The Post-Westphalian State, National Security Cultures, and Global Security Governance

James Sperling
EU-GRASP

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EU-GRASP Working Papers
EU-GRASP Coordination Team: Luk Van Langenhove, Francis Baert & Emmanuel Fanta
Editorial Assistance: Liesbeth Martens
United Nations University UNU-CRIS
72 Poterierei – B-8000 – Bruges – Belgium
Email: fbaert@cris.unu.edu or efanta@cris.unu.edu

Additional information available on the website: www.eu grasp.eu

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Abstract

This paper has two goals. The first is to investigate how the transition from the Westphalian to the post-Westphalian state, particularly in Europe, requires a reconceptualization of our approach the problem of security, in terms of content and form. The second goal is to assess how national security cultures shape national responses to four categories of national security governance policies: assurance (post-conflict interventions), prevention (pre-conflict interventions), protection (internal security), and compellence (military intervention). This line of enquiry is predicated upon two key assumptions: first, states can no longer be treated as homogeneous actors; and second, national responses to external threats are shaped by structural variables (e.g., the distribution of power) and agency circumscribed by the proscriptions and prescriptions of national security cultures. These assumptions bring forward the problem of reconciling state structure and the agency of national elites in the formulation of security policies, particularly in a comparative framework.

About the Authors

James Sperling is Professor of Political Science at the University of Akron. He is co-author of EU Security Governance (Manchester 2007), co-editor of National Security Cultures: Patterns of Global Governance (Routledge 2010), and European Security Governance: The European Union in a Westphalian World (2009). He has also published articles on security governance and the transatlantic relationship in the British Journal of Political Science, Contemporary Security Policy, European Security, International Affairs, International Organization, and the Review of International Studies. He is currently co-authoring a book with Mark Webber provisionally entitled NATO: Decline or Regeneration?
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The Post-Westphalian State, National Security Cultures, and Global Security Governance

James Sperling
University of Akron

This paper has two goals. The first is to investigate how the transition from the Westphalian to the post-Westphalian state, particularly in Europe, requires a reconceptualization of how we approach the problem of security, both in terms of content and form. The second goal is to assess how national security cultures shape national responses to four categories of national security governance policies: assurance (post-conflict interventions), prevention (pre-conflict interventions), protection (internal security), and compellence (military intervention). This line of enquiry is predicated upon two key assumptions: first, states can no longer be treated as homogeneous actors; and second, national responses to external threats are shaped not only by structural variables (e.g., the distribution of power), but by agency circumscribed by the proscriptions and prescriptions of national security cultures. These assumptions bring forward the problem of reconciling state structure and the agency of national elites in the formulation of security policies, particularly in a comparative framework.

The world’s major powers fall along a continuum demarcated by Westphalian and post-Westphalian states. Consequently, each state faces different, yet overlapping, vulnerabilities and insecurities, which in turn may produce alternative and possibly competing national security agendas. Similarly, the ability of national elites to meet those vulnerabilities and insecurities is shaped and limited by the imperatives, prescriptions, and proscriptions of the national security culture. The precise variations in state structure and national security culture between two or more states creates a context that is (un)favourable to bilateral or multilateral security cooperation. The problem of collective action in the provision of regional and global security governance is similarly complicated by an important, oftentimes overlooked intervening variable; viz., the technology of
public goods supply. Even where there is a positive, reinforcing correspondence between the structural characteristics and the national security cultures of the cooperating states, the production technologies for specific categories of public goods can either ease or complicate the dilemma of collective action in the security sphere.

Thus, this paper asks four questions: Does the coexistence of states ranging from the Westphalian to post-Westphalian necessarily complicate global or regional security cooperation? What implications does that coexistence have for the process of securitization regionally or globally? Are the security governance tasks of post-Westphalian states fundamentally different from those of Westphalian states or do they merely engender different forms of security cooperation? Do national security cultures shape national security policy choices independent of the distribution of power in the international system?

Security governance and the emergence of the post-Westphalian state

The importance of domestic constitutional orders as the determinant of international order has long factored into the study of international relations as a causal variable across the theoretical spectrum (e.g., Thucydides 1954; Machiavelli 1998; Kant 1939; Hilferding 2006; Carr 1964; and Rosecrance 1963). Phillip Bobbitt (2002), for example, linked the historical evolution of the European state system to changes in domestic constitutional form. The democratic peace hypothesis similarly maintains that a specific form of constitutional order, a liberal democracy, guarantees global or regional peace and stability (Owen 1994; Lipson 2003; Barnett 2008). Stochastic analyses generally support the hypothesis, but the data supporting the hypothesis are largely drawn from the European and Anglophone worlds (Russet and Oneal 1997; Ward and Gleditsch 1998). The empirical support for this hypothesis rests on the circumscribed empirical base of the European system (broadly conceived), precluding from consideration the more fundamental change that is taking place - the rise of the post-Westphalian state in a largely Westphalian world (Caporaso 1996 and 2000; Falk 2002). The post-Westphalian hypothesis better explains the emergence of a European (and Transatlantic) security community, than does reliance upon an evolutionary form of constitutional order in constant historical flux. Conversely, the persistence of the Westphalian state elsewhere better explains the continuing force of anarchy and

1 Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder (1995, 2002) also demonstrate that states in the early stages of democratization are as likely to be war prone as not. Kal Holsti (1995) rejects the emphasis on democratic constitutional orders and suggests that the absence of domestic legitimacy, regardless of constitutional form, is the better indicator of bellicosity.
the persistence of the balance of power, concerts and impermanent alliances as regulators of interstate conflict.

Westphalian sovereignty forms a significant barrier to cooperation generally, and security governance specifically (Jervis 2002; Keohane 1984 and 2001). John Herz (1957) identified territoriality as the key characteristic of the Westphalian state and characterized it as the “hard shell” protecting states and societies from the external environment. Territoriality is increasingly irrelevant, particularly in Europe. States no longer enjoy the “wall of defensibility” that leaves them relatively immune to external penetration. The changed salience and meaning of territoriality has not only expanded the number and type of security threat, but intensified the reliance upon the ‘soft’ elements of power and the downgrading of the ‘hard’ elements of power. Westphalian states remain chiefly preoccupied with protecting autonomy and independence, retaining a gate-keeping role, and avoiding external interference in domestic constitutional arrangements.

The transition from the Westphalian to the post-Westphalian state is captured by reference to three separate, but interrelated developments in the international system. The first development is the qualitative erosion of the state’s ability and desire to act as a gate-keeper between internal and external flows of people, goods, and ideas. In the post-Westphalian state, there has been a qualitative change in the nature and volume of flows across national boundaries as well as a change in the nature and height of the technical and normative barriers to controlling those flows against the wishes of individual agents. The second development leading to the transition to post-Westphalianism is the voluntary acceptance of mutual governance between states and the attending loss of autonomy in order to maximize the welfare benefits of those cross-border flows and meet common challenges or threats to national welfare. Similarly, for the Westphalian state encroachments on national territoriality and autonomy are involuntary, the barrier to intervention is technically and normatively surmountable, and unwanted external encroachments reflect power differentials. The third change reflects the asymmetrical status of international law for Westphalian and post-Westphalian states. For the post-Westphalian state, international law qualifies sovereignty in novel and meaningful ways: first, international law defines the (il)legitimacy of a government’s sovereign prerogatives against their own citizenry (and a corresponding ‘duty to intervene’ when international law is violated in extremis); and second, states acknowledge the existence of recognized extra-national adjudication of disputes and voluntarily comply with that extra- or supranational adjudication of disputes. These developments fundamentally separate Westphalian from post-Westphalian states; the latter accept the circumscribed legal autonomy of
the state vis-à-vis the citizen as necessary and legitimate. The evolution of the European state system, particularly the trajectory of the European Union, provides empirical evidence supporting the post-Westphalian hypothesis and its relevance for understanding the limits and possibilities of security governance cooperation in the 21st century.

The post-Westphalian hypothesis challenges the assumption that states can be treated as homogenous actors, that there is a single, homogeneous international system, and that states confront the same structural constraint; viz., the distribution and concentration of power. The contemporary international system is populated by a range of states falling along a continuum bounded by the Westphalian and post-Westphalian forms: each form faces an alternative set of objective security vulnerabilities, and is compelled to practice an alternative form of statecraft - instrumentally and substantively. Post-Westphalian states, while not indifferent to territorial integrity, have largely abandoned their gate-keeper role owing to the network of interdependencies formed by economic openness, the political imperative of welfare maximization, and democratic political principles. Autonomy and independence have been devalued as sovereign imperatives; sovereign prerogatives have been subordinated to the demands of the welfare state and the preferences of individual agents. Post-Westphalian states are more vulnerable to the influence of non-state actors - malevolent, benevolent, or benign - in international politics. Non-state actors fill or exploit the gaps left by the (in)voluntary loss or evaporation of sovereignty attending the transformation of the The changing nature of the security agenda, particularly its functional expansion and the changing agency of threat, necessitates a shift from coercive to persuasive security strategies (Kirchner and Sperling 2007).

The success of the European project in the post-war period reinforced Europe's material, ideational, and cultural interconnectedness (March and Olsen 1998: 944-7). The ‘connectedness’ of the European state system, facilitated by the success of the post-war institutions of European economic and political integration, have made these states easily penetrated by malevolent non-state and state actors. Moreover, a number of developments have stripped away the prerogatives of sovereignty and eliminated the autonomy once afforded powerful states by exclusive territorial jurisdiction: the growing irrelevance of geography and borders; technological innovations, particularly the revolution in information technologies and the digital linking of national economies and societies; the European-wide convergence around transnational meta-norms of inalienable civil liberties, democratic governance, and economic openness; and a rising ‘dynamic density’—defined by John Ruggie (1986) as the ‘quantity, velocity, and diversity of transactions’—within Europe.
The ease with which domestic disturbances are transmitted across national boundaries and the difficulty of deflecting those disturbances underline the strength and vulnerability of the post-Westphalian state: the ever expanding spectrum of interaction provides greater levels of collective welfare than would otherwise be possible, yet the very transmission belts facilitating those welfare gains serve as diffusion mechanisms (Hanrieder 1978; Most and Starr 1980; Siverson and Starr 1990) hindering the state’s ability to inoculate itself against exogenous shocks or malevolent actors. Those actors, in turn, are largely immune to sovereign jurisdiction as well as strategies of dissuasion, defense, or deterrence. Consequently, broad and collective milieu goals have been substituted for particularistic national security goals, conventionally conceived. Perforated sovereignty has rendered post-Westphalian states incapable of meeting their national security requirements alone; security has become a structurally conditioned (impure) collective good. This development, in conjunction with the emergence of failed states and the growing autonomy of non-state actors has produced a changed threat environment that, in turn, has required the securitization of policy arenas heretofore defined in terms of welfare or law and order.

Thus, Westphalian and Post-Westphalian states differ along four dimensions: the degree of penetration by state and non-state actors and the consequences of that penetration for national authorities; the nature and extent of the securitization process; the level of sovereign control, de facto and de jure; and the referent for calculating security interests (see Table 1). The presence of states with fundamentally different characteristics poses a significant barrier to a unified system-level of theory (Powell 1991: 1305), but the existence of states with fundamentally dissimilar structural characteristics suggests the need for the analysis of regional security systems as the appropriate unit of analysis. With the post-Westphalian state, the emergence of highly institutionalized forms of security governance becomes comprehensible, particularly the European security community formed by the European Union (EU), as well as the Westphalian embrace of less effective forms of security multilateralism elsewhere.
Table 1: Key Characteristics of (Post)-Westphalian States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Westphalian State</th>
<th>Post-Westphalian State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Penetration</strong></td>
<td>The degree of penetration by non-state and state actors is limited and revocable.</td>
<td>The degree of penetration by non-state and state actors is extensive and irrevocable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Critical threats</strong></td>
<td>State security largely defined by threats to territorial integrity, autonomy from external influence, and power maximization.</td>
<td>State security largely defined by the vulnerabilities of the state attending the voluntary and structural erosion of sovereignty; states are primarily oriented towards milieu goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sovereign Control</strong></td>
<td>The state functions as effective gatekeeper between internal and external flows; disinclination to surrender sovereignty to individual agents domestically or to international institutions.</td>
<td>There is a <em>de facto</em> erasure of sovereign boundaries and governments are unable to act as effective gatekeepers between internal and external flows; there exists a sanctioned loss of sovereign control to individual economic agents and a willingness to transfer sovereignty to international institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interest referent</strong></td>
<td>Interests are narrow and self-regarding.</td>
<td>Interests are constituted by a broad, other-regarding set of criteria.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Threats in the Contemporary International System

The vulnerabilities of the post-Westphalian state and the securitization process that those vulnerabilities have engendered require an alternative conceptualization of threat and content of security policies. That states today now embrace an expanded national security agenda is no longer contested, but the precise boundary between a security threat and a challenge to domestic governance is not yet fixed. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde (1998: 21), despite their embrace of a broadened security agenda, limit security to those threats that are ‘about survival [and pose] an existential threat to a designated referent object’...’. This suggested demarcation is too restrictive given the novel vulnerabilities facing the post-Westphalian state and the inevitable prominence of non-state actors as the primary agent of threat. A comprehensive approach to
security governance must also include threats posed to the systemic or milieu goals of states, the legitimacy or authority of state structures, or national social cohesiveness and integrity. These three categories of threat are of particular concern for late- and post-Westphalian states.

These threats cannot be reduced to a state-centric security calculus where the state is both subject and object of the analysis. Instead, the new security agenda demands a more nuanced and complicated treatment of the security problem: the state is only one agent and target of security threats. Non-state actors play an important role as agents of insecurity; security is sought for society, the state, and the milieu goals embraced by international society; and there has been a relative diminution of the state, both as a target and source of threat. A typology of threats, which bears directly on the problem of security governance and the post-Westphalian hypothesis, defines threats along two dimensions: the target of the threat (state or society) and the agent of threat (state or non-state) (see Figure 1).

The categories of threat captured by this typology underscores that states do not face a tractable security environment for two reasons: first, states play a relatively minor role as protagonists in the present security system, and agency is attributed overwhelmingly to non-state actors that are beyond the reach of states or the traditional instruments of state-craft; and second, threats against the state are indirect rather than direct, and now purposely target society or the regional milieu. Transnational non-state actors are the agents of threat that target societal rather than state structures and are of most concern to post-Westphalian states, while a state-centric calculus defines threats for the Westphalian state (Sperling 2009). Many of the new security challenges threaten social structures or cohesion. Other security challenges threaten social structures or cohesion. Still others target institutionalized governance structures or the milieu goals of states in a specific region, particularly where national systems are democratically governed and adhere to economic liberalism. Where these conditions present themselves, the state itself is largely bypassed as a target of threat. Problematically, states are the least likely source of threat denying national authorities a well-defined threat referent.

The confluence of post-Westphalian vulnerabilities and non-governance in weak or failed Westphalian states requires a reconceptualization of the governance functions served by any regional security system. The difficulty of managing these security threats derives from two conditions: the inability of governments to control territory owing to the state’s involuntary loss of de facto sovereignty and voluntary abnegation of de jure sovereignty; and the problem of non-
governance in areas of the world devoid of de facto sovereign jurisdiction. Security governance provides a conceptual framework capturing both aspects of this dynamic.

**Figure 1: A Typology of Threats**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agent of Threat</th>
<th>Target of Threat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Traditional War:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Conventional war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Nuclear war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Institutions:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Weak civil institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Cyber warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milieu</td>
<td>Impure public good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Macroeconomic instability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Energy infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-state</td>
<td>Asymmetric War:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-state</td>
<td>Individuals:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Migratory pressures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Transnational organized crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milieu</td>
<td>Pure public good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Environmental degradation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Non-governance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Security Governance, Governance Functions, and Systems of Governance**

Why security governance? The fundamental problem of international politics—and security provision in particular—is the supply of order and the regulation of conflict without the resort to war. Anarchy—and the benefits afforded the state by it—precludes the emergence of global or even regional government to manage its attending liabilities. The regulation of international politics, particularly the management of disorder, can be best thought of as a problem of governance as well as non-governance.\(^2\) There are alternative conceptualisations of security arrangements, but they are mutually exclusive (collective defence or concert) and are defective for the purpose of understanding the problem of security today owing to their inherent limitations, the most important of which is a preoccupation with the military aspect of security and the assumption that all states are essentially Westphalian.

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\(^2\) See Hallenberg and Wagnnson (2009) on pre-Westphalian states as a form of non-governance.
A conceptual reliance upon alliances or concerts for understanding the requirements and modes of national security is obsolete, at least in the European and possibly wider Atlantic area. Alliances and concerts, as either formal or informal institutions, have been rightly regarded as mechanisms for regulating disequilibria in the international system.\(^3\) The traditional concern of the theory of alliances—the determination of which states will align with other states and the reasons for doing so—is not particularly relevant to our understanding of the security dilemma facing late- or post-Westphalian states or the appropriate form of security governance. Similarly, concerts have had the limited preoccupation of minimizing the potential for conflict between the Great Powers and limiting the mutual interference in one another's domestic affairs. Not only have the source of threat and the security objectives of the state changed in fundamental ways, but the nomenclature of alliances and concerts is increasingly irrelevant to the problem of security governance. Both systems of international conflict regulation remain overly state-centric, tend to depend upon the existence and relevance of power disequilibria among a well-defined set of states, and cannot account for the subcontracting of heretofore sovereign responsibilities to international or supranational institutions, particularly those falling outside the traditional concern of territorial defence. Consequently, the formulation and execution of security policy cannot be disciplined or translated into the traditional rubric of sovereign jurisdiction or assessments of the capabilities and intentions of identifiable adversaries with a state identity. Only by relying on an alternative concept of security governance can we capture the challenges and instruments of attaining group security from within, as well as security from 'out' groups.

Security governance has been expansively defined as 'an international system of rule, dependent on the acceptance of a majority of states that are affected, which through regulatory mechanisms (both formal and informal), governs activities across a range of security and security-related issue areas' (Webber 2002: 44). This definition is elastic enough to accommodate analytical frameworks treating institutions as mechanisms employed by states to further their own goals (Koremenos, et al. 2001: 761-99), states as the primary actors in international relations where some states are more equal than others (Waltz 1978; Gilpin 1981), power relationships determined not only by underlying material factors, but norms and identities (Checkel 1998; Hopf 1998; Barnett and Duvall 2005), and states as constrained by institutions with respect to proscribed and prescribed behaviour (Martin and Simmons 1998; March and Olsen 1998). This broad conceptual definition of security governance permits an investigation of the role institutions play in the security domain,

\(^3\) For the period 1648-1945, see Langer (1950); Taylor (1954); Holsti (1991); and Schweller (1998). For the post-war period, see Wolfers (1959), Osgood (1962), Liska (1962); and Walt (1987).
particularly the division of labour between states and international or supranational institutions, the proscribed and prescribed instruments and purposes of state action, and the consolidation of a collective definition of interest and threat.

The conceptualization of security governance generally falls into one of four broad categories: as a general theory of state interaction (Webber 2002 and 2007; Webber et. al, 2004); as a theory of networks (Krahmann 2003); as a system of international and transnational regimes (Young 1999; Kirchner 2007); and as a heuristic device for recasting the problem of security management in order to accommodate the coexistence of alternative forms of conflict regulation, the rising number of non-state actors considered relevant to national definitions of security, and the expansion of the security agenda (Holsti 1991; see also Sperling 2003, 2007, 2009). Security governance possesses the virtue of conceptual accommodation: it allows for hierarchical and heterarchical patterns of interaction as well as the disparate substantive bundling and normative content of security institutions. Security governance possesses the additional virtue of neither precluding nor necessitating the privileging of the state or non-state actors in the security domain; it leaves open the question of whether states are able to provide security across multiple levels and dimensions unilaterally, or whether states are compelled to work within multilateral or supranational institutional frameworks. Most importantly, the concurrent emergence of the post-Westphalian state and the broadening of the contemporary security agenda are the key rationales for adopting the concept of governance rather than the more established frameworks and concepts in the security field. Moreover, the emergent role of the EU as a security actor—and a corresponding erosion of state prerogatives in this policy domain—requires a more plastic framework allowing the simultaneous consideration of EU (and the structural characteristics of its member states) with other states in the system, particularly the late-Westphalian states of Northeast Asia and North America as well as the Westphalian states of Eurasia and the Mediterranean.

Governance Functions. One approach to the problem of disentangling and understanding the current threat environment is a focus on how those threats are manifested. In this case, security challenges may be defined by the arena of conflict (state, society, or milieu) and the instruments of conflict resolution (coercive or persuasive). These sets of variables produce a typology presenting six distinct categories of security challenge: resolving interstate or intrastate conflicts; preventing the criminalization of national economies; avoiding the collapse of weak or failing states; institutionalizing democratic norms and institutions regionally; and constructing effective systems of regional governance (see Figure 2). These policy challenges overlap in many instances and are
inseparable in practise. In some cases they require the simultaneous application of the coercive and persuasive instruments of statecraft; in many cases the distinction between intra- and interstate conflicts is unhelpful; and in still others, the policy challenges and tasks are sequential.

**Figure 2: Challenges of Governance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arena of Conflict</th>
<th>Instruments of Statecraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>State</strong></td>
<td><strong>Coercive</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoidance of interstate conflict by coercive means</td>
<td>Avoiding civil conflict or collapse of internal authority in weak or failed states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Society</strong></td>
<td>Protection of society from transnational criminal organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional or Global Milieu</strong></td>
<td>Avoidance of inter- and intrastate conflict by coercive means</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A second approach to security governance identifies the tasks of security governance as the institutional and normative frameworks supporting multilateral peace-keeping, peace-making and peace-enforcement operations (Kirchner 2007). There is a great deal of value to be gained from adopting this approach, but it is limited owing to its exclusion of those internal security governance functions that present the most intractable threats in the contemporary state system; viz., those posed to civil society. This latter category of threat, which increasingly requires external
cooperation, is most directly affected by the presence or absence of an effective form of security governance.

Although both typologies provide a window into the governance tasks resulting from the expanded security agenda, a functional categorisation of security policy not only provides a typology that captures both the external and internal tasks of governance, but explicitly captures the distinction between pre- and post-conflict interventions. Such an approach combines the functional and instrumental requirements for meeting the security challenges facing Europe today. Security governance performs two functions—institution-building and conflict resolution—and employs two sets of instruments—the persuasive (economic, political and diplomatic) and the coercive (military intervention and internal policing). Taken together, four categories of security governance suggest themselves: assurance, prevention, protection, and compellence (see Figure 3).

**Figure 3: Policies of Governance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functions</th>
<th>Instruments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Persuasive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Institution-building</em></td>
<td>Prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Conflict Resolution</em></td>
<td>Assurance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Policies of assurance identify efforts aimed at post-conflict reconstruction and attending confidence-building measures. Three general policies of assurance are common to the major powers: policing and border missions; military peace-keeping missions; and economic reconstruction aid. For the purposes of cross-national comparisons, three questions arise: what

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4 This typology is applied in a qualitative study of the European Union by Kirchner and Sperling 2007 and in a quantitative analysis by Dorussen, et. al, 2009.
budgetary and personnel contributions are made to the operation; does the country under consideration betray a geographic bias in its governance policies; and does the country prefer to act bilaterally or multilaterally. Policies of prevention capture efforts to prevent conflict by building or sustaining domestic, regional or international institutions that contribute to the mitigation of anarchy and the creation of order. Common policies of prevention include aid and technical assistance for internal political and economic reform, ranging from establishing civil-military relations consistent with the Euro-American norm, to enhancing the prospects for democratic governance, to aiding the development of market economies. A second set of prevention policies focuses on the problem of forestalling migration and controlling the inflow of political refugees or economic migrants via economic development.

Policies of protection describe internal and multilateral efforts to fulfil the traditional function of protecting society from external threats. There are four general categories of protection policies: health security, terrorism, organized crime, and environmental degradation. A cross-national comparisons would reveal how and whether those issues have been securitized and if so, the relative importance of each category measured primarily by budgetary expenditures and policy initiatives seeking to ameliorate the threat (e.g., improved health surveillance or funds devoted to medical research) or to eradicate it (e.g., increases in personnel or budgetary resources to combat crime or terrorism). Policies of compellence capture the tasks of conflict resolution via military intervention, particularly peace-making and enforcement. As with the traditional focus of security analyses, a country-specific analysis would assess national contributions to unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral interventions to restore or create regional order or to remove a direct military threat to national security. Policies of compellence raise an important question: do some states rely disproportionately upon the military instrument relative to the other three categories of security governance?

These four tasks of security governance are oftentimes pursued concurrently; it is also clear that economic and military instruments can be used towards the achieving of not dissimilar goals. Arguably there is an elective affinity between policy instruments and a specific form of governance challenge; and post-Westphalian states exhibit a substantive normative reliance upon the civilian instruments of statecraft and a disinclination to rely upon military force.
National Security Cultures and Governance Policies

Kalevi J. Holsti (1991), Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998), Robert O. Keohane (2001) and Robert Jervis (2002), among others, have considered the domestic and systemic requirements for effective security governance. With the exception of Holsti, who addressed the necessary and sufficient conditions for system stability (defined as the absence of war), these authors have been preoccupied with the preconditions for the emergence and persistence of a security community. The international system does not constitute a security community nor does it approach the necessary conditions for one. Regional security subsystems range from a rudimentary systems of governance (e.g., the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific) to more complex forms of governance (the European security community institutionalized in the EU). Within the various regional subsystems constituting the international system, there are variations in national security policies and preferred forms of governance. The security governance policies - in form or content - that these states implement and the limits of interstate cooperation can be best explained by variations or similarities in national security cultures. National security cultures provide the lens through which national authorities refract the structural position of the state, the objective threats to national security, the instruments relied upon to meet those threats, and the preference for unilateral or multilateral action. Even though national security cultures significantly overlap, threats are commonly shared and understood with respect to cause and effect, and multilateral cooperation is preferred to bilateral or unilateral action, states may still be incapable of meeting those threats individually or collectively.

National security cultures pose a potential barrier to effective security governance cooperation. There are those who treat national strategic cultures as relatively fixed and incorrigibly national (Lindley-French 2002; Rynning 2003; and Longhurst and Zaborowski 2005). Others, particularly Christoph Meyer (2005), Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Daniel Verdier (2005) and Janne Matlary (2006) detect instead a convergence of cultures. While these two orientations are oppositional, it is of little practical consequence if divergent national security cultures reflect the dynamic of disparate material interests or the retarded development of ideational assimilation. Security cultures may be defined according to four criteria: the worldview of the external environment; national identity; instrumental preferences; and interaction preferences. The worldview of the external environment refers to the elite consensus on the underlying dynamic of the international system, the importance and viability of state sovereignty, and the definition of security threats. The national identity identifies the extent to which national elites have retained an ‘egoist’ definition of
the national interest and the extent to which the elites have embedded the national interest in a broader, collective ‘we’ defined against some ‘other’. The instrumental preferences demarcate those states which retain the traditional reliance upon the military instrument of statecraft and the coercive use of economic power as opposed to those who rely on the civilian instruments of power, particularly international law, economic aid, and the creation of normative frameworks. Interaction preferences refer to the level of cooperation favoured by a state when seeking to ameliorate a security threat; interaction preferences fall along a continuum marked at one end by unilateral action and at the other by ‘reflexive multilateralism’ within formal institutional structures.

Post-Westphalian and Westphalian states have significantly different, if not oppositional, security cultures. Disparate security cultures pose a largely self-evident barrier to interstate cooperation across the four security governance policies: states will disagree not only on what constitutes a threat, but the appropriate means for ameliorating it. Common security cultures only produce cooperation when they tend towards the post-Westphalian variant whereas the Westphalian variant may or may not impede cooperation. In the former, states are likely to view multilateralism as the strategy of choice reflexively, to securitize a not dissimilar range of threats, and to adopt policy options that minimize social and economic dislocations internally and in the target state or region. Westphalian security cultures, on the other hand, are similar insofar as they target the maximization of power, rely upon military power to achieve their goals, and acknowledge a circumscribed range of threats. Despite that commonality, however, the security cultures themselves do not provide the basis for routinized cooperation. Moreover, where a common threat is identified, cooperation, when it does occur, is just as likely to be tactical and contingent rather than strategic and long-lived. Just as divergences in the security cultures of late- and post-Westphalian states, for example, vex transatlantic cooperation on a range of security governance policies, the overlapping of the late-Westphalian and Westphalian security cultures of the United States, and China and Russia, respectively, virtually preclude any form of sustained security cooperation, particularly with respect to the policies of assurance, prevention, and protection.
Table 5: National Security Cultures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World view of external environment</th>
<th>Elements</th>
<th>Westphalian</th>
<th>Post-Westphalian</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refers to the elite consensus on the underlying dynamic of the international system, the importance and viability of state sovereignty, and the definition of security threats.</td>
<td>Competitive international system populated by sovereign, autonomous states preoccupied with territorial integrity; interstate interaction is largely zero-sum.</td>
<td>Cooperative international system populated by states largely indifferent to sovereign prerogatives, territorial secure, and welfare maximizing; interstate interaction is generally joint-sum.</td>
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| Identity | Captures the way in which national elites define the nation vis-à-vis the external world. | Elites retain an ‘egoist’ definition of the national interest and define the nation in opposition to an ‘other’ posing an existential threat. | Elites denationalize the national interest; the national is embedded in a broader collective ‘we’ rather than in opposition to an ‘other’. |

| Instrumental preferences | Identifies preferred instruments of statecraft which can be assessed in relation to the typology of power. | Realist power resources, particularly a reliance upon the coercive instruments of statecraft | Direct and indirect institutional power, preference for reliance upon persuasive instruments of statecraft |

| Interaction preferences | Refers to the preference for unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral cooperation in addressing security threats. | Ranges from preference for unilateralism to conditional and temporary bilateralism or multilateralism | Ranges from preference for multilateral cooperation within institutions to abnegation of sovereign prerogatives to empower institutional rather than national action. |

The intersection of the changes in the nature of the state in conjunction with the variations in national security cultures generates three testable hypotheses:

- $H_1$: National security cultures account for the securitization of threats and the preferred instruments relied upon to meet them.
• H₂: ‘Post-Westphalian’ security cultures mitigate the problem of collective action, while ‘Westphalian’ security cultures intensify the problem of collective action in the provision of security.

• H₃: National security cultures produce preferences for specific forms of security governance systems that, in turn, facilitate or inhibit international cooperation.

Conclusion

The confluence or divergence of security cultures in conjunction with the placement of a specific state along the continuum of Westphalian and post-Westphalian states has important consequences for the form of security governance, particularly the regulation of interstate conflict. Any system of security governance has a security referent; a regulator of conflict; a normative framework defining the boundaries of (il)legitimate action; and the established interaction context. The security referent identifies the target of the security arrangement. The system regulator identifies the range of mechanisms relied upon to resolve conflicts. The normative component assesses the function norms play in the calculation of states interests and behavior. The interaction context, the final component, identifies the level of intramural amity and enmity as well as the intensity of the security dilemma. The European geopolitical space has undergone the greatest evolution in the direction of post-Westphalianism and the individual European states have developed security cultures that are convergent rather than divergent. That confluence of factors has produced a fused security community (Sperling 2008).

A fused security community, the most advanced form of security multilateralism that has yet emerged in the international system, exists where states rely upon socially accepted and internalized norms rather than the military enforcement of rules. The security referent in a fused security community has three characteristics: first, the member states have a single set of security interests derived from an identical set of norms and values; second, even though states retain de jure sovereignty and a nominal notion of national identity, the existence of a within group “other” or the persistence of negative identities do not. Conflict is regulated by rule of law embedded in a broad and dense legal framework, including voluntary adjudication of conflicts by a mutually recognized legal authority above the state. And finally, states in such a community have an abiding intramural amity devoid of the security dilemma. The emergence of such a system of security
governance requires the structural requirement of the post-Westphalian state and a confluence of national security cultures that prescribe adherence to a normatively governed security system.

References


EU-GRASP

Changing Multilateralism: the EU as a Global-regional Actor in Security and Peace, or EU-GRASP in short, is an EU funded FP7 Programme. EU-GRASP aims to contribute to the analysis and articulation of the current and future role of the EU as a global actor in multilateral security governance, in a context of challenged multilateralism, where the EU aims at “effective multilateralism”. This project therefore examines the notion and practice of multilateralism in order to provide the required theoretical background for assessing the linkages between the EU’s current security activities with multi-polarism, international law, regional integration processes and the United Nations system.

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EU-GRASP Working Papers

Contact: EU-GRASP Coordination Team
72 Poterierei – B-8000 – Bruges – Belgium
Email: fbaert@cris.unu.edu or efanta@cris.unu.edu

Additional information available on the website: www.eugrasp.eu