The EU as a Global-Regional Actor in Security and Peace

The willingness, capability and acceptance of the EU as a global-regional security actor

The EU-GRASP Final Integrative Report
EU-GRASP

Changing Multilateralism: the EU as a Global-Regional Actor in Security and Peace, or EU-GRASP for short, is a European Union (EU) funded project under the 7th Framework Programme (FP7). EU-GRASP aims to contribute to the articulation of the present and future role of the EU as a global and regional actor in security and peace. Thus, EU-GRASP is aimed at studying the processes, means and opportunities for the EU to achieve effective multilateralism despite myriad challenges.

PARTNERS

EU-GRASP is composed by a consortium of nine partners. While the project is coordinated by the United Nations University institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS), Bruges, Belgium, its other partners are drawn from across the globe. These are, viz: University of Warwick (UK), University of Gothenburg (Sweden), Florence Forum on the Problems of Peace and War (Italy), KULeuven (Belgium), Centre for International Governance Innovation (Canada), Peking University (China), Institute for Security Studies (South Africa) and Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (Israel).

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“A more capable Europe is within our grasp”

European Security Strategy, 2003
# Table of contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introducing EU-GRASP</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The research approach</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding multilateralism</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding security governance</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levels of cooperation</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European structure and policies</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact and acceptance</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU and multilateralism: nine recommendations</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion: the EU as a focused, flexible and fast actor in peace and security</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This report is a final product of a research project, called EU-GRASP that aimed at a better understanding of the EU’s role in regional and global peace and security issues. Undertaking this was a fascinating and challenging task, especially as the subject matter was, for various reasons, a real moving target.

First, between the time of submitting the research proposal in 2007 and the completion of the project beginning 2012, the geopolitical world changed dramatically. Not only did the world become more multipolar than ever before, the gravity of economic power shifted considerably from the West to the East. This has major consequences for the European security strategy that always had a strong Atlantic component. But today the US seems more and more to be looking to the Pacific, as demonstrated for instance by Hillary Clinton’s article ‘America’s Pacific Century’ (Foreign Affairs, November 2011).

Secondly, the growing interconnectedness of states and people continues to bring with it new and often-unforeseen security threats. As a result, the security agenda is constantly changing and so are people’s perception of threats and insecurity.

Thirdly, throughout the duration of the project, the EU’s internal organisation as a security actor was in constant transformation. Following the Lisbon Treaty, the new structures of the ‘European External Action Service’ began to be implemented. Together, these elements contributed towards influencing the EU’s security agenda. Yet, such transformation also brought to the fore the fact that security governance at a European level needed to be multilateral. The present report therefore aims to bring together some of the main findings from the case studies undertaken in the course of the EU-GRASP project. These studies demonstrate that one cannot speak of a single form of European security governance. Indeed, there are several types of security challenges, which all call for different approaches and various ‘coalitions’ of actors.

There is a need for fluidity in the architecture of global and regional solutions according to the specific security issues encountered. Effective multilateralism, which presupposes working more closely and efficiently with others, is more and more also a matter of networked multilateralism, with an emphasis on the coordinated management and regulation of security issues by different kinds of actors.

With the present report, the reader is presented with some of the complexities of how the EU deals with peace and security, and with a first translation into policy recommendations regarding the future of the EU as a security actor.

Luk Van Langenhove
EU-GRASP Coordinator & UNU-CRIS Director
What is EU-GRASP?
EU-GRASP was conceived to contribute towards the understanding and articulation of the current and future role of the EU as a global actor in multilateral security governance, in a challenged multilateral environment. The project examined the notion and practice of multilateralism and security in order to provide an adequate theoretical background for assessing the EU’s current security activities at different levels of cooperation, ranging from bilateralism to inter-regionalism and multilateralism, and their inter-linkages. EU-GRASP was a 3-year project that started in February 2009 and ended in January 2012.

The project work plan consisted of the following components:

An analysis of the evolving concepts of multilateralism and security, and the EU’s role as a security actor;

Case studies of the EU’s approach to a number of specific security issues: regional conflict, terrorism, WMD proliferation, migration, energy and climate change, and severe violations of human rights;

A transversal comparative analysis applying and integrating the case-study findings;

A foresight study, which builds on the project’s findings and proposes scenarios for future EU policy directions towards external security relations and multilateral approaches to threats and challenges.

Overall, EU-GRASP examined the notion and practice of multilateralism in order to provide the required theoretical background for assessing the EU’s current security activities with multi-polarism, international law, regional integration processes and the United Nations system.

Who funds EU-GRASP?
EU-GRASP was funded by the European Commission, Directorate-General for Research & Innovation, Seventh Framework Programme, Socio-Economic Sciences and the Humanities.

Project officer: Dr. Angela Liberatore (European Commission, Directorate-General for Research & Innovation)

Who coordinated the project?
The coordination of EU-GRASP was done by the United Nations University institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS).
Who was involved in the project?
Consortium partners of EU-GRASP are: University of Warwick (UK), University of Gothenburg (Sweden), Florence Forum on the Problems of Peace and War (Italy), KULeuven (Belgium), Centre for International Governance Innovation (Canada), Peking University (China), Institute for Security Studies (South Africa) and Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (Israel).

The EU-GRASP International Advisory Board
Louise Fawcett (Oxford University), Nicola Harrington-Buhay (UNDP Brussels, EU-UN Liaison Office), Karen Fogg (former European Commission official, associate research fellow Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies), Ole Waever (Copenhagen University), Alain Délétroz (International Crisis Group), Alvaro de Vasconcelos (EUISS), and the two academic coordinators of sister FP7-projects MERCURY (Mark Aspinwall, Edinburgh University) and EU4SEAS (Jordi Vaquer i Fanes, CIDOB).

What were the project objectives?
Strengthen the understanding of multilateralism, and its relation with other concepts such as multipolarity and interregionalism;

Better understanding of the evolving nature of the EU as a global actor within the field of security and EU’s current role in global security governance;

Understanding and developing the changing role of the EU towards other regional integration processes in the peace and security field;

Better understanding of the relationship between external and internal dimensions of the above mentioned policy domains, namely the legal aspects of EU’s involvement in security at regional and global levels;

Suggesting future roles to the EU on the world stage within the field of security;

Advancing state-of-the art theories on multilateralism, by integrating the contemporary agenda of international security, multilateral security governance and the overall role of the EU within these fields;

Advancing policy-making - Increasing awareness and information, and improving the contribution to the formulation and implementation of European cooperation initiatives at the global and interregional level.
The research approach

EU-GRASP is aimed at studying the role of the EU as a global-regional actor in security and peace. This remit implies research that is committed to studying not only the present role of the EU in a multilateral environment, but which also inquires into the EU’s anticipated role in the emerging global order.

Attempting such a study enumerated above presents, at the best of times, a multi-layered challenge to a researcher. It is even more so in the environment of challenged multilateralism in which the EU currently finds itself. Not only is the topic somewhat intractable in its various and varied dimensions, but also, undertaking such a research is fraught with such pedagogic challenges such as what is the best ‘entry point’, what methodological strategies should be adopted, and, more importantly, how best to present the findings.

At the preliminary stage, we undertook an assessment and refinement of concepts that would be used in the course of the project, and which are relevant to study and understand the role of the EU as an actor in peace and security. This inceptional endeavour focused principally on clarifying theories of security, especially those relating to the so-called non-traditional security studies, in order to link such theories to empirical research. Additionally, our rudimentary research also focused on the concept of ‘security governance’ and its applicability to EU’s practice. In the final analysis, these two research components were brought together with the aim of bridging the existing gap between the literature on security theory and those on security governance, using the results deriving therefrom to interrogate the EU as a global-regional actor in peace and security.

The central argument of the first conceptual research is that there is need to develop a specific theoretical framework for analysing the EU as a peace and security actor. Whilst the EU/European security governance literature certainly provides a flexible analytical prism for this purpose, it falls short, in our view, of the optimal analytical tool in that its application is limited to the conceptual notion of security and therefore remains pre-theoretical. We propose that it is by utilising the security studies literature that we can provide a flexible framework and a comparative methodology, which transcends the traditional notion of security - a notion that is essentially defined in terms of threats to states. This suggested approach, in turn, would engender a more sophisticated and comprehensive understanding of how the EU does and speaks security.

The second major theme we investigated concerns the levels of transversal cooperation the EU is involved in (bilateral, regional, interregional and global). The mapping of bilateral cooperation...
focused on EU’s interaction with some specific states including the United States, Russia, China, Japan, Israel, etc. Similarly, the mapping of interregional relations offered an overview of the current cooperation with Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Mediterranean. With regard to cooperation at the global level we focused mainly on the relation between the EU and the UN, taking into cognisance other multilateral frameworks that have a global reach. Finally, the mapping of the EU as a regional actor highlights the EU’s institutional and policy outputs through an investigation of its coherence and its current level of accountability and legitimacy.

The landscape of security studies is over the last years completely changed by the debate between traditional and non-traditional security issues. EU-GRASP takes stock of this and includes the in-depth study of six security issues: regional conflict, terrorism, WMD proliferation, energy security and climate change, severe human rights violations and migration.

**EU-GRASP case studies (see table)**

Against the background of its analytical work and the results of the case studies and transversal reports, EU-GRASP has designed a foresight exercise to project the consequences of its findings into the near future. The idea of foresight is to explore the possible future of EU policies regarding different security issues, and according to the different forms of multilateral cooperation as a variation of key policy choices.

The foresight exercise is divided into two phases. The first concerns the definition of future “scenarios” based on EU-GRASP’s findings and with additional inputs from a group of experts, scholars and practitioners. The second phase builds on the various scenarios to identify policy implications through a participatory workshop with EU policy makers. Interaction with target-public is key for this project: EU-GRASP desires that its work of three years will be relevant for EU’s decision-making and role in multilateral security governance, whether in relation to EU’s daily undertakings or those of its member states.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional conflict</th>
<th>Terrorism</th>
<th>WMD proliferation</th>
<th>Energy security &amp; climate change</th>
<th>Migration</th>
<th>Severe human rights violations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israeli-Palestinian regional security complex</td>
<td>Israeli-Palestinian regional security complex</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>Lybia</td>
<td>Israeli-Palestinian regional security complex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Lakes (DRC)</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Pakistan-India</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Transatlantic focus</td>
<td>Darfur/Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>South-East gate</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad-Sudan-Central African Republic</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table:**

- **Regional conflict**: Israeli-Palestinian regional security complex, Great Lakes (DRC), Horn of Africa, Chad-Sudan-Central African Republic, Russia
- **Terrorism**: Egyptian-Palestinian regional security complex
- **WMD proliferation**: Iran
- **Energy security & climate change**: Central Asia, China
- **Migration**: Lybia, Transatlantic focus, Darfur/Sudan, South-East gate, Mediterranean
- **Severe human rights violations**: Israeli-Palestinian regional security complex, Darfur/Sudan, Zimbabwe, Lebanon
Understanding Multilateralism

Towards the study of multilateralism 2.0.

Multilateralism was created as a form of cooperation among states that institutionalises intergovernmental cooperation and substitutes anarchy. The starting point for most scholars who study multilateralism is the definition by Keohane and its expansion by Ruggie. ‘I limit multilateralism to arrangements involving states’ says Keohane (1990: 732) and that is a core issue of most of the academic thinking on the issue. Multilateral arrangements are institutions defined by Keohane as ‘persistent sets of rules that constrain activity, shape expectations and prescribe roles’ (Keohane 1988: 384) in a purely institutional (rather than normative) manner. Ruggie however, presents a definition that is not only institutional but also normative, including behaviour. For Ruggie (1993: 11), multilateralism is an institutional form that coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of generalised principles of conduct (...) which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard for the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence. A common feature of these and other contemporary viewpoints is the centrality of states: they are regarded as the constitutive elements of the multilateral system and it is their interrelations that determine the form and content of multilateralism. This implies, as noted by Schweller (2010: 149), that international politics is regarded as a closed system in at least two ways: it spans the whole world and there are huge barriers to entering the system. Indeed, the world is today almost fully carved up in sovereign states and this affords little or no room for the creation of new states. Things are much different today than in 1648, – seen as the birth of the Westphalian world order – when the chunkiest parts of the world were not composed by sovereign states, thus affording great opportunities for state creation. Consequently, there was an open international system for a long time. However, over the years the whole globe became partitioned into sovereign states.

Multilateralism is clearly under challenge in the 21st century and has been so since the end of the Cold War. More than a reflection of the failure of the concept, this crisis is the sign of a changing international context, which has rendered anachronistic the traditional intergovernmental multilateralism of the immediate post-World War II era. In today’s reality, states play a relatively declining role as protagonists in the security system, as threats have acquired a system-wide significance. In order to overcome this crisis, multilateral institutions, such as the UN, need to adapt to this change, reinventing themselves according to the new context. Thus, as the world is changing, so must the concept of governance, namely its reflection in the multilateral system.

The emergence of truly global problems, such as climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and many others, have indeed
led to an increasing paradox of governance: ‘the policy authority for tackling global problems still belongs to the states, while the sources of the problems and potential solutions are situated at transnational, regional or global level’ (Thakur & Van Langenhouw 2006). As such the building blocks of multilateralism, the states, seem to be less and less capable of dealing with the challenges of globalisation. But because the multilateral world order is so dependent on the input of states, multilateralism itself is not functioning well. The drama according to Weiss (2008) is that the UN would never had emerged at all, if it was not configured as an instrument of state interests.

In sum, there seems to be sufficient reasons to claim that ‘the values and institutions of multilateralism as currently constituted (...) are arguably under serious challenge’ (Newman & Thakur 2006: 531). But, as suggested by the same authors, the fundamental principle of multilateralism is not in crisis! What is needed is an update of the organisational issues in order to be in tune with today’s reality.

Multilateralism is thus both a normative concept (it is an ideal to promote) and a practice (it refers to a set of existing practices and institutions). At both levels it is subject to change and one can think of how an updated global multilateral governance system could look like. Such a vision could be called ‘Multilateralism 2.0.’ This is a metaphor as it refers to a jargon used in the ICT world. As all metaphors, it has its limitations. But metaphors in science can also serve the purpose of viewing things from new perspectives (Harré 1976). The core of the metaphor advanced here is an implicit reference to what is now called ‘Web 2.0’, a concept currently used to be described as the second phase in the development of the World Wide Web. It describes the change from a ‘web’ consisting out of individual websites to a full platform of interactive web applications to the end users on the World Wide Web. The Multilateralism 2.0. metaphor tries to grasp how the ideals and practices of multilateralism are currently undergoing a similar transformation. It is partially a descriptive metaphor as it tries to capture what is going on. But it is also a normative metaphor that points to what is possible and desirable.

The essence of introducing the ‘Web 2.0’ metaphor in international relations lies in stressing the emergence of network thinking and practices in international relations and in the transformation of multilateralism from a closed to an open system. In Multilateralism 1.0 the principal agents in the interstate space of international relations are states. National governments are the ‘star players’. Intergovernmental organisations are only dependent agents whose degrees of freedom only go as far as the states allow them. The primacy of sovereignty is the ultimate principle of international relations. In Multilateralism 2.0, there are players other than sovereign states that play a role and some of these players challenge the notion of sovereignty and that makes the system much more open. The trend towards multipolarity is more than just a redistribution of power at the global level. It is also about a change in who the players are and how the playing field is organised.

It is symptomatic of this trend that the Harvard Business Review chose as one of its ‘breakthrough ideas’ for 2010 the concept of ‘independent diplomacy’ (Ross 2010). In that article the question was raised: why should we pretend that only nation-states shape international affairs? There are signs that Multilateralism 2.0 already partially exists. But of course there are also strong forces to
continue with Multilateralism 1.0. As such it is not even sure that a fully-fledged multilateral system version 2.0 will ever emerge.

The first characteristic of Multilateralism 2.0 is the diversification of multilateral organisations. In recent years there has been a dramatic rise of all kinds of international organisations and regimes. According to Schiavone (2001), the number of intergovernmental organisations has grown from 37 to well over 400 in the period between 1990 and 2000 (see also Higgott 2006). While mostly operating on an inter-governmental basis, some of these organisations have acquired some autonomy in the exercise of their competences and even have a ‘legal personality’ just as states (Ip 2010). Increasingly these organisations look more to networks than to formal (bureaucratic) organisations. In line with a ‘trans-nationalisation of policies’ (Stone 2004) one can state that Multilateralism 2.0 implies the rise of transnational policy networks (Djelic & Quach 2003, Stone 2008).

Secondly, there is a growing importance of non state actors at the regional rather than global level. States have by now created a large number of global and regional institutions that have themselves become players in the international order. Some of these new players, although not states, do resemble states in their behaviour. Such an institution as the EU exemplifies this trend (one can point for instance to its presence as observer in the UN, its coordination strategy at the International Monetary Fund, its membership at the G20, etc.). Other regional organisations are – although not to the same extent as the EU – following suit. As a result, one can say that we are currently witnessing a transition from a world of states to a world of states (including the BRICS as new global powers) and regions (Van Langenhove 2007, 2008). This trend is further reinforced by the phenomenon of devolution whereby national powers are in some states transferred to subnational regions. Some of these subnational regional entities even have the ambition to be present at the international stage as well. In Europe, Flanders has perhaps more autonomy in Belgium than Luxembourg in the EU. Yet, Luxembourg is considered to be a sovereign state, while Flanders is not. In that article the question was raised: why to pretend that only nation-states shape international affairs?

Thirdly, next to the increased relations between ‘vertical’ levels of governance, there is a growing interconnectivity between policy domains horizontally. Finance cannot be divorced from trade, security, climate, etc. A distinctive characteristic of Multilateralism 2.0 is thus that the boundaries between policy domains (and the organisations dealing with them) are becoming more and more permeable. Instead of clear separated areas of policy concern treated within separate institutions, there are now communities of different actors and layers that form together a global agora of multiple publics and plural institutions (Stone 2008).

Finally, under Multilateralism 1.0 the involvement of citizens is largely limited to democratic representation at the state level. The supranational governance layer does not foresee direct involvement of the civil society or of any other non-governmental actors. In Multilateralism 2.0 there is an increased room for non-governmental actors at all levels. This is perhaps the most revolutionary aspect of Multilateralism 2.0. but also the most difficult to organise. This is related to the state centric and institutional focus of classical multilateral organisations. In such a closed system there is hardly any room for open debate, let alone for the involvement of citizens. But as Klabbers (2005) argued, there is evidence
that an alternative is emerging, that of multilateral institutions functioning not so much as an organisation but rather as an agora, that is ‘a public realm in which institutional issues can be debated and perhaps, be decided’ (Klabbers 2005: 382).

In sum, the signs are there that multilateralism is moving from a 1.0. mode to a 2.0. mode. But, as mentioned above, states have been the architects of Multilateralism 1.0. and they crafted a form of multilateralism that is in tune with state interests. The big challenge today is whether non state actors will have the power and the degrees of liberty to be involved in crafting Multilateralism 2.0. Regional organisations could be in a position to contribute to such a new regionalised world order. Bull (1977: 261) already imagined such a ‘more regionalised world systems’. More recently, Katzenstein (2005: 1) stated that ‘ours is a world of regions’. And Slaughter (2004) described a ‘disaggregated world order’ where the model is in many ways the EU, that has indeed the ambition to be involved in such an operation. By embracing the principle of ‘effective multilateralism’, the EU has clearly indicated the willingness to contribute to reforming multilateralism. But the paradox might be that its own member states with their own 1.0. form of diplomacy are perhaps not ready yet for such a move.

Further readings


Understanding security governance

The loose concept of governance seemed to be apt in capturing the idea of a variegated environment characterised by a multiplicity of actors and levels. This was especially the case with the EU given the multifaceted nature of its policy-making milieu. Webber et al. (2004) began with some important definitional points, and in particular, focussed the analysis on security governance in Europe. That is, the concept was considered in part to be European specific, in part a socially constructed product of the societies and structures dominant on the continent, has taken these issues forward, and asks the important evaluative question, as to the way in which the concept of security governance can be seen to lead to offer significant advances on other means of thinking about the security of Europe.

In Kirchner’s words, security governance is an ‘intentional system of rule that involves the coordination, management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities, interventions by both public and private actors, formal and informal arrangements and purposefully directed towards particular policy outcomes’ (Kirchner 2007a: 3). A ‘governance approach’ should help understand vertical and horizontal interactions among different actors, serving as an organisational framework (Schroeder 2006: 5), analysing how security is produced (Webber et al. 2004) and ultimately representing an observable trend (Britz & Ojanen 2009). According to Krahmann, security structures or a coalition’s fluidity and flexibility represent a distinctive characteristic of security governance, so that security coordination takes on different shapes (Krahmann 2001: 5).

Of particular relevance for Kirchner is, instead, the working and coordinating mechanisms of security governance within and across issue areas. In this regard, co-ordination, management and regulation are the three components of governance and also the three tools used to empirically test it. Specifically, co-ordination concerns the way in which actors interact and who, among them, leads the policy-making process, implementation and control. Management relates to risk assessment duties, monitoring, negotiations, mediations and resource allocation, while regulation is conceived as the policy result, its intended objective, its fostering motivation, its effective impact and the institutional setting created (Kirchner 2007b: 24).

A significant part of the literature on security governance deals with the EU and its role therein. This is not surprising. Europe’s ‘post-Westphalian traits’ seem to be the ideal-type of a governance structure for several concerns, security included. The interdependencies that resulted from the internal economic project and the loss of some sovereign prerogatives related to that objective,
suggested that a certain degree of multilateral coordination at more levels and among different actors was necessary to face ongoing risks (Kirchner and Sperling 2007a & b). Indeed, the idea that global solutions to security problems can better be achieved through the existence and the practices of post-Westphalian states (Kirchner & Sperling 2007 a & b) spurred debates on the exportation of the European system of governance. According to this reasoning, this exportation could overcome some of the heterogeneity in the international system and set the basis for institutional and normative regulation of security challenges. However, threats can also be perceived and assessed differently; some actors prefer unilateral strategies rather than multilateral solutions and opt for hard tools to solve security matters. This is so, the argument goes, because some Westphalian states exist in the international context and characterise different systems of security governance from the European one: this ends up overburdening and complicating the achievement of global security (Sperling 2003, Hallenberg, Sperling & Wagnsson 2009).

As already stated, the literature on security governance is problematic in that it focuses predominantly on the dynamics of ‘governance’, on the multiplicity of actors, tools and instruments rather than the complexity of security and the implications varied meanings of security have for our understanding of the EU as a security actor. As acknowledged by its proponents, security governance ‘is a heuristic device for recasting the problem of security management in order to accommodate the different patterns of interstate interaction, the rising number of non-state security actors, the expansion of the security agenda and conflict regulation or resolution’ (Kirchner and Sperling 2007b: 18). Thus, the security governance approach, although possessing ‘the virtue of conceptual accommodation’ by its own admission, is ‘pre-theoretical’ (Ibid), and thus lacks nuance in terms of how the EU constructs its understanding of security and engages in security practice. Our argument, therefore, is that the security governance literature would benefit from incorporating a theoretical approach to security: this will provide a more complex understanding of the way in which security comes to be understood and intersubjectively defined, which in turn has implications for the relevant actors involved, governance strategies, processes of engagement, and finally, policy practice and outcome.

Another potential shortcoming of the security governance literature is its predominantly Euro-centric contextual focus. Our argument here is that in order to understand the EU as an actor in security governance structures, a more global outlook is required to incorporate other dimensions and influences in the framing of EU/European security issues and practices, and on how they are constructed, managed and regulated. On this point, a significant step has been taken by Sperling (2003, 2009). He envisages the possible existence of different systems of security governance characterised by the following features which include: the regulator, considering the mechanisms adopted to face security problems and resolve conflicts; the normative framework, identifying the role that norms play in determining interests and behaviours; sovereign prerogatives, investigating the degree of hierarchical interactions; and the security referent, defining the nature of the state, the interaction between identity and interests and the usefulness of force, and the interaction context, investigating the strength of the security dilemma (Sperling 2009).
In our view, this is a productive way forward which aims at overcoming the strict European focus of current research, whilst simultaneously dealing with the EU’s role in different security structures, and adding a comparative perspective to the analysis of EU security governance.

In this context, our contribution would not only be in acknowledging that overlapping systems of security governance have implications for the EU, but also in laying down the methodological foundations to investigate how and why the EU can interact within them, and contribute to the sustainability, transformation or dissolution of such arrangements. Moreover, it moves beyond a pre-theoretical, functional aggregation of factors and characteristics of systems of security governance (and states within them) to ask critical questions of how they were constructed in the first place, and how this impacts on the way in which the EU can speak and do security. In summary then, whilst there is an acknowledgment in the latest European security governance literature of the security referent, the role of norms and the context of interaction – which is also of interest within our approach – there remains limited discussion on what is meant by security per se, or how it can be understood theoretically and explored methodologically in the context of the EU and Europe.

How then, do we propose to take security governance forward and move it from a pre-theoretical to theoretical framework of analysis? To reiterate, our argument is that we must move beyond characterisations and typologies towards a clear theoretical and methodological foundation. More specifically, we contend that there is a need to take the constructivist turn in security studies seriously in order to allow us to move beyond security as an objective phenomenon that is ‘out there’ and can be measured or analysed through a linear or deductive methodology. We also argue in this context that a more obvious synergy with the security studies literature will enhance the analytical sophistication of the security governance literature.

Whilst the EU/European security governance literature certainly provides a plastic or flexible frame for this purpose, it falls short in our eyes, as it does not move beyond a conceptual notion of security (it is pre-theoretical). The suggestion here, therefore, is that through utilising the security studies literature, we can provide a flexible framework and a comparative methodology, which moves beyond traditional notions of security as the activity of states; a notion that is fixed or defined simply as a threat, and provides a more complex understanding of how the EU does and speaks security. We recognise that for many such a comparative or eclectic approach is problematic on a philosophical and intellectual level, but our position merely suggests that there is much to connect such theories (although not to collapse them into one theoretical approach, see Floyd 2007) – and that, whilst not compatible in terms of the methodological minutiae can at an intuitive and comparative level illuminate the problems in each, whilst also providing a platform for dialogue and theory building.

Thus, it is not the assertion here that security governance is not a fruitful avenue for research. Indeed, we very much concur with the conceptualisation of security governance provided in this literature and its notion of European security as part of broader regional and
global security governance structures. However, we do believe that it lacks a more complex understanding of the variegated meaning of security and security logics in the context of the EU/Europe. Our approach, therefore, almost takes a step backwards in its conversation with this literature – in that it seeks first to analyse the discursive construction of ‘security’ in different policy areas, whilst also not losing sight of the connection between construction, governance/governmentality, policy practice and outcome. Overall, we suggest this is a more nuanced approach which allows the analyst to probe the dynamics of EU security action, and indeed, the implications and consequences of such action in terms of policy governance, effectiveness and its own identity.

Further readings
EU-GRASP researchers George Christou and Stuart Croft edited a special issue on European ‘security’ governance with the Taylor and Francis journal “European Security”. This collection contains ten contributions on a wide range of security governance issues.

In 2012, this special issue of European Security will also be published as a book by Routledge under the title of European ‘security’ governance (edited by George Christou and Stuart Croft).

In 2012, Routledge will also publish a volume in their Routledge/ECPR Studies in European Political Science Series on the topic of The EU and Multilateral Security Governance. The volume will be edited by Luk Van Langenhove, Sonia Lucarelli and Jan Wouters.
Developments characterising the rapidly evolving global environment are reflected in the ‘Multilateralism 2.0’ concept. The latter emphasises the diversification of multilateral actors and the ensuing diversification of multilateral playing fields. The concept accounts for a complex network of actors that perform and interact in a multipolar environment, where openness and flexibility are the keywords. The EU is a part of this multipolar environment where it plays a role not as a state but as a regional organisation operating in a complex international environment comprising states, multilateral and regional organisations. The EU itself, in its relations with other actors, is characterised by its multi-faceted appearances as one can distinguish elements of bilateral, regional, interregional and global actorness. As such, the EU contributes to establishing a fluid architecture of global, regional and national solutions to security threats that embody different actors at multiple levels according to the challenges that need to be addressed. Within such a fluid architecture, there are no fixed roles or positions for any actor - hence the growing need for coordination, management and regulation. Not surprisingly then, there emerged the new concept of ‘security governance’, which focuses on how multiple actors in a web of power and responsibility coordinate, manage and regulate their actions. The concept of security governance is therefore useful to overcome the conundrum of state-centrism while at the same time allowing for the inclusion of a larger definition of security and the means put in place by a variety of actors to address various security issues. In this framework, security governance can therefore help to understand the proliferation of transnational cooperation amongst both state and non-state actors in the post-Cold War era, where new security threats are challenging the ability of sovereign states to ensure the security of their citizens.

To evaluate the successes and failures of the EU as a global actor in security and peace requires an analysis of EU action at multiple levels of security governance. Instructively, it should be noted that the EU is not a single state. Consequently, the EU can be understood as a geographical "region" and/or an integrated set of institutions that create a multilevel and multilocational foreign policy (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan 2008: 8-34). This creates two significant problems for understanding bilateral relations. Firstly, as the EU is itself a region, bilateral relations constitute "regional-state relations". This has led to Heiner Hänggi going beyond the term bilateralism, and referring to EU bilateral interactions with single powers as ‘hybrid interregionalism’ (2000: 7). “Hybrid interregionalism” refers to a framework where one organised region negotiates with a group of countries from another (unorganised or dispersed) region. For instance, in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) the Mediterranean countries negotiate individually.
with the EU. Similarly, referring specifically to commercial relations, Aggarwal and Fogarty (2004) take the Lomé Agreement as an example of hybrid interregionalism, whereby the EU is unified and has trade relations with a set of countries that are not grouped within their own customs union or free trade agreement. Hänggi goes beyond formal frameworks and refers to hybrid interregionalism, in which a region, such as the EU, interacts bilaterally with single powers. Formally, this can be thought of as a “region-to-state” (or “region-to-country”) relationship.

In its broader sense, interregionalism refers to the process whereby two specified regions interact as regions, that is, region-to-region relations. The most institutionalised form of interregionalism, so-called “pure interregionalism”, develops between two clearly identifiable regions within an institutional framework (for instance the EU and the African Union). Pure interregionalism captures, however, only a limited part of present-day interregional cooperation. This is because many “regions” are dispersed and porous, without clearly identifiable borders, and demonstrate only a low level of regional agency. In other words, regional organisations are not discrete actors, which can be isolated from classical intergovernmental cooperation between nation-states (i.e. classical bilateralism). It is widely contested among scholars even to what extent the EU (sophisticated as it is) should be considered a discrete actor. Although interregionalism is not explicitly mentioned as an objective in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), it is deeply rooted in the European Commission’s and the EU’s foreign policies and external relations. There is a long history of a rather loose form of interregionalism between the EU and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) group of countries, and this interregional policy has been partly revised under the new Cotonou Agreement and other frameworks. Since the 1990s interregional cooperation has been further developed as a key feature of the EU’s foreign policies with other counterpart regions, at least in official declarations. Indeed, we are witnessing a trend whereby the European Commission and other European policymakers seek to promote interregional relations and partnerships with the Global South, albeit not always with a consistent formulation (Söderbaum & Stålgren 2010).

Our analysis of the EU’s interregional cooperation with Africa, Latin America and Asia reveals that the EU uses a variety of instruments and models of engagement to foster relations with countries and regional partners. As we have seen, EU-driven interregional cooperation tends to be multifaceted, with different issues and themes receiving different emphasis in different counterpart regions and in different security issues. Interregional policy is, therefore, not a fixed set of guidelines but rather is subject to adaptation. A comparative assessment suggests a variation in the way that the EU conducts its foreign policies towards different regions (Söderbaum & Stålgren 2010).

This implies that the EU does not appear to have a specific preference for one particular model of cooperation. It is evident that the EU tends to be pragmatic in its various relationships with the rest of the world. In this regard, the EU increasingly behaves as an actor on a variety of levels in world affairs — having “a global strategy” (Farrell 2010, Söderbaum & Stålgren 2010). Far from being locked into a specific foreign policy doctrine (such as interregionalism), the EU uses any type of policy that it has at its disposal and which appears to be most suited to a given objective.
It is useful to distinguish between security issues and other types of (non-security) issues, such as trade, aid and development. Needless to say, security and development may affect one another. Together forming the much-talked about security-development nexus. Yet, it is also relevant to point out that generally speaking interregional cooperation is quite often more developed in the field of trade, aid and development compared to security.

A general characteristic of interregional cooperation (both in the security and non-security sphere) is that issues are often dealt with through multi-country dialogues, summits and policy declarations. Interregionalism may therefore be criticised as rhetorical, symbolic and sweeping. In contrast, however, there is also evidence that interregionalism may provide a useful forum for dialogue and framework for enhancing cooperation at lower levels. In this way, interregionalism may reinforce bilateral collaboration, or may be a stepping-stone to multilateral cooperation. As a result it is not useful to analyse interregional cooperation in isolation from other forms of cooperation. There is a tendency that interregionalism sometimes is important even if it is not so well-developed or intense.

Our research result reveal that it is misleading to only concentrate on pure interregionalism, that is, institutionalised cooperation between two regional organisations. The more complex and pluralistic processes of transregionalism and hybrid interregionalism reveal that especially the counterpart regional organisations are more open-ended and ambiguous, implying that policies of regional organisations interact with policies of states/governments. Taken together, this leads to the possibility of an increasing number of (interacting) forms of collaboration on different “levels” (hence the relevance of transversal cooperation as an analytical device).

The interregional model is perhaps most developed in the EU’s relationship with Africa, at least in the sense that interregional cooperation and partnerships exist in most issue-areas and with Africa as well as all sub-regional organisations. Yet, it is very evident that EU-Africa interregional cooperation is dominated by the EU and to quite a large extent it depends on the EU’s interests and agenda. This is however not equivalent to saying that asymmetric interregionalism is necessarily detrimental. And it is not simply that EU dictates the agenda. For example, many observers would say that the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is African-driven and EU-Africa interregional cooperation is to a large extent designed in order to strengthen APSA and African management of its own security crises.

EU-Asia collaboration is at least partly different in terms of the degree of institutionalisation as well as the nature of the issues covered. For instance, terrorism and WMD are greater concerns in Asia than in Africa and Latin America, whereas Africa is heavily affected by a large number of regional conflicts. But interregionalism in Asia is clearly affected by the fact that ASEAN is more or less the only viable regional organisation. But the EU is not necessarily advocating in favour of increased pure interregionalism. On the contrary, while in the past the EU has combined pure interregionalism with forms of hybrid interregionalism, there is today a growing preference for hybrid interregionalism and more flexible solutions. “This may be explained in part by the difficulty of negotiating over very complex and politically contentious issues with disparate groups of countries. The EU has found that the difficulty of completing such negotiations, and the subsequent problems in implementation
and compliance, make different forms of region-state treaties a more effective instrument for economic cooperation” (Farrell 2010). Hence, despite the many official declarations about the EU’s preference for interregional relations, a closer empirical review reveals a complex pattern of intersecting, complementing and at times competing models of external relations - resulting in a mixture of bilateral, multilateral and interregional policies in a world with external and internal obstacles.

Previous research suggests that the EU’s policy mix depends very much on who the counterpart is (Söderbaum & Stålgren 2010). We argue that this variation in interregional relations is often linked to questions of relevance and power. The EU cannot deny the contemporary relevance and power of key East Asian states which results in partnerships that are symmetric in nature. This contrasts sharply with the EU-Africa relationship, which, although officially designated as an equal partnership, for now at least clearly remains asymmetrical (CEC 2004: 9). Compared to the more flexible and pluralistic approach to Asia, the EU tends to emphasise the interregional and regional model much more strongly in the African context.

A similar asymmetry, although not as one-sided, can also be detected in the EU’s relationship with Latin America. This suggests that, while much of the EU’s interregional relations are conducted under the pretext of mutual benefit, the distribution of these benefits appears to be a function of the power position of the EU relative to its counterparts. That is, the stronger the counterpart (in terms of power and relevance), the more concessions are made by the EU. With weaker “partners”, the EU seem to dictate far more of the conditions for interregional cooperation. The relatively stronger East Asian region benefits from access to European markets and Asian countries are generally invited to participate in equal or symmetric partnerships with the EU. There is little conditionality attached to East Asian cooperation, which reflects the EU’s response to an increasingly powerful region. Indeed, security issues, such as human rights are sensitive for many Asian countries and the EU has chosen to maintain a rather low profile on these issues instead of pressurising for political changes. However, the EU attaches economic, trade and political conditionalities in its dealings with Africa. The EU’s dealings with Latin America appear to lie somewhere between these extremes.

Further reading
In 2012, Springer Verlag will publish a volume edited by Fredrik Söderbaum, Tiziana Scaramagli and Francis Baert that goes deeper into the notion of interregionalism and the interaction between the different levels of transversal cooperation as researched in EU-GRASP: bilateralism, regionalism, interregionalism and multilateralism. This volume will be published in the United Nations University series on Regionalism.
European structure and policies

Since the creation of Europe, security and defence concerns have been both of primary importance and highly controversial. Early attempts to set up a defence union were largely unsuccessful. The emergence of new security threats at the end of the Cold War provoked a renewed interest in security and defence-related issues. In parallel, the setting into place of the basis of the EU’s foreign policy dates back to the early 1990s. At the time, the mutations of the European institutions, and the world they were evolving in, called for a profound review of the way the European foreign policy should be organised. As such, the Maastricht Treaty represents an important milestone with the introduction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Title V of the Treaty which established the CFSP as one of the three pillars of the European Union represents a turning point for the European integration process since it calls for an institutionalisation of cooperation of the member states’ foreign policies. The CFSP essentially marks the attempt by the member states to resolve their lack of coordination when faced with a crisis situation. The conflict ensuing from the breakdown of Yugoslavia clearly showed the need for an institutional framework to guide the various European foreign policies and favour common positions rather than disaggregated responses to similar crises. The Amsterdam Treaty further reinforced the CFSP by creating the position of a High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Initially the position was established in order to better coordinate the implementation and conduct of the CFSP but gradually has expanded to encompass additional functions including the post of Secretary General of the Council of the European Union.

It is in his position of High Representative/Secretary General (HR/SG) that Javier Solana was tasked by EU foreign ministers to draft a ‘European strategic concept’. The result was the publication of the document “A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy” in 2003 and its adoption by the European Council during its meeting in December of the same year. The ESS represents the document leading the way for what European foreign policy should be like. In other words, “it outlines the long-term policy objectives and the instruments that can be applied to achieve them” and therefore “it could indeed serve as a reference framework for day-to-day policy-making, defining also the legitimacy of actions and leading the development of capabilities within the EU” (Biscop & Drieskens 2006: 27). Among the various elements contained in the document it is noteworthy to stress the call it makes for increasing collaboration with international organisations and cooperation with major actors of the international scene. Within the part dedicated to the Strategic Objectives of the ESS special attention is thus given to multilateralism by calling for ‘An International Order Based on Effective Multilateralism’. The 2008 review of
the European Security Strategy also clearly underscores the fact that the EU has to work in favour of multilateralism and in collaboration with international institutions. The Review states that “At a global level, Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral order. The UN stands at the apex of the international system.” It also adds that the EU finds itself at “a unique moment to renew multilateralism, working with the United States and with [its] partners around the world.”

The signing of the Lisbon Treaty marks yet another important step in the integration of Europe, as with its adoption the EU aims to improve coherence in its external actions and, at the same time, enhance its accountability towards European citizens. The most relevant innovations related to the Union’s global actorness concern, first, the appointment of a President of the European Council, to give more visibility and consistency to both ‘the work of the European Council’ and ‘the external representation of the union on the CFSP issues’ (Article 9B paragraph 6, Treaty of Lisbon). Second, the creation of a ‘High Representative (HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’ – called the ‘EU Minister of Foreign Affairs’ – who is also Vice-President of the Commission, and thus responsible for the coordination between the Council and the Commission. Third, the introduction of a European External Action Service (EEAS) to assist the HR and streamline the EU’s external services by representing the Union in non-EU countries on all matters of foreign policy. Fourth, by conferring legal personality onto the EU (Article 46A), the Lisbon Treaty enables the Union to sign treaties or international agreements falling under the competences transferred to the EU by its member states. Finally, the Lisbon Treaty also streamlines decision-making procedures by extending the use of Qualified Majority Votes for matters pertaining to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), thus demonstrating the EU’s willingness to facilitate decision-making among the 27 member states. Although these innovations do not challenge CFSP’s intergovernmental nature at its core, they nevertheless affirm the EU’s commitment in improving its efficiency and coherence at the international level.

The EU has therefore continuously strengthened its organisational structures with the Lisbon Treaty only representing one of the latest stage – albeit a major one – that installed some major changes and innovations, while at the same time stepping up its global presence. This has also been witnessed very practically as since 2003 more than 22 civilian and military missions have been carried out by the EU in the Balkans, the Middle East, Asia and Africa. Therefore, in terms of civilian and military capacity, these missions deployed under the ESDP demonstrated a certain EU potential. However, military capability, be it human or material, is still generally insufficient. Despite the absence of an EU standing army, standby battlegroups have been settled as well-trained and -equipped forces that can be deployed on short notice. Further, the Permanent Structured Cooperation constitutes a remarkable attempt aimed at tackling the capability deficit. But an issue that remains to be dealt with is the absence of a common operational structure for coordinating efforts and deployments on the ground.

Despite this demonstrated ability, we cannot forget that the EU is not a state but a regional organisation that operates in a complex international environment comprising states, multilateral organisations as well as other regional organisations. The willingness of the EU to involve itself in international peace and security and address the threats it is faced with has thus been translated in the structure
and policies it has adopted to respond to these threats. Of course, the structures and policies are not uniform and largely depend on the threat they are meant to tackle. Nevertheless, some common features can be identified and most importantly is the EU’s readiness to engage with other international actors and act in favor of an effective multilateralism. Secondly, the EU also shows elements of bilateral, regional, interregional and global actorness. As such, the EU contributes to establishing a fluid architecture of security governance spanning from the global, the regional and the national levels and that embodies different actors at multiple levels according to the problems that need to be faced.

For example, in what concern energy security, international energy network projects serving the EU’s security of energy supply necessarily involve the agreement of third country governments as internal developments in the EU energy markets cannot be considered in isolation from external matters, namely the EU’s existing arrangements with supplier states (Benford 2006: 41). It is therefore important that the EU’s international cooperation framework encourages the development of projects with third country governments. In this field of external relations the EU currently holds Memoranda of Understanding on energy with a number of third countries, as well as so-called ‘Energy Dialogues’. The EU-Russia Energy Dialogue takes on a particularly important role in this regard given the strong mutual interest and interdependence in the energy field between the EU and Russia, in particular regarding the supply of natural gas and (to a lesser degree) with respect to oil. The EU offers the largest consumer market for Russian gas and Russia not only oversees the largest natural gas reserves but also exercises full control over the key pipelines that provide the main access to these reserves. The EU’s broad challenge thus becomes managing this interdependence with a view to gaining maximum control over outcomes, namely ensuring security of supply (Benford 2006: 42).

Further reading
Any meaningful assessment of the impact and acceptance of EU’s role as a global-regional actor in security and peace must begin with an identification of the EU’s goals and the underlying assumptions of the EU’s involvement in a particular intervention (i.e. the EU’s construction of the conflict). The next step is to distinguish between output, outcome and impact. As mentioned in the section on security governance, there is an abundance of literature on the intervention strategy and processes of implementation in a rather narrow sense. Indeed, literature in the field is heavily geared towards ‘output’ (e.g. training of soldiers in human rights) and ‘outcome’ (e.g. soldiers are respecting human rights in their activities) of interventions, rather than whether any peacebuilding impact on the society in a broader sense can be detected.

The societal impact is particularly relevant for assessing more comprehensive interventions (even if some evaluators and researchers claim that only output and outcome should be assessed, not impact). However, as pointed out by Woodrow and Chigas (2008), impact needs not be elusive and unreachable, too long-term or impossible to assess, but can be identifiable in everyday occurrences. Such understanding is also consistent with the OECD-DAC’s definition of impact as including: ‘the primary and secondary, direct and indirect, positive and negative, intended and unintended, immediate and long-term, short-term and lasting efforts of the effort’ (quoted in Woodrow & Chigas, 2008, 19). Importantly, ‘if projects are not accountable for how their interventions contribute to the broader peace, one runs the risk of investing a lot of time, resources, and effort in programmes with excellent outcomes, but that make no measurable difference to the conflict’ (ibid).

Impact assessment is a difficult task. Research has shown that in terms of actually measuring the results and impact of peacebuilding some of the most important (methodological) weaknesses include: the general lack of planning (i.e. a conflict analysis was often missing as a foundation to develop and implement the intervention); often there is a weak connection between the conflict analysis and intervention itself (and in some cases the conflict analysis is completely missing); the goals of intervention are often so general and vague (‘contribution to peace’) that they are not measurable, and it is very difficult to evaluate their impact (Spurk 2008, Woodrow & Chigas 2008). Hence, a proper impact assessment requires planning and conflict analysis (including the extent of regionalisation of conflict). The intervention thus needs to be planned and designed before it is implemented (it is at least very difficult to get solid answers about impact when such assessments are carried out in retrospect). Furthermore, impact assessment requires understanding of causality,
or at least ‘a convincing estimate of causal relationship’ (Svensson & Brattberg 2008: 24), and this requires ‘a theory of change’, which is able to explain how and why a particular intervention will contribute to broader peace and security. Impact is frequently expressed in terms of the success or failure of an intervention. There is however no consensus among academics, policy makers or recipients of intervention as to what constitutes or explains successful intervention; assessments are subject to bias and politicisation. Our framework seeks to problematise the way the EU defines the success or failure of its engagements. We need to acknowledge a general weakness of the way success and failure is defined and how impact is assessed. The first general weakness is that interventions are often predicated upon very sweeping definitions of ‘successful’ outcomes, and are justified with morally charged and normative propositions by interveners, such as human rights, human security and the responsibility to protect. The strategies adopted by interveners are justified on the basis that they lead to greater security, stability and development of the targets of intervention and/or of the global community. Such rhetoric usually emerges from a western philosophical tradition (Der Derian 1995) that clothes raw economic and political interest. Notions of success are thus deeply embedded in cultural values and politico-economic interests; they are always ambiguous, meaning one thing for those loyal to the values of a global ‘outsider’ community, and another for those who identify themselves as ‘insiders’ (Rubinstein 2005). Notably, the values and understandings of those for whom the impact of intervention is experienced as largely excluded from interveners’ definitions and measures of success.

This behaviour can be explained by the fact that it is politically expedient for interveners to claim that their initiative has been successful, regardless of its real effects. Many broad-based international interventions arise from the assumptions of the ‘liberal peace’ model – that democratisation, human rights, liberal market economics and the integration of societies into the global community bring peace and stability (MacMillan 1998). Success then tends to be measured according to how closely these objectives have been achieved, rather than according to how intervention has impacted upon the everyday worlds of the targets of intervention – particularly the less visible. By paying attention to actors that are usually invisible in the formulation of success and failure, we seek to problematise prevailing conceptualisations and discourses of success and the frameworks of analysis, design and evaluation that sustain them. Finally, impact assessment then needs to be related to the effect on the EU’s identity and projection as a peace and security actor. Thereby, we are able to identify both sides of the coin: one that identifies the actual output, outcome and impact in terms of increased peace and security in the regional conflict itself, and the other that identifies the status of the EU’s capacity and identity as a global peace and security actor.

The case of the EU as a defender of human rights has also been affected by the unexpected outcomes of some of its own policies most notably in its handling of migration. The prevalent security approach undertaken by the EU and Member states presents weaknesses on many fronts. First of all, some of the EU’s practices regarding the removal of irregular refugees are often found to breach human rights conventions. EU’s practice of relying on third states and authoritarian regimes
to help establish a more effective migration control regime often tends to conflict with such international law principles as non-refoulement. In several cases, guarantees given by such states and regimes have proved not to be worth the paper on which they are written.

While the view is widely held that there is need to strengthen capacities in refugee-generating countries, the process which the EU has adopted has so far not yielded desired results. Collaborative activities between the EU and USA (such as data-sharing, screening and profiling etc.) arguably geared towards a more robust migration control often lead to allegations of "fortress Europe-USA". In some instances, such practices have been perceived as encouraging discriminatory practices.

The EU's strategy for handling its anti-terrorism campaign has not fared well either. Quite naturally, the EU's strong subscription to democratic values means that it eschews the use of violence to canvass political views. Consequently, the EU disownces entities such as Hamas, the PKK given their propensity to adopting violent means to press home their demands. However, the drawback of this strategy is that what some might regard as the legitimate democratic claims (and one might say, gains) of such entities Hamas, for instance, its winning a democratic election, are perfunctorily ignored or rebuffed by the EU which prefers to deal with the entity from a security premises.

The EU-standards begin to unravel. However, when one considers its approach to entities that seemingly fall into the same cauldron as Hamas. A case in point here will be the manner in which the EU often responds to the Russian/Chechen crisis, especially regarding terrorist attacks by one on another. When a terrorist attack on the Chechen Parliament occurred in October 2010, the EU's appeal for a greater cooperation with Russia in fighting international terrorism fell on deaf ears in Moscow: the Russian leadership believed that the EU favoured Chechen campaign against Russia's stability.

That said, one should not underestimate some of the immediate impacts that the EU's involvement has had. This is particularly so in its direct engagement on the ground either through its delivering of humanitarian aid (as was the case in the Gaza strip for example) or through the deployment of fully fledged ESDP missions (as was the case with the deployment of EUFOR Chad/CAR). With these instruments the EU has effectively been able to address some of the security problems even though it has been at a very local level and usually within a limited time-span linked to the duration of the mission itself. Focusing on the EU missions deployed under the Common Security and Defence Policy, those being designed as short-term interventions can be assessed positively. Both the EUFOR Chad/CAR mission and Artemis in the DRC had very limited mandates focusing mainly on the stabilisation of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in a geographically confined area within a short-time period. However, those missions seen within a rather long-term perspective and broader mandate are considered to be less efficient and successful.

For the European Union to establish itself as a globally recognised leader, its acceptance by external actors and international organisations is essential. Effectiveness and consistency are highly
relevant in this context, as bad performance will cast doubts about the capacity and willingness of the EU.

In terms of cooperation with regional organisations, the situation in the Horn of Africa highlights that although the AU and the IGAD generally welcome the cooperation with the EU, there are difficulties to cope both with the EU’s demands and expectations. Furthermore, approaches followed by the EU do not necessarily conform to the position held by the AU or IGAD as the example of Omar al-Bashir’s indictment by the ICC highlights. While the EU supports his indictment, the AU’s and IGAD’s position is that this has made negotiations on the conflict in Darfur more difficult and problematic. In addition, Sudan has become even less willing to cooperate with the EU, for example withdrawing from the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. In contrast to the African cases, the impact of EU’s security governance in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict manifests itself in the way the EU is understood by the core parties of the conflict. Thus, the Israelis believe that the EU is supporting the Palestinian Authority while the Palestinian Authority in turn believes that the EU supports Israel. In other words, the impact can be understood as distrust for the EU by both core parties to the conflict.

Furthermore, any success in outcome, output or impact is diminished by bureaucratic ineffectiveness resulting from the complex and demanding institutional set-up of the EU. Although the EU tries to be present on the ground not least through its Commission Delegations, inadequate exchange of information between the Delegations hampers effective policy implementation. Also increasing the ineffectiveness of EU’s security governance are the hierarchical and complicated relationships between Brussels and the field level due to the multitude of actors, an overlap of bilateral and EU policies and top-down approaches from Brussels. All this is further exacerbated by weak staff competence which implies that there are mainly inexperienced junior employees deployed to the most difficult settings where senior experts avoid to be deployed due to the difficult working and living conditions.

While the EU is resolute in its fight against terrorism and commitment to democratic governance, the Union has not been able to translate these ideals into support for those who desire them most. Rather, its machinery for social and political transformation continues to target elitist networks of government officials. Activists in Egypt and across the Mediterranean have been attempting to fill in this void through the flourishing of an independent civil society and other social networks: In the case of Egypt, bloggers have been quite efficient in this regard. Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan formed the Agadir Initiative in 2002 to provide for free trade between these four countries, with the European Commission providing technical support for its implementation. Underlying such an initiative is however the flawed assumption that somehow economic development will automatically lead to political change, stability and security in the Mediterranean. This has been the ‘European talk’ and message that Arab regimes have been only too happy to oblige and transmit to their societies.
With regard to human rights violations, the EU's handling of human rights issue reveals inconsistencies and double standards in its actual policies for the promotion of human rights, especially in the haphazard use of CFSP instruments (2001). On a number of occasions, analysts have demonstrated how the widely heralded goal of human rights' protection and promotion has been sidelined due to other (more compelling) interests, such as economic advantages, commercial gains and security (Olsen 2000, Youngs 2001, Balfour 2006). Not surprisingly, the EU has traditionally shown a greater zeal in resorting to punitive measures for violations of human rights in those regions of the world where it has ‘the upper hand’, particularly in the ‘poor, marginal countries’ of sub-Saharan Africa (Smith 2001: 193). In spite of differences and contradictions, the EU's discourse appears to have been coherent at least in so far as it has lived up to the ‘people first’ principle underlying the human security doctrine. However, when it comes to criticising and holding human rights abusers accountable, the EU's double standards manifest more conspicuously, thus undermining its credibility as a human right defender.
new multilateralism will no longer be the exclusive preserve of states, nor will it be hierarchically organised in highly institutionalised organisations. The proliferation of multilateral regimes in the last two decades is shaping a ‘Multilateralism Mode 2.0’ characterised by the diversification of both the multilateral playing fields and multilateral actors. This more open multilateral system brings with it more opportunities for the EU. To take advantage of them, however, it needs to first come to grips with a new situation where asymmetries, variable geometries and one of a kind agreements will be the rule, rather than the exception. The EU must be steady in its promotion of multilateralism as an ideal, but extremely flexible in its multilateral practice, and find ways – for which EU governance seems particularly well fitted compared to the traditional diplomacies – to engage with legitimate subnational, multinational and transnational non state actors and their networks. At the same time, it must find innovative ways to address the problems of absent, competing, obsolete or ineffective multilateral structures that exist both at the regional and global level.

2. DEALING WITH A MULTIPOLAR WORLD OF REGIONS.

When engaging with regional organisations the dream of a ‘world of regions’ modeled on the image of the EU often results in a fixation on institutional questions, as a consequence, when institutions are absent or fail, a lack of strategic vision. The
kind of institutional support that has benefitted both small subregional organisations, such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, and much larger ones, such as the African Union, are investments that should not be lightly abandoned. But the EU institutions must be flexible enough to work with other institutional structures or simply to create alliances with groups of countries that are promoting multilateral solutions in their regions and on the global scale, such as those of Latin America and of Africa. The parallel between the EU and other regional organisations, however, should not be replaced with a tendency to see the EU in constant comparison with the USA and the emerging powers, trying to act as their mirror image, or adopting their behaviour and, even less, their interpretation of power. The sui generis character of the EU is a strength in global multilateralism, and should not be abandoned lightly.

3. INTERNAL DECISION-MAKING DETERMINES THE ABILITY TO SUCCEED IN MULTILATERALISM.
The close compatibility between European Integration and multilateralism does not mean that the EU will automatically succeed as a multilateral player; indeed, the complex internal negotiations to reach a common position can make it much harder to play a decisive role in global multilateralism. Of the many reasons that explain the difficulties the EU has in global multilateral settings, the one which stands out is its lack of internal cohesion. The stark contrast between the EU's ability to play a role in trade negotiations in the WTO compared to the fiasco at the 2009 Copenhagen UN Climate Change Conference, for example, illustrates the point. If it wants to become a successful multilateral player, the EU must expend more effort using the combined capabilities of the EU institutions and of EU national diplomacies to convince third parties, and less time negotiating amongst EU member states.

4. SINGLE VOICE, SINGLE CHAIR.
The EU is more successful in global multilateralism when it has a unified voice; the best way of ensuring this simple voice is often, but not always, to occupy a single, EU chair. This could be particularly important in the UN Security Council, as well as the IMF, the World Bank, the Contact Group for the Balkans, the G20, the P5+1 negotiations on Iran's nuclear programme, the Minsk Group and numerous other multilateral fora. This issue is extremely sensitive for member states, as illustrated by the efforts of some EU member states to sit at the G20 table when it was activated. However, it is no longer acceptable to consider membership in international organisations and in smaller multilateral fora (such as contact groups) a crucial issue of sovereignty when so many decisions that affect both citizens' lives and national politics are already highly integrated. Monetary policy is, given the current situation, the most blatant example. The EU is needed to solve many global issues, and a normative argument in favour of a single strong voice should be made to politicians and citizens to circumvent the monopolies that national diplomatic services guard at an unacceptable cost in terms of both increasing European influence and solving urgent global challenges.

5. MULTILATERALISM IS A STRATEGIC CHOICE WHICH SERVES EU INTEREST.
Success in multilateralism must not be judged only from a purely normative perspective – multilateralism as an objective per se – but also for its effectiveness, or lack thereof, in the production of public goods and the advancement
of EU goals. But EU interests must not be too
narrowly defined. Contradiction between values
and material interest is a common concern for
EU policymakers and analysts. When the value at
stake is the promotion of multilateralism, however,
this contradiction is often more apparent than
real. When seen in wider perspective, both of time
and of issues, promoting multilateral frameworks
at the expense of some immediate material
interests is rational. Norm-based contexts which
produce multilateral policies constitute a better
environment for the EU than crude power politics,
which test its cohesion and almost invariably put
the EU at a disadvantage. This is one lesson that
EU member states have learned from their own
engagement in European integration and that
the EU as a whole must not forget: strengthening
the system is sometimes worth the loss of an
immediate negotiating goal.

6. COHERENCE IN VALUES DOES NOT CONFER A
HIGHER MORAL GROUND.
Being flexible in the forms and modalities of
multilateralism to circumvent the rigidities of
an exceedingly institutional approach opens the
possibility that the EU be accused of applying
double standards. Coherence is a crucial value for
success in the mid to long term, and the best way
to ensure it is to apply uniformly the principles
and values of the EU. But neither this normative
approach, nor the success of European integration
itself, confer a higher moral ground to the EU in
its relations with individual countries or with
less cohesive and integrated groups of states.
Despite all its efforts to promote regionalism
across the planet, the EU has alienated other
regional groups by stressing its unique level of
integration and demanding special treatment.
Nowhere is this more obvious than at the UN,
when the EU lost a first vote to upgrade its status
and could only win it after backtracking. Smaller
subregional agreements on the peripheries of
the EU, for example in the Black Sea, have shown
that EU policies can make it considerably harder
to maintain, let alone strengthen, looser forms of
integration as the EU privileges its own strategies
(enlargement, neighbourhood) over genuine
multilateral cooperation.

7. THE UNION MUST MAKE SPACE FOR OTHER
ORGANISATIONS IN EUROPE.
Multilateralism is also changing in Europe. The
EU is the most advanced and most successful
expression of multilateralism, but it is not the
only game in town, and it should not behave that
way. Despite the enlargement and neighbourhood
rhetoric, the EU external border has become the
strongest dividing element on the Continent. The
EU needs to rethink its policies in order to open
some space to wider (OSCE, NATO, Council of
Europe) and narrower forms of multilateralism.
This rethink is needed not just to uphold the EU’s
own commitment to multilateral solutions, but
also to avoid a new polarisation on the Continent
(the so-called ‘spectre of a multipolar Europe’)
and the alienation of key players in its immediate
neighbourhood. Even fragile and imperfect forms
of regionalism, such as the ones found around the
Baltic and the Black Sea, can act as steps towards
an EU-style permanent peace. The usefulness of
such weaker forms should not be judged, as the
European Commission tends to do, by whether
their norms and practices are formally compatible
with the EU’s own, but rather by whether they
are helping to produce the changes in behaviour,
attitudes and sense of identity that will provide
the foundation for nonviolent problem solving and
ultimately, a deeper-reaching integration. Some of
the organisations that are not purely regional but
play a role have been overlooked by the EU because
they do not conform to categories of EU foreign relations: for example, GUAM has been overlooked in the post-Soviet space, and the EU has stressed the cooperation that would be ‘desirable’ (for example, in the Southern Caucasus) rather than supporting the one emanating from the countries of the region.

8. THE EU HAS POWER, BUT ITS FRAGMENTATION MUST BE OVERCOME.

The normative drive to promote multilateralism can only be meaningfully satisfied when the EU develops the required capabilities. ‘Market Power Europe’ has been used to describe a powerful set of capabilities in economic issues, in particular those related to trade. But in other areas, this power is mostly fragmented and diffuse. The EEAS should provide a new arm to the EU’s activity in regional and global multilateral forums; nonetheless, its impact will remain limited for as long as the member states’ diplomatic services continue to keep substantial parts of their own multilateral engagement disconnected from the EEAS and from other EU institutions. From intelligence to public diplomacy to military force, the EU’s multilateral involvement is limited by not having its own capabilities. In the case of peace missions, member states not only have to contribute the capabilities, but even to fund their own participation. Further development of CSDP, including a common mechanism for financing missions and further joint military and civil capabilities will be crucial to increase the preparedness and effectiveness of EU action. The good news is that the indispensable (and most expensive) capabilities exist already at the hands of the member states, and they just need to be made operational in a joint manner, as ESDP/CSDP missions have shown in places like the Balkans, Africa and the Indian Ocean.

9. THE EU MUST LOOK OUTWARD AND BE PREPARED TO LISTEN AND TO LEAD.

There is growing demand for multilateral policies in the global and regional arenas for an increasing number of issues, from the fight against climate change to disease control. The USA has shown awareness that unilateralism is seldom the way to go, and the emerging powers still prefer systems that will constrain the West. There is, therefore, demand for more multilateralism and, arguably, demand for a larger European role. One thing the Euro crisis proves, for instance, is that the whole world wants a strong Euro and a strong EU in international monetary affairs. This stronger European role can only be played in a substantial way that is consistent across a broad spectrum of issues if the EU acts as a cohesive actor. In this most challenging hour of European integration, when the main achievements of the EU are under unprecedented tension, the Union can not afford to look exclusively inwards. Nor can it delegate its role in shaping global multilateralism to unpredictable combinations of the larger EU member states.
Conclusion: the EU as a focused, flexible and fast actor in peace and security

As would have been noted from the foregoing sections of this report, there is no doubt that the EU earnestly desires to play a critical and important role in global and regional peace and security in an environment of multilateralism. It is beyond controversy today that multilateralism is the way forward in dealing with some of the most daunting challenges and threats to human security. The benefit of effective multilateralism to states is as assuring as the dividends of democratic and security governance are to a world of multipolarity.

Certainly, effective multilateralism will necessarily require the diminishing and downsizing of the much-cherished principle of state sovereignty: each state that desires to be a partner in an effective multilateral system unavoidably accepts the relaxing of its grip on some of the traditional frontiers of sovereignty. Collapsing individual states’ will and predilections under a regional or international organisation in the name of multilateralism implies a high level of trust that such an organisation shall deliver what the states ask of it through its constitutive instrument or state practice.

Together, there are three determinants that shape the role and influence of the EU as a global-regional actor in peace and security: willingness, capacity and acceptance. Willingness relates to the power that member states entrust upon the EU. Whatever the ambitions of the EU are, the need to be in tune with the positions of its member states is crucial. Capacity refers to the organisational capacity and operational experiences. This implies not only resources but also sophistication of command structures. Acceptance relates to the place of the EU in the geopolitical reality and the multilateral playing field. This includes the institutional collaboration with the UN but also its relations with the different powers of today’s multipolar world.

The EU has proved to be a formidable aspirant to effective multilateralism. In several aspects, it has adopted legal regimes and installed mechanisms towards ensuring that it continues to play a critical role in global and regional peace and security and continue to guarantee the trust placed in it by its member states. Nonetheless, the EU has not always got it right. And much remains to be done. In order to continue to be relevant and effective, the EU must be more ambitious and daring in its approach; it must step out of its comfort zone and embrace new prospects. In doing so, the EU needs to be purposeful and expedient. In short, it will serve the EU a great deal of purpose if it stays focused, remains flexible, and acts and reacts fast whenever situations arise. This approach is
what the EU-GRASP project refers to as the ‘triple F’ approach: Flexible, Focused and Fast, which concepts are articulated below in seriatim.

**FLEXIBLE**

One major criticism that has been levelled against the EU is that it often fails to take into account the individual dynamics and particular contexts of the partners it engages with. Instead, the tendency is for the EU to adopt a one-size-fits-all strategy, which is more often counterproductive. ‘Rigidity’ would frequently be injurious to dynamism in a multilateral environment, just as unbridled fluidity could equally threaten cohesion and undermine solidarity. What the EU requires, is to temper its often-stifling obstinacy with some flexibility. This will not only enable the organisation to constantly evolve and adapt its strategies in consonance with developments around the world, such a process will also inspire confidence and increase trust among its partners.

As a regional organisation, the EU has had a tendency to emphasise inter-regional dialogue. This has brought forth some achievements and should be continued. However, the EU should endow itself with strategic approaches that would allow it to enter into interactions with a much wider variety of actors that make up the international environment. The focus should be on groups of states with multilateral ambitions, as well as on international organisations, especially the UN system.

**FOCUSED**

As would have been noted from the case studies covered in this project, the EU clearly aspires to be an ubiquitous player in the field of peace and security. This is commendable. However, the EU does not have unlimited human and financial resources. Therefore, rather than risk becoming something of a jack of many trades and master of none, the EU should be more selective in its choices. While one may not prescribe for the EU exactly the thematic areas it should focus on -as an organisation the EU certainly knows where its strengths lies – we are of the opinion that the EU should be guided by various considerations in coming to decisions as to what and what not to include in its docket. However, ‘focusing’, as proposed by EU-GRASP, should not be mistaken for tepidity, or that the EU should stay condemned to those issues where it is always guaranteed some level of success even with minimal efforts.

**FAST**

Finally, the enlargement of the EU to its present strength of 27 members definitely bodes well for the organisation at least, as far as ventilating the ideas of the EU across Europe is concerned. As the aphorism goes, the more the merrier, and certainly even more so for Europe. However, the more is not necessarily the merrier for the EU-decision making process. Multilateral institutions are often propelled by national rather than collective interests of member states. The complex nature of CFSP decision-making process in the EU system does not help the matter. Debates are often endless resulting in either actions not being taken in time, taken at all, or taken outside the CSFP framework. It is tempting to suggest that core decision-making in the EU should be left to a group of states. While such a surrogate process will certainly reveal the lack of internal cohesion within the EU, it may in the short-term help to prevent stalemates and impasses. Were this option to be adopted, it will enhance EU’s decision-making processes and will mean that decisions are reached much faster.
It will be naïve to assume that ‘fast’ is an easy, ready-made option. To start with, the process for determining which group of states can competently take decisions on behalf of the whole EU should be expected to be as vitriically controversial as possible. Nonetheless, it is possible that with increased promotion of common values by EU institutions, increased information exchanges, dialogue and coordination among member states, the EU decision-making process becomes more expedient. Thus, for now, what the EU should focus on is developing mechanisms that can help it achieve a faster turn-around time in decision-making. A good start might be for the organisation to rid itself of the notorious, procedural complexities that characterise its systems. The institutional transformations resulting from the Lisbon Treaty, if made fully effective, have the potential to enable the Union to act in more timely and coherent way.


Controls of Scientific Development, Dordrecht: Reidel.


