Final Report on Regional Conflict

June 2011
EU-GRASP

Changing Multilateralism: the EU as a Global-regional Actor in Security and Peace, or EU-GRASP in short, is an EU funded FP7 Programme. EU-GRASP aims to contribute to the analysis and articulation of the current and future role of the EU as a global actor in multilateral security governance, in a context of challenged multilateralism, where the EU aims at “effective multilateralism”. This project therefore examines the notion and practice of multilateralism in order to provide the required theoretical background for assessing the linkages between the EU’s current security activities with multi-polarism, international law, regional integration processes and the United Nations system.

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The EU as a Peace and Security Actor in Regional Conflict:
The Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa, Sudan-Chad-CAR and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

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Introduction

‘Regional conflict’ has proved to be a particularly important security issue for the EU, not least since the Union has been actively involved in a large number of such regionalized conflicts around the world. The European Security Strategy (ESS) has become an important framework for the EU's role as a global peace and security actor, highlighting both present and future global challenges and key threats to international security. Some of the main global challenges are related to that "security is a precondition for development” and that “a number of countries are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty” (European Union 2003:4). Key threats are defined as Terrorism, the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Organized Crime, State Failure as well as Regional Conflicts (the two latter not least due to their ability to exacerbate the three former).

Four regional conflicts have been selected for inclusion in this study: The Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa, Sudan-Chad-CAR and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. These cases have similar characteristics in the sense that they all defined as complex “major armed conflicts” that have been going on for more then several decades (see for instance UCDP at www.pcr.uu.se). The conflicts have serious security ramifications for the neighbouring countries, thereby forming a regional
security complex. They have also strong repercussions on global peace, (resulting in discussions in the UN security council) and involving a range of external parties and third-party actors. The four cases have, obviously, also different characteristics. They are geographically differently located in relation to the EU. Each case has very different importance to other important global players (the USA, UN, China etc), with important effects on ‘securitization’ and the nature of the security threat. The idea is to analyse whether EU practises differ in different circumstances. Case selection is a compromise between ‘examplifying cases’ within a multiple cases approach (whereby cases are selected that are rich in information) and a reasonable degree of ‘sampling’ in order to produce generalizable conclusions, at least insofar as the sample covers some of the main examples of EU involvement in regional conflict outside Europe (main exceptions include Iraq and East Timor). The four cases should enable us to draw some conclusions on the EU’s role in regional conflict and the security issue per se, while at the same time enable comparison with other traditional and new security issues in the other workpackages.

The study is structured as follows. The next section discusses why, how and when regional conflicts become security issues. The third section describes the four cases and the evolution of the different regional conflicts, namely the African Great Lakes Region (GLR), the Horn of Africa, the Chad-Sudan-Central African Republic (CAR) region as well as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The article then moves on, in the fourth section, with comparing the four cases using the analytical framework, which is built around three components: EU Speak; EU Security Governance, and Impact. This leads into a concluding and general discussion about the EU as a peace and security actor, lessons learned and implications for the future resulting from the Lisbon Treaty.

**Regional Conflict as a Security Issue**

The first question to be raised is how regional conflict becomes a security issue. On a general level, the EU defines regional conflict as a threat to peace and stability throughout the world. Any actor that is involved in a conflict – in this case a regional conflict – makes certain assumptions about the logic and dynamics of the conflict, who the actors are, and what needs to be done in terms of external engagement and intervention. These are complex questions, for which there can never be straightforward or purely objective answers, and by implication all conflicts are, at least to some extent, ‘constructed’. As pointed out by Christou et al. (2010: 21), critical questions are: How and why has this issue been constructed as security? What sort of security logic was constructed for this issue area and how was it constituted and legitimised? And what actors are involved in this
construction? Through considering these questions we are equipped to understand how the EU sees the regional conflict in security terminology. Furthermore, and depending on how the EU defines, constructs and securitisés the (regional) conflict, we can judge whether the conflict incorporates old security issues, primarily linked to state security, or whether the EU emphasises human security aspects (for instance risk of refugee flows to Europe, etc.).

According to the ESS, regional conflicts “impact on European interests directly and indirectly.” Furthermore, “violent or frozen conflicts (...) threaten regional stability. They destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructure; they threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights. Conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides opportunities for organized crime. Regional insecurity can fuel demand for WMD” (European Union 2003:4).

Thus, the ESS highlights the close interconnectedness of regional conflict and other security threats and key challenges (such as state fragility, terrorism, and WMD). Further emphasized is the significance of security as precondition for development. Hence, the ESS directly links to and reinforces the discourse on the security-development nexus and further highlights the interconnectedness of conflict, insecurity and poverty. By doing so, a guideline for any potential European approach is outlined by stating that dealing with the older problems of regional conflict is considered to be the most practical way of dealing with new threats which are often elusive (European Union 2003).

The EU considers the changes in the post-cold war era, with its new opened borders as the main reason for understanding regional conflicts as a security threat for Europe and the world. The changing shape of conflicts (today intra-state rather than inter-state conflicts prevail) and their spill-over effects make regional conflicts one of the most challenging security threats (Solana 2004). It was in 1992 that the EU, and in particular the Council, began talking about new security threats highlighting regional conflicts and thus, adopting a multi-level approach to deal with them. The Mediterranean area was considered to be priority, where the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (IPC) was part of the wider regional security threat (Altunişik 2008). Thus, the EU concluded that ‘Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase’ (Solana 2004:54).

In addition to the discourse about the security-development nexus, the discourse on human security is of particular importance in relation to the EU’s construction of conflict on the African continent. In EU’s more general speak, the Human Security Doctrine for Europe comes out quite explicitly. This
doctrinal acknowledges in particular the various links between regional wars and human security: “New wars have no clear boundaries. They tend to spread through refugees and displaced persons, through minorities who live in different places, through criminal and extremist networks.” It is further stated that “the tendency to focus attention on areas that are defined in terms of statehood has often meant that relatively simple ways of preventing the spread of violence are neglected” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities 2004:18). The conclusion drawn from these aspects acknowledges that “a regional focus (...) has operational implications” (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities 2004:19).

Evolution of the cases

The Conflict in the African Great Lakes Region/DR Congo

The relations between the EU and the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are first and foremost regulated by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) which was implemented in 2000 and revised in 2005 and 2010. Although poverty reduction is the main objective of the CPA, the agreement is based on the idea that “without development and poverty reduction there will be no sustainable peace and security, and without peace and security there can be no sustainable development” (Cotonou Partnership Agreement 2010: 6). In other words, EU policies towards Africa build primarily on the security-development nexus discourse which is also emphasized in the European Security Strategy (ESS) from 2003.

Five years after the adoption of the ESS, the report on its implementation entitled Providing Security in a Changing World was published in 2008. Again, there is a strong focus on the security-development nexus. Within this discourse, state fragility is emphasized in close connection with conflict. It is mentioned that countries such as Somalia and the DRC are “caught in a vicious cycle of weak governance and recurring conflict” (European Union 2003:8). State fragility is then closely linked to human security, which is another central concept guiding the Union’s approach regarding the implementation of the ESS. In other words, the ESS and the EU’s security speak is built around two rather general and closely connected discourses: the discourse about the security-development nexus and the human security discourse. These two discourses recur in various EU documents and provide the framework for the Union’s involvement in Africa, such as The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership in 2005 (Council of the European Union 2005b) and The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership in 2007 (Council of the European Union 2007).
How does EU speak about and manage the regional dimension of the conflict? As early as 1996, the interconnectedness of the countries in the African GLR was acknowledged by the EU through the appointment of Aldo Ajello as the very first EU Special Representative (EUSR). The EUSR’s objective was initially “to assist these countries in resolving the crisis affecting their region; and to support the efforts of the UN and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), as well as those of regional leaders and other parties, aimed at finding a lasting and comprehensive peaceful solution to the political, economic and humanitarian problems facing the region” (Council of the European Union 1996:Article 1). Thus, the EU acknowledged the on-going conflict as regional although by that time, no European foreign policy as such existed towards the GLR (Grevi 2007). Further, the importance of multilateralism, meaning coordinated approaches with the UN and the by then OAU was highlighted by the Union as prerequisite to find comprehensive solutions for the region as a whole. However, this regional and rather nuanced ‘speak’ was counteracted by the practices in the domain of development cooperation. The EU’s development cooperation with what was then Zaire was interrupted in 1992 due to a “lack of progress in the political democratization, the high degree of corruption, the economic mismanagement and the differences between the member states in their policy” (Hoebeke, Carette et al. 2007:5). It took another seven years until the first EU mission was implemented in the DRC. A considerable change in the EU’s approach occurred at the beginning of the 21st century following the signing of the Sun City Peace Agreement in 2002. By then, the Commission resumed its development cooperation with the DRC and there was a shift in focus from conflict settlement to peace building and political transition.

At present, the overall objective of the EU is to further stabilize and to support the reconstruction of the country. The Commission, for example, provides roughly € 584 million under the 10th European Development Fund (EDF) covering the period from 2008 until 2013 (Government of the DRC and European Commission 2008). In terms of Council activities, five civil and military missions which have been deployed in the DRC since 2003 have to be emphasized: the two military missions ARTEMIS and EUFOR RD Congo in 2003 and 2006 as well as the civil missions of EUPOL Kinshasa (2005-2007), EUPOL RD Congo (2007-2011) and EUSEC RD Congo (2005-2011). The EU’s goals and policy declarations (EU speak) are highly stated. However, the EU’s patterns and practices of

\footnote{The distribution of the provided funds results from the objectives outlined in the so-called Country Strategy Paper (CSP). Therefore, 50% of the money provided is targeted at infrastructure issues while 25% focus on governance aspects. The remaining funds are divided between the health sector (10%) and unclassified aspects (15%) which include among others environmental aspects and the management of natural resources as well as the support of regional economic development and integration (Government of the DRC and European Commission 2008).}
security governance are utterly complex. As illustrated in Figure 1, a vast number of different institutional actors are involved in security governance with regard to the DRC.

**Figure 1: Institutional Actors of the European Union in Brussels and in the DR Congo (2010)**

The figure illustrates the institutional actors in Brussels and in the field which are directly involved in security governance in the DR Congo, with particular reference to the provinces of North and South Kivu. Since the figure is simplifying, it does not pretend to be exhaustive.

Source: [Lurweg 2011].

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2 The figure illustrates the institutional actors in Brussels and in the field which are directly involved in security governance in the DR Congo, with particular reference to the provinces of North and South Kivu. Since the figure is simplifying, it does not pretend to be exhaustive.
This pattern also reveals that the EU's official discourse is not in tune with its really practices of security governance. The EU repeatedly refers to the conflict in the GLR as a ‘regional conflict’ which implies ‘that a lasting solution to the continuing crises in Eastern DRC will be possible only within the framework of cooperation at regional level’ (Louis Michel, press release 20 January 2009). One important problem is that such statements ought to have been emphasized much earlier. The fundamental problem is two-folded. First, there is a poor understanding of the complexity of the regional conflict. The European policy community tend to use state-centric rather than ‘regional’ lenses. This is connected to the second problem, namely that the EU’s own bureaucratic machinery is so complex and state-centric, that it is not flexible enough to design regional security governance mechanisms that stretches across national boundaries.

**Horn of Africa**

In line with the establishment of a formal European foreign and security policy in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, the EU became deeply involved in the regional conflict prevailing in the Horn of Africa. Regarding the stability of the region, the Ethio-Eritrean conflict was considered to be among the most detrimental (Plaut 2004; Lyons 2009). During that war, both parties actively sought support from their respective neighbouring countries and mutually tried to undermine the others capacity most notably by backing dissenting rebel groups. Thus, far from being restricted to the battle-field along the disputed parts of the border, the confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea soon extended to the entire region (Cliffe 2004).

Eventually, the war was put to an end after a decisive military victory of Ethiopian armed forces which led Eritrea to accept the terms set out from Addis Ababa and to negotiate a peace settlement under the auspices of Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, who was then OAU President. The negotiated agreement included among others the deployment of an UN Peacekeeping force along the border, the referring of war claims and the border demarcation to international legal bodies (Zondi and Réjouis 2006:74). Although the fighting on the border was put to an end, both parties continued to engage in a variety of actions aimed at undermining its neighbour (Lyons 2009).

This display of animosity did neither facilitate the task of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) nor the approaches of other international actors. The EU, among others, has been closely monitoring the evolution of the situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea expressing its concerns for the negative regional consequences of the conflict and its difficult as well as fragile
resolution (Presidency 2000). Moreover, as one of the Guarantors of the Algiers Agreement that put an end to the war, the EU was directly involved in the post-conflict process. Thus, the EU had together with the other guarantors of the agreement (Algeria, the OAU/AU, the US and the UN) the responsibility to ensure the compliance with the provisions included in the document. Some EU member states also became involved more directly in the post-conflict process, for example the Netherlands providing a large part of the initial UNMEE peacekeeping force.

Thus, the EU’s involvement in the settlement of the Ethio-Eritrean war demonstrates the growing interest of the EU in being involved in peace and security issues in the Horn of Africa. Still, in these nascent years of the ESDP, the EU lacked a proper framework guiding its actions. Therefore, and based on its experience in the GLR and in the Balkans, the EU puts a particular emphasis on supporting the work of the UN in stabilizing the peace and security situation, and EU officials regularly saluted the close cooperation between the two institutions (European Commission 2003; European Union 2003).

Besides close cooperation with the UN, the EU supports the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and therefore established the African Peace Facility (APF) to channel funds into both capacity building projects and AU peacekeeping operations (European Commission 2004). The EU’s engagement with the African continent is further strengthened through the Joint Africa-EU Strategic partnership from 2007. In fact, the Horn of Africa became the first region for which the EU adopted a specific framework dealing with peace and security issues. It thus became “a test case for applying the EU-Africa Strategy” (European Commission 2006:4). Various documents were prepared by the EU to lay the ground for coordinating its policy with regard to the Horn. For instance, in 2006, the Commission produced a Communication on an EU Regional Political Partnership for Peace, Security and Development in the Horn of Africa (European Commission 2006). This Communication not only outlined the need for solving the peace and security problems in the Horn, but it also highlighted the strategic importance of the region for the EU. The Commission’s views were further strengthened by the European Parliament’s report on the Horn of Africa of 2007, stressing the need to profoundly engage with the Horn of Africa region in order to support peace and stability (European Parliament 2007). Eventually this led to the adoption of the Council document ‘An EU Policy on the Horn of Africa – towards a comprehensive EU strategy’ in 2009 (Council of the European Union 2009).

This new EU strategy for the Horn most importantly stressed the need to engage with a political solution for the region as a whole rather than providing band-aid solutions to conflicts and security
problems taken in isolation. Thus, from the Commission’s Communication up to the Council’s EU strategy, the close interconnectedness of the various security issues affecting the entire Horn of Africa region has been highlighted ([European Commission 2006:5-6; European Parliament 2007:5; Council of the European Union 2009:7-8]). Furthermore, it was stressed that a broad approach involving the existing African regional organisation was needed to solve the problems (Council of the European Union 2009:17). Therefore, “Increasing the capacity and political commitment of the AU, IGAD and other sub-regional organisations to play a key role in regional stabilisation is a high priority in the regional partnership” (European Commission 2006:8).

Moreover, the EU strategy for the Horn identifies different threats which are both linked to the regional conflict and of particular concern for the EU. In the Council Strategy for the Horn it is recognised that “A prosperous, democratic, stable and secure region, in which respect for human rights and international humanitarian law is ensured, is in the strategic interest of both EU and the countries in the Horn” (Council of the European Union 2009:9). In particular, the EU identified migration, terrorism and criminalisation (such as piracy) as threats which developed out of the fragility of the states in the Horn (European Commission 2006:6-8). Regarding migration, the EU has been concerned by the number of refugees in the region and particularly regarding the increasing numbers of refugees trying to enter the EU (European Commission 2006; Council of the European Union 2009).

Another security aspect is linked to the growing fear that the anarchical situation in Somalia could serve as a breeding ground and safe haven for terrorists. This perceived security threat is intensified not least by the growing significance of Al Shabab in Somalia since 2007 and their apparent radicalisation in line with their potential linkages to Al Qaeda. Furthermore, piracy has come to the fore since the number of hijacked ships along the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden has skyrocketed since 2007. To respond to this security problematic, the EU deployed its first naval mission, EUNAVFOR Atalanta, in 2009, while some of its member states had already become active before (Council 2008; Germond & Smith 2009; Helly 2009).

The piracy problem brought Somalia back into the focus of the international community and the EU itself acknowledged that the answer to the piracy problem in the region was not to be found in the seas but in the interior of Somalia (Council of the European Union 2010a). The EU therefore decided to step up its efforts regarding Somalia through increasing its support to the on-going efforts of the IGAD and the AU as well as regarding the AMISOM force that had been deployed in Mogadishu. Furthermore, the European Commission adopted a large scale support programme
providing both humanitarian aid and support to the governance sector in Somalia (European Commission 2009). In parallel, the EU gave financial support to the training of troops of the TFG and further deployed military advisors (Council of the European Union 2010b; Council of the European Union 2010c). Moreover, this endeavour was undertaken in a truly regional way as the trainings were conducted in other countries of the Horn, namely Djibouti and Uganda (EUTM 2010).

**Sudan – Chad – CAR**

While Sudan has been engulfed in the North-South war since the 1960s, Chad endured a brutal civil war during the 1980s that also saw the involvement of several of its neighbouring countries including Libya, Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR) (Marchal 2006: 469-470; Debos 2008; Flint & De Waal 2005). The more recent conflict in Darfur has its roots both in the past politics of the Sudanese state regarding its Eastern province but also in the unstable and somewhat volatile regional complex that ties together Sudan, Chad, CAR and other neighbouring countries (Marchal 2006; De Waal 2008; Debos 2008).

The conflict in Darfur itself erupted in 2003 and attained its culminating point in 2004. The conflict was triggered by rebel attacks led by the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Both the SLM/A and the JEM have claimed to represent the Darfuri population, in particular the Furs and the Zaghawas, which had been marginalised by the central government in Sudan (Flint 2007). These attacks were soon retaliated by the government in Khartoum which sent in troops and used local militias, the so-called Janjaweed, to suppress the rebellion. Both the governmental troops and the militias were then responsible for much of the violence, killings and human rights violations that occurred in 2003 and 2004 (Slim 2005:814). This soon led to a massive exodus of the local population trying to reach some safe haven either in neighbouring Chad or in camps for internally displaced people (IDP) in Darfur.

It is also at that time that the international community picked up increasing interest in the conflict in Darfur, especially linked to its ethnic and religious undertone, as well as the large scale humanitarian crisis that it had provoked. The war in Darfur was often described as pegging Arabs/Muslims against Blacks/Non-Muslims, the former being led by the government in Khartoum while the latter representing the majority of the population in Darfur (Mamdani 2009). In fact, several actors on the international scene, headed up by the then US Secretary of State Colin Powell,

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3 The population in the Darfur is mainly composed of Furs, Zaghawas and Masalit which can be found on both side of the border between Chad and Sudan.
labelled the conflict in Western Sudan as ‘genocide’ (Powell 2004; Mamdani 2007). However, such a reading of the situation was not shared altogether by the international community. The UN as well as the EU, for example, refused to consider the war in Darfur as genocide but recognised the high level of violence and the exactions that were being committed as being a crime against humanity (Luban 2006).

By that time, the relations between Sudan and the EU were quite strained and the EU had already suspended its development aid to Khartoum when Omar al-Bashir became president in a military coup in 1989. Moreover, the EU, like other international actors, was particularly concerned in securing a deal between North and South Sudan ending the decades-long war (Slim 2005:822). Thus, rather than adopting a confrontational approach, the EU sided with the on-going efforts of the international community to resolve the conflict in Darfur through backing the negotiation attempts between the Sudanese government and the Darfuri rebel groups (Slim 2005:822). From the onset, the EU recognised the leadership of the AU in the negotiation process between the Darfur rebels and the Khartoum government and supported the deployment of an AU mission in Darfur at a later stage (AMIS) (International Crisis Group 2005; Franke 2009:257). A specific role was further held by the then EU Special Representative for Sudan, Pekka Haavisto, who represented the EU during the various negotiation processes such as the Abuja talks (Council of the European Union 2005a). Additionally, the EU adopted embargos on arms, munitions and other military equipment on Sudan (Council of the European Union 2004). Based on a report written by members of the European Parliament who went on a fact finding mission to Sudan in 2004, the discursive description regarding the situation in Darfur was tightened describing the exactions committed in Darfur as “tantamount to genocide” (European Parliament 2004). By that time, the conflict on the ground had been exacerbated. Whereas 2003 and 2004 mark the height of the Darfuri conflict in terms of casualties, the situation slowly evolved from a local conflict to a protracted war across the border between Chad and Sudan in 2005. Within Chad, the political situation had been aggravated and opposition to President Idriss Déby was mounting (Marchal 2006:476-477; Massey and May 2006). Eventually, several rebel groups based in the east of the country, close to the border with Sudan, decided to join forces and launched a rebellion against the government in N’Djamena. This rebellion effectively threatened the authority of President Déby by using the neighbouring Darfur and north-eastern CAR as rear bases for launching their attacks (Massey and May 2006:445). The beginning of the insurgency in eastern Chad also marked the deterioration of the relations between Chad and Sudan (Marchal 2006; Tubiana 2008).
Sudan had been suspicious of a Chadian backing of the Darfur rebels most notably because the president of Chad is himself a Zaghawa like the leadership of both the JEM and the SLM/A (Marchal 2006:479). In retaliation, the Khartoum government began providing some tacit support to Chadian rebels that operated close to the Sudanese border. The situation in the region therefore turned into a proxy war between Chad and Sudan that was fought on both sides of the border almost escalating to an open inter-state conflict (Marchal 2006). Despite eventually signing the Tripoli agreement to resume normal relations, both Sudan and Chad continued to provide support to rebel groups operating in the neighbouring country with the aim of destabilising the respective government (Tubiana 2008).

In addition to destabilizing Chad, the conflict in Darfur also impacted upon the Central African Republic. While the political and security situation in CAR had been notoriously unstable, the country was also severely affected by the wars that had been waged in the neighbouring countries and in particular by the war in Chad during the 1980s and the conflict in the DRC during the late 1990s and early 2000s. In 2003, with the help of Chad, the former rebel François Bozizé, staged a coup d’état in CAR and became president but failed to resolve the security problems in the country (Debos 2008; Mehler 2009). Most particularly CAR remains engulfed in a low intensity rebellion in the north-eastern part of the country close to the borders with Sudan, Chad and the DRC. Thus, the arrival of several thousands of refugees from Darfur increased the fragility of the situation given the incapacity of the Bangui government to impose the rule of law (Mehler 2009).

In response to the escalating regional dimension of the conflict fuelled by spill-over effects, the EU started taking a keen interest in the situation in Chad and CAR besides Sudan itself. Under the impetus of France, a traditional protector of Chad and CAR, the EU decided to deploy an ESDP Mission to protect civilians, particularly refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), as well as UN personnel and equipment, and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid in eastern Chad and north-eastern CAR (Council 2007).

The EU’s decision to send troops to Chad and CAR reflected the European frustration regarding the inability of the AU mission to secure the region and was understood as a direct response regarding the security concerns in the area close to the Sudanese border.\(^\text{5}\) Thus, the EUFOR mission was

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\(^4\) It should be noted though that despite being a Zaghawa, President Idriss Déby is from a different clan that the leadership of JEM and SLM/A

\(^5\) On multiple occasions Sudan had shown its reluctance in fully collaborating with AMIS II and in implementing the provisions of the agreements reached in the negotiations in Abuja (Mansaray 2009: 38-40;
aimed at ensuring safety for a transitional period until the United Nations mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) would take over the tasks of ensuring the security of refugees and IDPs.

Whereas the EU was able to deploy its troops in Chad and in CAR, the unwillingness of the Sudanese government to see ‘westerners’ operating in its troubled province, prevented or deterred any large scale involvement of the EU within Sudan (Gya 2010: 13). Thus, the EU was backing the efforts of the AU undertaken within Sudan through providing both financial support, for mediation efforts and the deployment of AU troops, and technical support including the deployment of technical advisors to help the AU accomplish its mission (Franke 2009, Pirozzi 2009). The fact that the EU eagerly provided support to the AU’s work in Sudan illustrates EU’s vision that African regional organisations become credible peace and security actors effectively tackling the security problems of the African continent (Segell 2010). From the very beginning, the EU emphasized that the AU’s engagement with the Darfur crisis was the most promising solution to solve the conflict: Consequently, the EU welcomed the AU’s decision to deploy a mission in Sudan – not least against the increasing concern of the AU regarding the human rights situation in Darfur. This force, initially aimed at being an observation mission, became the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) being mandated to monitor conflict and the cessation of hostilities but also to ensure the compliance with human rights (Boshoff 2005).

After realizing the daunting task at hand and the difficulty of accomplishing its protection mission given its very small size (only 600 soldiers were initially deployed), the AU Peace and Security Council decided to expand the mission and to refocus its mandate towards the protection of the population thus becoming a peacekeeping operation. The EU soon adopted a Joint Action to step up its support to the renewed AMIS including financial as well as technical expertise in terms of airlifts, logistics support and training but also deploying European military and police experts since “the EU considers that strengthening the EU-AU partnership is the best way to help improve security in

Williams 2006). The EU was favouring the transfer of the peacekeeping operation to the UN once the mandate of AMIS had expired. However, Sudan staunchly refused the idea of a UN operation in Darfur and managed to render ineffective the UN Security Council Resolution 1706 which called for the deployment of a 20 000-strong UN force (BBC News 2006a). It was not until a year later that the UN was able to adopt a new resolution to establish this time a hybrid mission with the AU (known as UNAMID) and, by doing so, receiving the approval of the Sudanese government (De Waal 2008: 442). Nevertheless, the UNAMID mission was to be only deployed within Sudan and did not have a mandate to address the security situation and the destabilisation in the neighbouring countries.
Darfur” (Council 2005, 2009). The total assistance provided by the EU and its member states to AMIS is estimated to have totalled more than 500 million Euros (Council 2008).

The EU continued to support the peacekeeping efforts in Darfur when the mission was transformed from a solely AU into a hybrid AU-UN mission known as the United Nations/African Union Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The EU welcomed the establishment of UNAMID as it had witnessed the inability of AMIS to undertake a task that was too important for its size and capacity (Franke 2009:257). The mandate of UNAMID was mainly to protect the civilian population from physical violence and violations of human rights. Although the resolutions that framed the mandate of UNAMID made reference to the ongoing tension with neighbouring Chad and CAR and the risk of destabilising the entire region, the mission itself was again strictly restricted to the situation within Sudan (Resolution 1769 and 1828). Nevertheless, the regional dimension of the conflict was taken into account both by the AU, the UN and the EU as outlined in a Council Conclusion stating that: “EUFOR Chad/RCA is a key contributor, together with the UN mission in Chad (MINURCAT) and the UN/AU mission in Darfur (UNAMID), to bringing security to the region and, by consequence, contributes to the efforts to consolidate peace and reconciliation in the region” (Council 2008).

Although at present, the tensions between the countries involved have decreased and the conflict in Darfur has been reduced to a scale of low-level violence, the region remains high on the EU agenda, particularly against the background of the successful referendum on the independence of South Sudan which was held in January 2011. Repeatedly, the EU has expressed its concern regarding the evolution of the situation within Sudan but also regarding the wider region (Council 2010d).

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The EU speaks about the IPC as a major security priority. The EU’s general and long-term goal is a two-state solution where Israelis and Palestinians live side by side in peace. In order to reach this general goal, the EU has defined a series of short- and medium-term achievements with a desired long-term impact. The EU perceives itself as a mediator and a diplomatic actor, who aims to assist in establishing various forms of dialogue between the core actors (i.e. Israel and Palestine, as well as the neighbouring Arab states). Simultaneously, the EU has taken over the role as a ‘development provider’, in particular in relation to the Palestinian side, i.e. the Palestinian Authority. Trade is

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6 UNAMID would comprise around 20 000 military personnel and 6 000 police personnel compared to the less than 4000 of AMIS.
another peace building tool that the EU uses in order to gradually build relationships between the core parties to the conflict, and with the EU itself.

Regarding the EU’s approach to peace and security in the Middle East, there are three main policy documents: the Venice Declaration of 1980 (acknowledging Palestinians’ right to self-government and PLO’s right to involvement in peace negotiations), the Berlin Declaration of 1999 (as a commitment to support the creation of a Palestinian state with permanent status in its talks with Israel), and the Road Map for Peace in 2002 (as a framework towards solving the IPC and creating lasting peace and security in the Middle East). Worth to mention is in addition the EU’s support in the Annapolis process and the EU Action Strategy for the Middle East Peace Process in 2007. Overall, ‘The European Union recognises Israel’s irrevocable right to live in peace and security within internationally recognized borders. At the same time it recognises the need for the establishment of a democratic, viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian State on the basis of the 1967 borders, with the possibility of minor adjustments through land swaps, Jerusalem as a shared capital, and a just and acceptable solution to the refugee issue’. 7

The EU’s official documents repetitively use a critical discourse against Israel, accusing it for conducting unacceptable and counterproductive acts towards the Palestinian population, such as settlement constructions and the closure on Gaza. Hence, the EU ‘calls for an urgent and fundamental change of policy leading to a durable solution to the situation in Gaza’. 8 At the same time, the EU acknowledges Israeli security concerns and condemns all sort of Palestinian violence against the Israeli population.

On a general level, the EU’s political security governance strategies in the ME peace process include:

- Political and economic relations, through association agreements and ENP Action Plans with Israel, the PA, Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt (and potentially also with Syria).
- Regional dialogue forums, through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, including all parties of the conflict to meet and discuss several issues (which are not further specified).
- EU’s participation in the Quartet (with the US, Russia and the UN), particularly supporting the Road Map, providing financial and human resources to the office of the Quartet

representative Tony Blair, and conducting dialogue with third countries on the ME peace process (Catherine Ashton).

- Consultations with all partners of the region (including the Arab League).
- Regular formulation of policy statements by the EU foreign ministers and the European Council.¹⁹

The mechanisms the EU intends to apply to implement its overarching strategies in the ME peace process include:

- Being the main financial supporter to the Palestinian population (European Commission and EU member states).
- Creating regional peace, stability and prosperity through humanitarian and emergency aid (through UNRWA and the PEGASE mechanism), state-building activities as empowering the PA, complementing PA plans, developing the penal and judiciary system as well as the police force through the EUPOL COPPS mission and supporting the Palestinian private sector.
- Offering different kinds of assistance managed by the EC Technical Assistance Office in Jerusalem.
- Organizing customs and trade into the Palestinian territories and within the PA.
- Border assistance between Gaza and Egypt through the EUBAM Rafah mission.
- Organizing dialogue between the European Commission, Israel and the PA regarding policy on trade, transport and energy.
- Supporting different civil society projects (“people to people” projects).²⁰

In addition and specifically regarding peace between Israel and Palestine, the EU highlights its standpoints regarding the five final status issues in its speak, namely (1) borders (in accordance with UNSC Resolutions), (2) settlements (as illegal according to international law), (3) Jerusalem (not stating the status of the city), (4) refugees (supporting a just, viable and agreed solution to the issue, but does not state how) and (5) security (condemning all sorts of violence as spoiling peace attempts and urging the Israeli government to act according to International law).²¹

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¹⁹ http://eeas.europa.eu/mepp/political/political_en.htm
²¹ http://eeas.europa.eu/mepp/eu-positions/eu_positions_en.htm
Comparison

Adhering to the framework of the EU-GRASP project, the comparative analysis is conducted through a prism consisting of three components: ‘construction’ (Speak), ‘security governance’ and ‘impact’ of the EU’s role in the various regional conflicts and the links between these components. The first section on EU Speak implies an analysis on how the EU discursively constructs the security issue of regional conflict in the four cases. The EU’s Security Governance implies an analysis of the general structure of security governance taking into account the crucial distinction between Brussels and field level (‘who is doing what?’) as well as short-term and the long-term governance practices. The third step in the analysis is to consider the relationship between the discursive construction of the security issue and the practices of security governance, hence, the relationship between ‘speak’ and ‘security governance’. A key question is whether the Union’s security governance strategies follow the discourses constructions through the Speak? The fourth step in the analysis is to assess the Impact of EU’s security governance (both regarding the impact on the regional conflict itself as well as on the EU itself).

EU “speaks” — The EU’s construction of regional conflict

Strong similarities can be detected when comparing the discourses applied by the European Union in the four regional conflicts especially between the three African cases. The Middle Eastern case stands a bit on its own, which is hardly unsurprising and which will be explored in detail below. Regarding the three regional conflicts on the African continent, the EU’s policies are based and constructed around the security-development nexus and the human security discourse. As already mentioned, these discourses have been developed during the last decade both in Africa-specific documents, for example in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, and on a more general level in the European Security Strategy and its Implementation Report as well as in the Human Security Doctrine. Furthermore, the discourse on state fragility has gained importance, mainly as a component of the discourse on the security-development nexus. Questions of human security are high on the European agenda for the African continent due to the fact that conflicts frequently either provoke or exacerbate the devastating humanitarian situation in conflict prone areas. As the example of the conflict in Darfur shows, aspects of human security and the broader security situation are closely linked: while the European Union’s focus was initially on the humanitarian situation, the security situation came more and more into focus during 2004 when the EU was getting increasingly aware of the ethnic character of the conflict.
State fragility is the dominant theme recurring in the regional conflicts in Africa. As far as the Great Lakes Region is concerned, the DRC is considered to be the core party of the regional conflict. Particularly the eastern provinces of the DRC are affected by on-going fighting between the Congolese army and various rebel and militia groups from the DRC itself but also from neighbouring countries, such as Rwanda (FDLR) and Uganda (LRA), reinforcing the regional character of this conflict. The DRC is an example of a fragile state built around a patrimonial system and a dysfunctional state bureaucracy.

In the Horn of Africa, the situation can be understood as “the result of a combination of bad governance and weak state capacity and (...) the existence of failed states.” Furthermore, “these factors are seen as particularly detrimental to the socio-economic development of the countries in the region” (Fanta, HoA, 20). Thus, it is feared that spill-over effects may fuel other security issues, such as increased migration, rise of terrorism, criminalisation and, particularly in that region, an increasing number of pirate attacks. Further, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons becomes more likely. As outlined earlier, the conflict in Darfur was in addition characterized by severe human rights violation, widespread violence and the ethnicization of the conflict. Of particular interest is furthermore the conflict within the Sudanese state and the way forward following the successful referendum for a separation of the southern from the northern part of the country.

In contrast to the security-development nexus and human security discourse dominating the EU's Africa policy, the EU has adopted a somewhat different security approach in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (IPC). The IPC is a main security priority for the EU, and it emphasises a two-state solution to end the conflict. This approach is clearly reflected in the Venice Declaration (1980), the Berlin Declaration (1999) and the Road Map from 2002.

Differently expressed, while the main effort regarding the regional conflicts in Africa is the stabilization of the region and the fragile states, the aim of EU's engagement in the IPC is the establishment of two secular as well as democratic states. The EU's main concern in the IPC is the concessional struggle over territories. Thus, regarding the IPC, the main short-term goal is to end direct violence, while the long-term goal is future Palestinian statehood. Of particular concern are questions regarding the sovereignty over Jerusalem, Israeli settlements in the West Bank, the Palestinians right to return and the Palestinian state borders. Unresolved are in addition questions of democracy and human rights.
As a result, the EU’s self-perception in the African versus the Middle Eastern context is different, which leads to different roles for the EU. On the African continent, the EU understands its role as being both an indirect and direct actor – as a supporter and financier of regional organizations (AU/IGAD/UN) and as a significant actor in the rather traditional fields of humanitarian and development assistance, but also increasingly in the sphere of security policies through the deployment of civil and military missions under the CSDP. Furthermore, the EU takes over a mediating role, for example as guarantor of peace agreements but also through the deployment of Special Representatives. While the EU acts substantially as an important development provider in the IPC, its role is also of a diplomatic nature assisting the core actors to establish various forms of dialogue. In doing so, it also has invested resources in civil society, and the grassroots levels, to build support and peace capacities from below.

Summing up, the comparison shows strong similarities of EU’s ‘speak’ in African regional conflicts and a different approach to the IPC. The Union’s discourse towards Africa is affected by its normative understanding of the interconnectedness of security and development as well as the emphasis on human security. Consequently, the EU highlights, at least rhetorically, the necessity to stabilize the regions through peacebuilding and state-building approaches. Even though there is also an emphasis on a (Palestinian) state-building approach, EU's speak towards the IPC is focused on dialogue as the mean to achieve a two-state solution to end the conflict. In the IPC, the EU perceives itself as one of the core diplomatic actors while in Africa, the focus is placed on cooperation with African regional organizations and the UN as well as the provision of humanitarian and development assistance.

It is striking how the EU is promoting itself as a normative actor advocating human rights and democracy. In all cases (including the IPC), the normative raison-d’être for the EU is to promote human rights and democracy in societies with high rates of violence. In the African cases, in which the state- and peacebuilding approaches are applied, the end-goal is to establish democratic societies. In the IPC, Israel is seen as a democracy, and the Union therefore promotes that Palestinian state to be built and established should also become democratic. Hence, a huge amount of EU funds have been invested in efforts trying to establish a democratic PA.

**EU Security Governance**

The key question in this section is how the EU’s construction of a particular regional conflict informs EU’s security governance. Which actors and agencies are involved, and what institutions,
tools and instruments are utilised and implemented? What role does the EU ascribe for itself in broader security governance; in particular, is it part of multilateral security mechanisms (especially the UN), or is it part of an autonomous mechanism? What does that mean in terms of the legitimacy and legality of the peace operations? Have these security structures changed over time, and in relation to the security logic? (Christou et al., 2010, 22-3).

Crucial in this regard is furthermore whether and to what extent the central institutions of the EU, especially the Commission and the Council, as well as the EU member states are working together and coordinating their policies and activities. This is considered as a crucial prerequisite for the EU to emerge as a coherent actor in global peace and security.

As a methodological contribution, a distinction between the two levels of security governance will be introduced: what we refer to as the European level—comprising of Brussels and the various capitals of the EU member states—and the field level. This distinction is relevant because our focus is not simply on the policy strategies or the discourses as these are defined and constructed in Brussels and the European capitals—what the EU and its member states say they are going to do regarding security governance—but also what takes place in practice, “on the ground” (in the field) in the specific sites of our study. Our claim is that there is often a certain discursive, even rhetorical dimension of security governance played out on the European level that is not transferred accordingly to the field level.

In the following analysis, we continue to compare the four cases in relation to EU’s security governance. With regard to the IPC, the EU member states have not always had a consistent view regarding the conflict itself and its causes. However, the diverging views have gradually become increasingly coherent and synchronised over time. At the same time, some of the historical differences in member states’ views on the IPC continue to play a role in internal discussions on how to form EU’s security governance towards the regional security complex as a whole and also towards Israelis, Palestinians, and the neighbouring countries. Against this background, it can be stated that the EU holds an anti-violence position highlighting diplomacy and negotiations as the normative principles. Consequently, its strategies imply political and economic relations, the establishment of regional dialogue forums as well as the Union’s participation in the Quartet. Further, consultations with all regional partners are high on the agenda and policy statements are formulated regularly on EU level. At the same time, the EU has a number of bilateral relations with the IPC actors. Many EU member states, such as Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the UK often have their own bilateral agreements with the IPC actors. As will be elaborated below, these vertical
security governance strategies can sometimes strengthen EU security governance, but often create contradictory and blurred actions vis-à-vis the IPC.

EU member states’ interests also play a crucial role in EU’s security governance in Africa. The role of both France and Belgium as former colonial powers has to be highlighted but other member states also pursue their specific interests particularly in the Great Lakes Region. This is not least due to the fact the DRC and especially its eastern part is described as ‘the big power house in terms of natural resources’. Thus, bilateral policies are implemented by various member states in addition to EU policies targeted at the different regions. Furthermore, EU policies, especially in the sphere of security policies, are highly influenced by national member states’ policies. In Chad and the Central African Republic, for example, French troops were involved in the on-going fighting due to French security concerns.

Focusing however on the approach followed at EU level, a strong regional approach in the Horn of Africa as well as in the Sudan-Chad-CAR conflict becomes visible. In both cases, the EU closely cooperates with the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The cooperation between the EU and the AU has for example been reflected in the extensive support the EU gave to AMIS, the AU Mission in Darfur which was founded in 2004. Not least against the background that the Sudanese Government was unwilling to accept “westerners” operating in Darfur, the EU recognised the AU’s leadership from the outset on. Consequently, the EU was backing the efforts of the African Union undertaken in Sudan in terms of both financial and technical support. At the same time, the EU has deployed several own civil and military missions under the CSDP to the various conflicts in focus. As highlighted before, five civil and military missions have so far been deployed to the DR Congo. Furthermore, since 2007, the naval mission EUNAVFOR Atalanta has been operational to combat piracy along the Somali coast and from 2008 until 2009 the EUFOR Chad/CAR mission fulfilled its task to protect civilians, secure the delivery of humanitarian aid and to bridge the gap until the UN mission MINURCAT was finally taking over these responsibilities.

Focusing on the cooperation between the EU and the IGAD, the Union directly supports programmes to address rather general peace and security issues while it also provides assistance during the negotiation processes over Sudan and Somalia. Both the cooperation with the AU and IGAD highlights the European Union’s understanding that regional organizations are best suited to deal with aspects of peace and security within their regional scope. Nevertheless, the EU shows presence in the various capitals through keeping EU Delegations which are responsible for securing
the delivery of humanitarian aid and development assistance while at the same time provide for political representation of the European Union in the respective countries. In addition and to take account of the regional dimension of the conflict, several EU Special Representatives were appointed.

Consequently, it can be concluded that the EU takes the regional character of the conflicts into account in its discursive constructions and understandings of the conflict. In security governance the EU places emphasis on collaboration with African regional organizations and/or through the UN. Still, it is a somewhat messy picture and not that easy to find uniform patterns. There are important differences. As mentioned before, the EU rhetorically acknowledges the conflict in the Great Lakes as being regional but practically focuses more or less exclusively on the DRC n security governance practices. This conclusion can be drawn despite the fact that the EUSR for the GLR plays a crucial role being considered as the only ‘true’ regional tool the EU applies. Furthermore, the example of the GLR questions the effectiveness of cooperation (and also intentions of such cooperation) between the EU and regional organizations. In the Great Lakes Region, the EU established links with and financially supports the ‘Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries’ (Communauté Économique des Pays des Grands Lacs, CEPGL) despite the fact that the organizations’ success is negligible. This highlights the problematic that the EU has found it very difficult to successfully engage in the context of a regional conflict where there is the absence of a credible regional counterpart. Consequently, and in contrast to the lip service paid in Brussels, the EU, in the case of the GLR, has not been good in dealing practically with cross-border issues and the regional dimension of the conflict primarily because the EU’s approach has been resolutely nation-based focusing on the DR Congo.

Consequently, the analysis highlights both similarities especially between the three African cases but also points out shortcomings in EU’s security governance which were detected regarding the Union’s approach towards the GLR and more specifically the DR Congo in the course of field work carried out in Brussels as well as in the Great Lakes Region. Thus, a discrepancy between the Brussels’ rhetoric and its implementation of security governance on the ground has been detected which will be further scrutinized in the next subsection.

**Relationship between EU Speak and EU Security Governance**

The preceding comparative analysis of ‘EU Speak’ and ‘EU Security Governance’ has already brought up shortcomings in terms of the implementation of security governance strategies
following the Union’s discursive logic. But how does the relationship between EU Speak and EU Security Governance look in detail?

The most obvious gap between the construction of the security issue, i.e. the regional conflict, and the security governance strategies of the European Union becomes visible in the empirical analysis of the case of the Great Lakes Region. While a regional logic is followed in terms of ‘EU Speak’, the actual implementation of security governance is focused on individual nation-states, primarily on the DRC. Furthermore, the coordination of European development and security policies is inadequate although the Union’s activities in the GLR are driven and informed by discourses on the security-development nexus and the human security imperative. The major reason for this outcome is to be found in the institutional set-up of the European Union causing institutional divisions, overlapping competencies and neglected discrepancies intensified through missing coordination mechanisms. In other words, ‘EU Speak’ is poorly translated into EU ‘Security Governance’ which implies that the EU does not fully exploit its potential as an actor in security and peace in the GLR.

Regarding the situation in the Horn of Africa, it has to be acknowledged that the EU at least tries to get involved with the region as a whole through an intensified cooperation with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). In other words, the EU attempts to address the problems of the Horn of Africa regionally through IGAD. The Union thus follows its own discourses on the importance of cooperating with other regional organizations that have a mandate in peace and security issues. However, this approach implies that the EU has to rely on the capacity and mandate as well as the willingness of IGAD, which in turn does not necessarily correspond to the Union’s ambitions. Therefore, the EU has become more directly involved in the region, for example through the deployment of the Atalanta mission patrolling the Somali coast to constrict piracy. The mission aims further at combating criminalisation and ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid but also reflects the EU’s concern regarding terrorism, state failure and bad governance. Hence, this naval mission, in addition to various development programs with the aim to improve the governance of the state in the region and to prevent state failure, brings together several of the main issues that are pre-eminent in the Union’s discourse on the Horn. Consequently, in the case of the Horn of Africa, EU’s discursive speak and its subsequent security governance strategies seem to be less divergent compared to the GLR.

Focusing on the Sudan-Chad-CAR triangle, the EU clearly highlights human security challenges in its Speak, namely the devastating humanitarian situation, and seems to translate these concerns into concrete action. Examples are the Union’s direct military involvement in the case of the EUFOR
mission as well as the support of the UN-AU hybrid UNAMID mission. These two operations aimed at improving the security and thus living situation of the population. However, this EU involvement is not unproblematic. The Union’s understanding of the conflict in the region as a spill over effect of the conflict in Darfur directly impacts on its subsequent activities. In other words, the deployment of the EUFOR mission essentially focused on protecting the IDPs and refugees of the Darfur conflict while not taking into account the wider context and the on-going conflict and political crisis in Chad and CAR as being independent of the conflict in Darfur. As a result, EUFOR has been accused of being deployed to help President Déby in his fight against the rebels from Eastern Chad instead of addressing the root causes of the conflict in the region. Finally, and similar to the situation in the Horn of Africa, the EU also tried to concretize its discourse on collaborating and supporting other international organisations in the case of the regional conflict around Sudan, Chad and CAR. The EU clearly sided with the AU and supported its endeavour in solving the crisis most importantly by providing financial, human and technical resources for the AMIS and UNAMID missions. However, the AU has at times criticised the EU’s involvement and collaboration as being inadequate and not always very helpful.

When it comes to the IPC, we see that due to EU’s inabilities to have a coherent actor capability, not least due to conflicting positions among the EU members themselves, the capacity to shift its security governance policies either comes too late or not at all. Several EU member countries take sole actions in the IPC, on behalf of their governments but as EU members. The most recent action was taken by Germany in November 2010, asking the USA to force an Israeli settlement freeze. Also, the EU’s impact in the conflict zone itself creates several warning signals but seemingly do not reach Brussels in time, or are not convincingly enough for the located EU officials to signal to Brussels on necessary changes. This implies that we have a Brussels security governance logic working and acting in accordance to its previous security discourses and multilateral understandings. Moreover, there exists the IPC security governance logic on the ground acting with a different pace and understanding. Also, the EU is acting contradictory in the field in relation to its normative overarching principles and along the same lines with the dilemmas they face with its perception of being a ‘force of good’ (Barbé and Johansson-Nogués 2008). This creates a view of an unclear EU position at best, and it does also lead to double standards in the eyes of the IPC conflict parties, making it utterly difficult for the EU to become a trustworthy mediator in the conflict. Consequently, and although the EU seems to try to at least partly translate its discourses into practice, the resulting impact remains in many cases questionable which will therefore be further scrutinized in the next chapter.
Impact of EU Security Governance

Impact assessment constitutes the third component of our framework. As noted above, whereas a rich menu of tools is available for the analysis of security governance, impact remains more weakly theorised and far less understood. Drawing on Christou et al., key questions include: What is the impact and influence of the EU’s security logic(s) and governance on any security issue, such as regional conflict? What role has the EU played? What effect has the outcome and impact of the security governance practices had on the EU’s identity and projection as a peace and security actor? In other words, has the EU managed to increase its global status as a valuable and effective peace and security actor (Christou et al., 2010, 23)?

The first step of such an analysis is to identify the EU’s goals and the underlying assumptions of the EU’s involvement in a particular intervention (i.e. the EU’s speak and construction of the conflict). The next step is to make a fundamental distinction between output, outcome and impact. As mentioned in the section on security governance, there is an abundance of literature on the intervention strategy and processes of implementation in a rather narrow sense. Indeed, literature in the field is heavily geared towards ‘output’ (e.g. training of soldiers in human rights) and ‘outcome’ (e.g. soldiers are respecting human rights in their activities) of interventions, rather than whether any peace-building impact on the society in a broader sense can be detected. Impact is of course difficult to assess. The criteria for assessing impact are contested. For instance, should impact be assessed in relation to the mandate of the peace operation, the size of the operation or through broader criteria, such as peace impact or saved lives? Yet, as pointed out by Woodrow and Chigas (2008), impact needs not be elusive and unreachable, too long-term or impossible to assess, but can be identifiable in everyday occurrences. Such understanding is also consistent with the OECD-DAC’s definition of impact as including: ‘the primary and secondary, direct and indirect, positive and negative, intended and unintended, immediate and long-term, short-term and lasting efforts of the effort’ (quoted in Woodrow and Chigas, 2008, 19). Importantly, ‘if projects are not accountable for how their interventions contribute to the broader peace, one runs the risk of investing a lot of time, resources, and effort in programmes with excellent outcomes, but that make no measurable difference to the conflict’ (ibid).

Research has shown that many peace operations and activities are poorly planned and that impact is largely absent from planning. In particular, often there is a weak connection between the conflict analysis and the peace and security operation itself (and in some cases the conflict analysis is completely missing); the goals of intervention are often so general and vague (‘contribution to
peace’) that they are not measurable, and it is very difficult to evaluate their impact (Spurk, 2008; Woodrow, and Chigas, 2008, Diehl and Druckman 2010).

Needless to say, any security operation needs to be planned and designed before it is implemented (it is at least very difficult to get solid answers about impact when such assessments are carried out in retrospect). Furthermore, impact assessment requires understanding of causality, or at least ‘a convincing estimate of causal relationship’ (Svensson and Brattberg, 2008, 24), and this requires ‘a theory of change’, which is able to describe/explain how and why a particular intervention will contribute to broader peace and security.

Impact is frequently expressed in terms of the success or failure of an intervention. There is however no consensus among academics, policy makers or recipients of intervention as to what constitutes or explains successful intervention; assessments are subject to bias and politicisation. Our framework seeks to problematize the way the EU defines the success or failure of its engagements. We need to acknowledge two general weaknesses of the way success and failure is defined and how impact is assessed.

The first general weakness is that interventions are often predicated upon very sweeping definitions of ‘successful’ outcomes, and are justified with morally charged and normative propositions by interveners, such as human rights, human security and the responsibility to protect. The strategies adopted by interveners are justified on the basis that they lead to greater security, stability and development of the targets of intervention and/or of the global community. Such rhetoric usually emerges from a western philosophical tradition (Der Derian 1995) that clothes raw economic and political interest. Notions of success are thus deeply embedded in cultural values and politico-economic interests; they are always ambiguous, meaning one thing for those loyal to the values of a global ‘outsider’ community, and another for those who identify themselves as ‘insiders’ (Rubinstein 2005). Notably, the values and understandings of those for whom the impact of intervention is experienced as largely excluded from interveners’ definitions and measures of success. This behaviour can be explained by the fact that it is politically expedient for interveners to claim that their initiative has been successful, regardless of its real effects. For these and related reasons, it may sometimes be difficult to disentangle speak/discourse from security governance and from impact of security governance.

Many broad-based international interventions arise from the assumptions of the ‘liberal peace’ model – that democratisation, human rights, liberal market economics and the integration of
societies into the global community bring peace and stability (MacMillan 1998). Success then tends to be measured according to how closely these objectives have been achieved, rather than according to how intervention has impacted upon the everyday worlds of the targets of intervention – particularly the less visible. By paying attention to actors that are usually invisible in the formulation of success and failure, we seek to problematize prevailing conceptualisations and discourses of success and the frameworks of analysis, design and evaluation that sustain them.

A second and somewhat related feature of many interventions is that they often provoke negative side-effects and that there is a need to question for whom and for what purpose the intervention is actually carried out. Interveners’ criteria for success have been criticized for being narrow and short-sighted, ignoring past experience (Jenkins, Plowden et al. 2006) and broad-reaching (particularly negative) effects. In widely different settings, such as Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Cambodia and Afghanistan, empirical research has shown that intervention can exacerbate or accommodate the inequalities in the target society that give rise to conflict (Duffield 2001; Keen 2005: 177; Kostic 2007; Springer 2009), leaving a culture of impunity in their wake (Fatima Ayub and Kouvo 2008).

More perniciously, researchers have noted that global elites may benefit from this state of affairs, turning a blind eye to the brutal exclusion of the poor by national power-holders (Hughes 2003; Springer 2009). If so, interventions that are successful for ‘outsiders’ may be failing ‘insiders’ in devastating ways. Hence, we find it necessary to include these dimensions in the analysis in order to empirically determine the output/outcome/impact that EU interventions have on regional conflicts.

Regarding the impact of EU’s security governance in the three African cases, it has to be concluded that in general, the Union’s security governance strategies have a rather marginal impact on peace and conflict transformation. Yet, such general statement needs to be nuanced. Focusing on the EU missions deployed under the Common Security and Defence Policy, those being designed as short-term interventions can be assessed positively. Both the EUFOR Chad/CAR mission and Artemis in the DRC limited and rather narrow mandates focusing mainly on the stabilisation of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in a geographically confined area within a short-time period. They were reasonably successful in achieving their rather specific goals. However, those missions with a rather long-term perspective and broader mandate are considered to be less efficient and successful. Needless to say, such broader and more ambitious objectives are also more difficult to achieve.
The EU’s own institutional and bureaucratic limitations go a long way to explain weak impact. Hence, any success in terms of outcome, output or impact is diminished by bureaucratic ineffectiveness resulting out of the complex and demanding institutional set-up of the EU being exacerbated by questions of personalities between Commission and Council actors both in Brussels and on the ground. Although the EU tries to be present on the ground not least through its Commission Delegations, inadequate exchange of information between the Delegations hampers effective policy implementation. The ineffectiveness of EU’s security governance is further increased by the hierarchical and complicated relationships between Brussels and the field as well as the multitude of actors, an overlap of bilateral and EU policies and top-down approaches from Brussels. All this is further exacerbated through weak staff competence, which implies that there are mainly inexperienced junior employees deployed to the most difficult settings where senior experts avoid to be deployed due to the difficult working and living conditions. This further hampers the effectiveness of the European approach.

The impact of the EU’s approach is often negatively affected by a failure to properly deal with the regional dimensions of the conflicts. In spite of some attempts to have regional perspective (through the EUSR) the EU’s security governance is generally designed on state-centric basis. Thus, it can be concluded that the overall impact of the EU as a peace and security actor in the Great Lakes region is diminished due to a strong focus on the DRC (in contrast to the regional perspective emphasised in EU Speak). The lack of a regional approach is also connected to a rather dysfunctional collaboration with African regional organizations.

Even if the EU explicitly seeks to cooperate with African regional organisations, this has been more difficult in practice, which also negatively affects impact of security governance. The situation in the Horn of Africa reveals that although the AU and the IGAD generally favour cooperation with the EU, there are difficulties to cope both with the Union’s demands and expectations. Furthermore, approaches followed by the EU are not necessarily conforming to the position held by the AU or IGAD as the example of Omar al-Bashir’s indictment by the ICC highlights. While the EU supports his indictment, the AU’s and IGAD’s position is that this has made negotiations on the conflict in Darfur more difficult and problematic. In addition, Sudan has become even less willing to cooperate with the EU, for example withdrawing from the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. Apart from these difficulties, it can also be concluded that the EU’s engagement has neither been able to contribute to the diffusion of tensions between the countries in the HoA nor had a noticeable impact on migration issues, terrorism and criminalisation.
In contrast to the three African cases, the impact of EU’s security governance in the IPC manifests itself in the way the EU is understood by the core parties of the conflict. Thus, the Israelis believe that the EU is supporting the Palestinian Authority while the Palestinian Authority in turn believes that the EU supports Israel. In other words, the impact can be understood as distrust for the EU from both core parties of the conflict. Furthermore, a rather ‘hidden’ impact is that the EU has a good mandate within the conflict but is de facto favouring Israel and its strategies being rather contested. This also generates the perception among the IPC actors that the EU has double security standards.

In addition to focusing on the impact of EU’s security governance on the conflict itself, it is of interest to also focus upon the impact on the EU itself. Focusing on the African continent first, it has been repeatedly stated that the interventions are considered as ‘test cases’ – in the HoA testing the regional approach on security and development within the framework of the EU-Africa Strategy and in the DRC, the deployment of military troops on the African continent starting with the operation Artemis in 2003. Thus, it can be concluded that the EU applies its CSDP missions as an instrument to shape EU’s self-image as a global regional actor in security and peace. However, due to the inadequate implementation, it is rather rendered a farce. Further, in the case of the Chad-Sudan-CAR region the EU is distrusted as a consequence of its meddling in the dispute between Sudan and Chad by supporting Idriss Déby, the president of Chad. In addition, the EU has been criticized for its staunch support of the ICC’s indictment of Omar al-Bashir.

**Conclusion: Lessons Learned, The Lisbon Treaty and the Future**

The purpose of this report has been to analyse how the EU is ‘constructing’ regional conflicts (as a security issue), how this leads to ‘security governance’ practices in distinct sites, and the ‘impact’ of these practices on the conflict as well as on the EU itself.

There is an abundance of literature on the EU as a peace and security actor. A conventional view has been that the EU is an economic giant but a political dwarf, with the conclusion that its security policy is weak. But the EU has increasingly become a security and peace actor. One reason for the Union’s increased activity and recognition lies in the contemporary conceptualization of security, which goes well beyond conventional large-scale military threats to include, for example, terrorism, migration, human rights, and state failure. In the face of the multiplicity of new threats, the EU member states have been able to overcome some of their internal differences, which has led to a
consolidation of the EU as a global actor. Similarly, the philosophy that “conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early” (European Council 2003: 7) has precipitated an EU proactivity which in turn has provided the intergovernmental machinery of decision-making with adequate time to respond. However, the mere fact that the EU has been very active in the different regions does not necessarily imply an effective outcome. This report reveals a rather intriguing relationship between Speak-Security governance -Impact.

The African cases presented in this paper, and particularly the cases of the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa are often referred to as ‘test cases’ or as ‘laboratories’ for EU crisis management. This is traced back not least to the fact that in 2003, the ‘Operation Artemis’ in the Congolese town of Bunia was the first EU military mission deployed outside the European continent. Operation Artemis is quite often cited as a ‘success’. However, as a consequence of, among other things, member states’ diverging interests in the region, the EU only managed a half-hearted response to the conflict (Smis and Kingah, 2010). And considering the EU’s role in the GRL more broadly it is possible to conclude that despite repeated declarations by the EU’s that conflict resolution in the GLR is a top priority, the Union proved to be a rather weak actor, divided by institutional incoherence and where Speak seemed to be more important than Impact (Lurweg 2011).

This report shows that the EU’s complex institutional set-up and the institutional wrangling between Commission and Council actors constitutes a major obstacles to the quality of EU as a peace and security actor. Consequently, the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and notably the implementation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) are of specific interest. This newly established committee aims at enhancing the Union’s external actions by integrating Commission and Council officials as well as member states’ diplomats under the authority of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Thus, it aims to tackle the current difficulty of institutional complexity and division by uniting the different entities under one authority. However, since the EEAS has started working only recently, it still remains uncertain whether it will effectively manage to unite the scattered and oftentimes competing resources in the Union’s system of external relations. In other words, the structural conflicts and limitations of the EU system may very well prove to be much more difficult than the formation of EEAS.

A further innovation of the Lisbon Treaty is expected to affect the relationship between the EU and the AU. Hence, it will impact on all cases where the two organizations cooperate regarding peace and security policies, such as in the regional conflict of Sudan, Chad and CAR. Thereby, the
streamlining of the EU foreign policy under the aegis of the High Representative will allow for more coordination of the various actions taken to support the work of the AU in the region. Amongst others, a closer relationship in Addis Ababa will be initiated through the establishment of an EU High Representative Delegation to the AU.

Following this approach and resulting out of the Union’s policy design for peace and security issues in the Horn is the growing awareness from an EU perspective that the Union has so far very little influence over the states in the region. Consequently, the EU stresses the need to make better use of its development aid as a tool to gain influence and as a way to advance its own position. However, this analysis is based on the inaccurate understanding that the delivery of development aid is sufficient to be able to influence the political decisions taken by the receiving states. In order for the EU to become more influential in the region, the Union should rather attempt to understand and take into account the countries’ own interests and expectations. This in turn would imply to focus on the security issues of the Horn not solely from the European perspective.

In terms of lessons learned from the involvement in the GLR, it could, for instance, be of interest to compare the Congolese experience in terms of Security Sector Reform (SSR) with the integrated SSR mission in Guinea-Bissau where the attempt was made to integrate police, military and justice aspects within one mission and to establish cooperation between Commission and Council actors from the very beginning on. This stands in stark contrast to the two separated EUPOL and EUSEC RD Congo missions in the DRC. In other words, the EU is ineffective and even dysfunctional as an actor in the DRC/GRL. The second and somewhat related lesson is that in the case of DRC/GRL it appears that it is extremely important for the EU to be perceived as a peace-builder by the international community (hence ‘doing something’) rather than what it achieves in the ground. In fact, *Speak* is more important than *Impact*.

From the case of the Sudan-Chad-CAR triangle, the EU should take the lesson that it needs to better examine the potential consequences of its policies and activities (no real conflict analysis). The deployment of the EUFOR Chad/CAR mission was initiated without sufficiently discussing the political and security situation on the ground. Thus, the consequence was that the EU was predominantly perceived as not being impartial but following French policies siding with the two incumbent presidents in Chad and CAR. Similarly, the EU’s unlimited support to the ICC should have been reconsidered taking into account the doubts expressed by several actors, including the AU and
the Arab League, concerning potential consequences on any approach negotiating a peaceful solution to the conflict.

From the IPC case the lesson learned is that despite that the Treaty of Lisbon can create, at least on the superficial level, a more coherent EU voice, it remains to be seen if the EU manages to foster a more independent actoriness capacity. The two levels of security governance (in Brussels and on the ground) need to be tuned more coherently in order to avoid confusion for the actors in the IPC. Further, a clear outline of how actions taken on the diplomatic level link with more long-term actions in civil society and on the grassroots levels needs to be better clarified. In the current situation, many EU actions are not understood by the different parties of the conflict, and are at best seen as single small scale actions, but more often as part of a US security logic, risking that the EU will be labelled by the IPC parties as a partial actor. The changes stemming from the Treaty of Lisbon can contribute to a more clear and coherent voice at the top-level. However, the Treaty itself is not enough for the more far-fetching needs to explain to the IPC actors what the EU’s peace and security logic really is all about. Only then can the EU’s stand as reliable mediator increase, and thereby develop as key mediating actor. This could balance the US position on the IPC, enabling a conflict transformation in line with many of the EU normative positions, and thereby take away the risk to be accused of double security standards.
Bibliography


### Appendix: Comparing the four regional conflicts

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Regional Conflicts</th>
<th>African Great Lakes Region/DRC</th>
<th>Horn of Africa</th>
<th>Sudan-Chad-CAR</th>
<th>Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (IPC)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Definition of regional conflict</strong></td>
<td>“Most of the unrest takes place in eastern Congo spilling over to neighbouring countries and thus sustaining the regional conflict in the GLR”</td>
<td>“A regional system of insecurity in which conflicts and political crises feed into and fuel one another”</td>
<td>“The regionalisation of the conflict was not the result of a spill-over of the Darfur conflict but rather the joining of separate crisis – one in Sudan and one in Chad – that found fertile ground in the instability provoked by the situation in Darfur and the neighbouring area”</td>
<td>“The IPC could be defined as regional conflict, or regional security complex that includes the Palestinians (PLO/PA/Hamas), Israel and the neighbouring countries that have been at war with Israel and that had, or still have, parts of their territory under Israeli occupation”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Core issues of the conflict</strong></td>
<td>DRC as a “state without a state” → patrimonial system → state decay → dysfunctional state</td>
<td>Inter-state and intra-state conflicts/proxy wars “situation in the Horn is the result of a combination of</td>
<td>Fragile states Conflict in Darfur: violation of human rights, violence, ethnicization of the conflict, criminalisation of</td>
<td>Concessional struggle over territories: Short-term security concerns: end of direct violence Long-term security</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>bureaucracies</strong></th>
<th><strong>On-going fighting btw Congolese army (FARDC) and various rebel/militia groups (FDLR; LRA; Mai Mai)</strong></th>
<th><strong>bad governance and weak state capacity and (…) the existence of failed states” → spill over effects fuelling of other security issues:</strong> Border disputes Migration Terrorism Criminalisation Piracy Proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW)</th>
<th><strong>the wider region Sudan: conflict between North and South – referendum in January 2011 Humanitarian situation in Darfur and neighbouring Chad (→ refugees) Multitude of rebel groups operating in the area (and supported by neighbouring states)</strong></th>
<th><strong>concerns: future Palestinian statehood (problematic: sovereignty over Jerusalem, Israeli settlements in the West Bank, Palestinians refugees right to return, Palestinian state borders) Democracy + HR Inter-state spill over on intra-state</strong></th>
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<td><strong>EU’s aim</strong></td>
<td><strong>Stabilization and reconstruction of the Congolese state → DDRRR and SSR → humanitarian situation → long-term development</strong></td>
<td><strong>Stabilization of the region to mitigate → migration (refugees to the EU) → terrorism → criminalisation (piracy)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Stabilization of the region → humanitarian situation → mitigate ethnic violence</strong></td>
<td><strong>Two-state solution (secular and democratic states)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EU’s self-perception</strong></td>
<td><strong>Significant actor regarding humanitarian and development assistance as well as regarding the stabilization and reconstruction of the DRC (CSDP missions to support SSR of the DRC) Partner of the UN in terms of SSR Mediator (through the EUSR for the GLR)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Assistance provider for regional organisations (AU; IGAD), the UN and neighbouring states Direct actor through EUNAVFOR Atalanta mission Peace mediator (Guarantor of the Algiers Agreement) Development provider →HoA as “a test case for applying the EU-Africa</strong></td>
<td><strong>Assistance provider for regional organisations as mediation actors and mission providers: AU and AMIS mission, the UN and UNAMID/MINURCAT, as well as supporting neighbouring states Direct actor through EUFOR Chad/CAR mission Guarantor of human security</strong></td>
<td><strong>Diplomatic actor assisting the core actors to establish various forms of dialogue Development provider</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>EU Security Governance</td>
<td>EU tools/support/strategies</td>
<td>EU Member States as Actors</td>
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<td>EU's involvement determined by COM, Council actors and individual EU member states; influenced by EU's strong focus on DRC as main player in the conflict</td>
<td>Regional rather than bilateral approach from the EU side → Cooperation with IGAD and the AU; but: weaknesses of these organizations (link to CEPGL!)</td>
<td>Strong national interests in the DRC: Belgium (former colonial power) France; UK; Netherlands; Sweden/Germany (technical development cooperation);</td>
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<td>EU Commission Delegations</td>
<td>EU Commission Delegations</td>
<td>France: having own security concerns; involvement of French armed forces in the fighting in Chad and CAR → France advocating and spearheading the deployment of EUFOR Chad/CAR</td>
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<td>EUSR for the GLR</td>
<td>EU Troika meetings with IGAD</td>
<td>Historically: diverging views which have gradually become more coherent (6) France: more critical vis-à-vis Israel compared to Germany</td>
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<td>Portugal (political interests in relation to Angola neighbouring DRC)</td>
<td>EU and Multilateralism/Regional cooperation</td>
<td>Cooperation with (O)AU and UN Financial support to CEPGL</td>
<td>Support to AU: funding AMISOM and AMIS Support to IGAD: peace and security programs + assistance during negotiation process over Sudan and Somalia → support to African regional organizations</td>
<td>Support of AU Collaboration between EU led EUFOR and UN led MINURCAT mission Support of ICC in the case of the Darfur conflict</td>
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<td><strong>Impact</strong></td>
<td><strong>Impact on the conflict</strong></td>
<td>Little impact Positive impact: EUSR humanitarian assistance CSDP missions with limited mandate (Artemis) Problematic: strong focus on DRC in practice (state-centrism) Complex institutional set-up of the EU + personalities and enviousness between COM and Council actors → bureaucratic ineffectiveness Hierarchical and poor relationship</td>
<td>Regional organisation (AU, IGAD) welcoming cooperation with EU but finding it sometimes difficult to cope with EU demands/expectations and in certain cases oppose EU’s position (ICC and al-Bashir). Overall, little impact: → Inability to diffuse tensions between HoA states → no real impact on migration, terrorism, criminalisation (Is it because HoA Regional Strategy is EUFOR Tchad/CAR had immediate humanitarian impact BUT only short term involvement. EUFOR as an armed force protecting Idriss Déby and Bozizé and helping them stay in power. EU support of ICC’s indictment of al-Bashir has made negotiation on Darfur more difficult and problematic. And Sudan less willing to collaborate with the EU (withdrawal from Cotonou)</td>
<td>Major impact: Israelis believe the EU is supporting the PA and vice versa Israeli and Palestinian distrust for the EU “Hidden” impact: Good mandate but partially de-facto favour Israel</td>
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<td>Impact on the EU itself</td>
<td>btw Brussels and field level Weak staff competence → junior employees still too recent?) → EUNAVFOR has not stopped pirate attacks agreement).</td>
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<td><strong>Impact on the EU itself</strong></td>
<td>CSDP missions as an instrument to shape EU’s self-image as a global regional actor in security and peace → however: inadequate implementation, weak EU actorness, and visibility rather than outcome most important to EU</td>
<td>HoA test case for regional approach on security and development within the framework of the EU-Africa strategy. To be applied to the other regions of Africa? Improved collaboration with IGAD and AU.</td>
<td>Distrust of EU for its meddling in the dispute between Sudan and Chad (support for Idriss Déby). (African) Criticism of EU’s staunch support of ICC’s indictment of Omar al-Bashir. Scaled-up collaboration with AU (especially for AMIS and UNAMID).</td>
<td>Criticism (public) of the EU from within and gradual increased coherent diplomatic actorness, but partial towards and de-facto favouring Israel</td>
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EU-GRASP

Changing Multilateralism: the EU as a Global-regional Actor in Security and Peace, or EU-GRASP in short, is an EU funded FP7 Programme. EU-GRASP aims to contribute to the analysis and articulation of the current and future role of the EU as a global actor in multilateral security governance, in a context of challenged multilateralism, where the EU aims at “effective multilateralism”. This project therefore examines the notion and practice of multilateralism in order to provide the required theoretical background for assessing the linkages between the EU’s current security activities with multi-polarism, international law, regional integration processes and the United Nations system.

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