EU Security Governance

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Abstract

The aim of this work is to provide informed insights about the main understandings on security governance. ‘Security governance’ as a concept is investigated, and the theoretical assumptions upon which or against which the term is built presented. Security governance literature lacks of a reflection upon the understanding and construction of ‘security’; instead, attempts at bridging the literature on security with that on security governance may enhance the theoretical and empirical relevance of the term. The analysis of the European system of security governance will emphasise how the post-Westphalian nature of states within Europe renders security regulation efforts different from those of other systems. Against this background, prospect of cooperation do not only depend on the possible exportation of the European system of security governance, but also on compatible interests among different actors and on European reliability as a security actor in cooperative efforts.

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Florence Forum on the Problems of Peace and War

Introduction

Trying to envisage the current and future role of the EU as a global actor in multilateral security governance is the main objective of the EU-GRASP project. For that purpose, the aim of this paper is to clarify and provide insights into 'security governance', trying to cover all aspects and issues raised in the literature. Moreover, the work will focus on the distinctive character of the EU security governance system and its place in multilateral security governance. Albeit strongly interconnected, these two domains require a separate handling, the first being prominently concerned with European security and its architecture, while the second concerns global security and the European influence and role within it.

The first part of this report looks at 'security governance', by discussing the nexus among the ever-changing concepts of security, governance and multilateralism. In this section, various definitions are provided, along with peculiarities that recall theoretical debates on security cooperation and governance approaches. While the concept of security governance has been increasingly and widely used in the policy community, its meaning and underlying characteristics have often been extremely varied, thereby hampering and/or fragmenting empirical studies on the topic.

The second part of the report highlights the understanding of 'security governance' in the European context. After discussing the arguments underpinning the 'different nature' of the European system of security governance, the report provides a snapshot on some empirical studies on the matter emphasising the need for innovative methodological tools to analyse security policies and initiatives. The third part sums up the findings of the previous sections and discusses the existence/interaction of different systems of security governance. Additionally, it emphasises the importance of the issue-area under investigation and argues for better internal coordination among

1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at an EU-GRASP workshop in July 2009 hosted by UNU-CRIS.
all security actors operating in an external environment. A section on the weaknesses of the literature and on questions for further research is provided at the end.

**Security governance**

*Theoretical remarks on security governance*

It is fair to say that the concept of ‘security governance’ has only recently entered the academic language. Thus far, a number of scholars have used the term without working out specific definitions and without examining the theoretical and empirical relevance of the concept. In its first operationalisations at the beginning of the 21\(^{st}\) century, the concept was aimed at making sense of a mutated international system, thereby drawing a distance from (and downplaying) previous theoretical and analytical approaches, especially as far as their application to the European landscape was concerned. The most recent definitions of the term seem more prone to underline a reality displaying both new and traditional features and seem to investigate their coexistence. This latter focus is especially needed to observe the variegated forms of security efforts at a global level rather than a restrained and quite exclusive security system.

While often unexplored, the concepts of security and governance provide important hints to understand the underlying assumptions of a composite term such as ‘security governance’. ‘Security’ has been investigated prevalently as the widening and broadening process of threats and referents identification. Few scholars have engaged in relating ‘insecurities formation’ and its implications to security governance as a term for mirroring innovative ‘modes’ of security cooperation. ‘Governance’, on its side, pictures the fragmentation, the multiplicity of actors, but also the coordination and management dynamics arising out of the necessity to face transboundary problems. Thus, following James Sperling’s wording, the real conundrum is to assess “how much conceptual and empirical value is added by substituting security governance for state-centric forms of security multilateralism” (Sperling 2009).

Two major turning points ignited a remark on security: the end of the Cold War and the September 11\(^{th}\) terrorist attacks on the United States. Indeed, these events impinged on different actors in different ways, but a shared belief slowly arose that no actor was able to provide for its security alone given the nature of the threats, and that order and stability required a certain degree of conformity of actions among different security actors. One of the most debated issues regarded the

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2 See on this point Attinà (2007: 88).
role of the state as both the determinant and the target of security threats. Military challenges threatening the survival of the state seemed not to constitute the main security risk after the end of the Cold War, while the state appeared unable to face new challenges alone (Webber et al. 2004: 5-6). Moreover, the foremost threats were neither mainly military, nor solvable through pure military means. The first theoretical approach explaining cooperation in security practices to be put into question was the alliance theory, with its emphasis on the state as the main agent and referent of security threats (inter-state conflicts) and its stress on military threats to states’ survival. For some scholars, states’ functions were the main victims of security challenges. For others, it was society that was endangered. Finally, human beings were considered as the potential referents of transboundary risks. According to these arguments, security was still about ‘survival’; what was not safely definable was the target thereof (Buzan et al. 1998). This broadened both the understanding of security and the potential levels of analysis.

Based on these observable trends, however, the security governance understanding is not able to gain a standalone theoretical relevance. This is so, as stated above, because the focus on its analytical contribution overlooks the influence that reflectivist approaches to security have exerted on the elaboration of security governance as such and on the specific forms of regulations fostered. These approaches look at the ‘constitutive’ dimension of security, explaining how the framing of an issue into a security modality impinges on the way the same is understood and then addressed: the security framing of an issue has an inevitable bearing upon its way of governance. Variants of these approaches insist more on discourses or practices as relevant determinants of securitisation processes. Thus, the proclamation of a major threat defines specific security actors and promotes processes of coordination at more levels. Through a different process, the governance of an issue is determined by its insertion into domains of insecurities set in motion by security experts, and by its handling through established techniques and practices. This general context contributes to the re-definition of an issue and to its management (Huysmans 2006). In addition, the use of similar instruments for the regulation of different issues and the chain-ganging process among different threats widens the range of activities to be undertaken favouring the formation of transnational networks composed by different actors, so that there no longer exists a real division bordering internal and external security and related practices (Bigo 2000, 2002). The ‘construction’ of threats or insecurities independently from an objective reality widens the spectre of issue-areas to take into consideration. Accordingly, the complexities of security threats; the actors; the instruments

3 For a review of the literature on security see, among many others, McSweeney 1999; Cambpell 1998; Kaldor 2007; Kelstrup and Williams 2000.
4 See for example, Bigo (2000, 2002).
and the security practices envisioned for their regulation have given even more relevance to governance as a catchword.

The use of a term such as ‘governance’ to refer to the regulation of disorder is not at odds with the concept of anarchy. In fact, the term has often been used in opposition to ‘government’, the absence of which on the international landscape is a distinctive feature of the realist school of thought. Differently from the traditional understanding of anarchy, governance goes one step further, using the absence of hierarchy to describe the heterarchic ‘mode’ of security management. The term focuses on the presence of multiple actors - institutions, states, international organisations and non-governmental organisations - charged to coordinate their efforts to regulate chaos. Indeed, while the purpose is commonly shared, the preferred ways and the instruments through which to achieve security may diverge, as the multiplicity and fragmentation of authority add to the complexity of the management process. Thus, a ‘governance approach’ should help understand vertical and horizontal interactions among different actors, serving as an organisational framework (Schroeder 2006: 5), analysing how security is produced (Webber et al. 2004: 26) and ultimately representing an observable trend (Britz & Ojansen 2009: 26).

Indeed, the concept of governance is not new, although the security connotation provides it with new insights. Globalisation literature has borrowed the concept of governance and carried it from the domestic to the international arena in order to account for its growing complexity: “globalization has brought new opportunities... but it has also made threats more complex and interconnected... also, globalization is accelerating the shifts in power and is exposing differences in values” (Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World (Anon 2008: 1)). Thanks to its managerial, technical and ‘problem solving’ understanding, governance was a useful device to depict the diffusion of authority towards subnational and transnational institutions as well as to explain regulation dynamics (Higgott 2005: 578). In the framework of political sciences, the term was used in public policy and local government studies to emphasise the efficient and appropriate division of functions among different structures. Governance approaches have also been used in European studies on federalism and integration. In the first case, the focus was on interaction levels among governments and on authority allocation across several government sectors. In the second case, it was employed to emphasise how negotiation processes along supranational, national, regional and local levels arose out of the integration processes and the subsequent policy-making diffusion (Hooghe &
Here, the debate was between ‘state-centric’ and ‘multi-level’ governance partisans, thereby dividing the camps among those who defended the autonomy of the state and those calling it into question, a divide that also fits the studies on security governance (Hooghe & Marks 2001).

Thus, the concept of governance was also widely used in European studies, emphasising shifts of authority (vertical aspect), multiplicity and interconnectedness of networks (horizontal aspect). Because of this bias, the security governance concept found its way easily into the European security framework, where new agencies, new structures and new private actors were increasingly engaged in the management of security problems and where different interaction levels favoured the composition of divergent interests. Moreover, the multiple and especially civil instruments spread out in the European architecture seemed appropriate to answer new security challenges. In this sense, regime and security community theories were useful, but only partially reflected the composite European security scenario.

In sum, a governance approach to security issues seemed quite suitable for the European context: here the fragmentation of authority and the overlapping multiple networks and tools were becoming characterising features of EU practices at problem-solving. The new security context, objectively and subjectively shaped, gave weight to governance as a term and as a practice.

**Definitions**

Against this background, some definitions of security governance have been put forward in the literature. In Kirchner’s words, security governance is an ‘intentional system of rule that involves the coordination, management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities, interventions by both public and private actors, formal and informal arrangements and purposefully directed towards particular policy outcomes’ (Kirchner 2007a: 3). At the basis of this understanding lies the idea of increasingly complex security challenges requiring cooperative solutions coupled with a reconsideration of the leading role played by the state (Kirchner 2005: 6). At a glimpse, this definition can be seen as comprehensive and broad enough to avoid a preventive categorisation into only one theoretical approach. This connotation, though, is intended, “it is a heuristic device for recasting the problem of security management in order to accommodate the different patterns of interstate interaction, the rising number of non-state security actors, the expansion of the security agenda and conflict regulation or resolution” (Kirchner & Sperling 2007b:

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5 On further literature about European governance see also Scharpf (2001); Scharpf, Kohler & Eising (1999). See also Haas (1958); Hoffmann (1966,1982); Moravcsick (1993, 1998); Milward (1992).
18). As seen before, the reason for such an open definition is to assess the multiple features of a reality exposing visible signs of change but also inevitable signals of continuity; in which ideas and values can be as important as power; where institutions can play or not a mediating role among actors’ interests; and in which new actors can line up with traditional ones and give birth to hierarchical or heterarchical interactions. The relation existing among power, interest and norms is believed to be too versatile to be subsumed within a unique paradigm (Katzenstein & Okawara 2001/02). Thus, according to Sperling, there exist four institutionalised systems of security governance: collective defence, collective security, Westphalian security community and Post-Westphalian security community (Sperling 2009).

Although comprehensive, the definitions of security governance invite a special consideration of the new aspects characterising the term. Each scholar has conferred a particular emphasis on one aspect of security governance according to what was retained to be its distinctive feature and its added value. Of particular relevance for Kirchner is, for instance, the working and coordinating mechanisms within and across issue areas envisaged by security governance. According to Kirchner, these aspects are paramount not only to assess its effectiveness, but also to investigate and weigh the importance of relative power and material interests, inter-subjective understandings, norms or institutional rules characterising the governance process (Kirchner 2007: 24). Also, according to Krahmann (2001: 5; 2004), fluid and flexible coalitions or security structures represent a distinctive characteristic of security governance, so that security coordination could materialise in a variable geometry of relations.

Other scholars have emphasised the multiplicity of, the diversity of and the interdependence among actors that the term evoked together with the overlapping systems of rules and networks contributing to the making and implementation of security policies: “there are many centres and not mainly states but regional and sub-regional institutions through which an increasing range of public and private actors organise their common or competing interests in international security” (Krahmann 2003: 5, 2003: 5-7; Watson 2009). In particular, its non-state centric nature was reported to be one of its main contributions, underscoring the shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’. Among non-state centric approaches to security, the term encouraged studies on institutions and organisations both as permissive contexts and actors: the idea was that these could play a leading role in governing security, forging a set of common norms regulating statecraft in a region (Sperling et al. 2003; Britz & Ojanen 2009; Biermann 2009), encouraging decisions and promoting policy solutions (Britz & Ojanen 2009; Ross 2009).
Finally, some scholars put the emphasis on the role of norms especially as related to principles of sovereignty (See, for example, Keohane 2001), that is, “on the role that norms play in the definition of state interests and acceptable behaviour” (Sperling 2009: 9) and on purposefulness as under-theorised variables in the study of security practices. They wanted to examine if governance was intentionally pursued and the elements that could indicate this intention, such as, for example, the European Security Strategy.

**European security governance**

*The post-Westphalian state confronting security threats*

Notwithstanding the emergence of new patterns, new actors and new threats at the international level, it is clear that security governance as a concept was adopted to make sense of a peculiar way of organising security efforts within the European landscape. This implied that something peculiar to this context exerted a deep influence on the ways in which to assess and regulate security challenges or risks. The attempt by Sperling (2003, 2009) at building a typology of systems of security governance is important on two accounts: firstly, thanks to a series of variables it permits to compare different systems of security governance (see above); secondly, it paves the way for a systematic study on the possibility to export the European system of security governance and to assess the EU’s role and influence in interactions with other actors. Thus, security governance can also be interpreted as “the analysis of an emerging universal system of security efforts” (Eriksson 2009). We leave the latter discussion for the next sections.

Given the comprehensive definition of security governance provided above, some variables help define its characteristics: thus, different cooperative attempts at problem-solving will look more or less promising with a view to a global system of security governance. Systems of security governance differ according to: the regulator, considering the mechanisms adopted to face security problems and resolve conflicts; the normative framework, that is its feature and its relevance in shaping behaviours; sovereign prerogatives, investigating the degree of hierarchic interactions; the security referent, depending on the nature of the state, the interaction between identity and interests and the usefulness of force; and the interaction context, investigating the strength of the security dilemma by considering common interests or identity (Sperling 2009; Snyder 1984). Within the European landscape, such variables assume a peculiar form thanks to elements proper to this context, defining a post-Westphalian system of security governance.
A post-Westphalian state is a structure no longer reducible to the features and the tenets of the ‘Westphalian’ or modern state, which is based on the sovereignty principle, a normative device emphasising authority on the constituency (Krasner 1999). The modern state works along the principle of territorial integrity, according to which no external actor can lawfully interfere in the internal matters of a state, while this latter is the sole agent, responsible and referent of security practices. Many authors retain that European states no longer comply with the underpinnings of modern states. Since the end of the Second World War the American defence umbrella has been a permissive context supporting intra-EU cooperative tendencies. In this regard, the goal of prosperity and the perspective of the internal market rendered European states’ borders increasingly blurred. The benefits achieved through increasing interconnections inevitably came at the price of new threats and risk transmission (Sperling 2007: 283). While a certain degree of security interdependence involved all global players and pushed for the adoption of various security cooperation patterns, in Europe this phenomenon was much more grounded due to the partial abandonment of some sovereign prerogatives and responsibilities. Meanwhile, the end of the Cold War and the above-mentioned process of security ‘construction’ activated new security understandings, new actors and new problem-solving regulation procedures. Those usually considered as ‘low politics’ matters lined up with traditional threats and added to the complexity of security management. The post-Westphalian nature of the European states was, according to some pundits, the culprit of an easy penetration by wicked state and non-state actors. The state’s porous borders from within and from outside underline another distinctive character of European security governance: the intertwined linkage between internal and external security needs.

The implications were twofold: ‘fragmentation’ characterised the post-Westphalian state, implying that all actors affected by a certain security issue and responsible for a certain domain should intervene to solve and manage a defined problem. On the other hand, as threats overcame states’ borders a certain degree of multilateral coordination with other actors was necessary. Possible interactions with other actors would be built upon the loss of some sovereign prerogatives and ‘territorial’ concerns, on identity-determined interests, on some fundamental normative principles leading to peaceful accommodation and avoidance of war, thus emphasising the normative and institutional dimension in external relations.6

An important line of enquiry, pushed by studies on the European Union, has been opened on the regional level of cooperation and on regional security structures, providing plausible explanations...
of new ‘security’ roles undertaken by certain actors (for example, the EU) (Lake & Morgan 1997; Thakur & Van Langenhove 2006; Telò 2001, 2007). As some pundits report, ‘most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones’ (Buzan & Wæver 2003: 4). Actors within a region are therefore prone to cooperate or coordinate their actions to avoid commonly defined security problems. Buzan and Wæver emphasize that threats involve neighbouring actors in a similar way, and policy provisions to cope with them spread out their effects on specific areas. Also, a regional security partnership is a security deal that encompasses principles of peaceful relations, a commitment to avoid power confrontation, the use of cooperation for the management of security problems and the creation of multilateral structures and new International Organisations (Attinà 2007: 89). Moreover, as emphasised by Juysmans (1998), the interdependence of processes of securitisation much more than security interests contribute to the delineation of regional complexes even outside of the European perimeter.

Aside from the ‘regional’ level of cooperation, the European Security Strategy of 2003 (ESS), intended to guide European actions in the field of international security, also favoured the creation of multilateral patterns (A Secure Europe in a Better World (Anon.) 2003). As Biscop (2005: 1) points out, “a security policy can be defined as a policy aiming to keep an object, in this case the values and interests of the EU safe”. In a confused scenario the ESS served as a sort of ‘grand strategy’ identifying the interests or the values intended to be protected by Europe, the threats to these and the possible strategies to achieve them. Values and interests are to be protected against terrorism; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; regional conflicts; states’ failure and organised crime, through “strong international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order” (effective multilateralism) (A Secure Europe in a Better World (Anon.) 2003). While a lot of scholars lamented a scarce prioritisation among interests and management tools, this document listed and helped shape the contours of the main threats to European security and specified the necessity to use all available elements to address them economically, militarily and politically. Moreover, it put a strong emphasis on ‘effective’ multilateralism, underlying the importance to come to terms with all International Organisations and security actors in a flexible but also efficient way. If an ordered world has to come about, then it is necessary that the EU intervene proactively when its rules and norms are disregarded. Ultimately, the availability of a document setting the vision and the strategies of the Union allows an assessment and evaluation of its practices or of its aspired role. In particular, the gap existing
between aspirations and actual deeds should identify the problems still hampering the fulfilment of a thorough security role.7

**EU security governance: approaches**

This section looks at how European security governance has been discussed in academic debate. In particular, the focus of this analysis is on the ‘modes’ of security governance. It must be recognised, however, that the ‘foreign policy’ literature covers most studies on European security.

It is noteworthy to observe that some debates on European security governance have mainly pinpointed the security structures and the multiplication of actors observable out of traditional frameworks, thus emphasising the idea of a division of labour among different security actors. In this sense, for example, Webber et al. focus their attention on an analysis of NATO, as a building block of European security, and on its coordination practices with existing and new emerging institutions (Webber et al. 2004: 8-20). Thus, considering some variables (heterarchy, actors, institutional level, ideational aspect and collective purpose) they testify to the nature of European security governance and to the growing ‘Europeanisation’ of security practices.8 In a similar way, Kirchner emphasises how states share security functions with burgeoning structures of the European second pillar and of the NATO framework, so that coordination strengthens security functions (Kirchner 2007: 30). Coordination concerns the way in which actors interact and who, among them, leads the policy-making process, implementation and control (Kirchner 2007: 24). Management relates to risk assessment duties, monitoring, negotiations, mediations and resource allocation, while regulation is conceived as the policy result, its intended objective, its fostering motivation, its effective impact and the institutional setting created. The existence of national as well as European levels represents an original mode of interaction among variegated domains (Charillon 2005: 529).

The aim of focusing on the ‘who acts and how’ sets a watershed from previous theoretical and empirical approaches (Wagnsson & Hallenberg 2009: 139). The innovative attempt at investigating practices of ‘functional’ security in Europe is undertaken by Magnus Ekengren.9 This

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7 See on this point Hill (1993).
8 According to the authors (Webber et al. 2004: 15), Europeanisation does not imply a perfect congruency of views among actors, but explores ‘the extent to which the European level is emerging as a necessary framework for the elaboration of security and defence policies, without this necessarily implying integration as traditionally understood. On relations with NATO structures and on general transatlantic relations see also Krahmann (2003).
approach retains that threats can propose themselves independently from a speech act, but empirical investigation as well as human interpretation are also important to analyse new security practices. Functional security practices are related to the safeguarding of society and government’s fundamental functions, and to the preservation of critical infrastructures over time against transnational security threats. Thus, multiple actors at more levels and networks coordinate their efforts to preserve functions rather than territorial integrity. They accomplish this task through crisis-management practices and emergency preparedness capabilities spread all over European pillars and requiring a synchronised enactment (Ekengren et al. 2006: V). Thus, the European Union’s capabilities will permit cooperation among member states (as long as they are prone to entrust the Union). Moreover, thanks to the availability of technicians and network experts and of multiple agencies created to face crises (European Food safety Authority, European Center for Disease Prevention and Control, EU’s joint research Center and Satellite Center, EUROJUST, EUROPOL) the EU seems better equipped to face variegated security threats than single states (Boin & Rhinard 2008).

A focus on practices is also set forth by the ‘insecuritisation’ theory of the Paris school, which emphasises the role that routines and technology application as a way to govern freedom play in studying new security threats, the actors engaged, the coordination levels, the transnational networks and the linkages among security challenges. The merit of this approach is to provide both a deep overview on how security is constructed and what to derive from patterns of security governance (Huysmans 2006; Bigo 1998, 2000, 2002; Neal 2009).

Other approaches provide a method to empirically study structures of security governance, concentrating, though, on the European one. Dorussen et al. (2009), maintain that the joint-product analysis provides an appropriate framework to study EU security governance as a collective action problem. Eriksson (suggests three organisational levels: macro, meso and micro, to which different problems, solutions and participants apply (2009: 61-75)). Sperling and Kirchner (2007b) provide a framework for assessing the instruments used (persuasive and coercive) to accomplish defined governance functions (institution building and conflict resolution) given the ongoing system of security threats. The security governance policies required to meet the afore-mentioned functions

10 Among the crises emphasised by the author are: BSE or mad cow disease; terrorist bombings in Madrid and London; electricity blackouts; waves of illegal immigration; avian flu; forest fires. Apparently, here the concept of security differs to a great extent from the one always alluded to in the literature and is identified empirically as what is likely to endanger in a given moment the normal working of societies and the safety of citizens. As a consequence, this approach is eminently inductive, there is no pre-ordained strategy or vision to direct practices.
can range from assurance, prevention, protection to compellence. While this typology has been used to analyse the European preference for governance policies, it can also be extended to other regions outside of the European perimeter, thereby allowing us to sketch some comparisons.11

Table 1: Typology of Security Governance Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instruments</th>
<th>Persuasive</th>
<th>Coercive</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institution-building</td>
<td>Prevention</td>
<td>Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Resolution</td>
<td>Assurance</td>
<td>Compellence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Policies of prevention are intended as policies aimed at downplaying or mitigating the causes of civil and interstate conflict.12 Policies of assurance are peace-building efforts employing mainly civilian tools, especially aimed at contexts in which intra-state troubles proliferate. More controversial seem to be the policies of protection. These policies are aimed at making up for the penetrability of the post-Westphalian state, and thus for the ability of external threats to create internal security challenges. Protection policies testify to the capability of the EU to provide for internal security against indefinite threats such as organised crime, terrorism, border controls, money laundering, computer and information network security and health security. The last basket of policies related to European security is the 'compellence' one, conceived to project force outside of the European perimeter. Here the military connotation prevails, representing the most debated aspect of European security by the academic literature.13

Thus conceived, this typology has permitted a preliminary but comprehensive assessment of European security governance, informing us of the peculiar feature of the efforts at security regulation and about the limits still hampering the achievement of the ideal-typical post-

11 See for example, Nygren (2009).
12 See also on this point Hettne & Söderbaum (2005).
13 See on this point Howorth (2008); Verheugen (2007); Béchat (2001); Schmitt (2003); Menon & Howorth (1997); Duke (2002); Schmitt (2000); Hayward (1997); Hamre & Serfay (2003); Howorth & Keeler (2003); Huntington (1999).
On this point see also Posen (2004); Sloan (2000: 40-42); Clementi (2004).
Westphalian system of security governance. On the positive side, the most important feature to be noticed is the availability of multiple civilian structures and tools that respond soundly to the new security requirements. Also, the variegated set of omni-comprehensive policies mainly encouraged by the ESS seem to be well conceived for the purpose of stability around the European perimeter, thanks, in particular, to a strong compatibility among member states’ interests norms and values.14 In this sense, the set of cross-pillar policies envisioned composes ‘structural foreign policies’, that is, holistic provisions seeking to influence and shape the external environment (Biscop 2008: 9). For the sake of preciseness, though, it is fair to specify that membership or the perspective of concrete benefits in favour of recipient states have been the main determinant of a transformation of neighbours’ internal systems. In addition, the EU has somehow forged its ‘external security governance’ primarily according to its interests, thus differentiating among different geographical zones (Haine 2008: 22).

A controversial assessment deserves instead the perspective of amalgamating different policy instruments spread out over the three pillars of the European Union. Indeed, the presence of security provisions outside of the intergovernmental pillar grants a major role for European institutions and actors and assures a multi-faceted overview of security problems. Nevertheless, these multi-level and multi-dimension peculiarities create consistency problems in policy-regulation, so that competences risk overlapping. To a certain extent, even the availability of civilian and military tools overburdens the coordination problem. Horizontal coherence requires that all activities, actors and institutions within the Union be mutually supportive and consistently linked; vertical coherence requires that member states’ policies be consistently linked to and mutually supportive of European institutions and agencies’ ones (Andersson 2008: 124). While there is no clear-cut set of priorities laid down, in the case of conflicting objectives short-term but high impact solutions are more likely to be undertaken, thus reducing the tenor of a composite security governance system.15 The attempt of the Lisbon Treaty of 2007 to increase coherence through the establishment of common principles and objectives for the external action and institutional reforms is noteworthy. Nevertheless, the list tabled by the Treaty in no way ranks different objectives and does not provide tools to solve conflicts arising among them (Dony 2009).16

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14 See on this point Patten (2001).
15 Dannreuther emphasises this point explaining that the aim at promoting political and economic transformation in the near abroad is counterweighted by ‘a number of strategic and security-driven interests which support a much more conservative and status quo oriented approach’, also backed up in this goal by the European Security Strategy (Dannreuther 2008: 72).
16 The objectives enlisted are: safeguard values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity, consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law; preserve peace,
From an analytical point of view, according to Hill and Smith (2005: 94), the problem may well not be inconsistency among policies, but the fact that this lack of coherence impinges on the ability of the Union to act and to therefore bring about tangible results.

Instead, a clear negative impact on European handling of security matters is determined by the unwillingness of states to cede their prerogatives. Nation states seem eager to preserve their authority and autonomy in what concerns matters strongly related to their sovereignty. The implication is twofold: firstly, the possibility to face external threats through states' coordination is wasted. Thus, even though there is a general agreement on the necessity to coordinate actions to efficiently and consistently respond to transboundary threats, states are reluctant to abandon their prerogatives. Secondly, the perspective of a ‘European’ role and influence backed by a solid and strong military stance able to enforce the breakdown of international rules or help shape the contours of international security settlements is endangered. According to the vast majority of scholars, this is mainly due to of the lack of a common strategic culture among member states, and therefore to the persistence, aside from the ESS, of pure 'national' prerogatives, interests and worldviews animating European states. Thus, while multiple actors and structures make the frame of the European security scenario, it is necessary to assess if and in which cases they are called to play a role in problem solving; even when they participate, it is to be investigated whether “they are acting autonomously or are pressed into service to pursue a security agenda defined by states” (Kirchner 2005: 24).

17 See on this point: Kirchner (2007a: 124); Sperling (2007a: 265-268). It is important to stress that the problem is lurking in the European security dimension as underlined by the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy of 2008, which stands as a sort of assessment of ESS’s five years of existence. The persistence of some obstacles, such as the lack of coordination, the resilience of the nation state and its prerogatives in military affairs, constitute a significant stumbling block to the perspective of security governance as emphatically anticipated at the beginning of the new century. As an example, while it is assessed that development policies make an important part of security policies and conversely security and peace are necessary for development, the task of amalgamating these policies is very arduous. Thus, recognising the importance of these issues, as part of a long-term strategy aimed at downplaying security threats in an efficient and respectful way, does not guarantee its actual application. The assessment of the Report underlines that the progress on the implementation of the ESS has been slow and incomplete, see Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy—Providing Security in a Changing World (Anon., 2008).
EU in multilateral security governance

Interaction dynamics among different systems of security governance

As stated above, while the analysis of ‘security governance’ has been applied prevalently to the European system of security regulation, some approaches have provided the basis for an assessment of global security governance. Indeed, examining this higher level of security management answers to ongoing complexities and provides insights into the international landscape. What we know from previous sections is: first, that there exist different systems of security governance defined according to a series of variables. Second, that each system of security governance shows different modalities to interpret and face security risks (governance policies). Third, following these variables, that the European system of security governance approximates a post-Westphalian system of security governance. Then, the possible aspects to be investigated can be: how does European security governance deal with other systems of security governance? What influence does the European system exert and which probabilities do exist to expand it? Which will be the features of multilateral efforts taking place?

Cooperation frameworks are a reality characterising different contexts outside of the European landscape. Thus, it is possible to speak of multiple systems of security governance, organised through regional frameworks, institutional settings, intra-regional fora or global organisations. What differentiates these variegated settings and renders the perspective of cooperation more difficult relates to those variables discussed in previous sections. Authors have put the emphasis on two peculiar sides of the same coin: first, on the existence alongside post-Westphalian states of Westphalian states and even of pre-westphalian states that show divergent normative structures influencing the tools of governance (coercive or persuasive) (Eriksson 2009: 63) and trust on the scope of governance (broadly-participated or state-led). Second, on different processes of securitisation, which lead to a different perception and assessment of threats and attitudes towards dissimilar strategies (multilateral, unilateral) (Kirchner & Sperling 2007a).

According to some scholars, global solutions to security problems can be better achieved through the existence and the practices of post-Westphalian states (Kirchner & Sperling 2007a). It follows that the exportation of the European system of governance could overcome the heterogeneity of the international system and set the basis for institutional and normative regulation of security challenges. Even in the case of norm and institution formation in the outer context it is not a given that these conform to European ones: ultimately, this could impede the development of a
comprehensive and shared normative and institutional system. Indeed, the limits to this turn in security relations, emphasised by the arguments presented, does not exclude the possibility of cooperative and multilateral arrangements among actors. As an example, the ‘mutual recognition of a threat’ instead of a ‘shared threat perception’ (alliance system) leaves some space for mutual accommodation: providing assistance to a member no matter what the security problem is stands as the main tenet of this argument (Britz & Ojanen 2009: 22). Accordingly, Eriksson (2009: 74), analysing EU governance in Congo, emphasises that security cooperation may take place despite different problem definitions by the actors engaged. Thus, as some scholars suggest, the EU has “to act responsibly not just towards the multilateral ideal or its institutionalised manifestations, but also towards the existing balances of power, influence and interests in the main regions of the world” (Menotti & Vencato 2008: 118). Having a role in security matters means to be able to deal with other security actors while making the added value of its own system of security governance count in handling a particular issue, “a thick global order would require a double balance between integration and accommodation of specific identities and between modern and post-modern forms of governance” (Maull 2005: 778).

A fruitful approach to discussing the role and influence of the EU as a security actor has a double dimension. Externally, it should investigate how actors work together (levels of cooperation, actors engaged) and the security governance approach likely to prevail in specific situations (persuasive or coercive). In this perspective, some authors analyse the ways in which the EU achieves its security goals and contributes to global security governance, and the ways in which it structures its relations accordingly.19 Careful attention to issue-areas is necessary. As a lot of authors pinpoint, security governance tends to be issue-specific: because of the nature of some issue-areas, certain regulation systems are more likely to arise either because of the power of the most important actors engaged in it or because of a general unwillingness to ‘post-modernise’ the issue for fear of losing sovereign competences on that matter (Nygren 2009). This implies that, notwithstanding the peculiarities of the European system of security governance, sometimes there may be a certain agreement and conformity among different actors on how to deal with some security issues. While this does not assure cooperation, it at least explains the deviation from the ideal-typical model representing a post-Westphalian structure of security governance. This argument is pushed forward by Adler and Greve (2009), who maintain the possible overlapping of different mechanisms of security governance within and across regions. In this sense, security governance is

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19 See for example, Madelin (2001); Ortega (2007); Cameron (2004).
made up empirically by a mixture of practices deriving from different order-creating mechanisms. The possible persistence of traditional security approaches has also been shown in the literature on European security, "governance need not to be 'new' or 'network governance' based on horizontal cooperation and public-private partnership. Instead...EU external relations may exhibit many features of 'old governance', including highly asymmetrical relationships between insiders and outsiders; the imposition of predetermined formal rules; the exclusive participation of bureaucratic actors, top-down communication structures" (Schimmelfelding & Sedelmeir cited in Lavenex 2004: 682). In this perspective, a series of contributions testify to both successes and failures of EU actions in the external environment, of positive and negative influences of the EU, the manifestations of these influences and the "problematic, conflictual and unintended consequences" (Telò 2009: 2).

The other dimension to be considered is internal and constitutive of the external one. This line of enquiry is particularly connected to the study of issue-areas. While the predisposition towards a new security governance is apparent, there remain some controversial elements within the internal governance process that end up affecting external projection. This goes beyond the consistency problems underlined above and pertaining to the multiplicity of actors and structures. Sometimes, threats are perceived differently, interests diverge and the normative tenet that should guide governance processes lacks. The absence of a coherent policy internally also influences the security governance approach undertaken in external relations.

In sum, there is a double causation process characterising the way in which the EU system of security governance interacts with other systems and materialises in security efforts: an external one, envisaging the EU dealing with other actors at more levels, and an internal one, testifying to the tenure as a coherent security actor. The next two sections will provide a glimpse into how the external dimension has been studied empirically and on the issue-areas of most concern for the European Union, emphasising the internal security regulation set forth.

**EU and multilateral levels of cooperation**

In this section, likely cooperation frameworks are listed. This is possible by reading through the contributions emphasising the different levels of cooperation the EU has engaged in with other actors to face security challenges. Indeed, the potential to be an important building block of global

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20 See on this point Rees (2005) and Tardy (2008).
governance is emphasised by its participation in many international institutional frameworks and by its participation in multi-layered fora (Ortega 2007: 92).21

Multilateral cooperation or coordination is the hallmark of the EU security approach, indeed “the concept of partnership is presented as a general modus operandi for the Union” (Menotti & Vencato 2008: 104)22, as the belief is widespread that modern day security threats cannot be dealt with alone. In this sense, European security cannot be set apart from the relations with its Atlantic ally, the United States. From this point of view, a first coordination problem arises, as the United States is perceived as a Westphalian state expressing a different position both on the use of force and on the strategic tools to employ to achieve security goals. Cases in point are issues such as terrorism, human rights, failed states, etc. These two trends have been exemplified by the war in Iraq, which has spurred and emphasised a broad range of literature on the crisis of multilateralism (Krause 2004; Newman 2007; Newman et al. 2006; Keohane 2006).23 Moreover, NATO, representing the collective defence system provided by a traditional alliance, is defined as a ‘Westphalian security community’ adding to and competing with the European system of security governance and creating the over-cited transatlantic rivalries (Hallenberg et al. 2009).24 Finally, there is a general agreement among scholars that the three Organisations engaged in European security – NATO the EU and the OSCE - should coordinate their efforts at their best, or at least divide their labour efficiently (Sperling & Kirchner 2004). In this case, the matter for investigation concerns how overlapping structures with different memberships interact with one another and what comes out as a result.25

Indeed, interactions with other great powers, such as Russia, Japan, and Canada, are another important facet of European cooperation layers. Bilateral relations can be conceived both at the national and the European level. In addition, these relations assume a particular importance in view of the peculiar role and influence that each of these great powers can play in a specific geographical context and regional settings and according to the issue-area in question. Aside from great powers, bilateral relations are also engaged in with other emerging countries –India, China, South-Africa and Brazil- but also developing states.

21 See also European Commission (2001).
22 See also Lucarelli & Mamers (2006).
23 For a classic on the matter see Ruggie (1983).
24 J. Hallenberg J. Sperling and C. Wagnsson, eds., op. cit., see also Krahmann (2004); Brimmer (2008); Smith & Stefenson (2005).
25 See for example, Hopmann (2003); Spero (2003).
Over the last decades, a lot of ink has been spent on the regional dimension as a potential stepping-stone of global governance. Above reference has been made to the ‘new regionalism’ as a promising strand of studies underlining the increasing number of regional complexes in order to face transboundary security threats. Following on from this argument, if regional clusters are more able to control and manage the effects of security threats within them, a multilateral cooperation process may diminish the probability of security threats arising, or may lower the probability of negative effects spreading out. This is the reasoning behind various attempts at regional and intra-regional cooperation in today’s international affairs. In this way, global governance may be advanced, making up for the lack of upper level authority and overall global solutions (See, Thakur & Van Langenhove 2006; Söderbaum & Shaw 2003). While studies on new regionalism are not specifically focussed on the EU, this latter case can of course be meaningfully inserted in those attempts at both facing regional security threats and at suggesting frameworks of inter-regional cooperation to handle challenges and assure security. Also, the European Union has been quite supportive of regional initiatives. Thus, regional security management is “a response to the way in which global evolution is driving such actors to defend their interests” (Bailes 2005: 9).

While actors gather to face problems, other constitutive dynamics are at play: common securitisation processes among actors may define regional security structures. Moreover, for other scholars, the practices that states pursue (what actors do and how they do it) is a form of ‘regions’ definition (Adler & Greve 2009: 62). This can be of some relevance both for Europe and for outside actors. Relations are quite strong with the African Union, the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), ASEM (Euro-Asiatic Forum), ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), and ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States). Indeed, the different nature of the states composing these regions or regional organisations, imbued with traditional or ‘modern’ features, limits the degree of coordination achievable on certain issue areas, such as human rights or issues of domestic governance, but does not impede a certain coordination on others.

Thus, the (inter-)regional dimension constitutes an important aspect of the European multilateral cooperation framework, and one in which the Union seems to be able to exert a significant influence. Some scholars, however, point out that while the EU is able to act in some regional contexts, certain others, such as Latin America and Asia, are left aside because the Union is not able to “commit significant resources of all kinds over a sustained period (Hill 2007: 12)”. Thus,

26 Recent contributions to the ‘regional dimension’ of security relations are, among others, Lake (2009); Fawn (2009); Paasi (2009).
27 For a powerful application of the regional security complex theory to energy security see Kirchner & Berk (2010, forthcoming).
according to this argument, it would make more sense for the EU to concentrate its attention on its
neighbourhood. The Stability Pact for the Balkans, with its multi-layered approach, its broad
participation and multi-level coordination, represents one of the most successful regional efforts
undertaken by the Union. The ENP policies towards the Eastern European and the Southern-
Mediterranean countries and Partnership and Cooperation Agreements; the Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership and the strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East designed in
2004; the Union for the Mediterranean encompassing issues such as maritime safety, energy, water,
and migration, are all aimed at downplaying the sources of potential conflicts by employing
external actions demanding coordination with local groups and other actors at various levels
(Dannreuther 2008; Menotti & Vencato 2008: 104–6).28

If the regional level can represent a stepping-stone for the resolution of security problems, global
solutions to solve security challenges have posed more analytical troubles for scholars. The G8 is
said to constitute an important forum of coordination on widespread security problems. There is no
doubt, though, that the principal structure referred to when speaking about a global level of
security governance is the United Nations. This is not to say that the latter is universally believed to
be the repository of security problems resolution. Moreover, it is to be taken into account that
international actors see differently both the role and the authority of the UN. Nevertheless, it
represents to-date the highest and broadest level of coordination among international actors. Aside
from the literature on regionalism that inevitably considers this upper level, recent academic
contributions have investigated relations between the European Union and the UN. The main
understanding is that the EU, with its particular security tools, can support the functioning of the
United Nations, thus contributing to global security governance. In turn, the United Nations can
emphasise the role and legitimacy of the Union as a security actor by conferring upon it important
security functions (Gowan 2008). Interesting is the analysis of Britz and Ojanen (2000) from a
‘security governance’ point of view, aimed at considering the similarities and differences of the
modes of governance of these organisations in order to see if they pertain to the same system of
security governance or whether they constitute two different systems.29

28 The authors list the instruments at the disposal of the EU to engage in peace-building, crisis management and
resolution efforts, development cooperation, trade, human rights, democratisation, environmental protection, electoral
observation, arms control, political dialogue, support for peace initiatives, post-conflict relief and humanitarian aid,
confidence-building measures, rebuilding of government structures, police reform, peace-keeping. Of course, these
instruments are distributed geographically according to the Union’s priorities, so that in some cases the tandem
‘structural stability–human security’ shifts towards the first goal.
29 See also on this argument Thakur & Newman (2000); Cooper, English & Thakur (2002); Krahmann (2003); Graham
(2004).
As seen, EU security governance expresses itself through a multilateral pattern of cooperation levels (bilateral, regional, inter-regional and global), in both the horizontal and vertical dimension. Each path exhibits different features according to the security actors engaged, according to the issue-area in question and the relevance of the area for European security interests. The EU-GARSP project will assess the European position, influence and role through the investigation of the systems of security governance having arisen or emerging in regional conflict; terrorism; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; energy security and climate change; human rights and migration. This should permit an investigation of different features of security governance taking place, as “the EU represents an interesting case, both in the way it serves the interests of its members, the European interests and the way it shapes the wider European and global governance system” (Kirchner 2007: 27).

Introducing case-studies

This section aims to provide a glimpse into the case-studies that will be undertaken within the EU-GARSP programme. This overview on different issue-areas does not pretend to be exhaustive, but provides hints as to why these issues are a security concern for Europe, how they are dealt with internally and externally, and which are the shortcomings persisting in their governance processes.

The WMD Strategy originated from a Swedish proposal for EU action on non-proliferation which was presented in a Political and Security Committee (PSC) meeting at the beginning of 2003, then taken up at the following European Council (14th April 2003). Here, EU foreign ministers instructed the High Representative, in association with the Commission and the PSC, to work on a global threat assessment, a long-term strategy and concrete proposals (GAERC, 14/4/2003, 8220/03 Presse 105). This was finally approved by the European Council together with the ESS. The main aims of the Strategy were threefold: enhancing effective multilateralism in the field of non-proliferation, promoting a stable international and regional environment, and promoting cooperation with key partners (Kienzle 2006). The EU elaborated a ‘non-proliferation clause’ to be included in all agreements with third countries. In terms of the second dimension, however, the EU has failed to impress, given its inactivity in regional hotspots such as India/Pakistan or North Korea. With regard to the last aspect, cooperation with key partners has limited itself to common positions, hence declaratory diplomacy, that which the EPC was often criticised for. Non-proliferation is an area of mixed competence between first and second pillars. Over time, the coordination problems between the Commission, the Council and member states have not been resolved. Member states, argue some in the European Parliament, have not shown a strong political will to implement many
provisions arising from the Strategy (Interview, European Parliament, April 2007). This is also due to the presence of nuclear and non-nuclear European states and namely by a silent Anglo-French veto, blocking the adoption of a tougher stance with regard to WMD as such (Alvares-Verdugo 2006).

Regional conflicts are one of the clearly identified thematic priorities within the scope of the European foreign policy, as stated in the ESS in 2003. This is so because they are believed to endanger regional and global stability also through the enhancement of old and new challenges. Thus, the Union has tried to take an active role on regional rivalries, especially close to its borders. This has required strong cooperation with other regional security actors, with the United States and with the UN. In the case of the Israel-Palestinian conflict the participation of the EU in the international Quartet reinforces the presence of the UN voice and acts as an active supporter on the ground. Nevertheless, and in contrast to counter-terrorism and WMDs, the issue has been tackled without a parallel or subsequent formulation of a unifying policy document; instead, the old ad hoc approach has prevailed. Moreover, its handling has seen the undertaking of confused initiatives from all pillars and of diverging stances from all member states.

The attack on the twin towers in 2001 and the subsequent Madrid and London attacks have inevitably upgraded terrorist threats to amongst the most important challenges to the security of the European Union in the European Security Strategy of 2003 (Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World (Anon.) 2003). One year later, the European Commission published a document to help implement the European Security Strategy for ‘terrorism’ provisions (European Commission 2004). Measures are undertaken in the Justice and Home Affairs pillar, through judicial cooperation, intelligence cooperation and external cooperation measures (especially with the US) (Lugar 2002; Shapiro & Byman 2006; de Neyers 2007; Hunter 2003; Kaye 2007), with a lot of other actors and international organisations, and the creation of structures such as Europol and Eurojust (Deflem 2006; Delpech 2002). Measures are also undertaken to secure borders and provide information on people crossing the EU space; to control possible terrorism financing systems; to assure transport security (on aircrafts, ships, airports and harbours); to protect infrastructures (electricity, gas, communication); to guarantee health security from bio-terrorist attacks; to strengthen relations

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30 This document is central to explaining the ways in which terrorism threatens the European Union and the multilateral cooperation patterns to be envisaged to downplay potential risks. It shows how military and non-military instruments should be amalgamated; how policies spread out within the three pillars can contribute to marginalise the causes of terrorism; how coordination is paramount for efficiency; and finally, how cooperation with other actors is necessary both to achieve internal security and to manage or solve potential threats coming from outside.
with third countries and regions for the coordination or the enhancement of anti-terrorist measures and for democracy promotion (Partnership and Co-operation agreements, development assistance, regional agreements, bilateral agreements). That said, in this area ‘European’ competences are quite reduced, while member states retain a paramount role. Thus, a lack of coordination may result and an emphasis on purely security measures preferred (Monar 2006; Sandler 2005; Bendiek 2006; Bures 2008). Moreover, there persists a controversial relationship between the objectives of fighting terrorism and of respecting human rights. To be sure, terrorism is linked to other security challenges facing the European Union today, for example, the proliferation of weapons of mass destructions acquire a new relevance in view of the possibility of falling into terrorists’ hands. Also, the link existing between illegal migration and terrorism challenges has been abundantly debated in the literature (Boswell 2007; Neal (2009). Nevertheless, these cross-pillar approaches are but few.

Energy policy must pursue aims that reconcile competitiveness, security of supply and the protection of the environment. The general blueprint for EU policy on energy supply security is given in the Green Paper on energy supply security (EU, 2000). The main point emerging from this Paper is that the European Union will become increasingly dependent on external energy sources (European Union 2000). Aside from this aspect, a key global environmental protection issue impinging on future energy policy design and implementation in the EU that cannot be ignored is climate change. With the Maastricht (Art. 2) and the Amsterdam Treaties (Arts 1 x7 and 3c), the idea of sustainable development was included among the principles at the basis of the Union. It is a regulatory principle restated several times as the point of reference for all the EU’s environmental policies (Commission 1997, 2000, 2001, 2005; D’Andrea 2008; Kramer 2004; European Union 1995, 2001a, 2001b; Geller 2002; Grubb 2001). Indeed, both energy supply and environmental provisions require a deep cooperation with other actors in the international landscape: in this case, different and sometimes contradictory patterns have been undertaken by the Union. This has often posed a prioritisation issue among security challenges: for example, given the energetic importance of Russia, some provisions against illegal immigration with this country have been downplayed. In

31 On this point see Guild (2008); Larsæus (2004); Alegre (2008).
32 A further effort should be made to map all the cooperation attempts envisioned by the Union and single states, so as to appreciate both the reach of the terrorist threat and the hottest-spots, and to assess the form of security governance system undertaken with other and possibly different security actors. In particular, in view of the growing importance of the literature on regionalism and inter-regionalism as tools to step up cooperation efforts, the literature should concentrate more thoroughly on these patterns in assessing potential threats and possible solutions, especially in geographical zones of immediate interest for Europe. On this latter point see Spence (2007).
33 The EU has committed itself in the Kyoto Protocol to a reduction target for greenhouse gases of 8 per cent per annum in the period 2008-2012 relative to base year 1990, with an agreed differentiated target setting for its member states, the so-called ‘Bubble Agreement’.
spite of ongoing liberalisation of European energy markets, fully integrated EU energy markets are still a far cry. Energy policy framework in the EU spans a myriad of regulations and measures at both the Union level and the member state level. However, the subsidiarity principle often turns out to be at odds with policies fostering the full integration of the internal EU market and competition rules. This holds notably for renewable energy markets.

The 1990s have seen the birth and the quick expansion of the Justice and Home Affairs domain (Monar 2001). The European economic project together with external factors (Yugoslavian and Iraqi conflicts, terrorist attacks) put the spotlight on the potential consequences of the free movement of people. With Schengen it became all the more apparent that controls at the external border together with cooperation on internal issues had to be intensified in order to enjoy a common internal security space (Monar 2001: 754; Bertozzi 2006: 7; van Selm 2005; Brouwer & Catz 2003: 100-6). Defined as a strategic priority impinging on overall stability, the management of migration is considered as a security matter needing coordination and cooperation processes at more levels and with more actors. The Conference held in Tampere in 1999 tabled clearly that part of the European migration policy was to be undertaken outside of its borders, in relations with third actors and countries, especially with Africa and the Mediterranean countries (Council of the European Union 2005), but also with Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia (Council of the European Union 2007). The lack of a thorough approach to migration and the resilience of nation states has exerted its influence on external multilateral relations. Thus, even though understanding the importance of a cross-pillar and multi-level approach towards migration, states are still struggling to keep away from completely harmonised asylum measures, refugees qualification and legal immigration provisions (Commission of the European Communities 2006: 3; UNHCR 2005). Also, the 'migration dimension’ included in external relations and development policies has created overlapping schemes of cooperation that sometimes create inconsistencies because of conflicting aims between security and development, and because of different decision-making procedures and actors in each policy field (Pastore 2007). Finally, the great emphasis on the security dimension of migration has led to reconsideration of the European tenure on human rights and its conformity with International Conventions signed (Carrera & Guild 2008; Guild 2005).

A human rights focus in EU foreign policy began after the end of the Cold War, with the European Council Declaration on Human Rights, the Resolution on Human Rights in Development Policy and

The Treaty on European Union that introduced the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty specify that the Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law (Treaty of Lisbon, Art. 10A). Indeed, for this principle to prevail in international matters it is necessary that it be broadly shared. The reality, though, seems to be that whilst often declared, it is most often not abided by. Also, the European Union has not always prioritised it when cooperating with other actors. A closer analysis shows that the development of the EU’s external human rights policy was not simply an emanation of internal values but also a mixture of principled and instrumental arguments, backed by assessments of the changing international context and by external demands. Perspectives also differ on human rights also between European states. Some countries are more concerned with the efficiency of aid spending and the accountability of taxpayers’ money. Some authors see the success of normative values, public opinion pressure and advocacy groups as having constrained Western governments to take up the human rights mantra: such apparently non-ideological consensus has legitimised foreign intervention and provided the powerful with a tool to control the less powerful (Balfour 2007; Chandler 2002a, 2002b; Commission 2001; Crawford 1996; Evans 1998; Kaldor 2007; Kaldor et al. 2005, 2007, 2007).

Security governance: a critical assessment of the literature

This final section aims at identifying all aspects of the literature on security governance that require further research. This provides us with guidelines to render security governance a valuable concept both from a theoretical and an analytical point of view.

First, an effort at bridging the literature on security with that on security governance is a suggested step. As seen in the first sections, the literature on security governance implicitly considers the way through which ‘securitisation’ processes have affected both the understanding and the modes of security regulation. Nevertheless, the rationale and the ‘constitutive’ processes are poorly debated and this ends up reducing the aim of the concept to stand with other theories accounting for cooperation efforts in security matters. Thus, further research is needed on how to consistently link...
the literature on security and the one on security governance, as put forward in particular by Kirchner and Sperling. Going through this process would also allow a diminution of the epistemological confusion around the term. In fact, there remains a general vagueness on what is referred to when speaking about security governance. Security governance has been conceived from time to time as a theoretical approach, as a would-be, as an empirical device, as a process focused on the institutionalisations of decision-making and coordination practices or as an action evaluated on the contribution provided to security problems management (Kirchner 2005: 10).

Indeed the operationalisation of the term has an impact on empirical research - the lack of clarity does not contribute to define once and for all the direction that empirical studies need to undertake. This is to be pursued especially because the variegated literature on governance, and the different approaches encompassed in that term (emphasis on actors, on decision-making practices, on different interest composition, on implementation, on authority diffusion) do inevitably impinge on the concept's reach. As there is no unique connotation of security governance there seems also to be no unique understanding of what the term implies for analytical purposes.

Second, while the literature has discussed the possibility to 'expand' the European system of security governance to advance a more normative and institutionalised global system, it has not reflected enough on the necessary internal conditions for this to happen. Thus, according to this scholarship, it is mainly the external environment that represents an obstacle to security efforts coordination. The internal level is as important as the external one to evaluate the role of the EU as a security actor. Some hints in this direction are provided by the literature emphasising two problems of governance per se: accountability and consistency. These problems are likely to gain more weight when 'security' considerations are on the table. In particular, the shift of authority raises problems of political representation and this poses questions over the legitimacy of defined practices. More importantly, though, the overlapping vertical and horizontal networks, the multiplicity of participants and the contradiction among priorities of different security actors are likely to generate reliability problems. The scarce consistency among policies, due to the cross-pillar structure splitting security roles and instruments, is likely to impact negatively on relations with the outer world, endangering the role of Europe, its influence and stance in multilateral security governance. In addition, a focus on different issue-areas emphasises that some matters are 'Westphalian' no matter who deals with them. It is, for example, assessed that issues regarding the military sphere of security constitutes coordination processes among actors having different national cultures. By and large, however, the impact that some, especially new, security threats may

have on European and global security governance is largely disregarded. This may be so because there is no basic consideration on how issues as migration, the environment and human rights violation may constitute security risks, and the subsequent implications (see the securitisation processes mentioned above). Inevitably, overlooking the understanding behind ‘new’ security issues does not permit to see the ranking these latter have in comparison to traditional security challenges and the mode of security governance. In addition, the literature would be thoroughly enriched by a mapping of the potential linkages among issue areas; from a ‘security governance’ point of view, it would make more sense to monitor these chains. In fact, this would permit a consideration of both the actors and the practices leading to these transmissions of insecurities.

Third, it is apparent that empirical studies on security governance have been biased by a focus on the European context. Because of its underpinnings, it is obvious that the concept best applies to the practices of the European Union. As Kirchner points out, the concept of security governance reflects the multiplicity of actors characterising the European context in security order; also, it provides a greater emphasis on the role of rules, norms and ideas in tailoring security policies; it underlines the ineffectiveness of a go-alone strategy and sets forth the conditions for multilateral cooperation (Kirchner 2007: 23). Along the same argument, “the validity of the governance approach lies in the ability to locate some of the distinctive ways in which European security has been coordinated, managed and regulated” (Webber et al. 2004: 3). Thus, most empirical works are biased by this framing, that is, on the way in which security practices are regulated in Europe. Sometimes, the emphasis on the post-Westphalian character of Western states and their penetrability ends up replacing the same concept of security governance. To a certain extent, security governance indicates and mirrors the European security landscape “the governance approach offers a holistic set of perspectives that link policy-making and institutional building, acknowledging the struggles for political power that shape the European process but also the normative dimension of the EU” (Farrell 2005: 458). The need arises, then, to carry forward further research on how security governance takes shape outside the European context or in interaction with the EU: as pointed out by Sperling and Kirchner, security governance is a term to analyse the different ‘modalities’ of security efforts with a view to a possible global security governance system. Thus, there is no value in confining the term to the analysis of European regulation processes.
Concluding Remarks

The aim of this work was to provide informed insights about the main understandings on security governance. Thus, a thorough analysis was undertaken to uncover its multi-faceted aspects.

The first part investigated ‘security governance’ as a concept, providing the available definitions and the theoretical assumptions upon which or against which the term is built. It has been emphasised how attempts at bridging the literature on security with that on security governance may enhance the theoretical and empirical relevance of the term. Building on the tenets of the first part, the second one has focused on the European system of security governance, emphasising how the post-Westphalian nature of states within Europe renders security regulation efforts different from those of other systems. This section also provided a snapshot on certain proposals for methodological and empirical analysis on security governance having Europe as the main object of study. The third section related the EU within a context of different security governance systems: issues such as exportability and influence of the European model have surfaced. While the perspective of cooperation along the European model may look gloomy, this paper has underscored two points. First, cooperation may arise notwithstanding the specific features of the actors because of a compatibility of interests. Second, the external environment is not the only one influencing coordination dynamics, but the internal facet (within Europe) also accounts for the consistency and reliability of Europe as a security actor in cooperative efforts. Thus, a study on the different levels of analysis defining the cooperation frameworks among different security actors and a focus on different issue-areas constituting security concerns for the EU can inform how security governance is effectively undertaken.

The article then suggested to endeavour a ‘theoretical’ remark on security governance, to go over all dimensions impinging on European security governance through the undertaking of multi-faceted and multi-sector analyses, and to broaden the relevance of security governance as a concept and as an analytical device through the study of security efforts outside of the European perimeter and of interaction patterns among different systems of security regulation.

References


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