relevance), the more concessions are made by the EU. With weaker “partners”, the EU seem to dictate far more of the conditions for interregional cooperation. The relatively stronger East Asian region benefits from access to European markets and Asian countries are generally invited to participate in equal or symmetric partnerships with the EU. There is little conditionality attached to East Asian cooperation, which reflects the EU’s response to an increasingly powerful region. Indeed, security issues, such as human rights are sensitive for many Asian countries and the EU has chosen to maintain a rather low profile on these issues instead of pressurising for political changes. However, the EU attaches economic, trade and political conditionalities in its dealings with Africa. The EU’s dealings with Latin America appear to lie somewhere between these extremes.
8. References


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## Appendix 1: EU Interregional Relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dialogue partners</th>
<th>Beginning/main events</th>
<th>Frequency and level of meetings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SADC (Southern African Development Community)</strong>&lt;br&gt;Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland</td>
<td>- 1994 Berlin Initiative</td>
<td>- Regular meetings at the level of foreign ministers and officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AU (African Union, former Organisation of African Unity)</strong>&lt;br&gt;53 African countries – all except Morocco</td>
<td>- 2000 first EU-Africa summit: Cairo Declaration and Action Plan&lt;br&gt;- 2005 EU Strategy for Africa&lt;br&gt;- 2007 second EU Africa Summit in Lisbon: Joint Africa-EU Strategy and Action Plan (including Morocco)</td>
<td>- Triennial summits at Head of State level&lt;br&gt;- Ministerial troika meetings twice a year&lt;br&gt;- Yearly college-to-college meetings between the EC and the AUC; biannual staff meetings (Joint Task Force)&lt;br&gt;- Regular meetings between EP and PAP committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Key Dates</td>
<td>Meetings and Agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS (Economic Community of</td>
<td>- 2000 initiation of high-level political dialogue</td>
<td>- Regular meetings at ministerial and senior official level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West African States)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone, Togo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development)</td>
<td>- 2003 first political dialogue meeting</td>
<td>- Meetings at ministerial level (EU Troika)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dijbouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations)</td>
<td>- 1978 first ministerial conference</td>
<td>- Ministerial conferences every 18-24 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei, Burma, Cambodia,</td>
<td>- 1980 Cooperation Agreement</td>
<td>- Meetings of senior officials between ministerials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the</td>
<td>- 2007 EU/ASEAN Commemorative Summit in Singapore</td>
<td>- Meetings of Joint Cooperation Committee usually every 18 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Vietnam</td>
<td>- 2007 Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership and Action Plan</td>
<td>- Regular meetings within the ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting)</td>
<td>- 1996 first ASEM Summit in Bangkok</td>
<td>- Summits every two years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU MS and Commission, the ASEAN</td>
<td>- 1998 ASEM II in London</td>
<td>- Ministerial-level meetings: thematic conferences and meetings of foreign and other ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat, Brunei, Burma,</td>
<td>- 2000 ASEM III in Seoul</td>
<td>- Range of meetings at senior official and working levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia,</td>
<td>- 2002 ASEM IV in Copenhagen</td>
<td>- Asia Europe Business Forum, Asia Europe Foundation and other NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan, the Philippines,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore, South Korea, Thailand,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Year of Event</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1994 initiation of political dialogue</td>
<td>Ministerial meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996 Memorandum of Understanding between the EC and the SAARC Secretariat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1998 first dialogue on non-technical issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>1989 Cooperation Agreement</td>
<td>Yearly Joint Ministerial Council of foreign ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990 free trade negotiations begin</td>
<td>Since 1995, senior officials meetings biannually and experts meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process/Union for the Mediterranean) Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Cyprus, Malta. Libya has observer status at certain meetings</td>
<td>1995 Euro-Mediterranean Conference on Foreign Affairs in Barcelona</td>
<td>Conferences of foreign ministers every 18 months and mid-term ministerial meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2004 development of European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
<td>Sectoral ministerial conferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005 10th Anniversary Euro-Mediterranean Summit; new 5-year work programme</td>
<td>On average three meetings of the Euro-Mediterranean Committee per Council Presidency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008 relaunch of the Barcelona process as the Union for the Mediterranean</td>
<td>Numerous meetings at senior official and expert level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, 1 – 2 sessions per year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LAC – Latin America and the Caribbean
33 countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>First summit in Rio de Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Second summit in Madrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Third summit in Guadalajara/Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Fourth summit in Vienna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Fifth summit in Lima</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Planned sixth summit in Madrid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summits at Head of State/Government level**

**Rio Group**
Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela

- 1990 Rome Agreement
- Biannual ministerial meetings (in years with no EU-LAC Summit)

**Central American States (San José dialogue)**
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama

- 1984 San José ministerial conference
- 1985 Cooperation Agreement
- 1993 Framework Cooperation Agreement
- 2003 Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement
- 2004 first Summit in Guadalajara, Mexico
- 2007: launch of Association Agreement negotiations
- Annual ministerial conferences
- Regular meetings of Joint Committee and Subcommittee for Cooperation

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2nd Framework Agreement on Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Declaration of Rome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Association Agreement negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ad hoc presidential and ministerial meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Biannual meetings of Joint Committee; annual meetings of Joint Sub-Committees for Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Specialised High-level Dialogue on Drugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Political dialogue at Head of State/Government, ministerial and senior official level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Association Agreement negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Relaunch of Association Agreement negotiations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Adapted/updated from Alecu de Flers and Regelsberger (2005).*
## Appendix 2.1. Regional allocations and priorities of the EDF 2008-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>FOCAL AREAS</th>
<th>EXAMPLES OF PRIORITIES</th>
<th>ALLOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| West Africa | Deepening of regional integration, enhancement of competitiveness and EPA    | - support to the implementation of reforms and adjustments related to the establishment of the customs union and the common market and the consolidation of macroeconomic stability;  
- support to the implementation of the EPA;  
- strengthening the competitiveness of the productive sector;  
- support to food security at regional level;  
- strengthening of the institutional capacities of regional organisations;  
- support to the policy for regional interconnectivity. | €597 million    |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengthening of good governance and regional stability</th>
<th>€119 million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- support to the establishment of the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), in particular its civil aspects;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- support to the formulation and implementation of a regional policy with regard to migration, in connection with the policies of freedom of movement and of combating human trafficking;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- support to the implementation of the regional programme of tackling the proliferation of small arms and other munitions;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- support to ECOWAS in electoral assistance policies and in preparation of electoral observation missions;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- support to actions and initiatives of ECOWAS and the African Union in the promotion of good governance, the fight against terrorism, actions in the field of SSR/DDR, money laundering and trafficking of drugs and humans.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-focal sectors</td>
<td>€60 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional policies in the area of human development (enhancement of research and of regional institutions in the areas of health, education and culture), environment and sustainable management of natural resources (e.g. energy).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2.2. EDF allocations and priorities for SADC 2008-2013.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>FOCAL AREAS</th>
<th>EXAMPLES OF PRIORITIES</th>
<th>ALLOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>€116 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|        | Regional economic integration | - Trade Integration;  
- Support for structural reforms in SADC;  
- Infrastructure development: support the region in developing its policy environment and projects derived from the SADC Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan, notably in the fields of energy, transport, and telecommunication, and in implementing the SADC Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology;  
- Food security policy and information management;  
- Capacity building, in particular support to the Secretariat for the implementation of trade agreements, the assistance of SADC National Committees and the mainstreaming of gender and HIV issues. | €92,8 million|
|        | Regional political cooperation | - Good governance: including capacity building assistance for the further implementation of the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections;  
- Regional pillar of pan-African architecture of peace and security: accompanying the operationalisation of the SADC Stand-by Force by ad-hoc training of police forces; strengthening the capacity of the Regional Early Warning Centre in terms of logistics, technical tools and professional skills; mediation: training of mediators and experts;  
- Disaster management. | €17,4 million |
Appendix 2.3. EDF allocations and priorities for Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean 2008-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>FOCAL AREAS</th>
<th>EXAMPLES OF PRIORITIES</th>
<th>ALLOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>€645 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Regional economic integration | Trade-related assistance and capacity-building: assistance to the ROs in implementing their economic integration mandates;  
|                            | - Alleviation of the impact of economic and fiscal adjustments on public expenditure;  
|                            | - Support to private sector development;  
|                            | - Infrastructure: development of a comprehensive regional transport, energy and communication policy and development of infrastructure proposals on the basis of the regional Transport and Communication Strategy and Priority Investment Plan;  
|                            | - Improvement of land and water resources management to develop agricultural and food production;  
|                            | - Improvement of the capacity of the region in deriving economic benefits from its marine resources and managing it in a sustainable way;  
|                            | - Conservation of natural resources and sustainable management of environment and energy resources. | €548 million |
| Regional political integration/cooperation | Support to the regional pillar of the pan-African architecture of conflict prevention, peace and security;  
|                            | - Support to post conflict reconstruction for conflicts with a regional dimension;  
|                            | - Launch of a structured dialogue with regional partners on governance and security. | €64 million |
| Non-focal sectors | - Assisting the region in knowledge development and capacity building (including for non-state actors and cooperation between education institutions in the region and fostering cooperation between academic and economic fields);  
- Enhancing capacity development of ROs and improving inter-regional coordination support to IRCC. | €32 million |
### Appendix 2.4. EDF allocations and priorities for Central Africa 2008-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>FOCAL AREAS</th>
<th>EXAMPLES OF PRIORITIES</th>
<th>ALLOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Central Africa | Support to economic and trade agenda (including natural resource management at the regional level) | - The implementation of a regional integration agenda: harmonisation and internal liberalisation (implementation of a common market) and external (common external tariff and liberalisation) and contributing to mitigate the costs related to these reforms;  
- Support to economic growth and diversification, and improvement of competitiveness, business environment, and physical infrastructures (transport, energy);  
- Sectoral policies: environment, agriculture, interconnectivity, higher education, etc. | €165 million |
|         | Support to the political integration agenda of the region | The support will continue to develop the results of ongoing cooperation and accompany the development of the capacity of CEEAC in the area of conflict prevention and resolution. | 5 – 8% |
|         | Non-focal sectors | Institutional support and technical cooperation facility. | |

Appendix 2.1-2.4 Sources: European Community Regional Strategy Papers and Regional Indicative Programmes for West Africa; Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean; Southern Africa Development Community; and CEC 2008a.
## Appendix 3.1. EU development assistance to Latin America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Focus/purpose</th>
<th>Amount allocated (million €) 2007-2010</th>
<th>Amount allocated (million €) 2007-2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social and territorial cohesion</td>
<td>Encourage exchanges of experience between local authorities of Europe and Latin America</td>
<td>131.0</td>
<td>194.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URB-AL</td>
<td>Increase the degree of social cohesion of the Latin American countries by promoting reforms and improved management of public policies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROsociAL</td>
<td>Combating drug trafficking: environment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual understanding/Higher education</td>
<td>Support the internationalisation of Latin American SMEs</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>139.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AL-INVEST</td>
<td>Support the internationalisation of Latin American SMEs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>@LIS</td>
<td>Promotion of the information society and bridging the digital divide in Latin America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual understanding</td>
<td>Support for projects by organisations working to promote mutual understanding between the EU and Latin America</td>
<td>128.4</td>
<td>223.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>331.4</td>
<td>556.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 3.2. EU subregional development cooperation in Latin America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subregion</th>
<th>Amount allocated 2007 – 2013</th>
<th>Priorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Mercosur    | €50 million                 | - Support for Mercosur institutionalisation  
- Support for the deepening of Mercosur and implementation of the future EU-Mercosur Association Agreement  
- Efforts to strengthen civil society participation, knowledge of the regional integration process, mutual understanding and mutual visibility |
| CAN         | €50 million                 | - Regional economic integration  
- Social and economic cohesion  
- The fight against illicit drugs |
| Central America | €75 million             | - Strengthening the institutional system for the process of Central American integration  
- Reinforcing the regional economic integration process  
- Strengthening regional security |

Sources: CEC 2007g, 2007h, 2007i
EU-GRASP

Changing Multilateralism: the EU as a Global-regional Actor in Security and Peace, or EU-GRASP in short, is an EU funded FP7 Programme. EU-GRASP aims to contribute to the analysis and articulation of the current and future role of the EU as a global actor in multilateral security governance, in a context of challenged multilateralism, where the EU aims at “effective multilateralism”. This project therefore examines the notion and practice of multilateralism in order to provide the required theoretical background for assessing the linkages between the EU’s current security activities with multi-polarism, international law, regional integration processes and the United Nations system.

EU-GRASP Deliverables
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