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ABSTRACT. Although it is widely recognized that the European Union plays an important role in global politics, it is still controversial what kind of international actor the European Union is. Following actorness theory, questions of actor capability take center stage, challenging the union’s ability to identify priorities and formulate policies as well as its availability of and capacity to utilize policy instruments. Therefore, the study at hand analyzes how coherent (or incoherent) the Union is in terms of its policy formulation and implementation regarding development and security policies developed in Brussels and targeted at the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The empirical findings of research conducted in Brussels, eastern Congo, and Rwanda reveal several patterns of insufficient coordination, causing incoherencies in the external policies of the Union. Profound institutional divisions, overlapping competencies, and neglected discrepancies become apparent. Thus, the research identifies several shortcomings that must be overcome if the Union wants to meet its own ambitions to be a coherent and influential actor in global peace and security.

KEYWORDS. European Union, foreign policy, development, security, coordination, coherence, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Great Lakes Region

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INTRODUCTION

“The European Union is a global actor, ready to share in the responsibility for global security.”

“If the EU wants to be a global actor, it has to have one lead with different components. But this is impossible due to the organizational structure. There are huge gaps, very different objectives at different levels and for different geographical areas. We have to find a solution inside the EU together with the member states.”

During the past two decades, there has been a substantial increase in interest concerning what particular kind of international actor the European Union (EU) is and in which ways it pursues international policies. This sustained attention reflects both the recognition that the EU plays an important role in global politics and the analytical challenge of dealing with the EU, since the actual political entity that the EU forms remains controversial.

Following classical realist approaches in the field of international relations (IR), the main actors of interest are first of all powerful states. From a realist point of view, the role of the EU in global politics has thus been rather neglected and underestimated over the years. However, this narrow and state-centric approach of traditional IR has been broadened as well as rejected by several scholars during the last years. As early as 1977 and following a social constructivist approach, Gunnar Sjöstedt pointed out the need to develop criteria to enable an evaluation of the possible actor character or nature of the then European Community and coined the concept of “actor capability.” It was later on further developed, among others, by Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler. Speaking about the EU’s “actoriness,” emphasis was put on the significance of taking into account (1) both the internal and external factors that permit, promote, or constrain the development of the EU’s role in global politics and (2) the general perception of the EU as an actor. According to Bretherton and Vogler, the EU could be considered as an actor “under construction” whose external activities were shaped “by a complex set of interacting processes, based on the notions of presence, opportunity and capability.” Capability implies “those aspects of the EU policy process which constrain or enable external action.” Consequently, regarding the debate about how the EU pursues foreign policies and what kind of international actor it is, the aspect of capability is of particular importance. The main characteristics of capability are the ability to identify priorities and formulate policies—which build on coherence—and the availability of and capacity to utilize policy instruments.

In their work, Bretherton and Vogler analyzed several policy areas at the EU level separately and from a horizontal perspective, such as trade, development, and security policies as a means to examine the extent to which the EU achieved actorness. Further sustained studies about the EU as a global actor with a focus on regional agency have been carried out by those interested in
However, the extent to which the EU’s actor capability with a particular focus on foreign policies is influenced by a coherent policy formulation and policy implementation remains an open question. This question can be understood as key to the understanding of the EU’s international performance at present as well as its potential to achieve a greater effectiveness in the future.

Consequently, the aim of this article is to reveal how coherent (or incoherent) the EU is with regard to policy formulation and implementation through analyzing the EU’s development and security policies in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The article aims to contribute to the discussion on the EU’s capacity as a global actor and its role in global politics by drawing conclusions from the level of coherence achieved regarding the EU’s capability and thus actorness. By doing so, the following questions will be examined: How coherent is the EU’s formulation of development and security policies (horizontal coherence)? How coherent is the EU’s implementation of development and security policies (institutional coherence)? And how coherent are EU and national member states’ policies (vertical coherence)?

**ACTORNESS THEORY AND COHERENCE**

The EU’s role as a global political and security actor has become more and more important during the past two decades following its increase in economic weight and geographical size. Nevertheless, the EU is still regarded as an actor “under construction” that has to expand its so-called “actorness” to be globally acknowledged as a capable foreign policy actor. The main concepts of actorness theory are opportunity, presence, and capability. According to Bretherton and Vogler, “opportunity” identifies “the context which frames and shapes EU action or inaction” and thus “conceptualizes a dynamic process where ideas are interpreted and events accorded meaning.” Consequently, shared understandings about the EU shape the context of its action. However, at the same time, these understandings cannot be looked at detached from material conditions; rather they have to be integrated. Thus, questions of opportunity must be taken into account when putting into relation the expectations of the EU as an actor in global peace and security versus its capabilities.

In contrast to “opportunity,” the notion of “presence” refers to “the ability to exert influence externally; to shape the perceptions, expectations and behaviour of others.” Regarding the EU, it can be stated that its presence in international affairs has increased significantly during the past few decades. However, presence does not exclusively require purposive external action. Simply due to its existence and its relative weight (e.g., demographically and economically), the EU impacts and shapes the rest of the world.
Due to both the broadening of its policy scope and its geographical enlargement, the EU’s presence has increased over time. At the same time, internal factors questioning the efficiency and legitimacy of policy processes seem to have diluted the EU’s presence. Consequently, special attention is paid to the notion of capability. Following Bretherton and Vogler, “capability” focuses both on the EU’s ability to formulate policies and the EU’s availability to use appropriate instruments to implement these. In turn, this either constrains or enables external action, which means that capability implies “the Union’s ability to capitalize on presence or respond to opportunity.”16 In other words, internal cohesiveness is considered to be the precondition for external action.17 As a consequence, Bretherton and Vogler identify four requirements as being basic for actoriness:

- Shared commitment to a set of overarching values
- Domestic legitimization of decision processes and priorities relating to external policy
- The ability to identify priorities and formulate policies—captured by the concepts of consistency and coherence, in which: (1) consistency indicates the degree of congruence between the external policies of the member states and the EU and (2) coherence refers to the level of internal coordination of EU policies.
- The availability of and capacity to utilize policy instruments—diplomacy/negotiation, economic tools, and military means

Of specific importance are the third and fourth requirements, since the analysis of the EU’s ability to identify priorities and to formulate policies is first and foremost based on the existence of what Bretherton and Vogler name consistency and coherence. The EU’s availability and in particular the capacity to utilize policy instruments depends on the degree of consistency and coherence. Thus, consistency and coherence are the key concepts to focus on when analyzing the EU’s capability as an actor in global politics.18 “Consistency” identifies “the extent to which the bilateral policies of Member States are consistent with each other and complementary to those of the EU.”19 “Coherence,” in contrast, deals with “the internal policy processes of the Union,”20 which can cause incoherencies due to the specific nature of the EU policy system itself.

The concept of coherence is a rather new, highly debated, and controversial one in the field of politics.21 Coherence describes “the action or fact of cleaving or sticking together: cohesion.”22 In relation to the coherence of policies and specifically regarding the coherence of development policies, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) stated in 2003 that policy coherence involves “the systematic promotion of mutually reinforcing policy actions [which create] synergies towards achieving the agreed objective.”23
This OECD definition is, however, too narrow. Consequently, the concept of “substantive coherence” is included, which “responds to the question whether the goals of rules and policies in different subject areas . . . fit or contradict each other.”

Following this definition of coherence, the concept has to be made applicable, and therefore a tripartite categorization is proposed, which highlights the specifications of horizontal, institutional, and vertical coherence. First, horizontal coherence implies primarily coherence between different EU policies. This means that “the policies pursued by different parts of the EU machine, in pursuit of different objectives, should be coherent with each other, or at least not involuntarily incoherent.” Consequently, an effective arbitration mechanism is required. Thus, the question to what extent EU security and development policies are formulated in a coherent way is raised. Of particular interest is the relation between specific missions under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and development programs in the eastern provinces of the DRC.

Closely connected to horizontal coherence is the second categorization of institutional coherence, which implies the need for coherence within EU’s external relations aiming at effective multilateralism. It constitutes the difficulties following the EU’s choice to handle the single policy sector of external relations by two sets of actors that each apply a different set of procedures. Thus, in contrast to horizontal incoherencies, which are predominantly the result of different policy objectives, institutional incoherencies arise out of different approaches to the same problem.

Finally, vertical coherence implies coherence between EU and national member states’ policies. This plays a role whenever one or several member states pursue national policies that are contrary to policies agreed on at the EU level. Consequently, questions of vertical coherence arise due to the fact that both the EU and its member states are simultaneously active in development cooperation. In addition, the various CSDP missions are administered by Council entities that give account to the member states.

Following this, the need for improved coherence is not only widely accepted and the subsequent benefits acknowledged but there is also a broad consensus that incoherence in policy formulation and implementation entails a higher risk of inefficient spending and duplication. Furthermore, the quality of service is considered to be lower, goals are more difficult to achieve, and there is ultimately a reduced capacity for delivery. These negative effects of incoherencies, in turn, impinge on the EU’s capacity and capability as a global actor in peace and security. In other words, incoherencies constrain the EU’s actor-ness. Thus, “coherence” is considered to be the ultimate objective while at the same time “coordination” is supposed to be the activity to achieve coherence. Coordination can imply the developing of common strategies and the determining of common objectives, the exchange of information, and the division
of roles and responsibilities. Furthermore, coordination can be facilitated by dialogue, liaison, and common training. Thus, while the need for coherence and the feasibility of coordination seems to be evident, several aspects impinge on these objectives. Among others, restrictive factors include a potential multitude of actors, the costs coordination entails regarding time and money, competition for influence and visibility between the different actors, and a more general unwillingness of actors to limit their margin for manoeuvre by the discipline of coordination.

**THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: THE INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS**

Regarding the institutional actors of the EU with respect to the its approach toward the DRC, the institutional division between Commission and Council actors is remarkable. Thus, the difference between the Commission policies, namely development and humanitarian assistance and policies formulated by the Council of the EU in terms of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) under the umbrella of the Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP), must be clear. As Figure 1 illustrates, the main actors on the Commission side in Brussels are the Directorates General (DG) for Development, designing the strategies and policies regarding development cooperation in the DRC, and the Department for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection of the European Commission (DG ECHO), managing short-term relief activities in the sphere of humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, EuropeAid is responsible for translating development policies into practical actions, while the Directorate General for External Relations (DG Relex) administers the EU’s external policies in general as well as more specifically short-term instruments such as the Instrument for Stability. Consequently, the Commission is represented in the capital of Kinshasa by a Commission Delegation and maintains field offices in eastern DRC to implement its development and humanitarian programs.

However, the structure under the Council of the EU is rather complicated. At present, two civil missions under the CSDP—the EU advisory and assistance mission for security sector reform in the DRC, EUSEC RD Congo, and the EU police mission, EUPOL RD Congo—operate in the DRC to support the reform of the Congolese security sector. These two missions have been separated from the beginning and respond to different lines of command, reporting back to different institutions (as illustrated in Figure 1). It is striking in this regard that the EUSEC RD Congo mission operates under the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), although the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) is in charge of operational planning and the conduct of civilian CSDP missions.
The continuous expansion on the civilian side of the CSDP regarding civilian crisis management and security sector reform is a further and more general complication. Thus, there is no longer a clear detachment of the intergovernmental and the community method. In other words, except for military
crisis management, almost all approaches could be undertaken either under the CSDP or as part of development assistance programs. However, what makes the coordination of the diverse instruments of Commission and Council entities difficult is the long-term/short-term dichotomy between development cooperation and CSDP missions. Long-term development instruments are frequently difficult to adapt to CSDP perspectives and vice versa. The financial situation—while development assistance is financed through the general budget of the European Development Fund (EDF) for Commission activities, there are only limited resources for civilian CSDP activities included in the general budget—is also problematic.34

The EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the Great Lakes Region of Africa (DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda) has a specific role. Besides providing political guidance to the heads of mission, the EUSR has to ensure the coordination between these missions and between the missions and the other EU actors on the ground. The aim of the EUSR is to cut across the institutional divide between CSDP and community instruments.35

COOPERATION IN ACTION: EUROPEAN UNION–DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO RELATIONS

Regarding the commitment of the European Commission, the overall objective is to further stabilize the DRC and to support the reconstruction of the country. To achieve these aims, the commission currently provides roughly €584 million under the tenth EDF covering the period from 2008 until 2013.36 In addition to European Commission activities, the Council of the EU has deployed a total of five civil and military missions in the DRC (see Figure 2).
In 2003, the EU launched its first military mission, code-named ARTEMIS, which aimed at contributing to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, eastern DRC. From 2005 until 2007, a civil police mission (EUPOL Kinshasa) was established to help the Congolese national police keep order, particularly during the electoral period in 2006. In addition, and to support the United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC) during the first democratic electoral process, a third mission, code-named EUFOR RD Congo, was launched. In July 2007, EUPOL Kinshasa was replaced by EUPOL RD Congo and the scope of the mission was expanded from Kinshasa to areas all over the country but especially to the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu. Since then, the purpose of EUPOL RD Congo is to support the reform of the security sector in the field of the police and its interaction with the justice system. Since June 2005, the EU has carried out a second mission to provide advice and assistance for the reform of the security sector in the DRC, code-named EUSEC RD Congo, which supports the Congolese authorities in the rebuilding of the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC). In short, “the DRC has become the largest laboratory for EU crisis management, together with the Western Balkans.”

IN SEARCH OF COORDINATION AND COHERENCE

Since “coordination” is perceived as the activity to achieve coherence, the following sections focus on coordination within the European Commission, within the Council of the EU, and on the coordination between these two entities, with a specific focus on the role of the EUSR for the GLR and the so-called “Rejusco” program. Following this, the vertical relationship between the EU and its member states is analyzed in the fourth subsection.

Regarding the question of coordination within the European Commission and in relation to its activities in the DRC, two different departments take center stage: the Directorate General for Development (DG DEV) and the Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO). For these two departments, the guiding policy documents are “The European Consensus on Development” and “The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid.” Furthermore, the communication titled “Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development” (LRRD) aims to link the two spheres of short-term humanitarian assistance and long-term development aid to minimize the so called “gray zone” between these two policies. Thus, both DGs are supposed to relate their policies to each other because the coordination of development cooperation initiatives and humanitarian assistance programs is considered to be vital to ensure coherence, which in turn increases the efficiency and impact of the activities implemented.

However, in practice, this linkage between short-term relief and long-term development assistance is more complicated. Both the institutional separation
between DG DEV and DG ECHO in Brussels and the actual implementation of policies in the field is problematic. Concerning the former aspect, one DG ECHO representative in Brussels questioned the new institutional structure that entered into force as of February 1, 2010. Since then, both DG DEV and DG ECHO are led by their own commissioner whereas previously they had a common one. Although this might give both DGs a stronger voice, one interviewee in Brussels remained concerned that in turn it could lead to the two DGs no longer speaking with the same voice, undermining coordination.

Regarding policy implementation in the provinces of North and South Kivu, the transition from emergency aid to development cooperation is considered problematic by both humanitarian and development actors. Sources repeatedly emphasized the different time frames of the programs and resulting difficulties. While development programs defined in so-called Country Strategy Papers (CSP) and financed under the EDF have a duration of five years, humanitarian programs are designed for 12–18 months. In South Kivu, for example, ECHO’s focus is on food security, which is not part of the current CSP for the DRC under the tenth EDF. However, according to ECHO, the ambition is to link questions of food security with the health strategy which, in contrast, is part of the tenth EDF and is followed by DG Development. As a consequence, there is the attempt to “build a bridge between them [humanitarian assistance and development programs]” and “to develop and participate in common strategies.” However, close collaboration is hampered by diverse objectives. In addition, the clear aim is that, theoretically, development cooperation has to become active once humanitarian assistance is faded out, but “this does not work in practice.”

Regarding coordination mechanisms in the field, a further significant aspect is the physical presence of EU actors. In contrast to South Kivu, where an ECHO field office in Bukavu was opened up only recently, there has been a strong presence of diverse Commission actors in Goma for several years. Thus, in North Kivu, coordination is facilitated in terms of formalized weekly meetings, which in turn lead to greater coherence regarding the implementation of EU policies, but not in South Kivu.

Consequently, in terms of horizontal coherence, it can be stated that its significance is explicitly incorporated in the guiding policy documents and enforced by the so-called Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) approach, highlighting the importance of coherence between the two policy areas to increase the effectiveness and the impact of the short-term humanitarian and long-term development activities implemented.

Nonetheless, the empirical reality illustrates the difficulties both in policy formulation and in policy implementation. The differing time frames and core areas of development and humanitarian programs cause planning difficulties which in turn can lead either to an overlap or a lack of activities in certain areas. In other words, horizontal incoherencies arise out of differing
policy objectives of the responsible Directorates General for development and humanitarian assistance on the Brussels level. Although, according to the interviewees, an attempt is made to link and build a bridge between the two policy areas through developing and participating in common strategies, no satisfying solutions have yet been found. Horizontal incoherencies are translated into institutional incoherencies since development and humanitarian actors follow different approaches. Consequently, the EU does not thoroughly exhaust its potential when it comes to the interplay of development and humanitarian activities in eastern DRC.

Coordination and Coherence within the Council of the European Union

Regarding the question of coordination within the Council of the EU and in relation to its activities in the DRC, the main focus is on the two ongoing missions, EUSEC RD Congo and EUPOL RD Congo, which were launched under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union. With regard to coordination, it is revealing that these two missions have always operated as two separate missions under two different chains of command and planning entities, even though both missions target the reform of the Congolese security sector. While EUSEC works with the Congolese military, EUPOL focuses on the Congolese police.50 One Council representative in Brussels declared that “these two missions could actually be a single one.”51 A staff member of the office of the EUSR for the Great Lakes Region stated that “if we start a mission now, it would be one mission.”52

Regarding separation, one representative of the Council Secretariat referred to structural problems and unclear responsibilities within the Council and between what was then DG E VIII and DG E IX: “For some reason, DG E VIII rather than IX was then in charge of planning and conducting that mission [EUSEC]. And this is strange because they have no planning and conduct authority as such.”53 Furthermore, the interviewee mentioned “jealousy and power play” between the two different directorates (DG E VIII and DG E IX) as a possible explanation for the separation of the missions when they were established.54 Regarding the situation on the ground, it was remarkable that all interviewees supported the strict separation of EUPOL and EUSEC—or at least took it for granted. One EUPOL representative, for example, highlighted that “there is no collaboration between EUPOL and EUSEC, that’s normal! Because they are the military and we are police officers. That’s it.”55 Furthermore, one EUSEC representative admitted that “one does not know what the other mission is doing; it’s another kind of work.”56 In other words, EUSEC and EUPOL are considered to be “two different metiers.”57

However, this strict separation can be challenged with regard to questions of gender and human rights, which are cross-cutting issues between the two
missions. Indeed, EUPOL and EUSEC share a gender advisor both in North and South Kivu respectively. While this appears to be a moderate way to make use of synergy effects, one interviewee criticized the whole gender approach as rhetoric since there is no specific budget for gender activities and so plans are not feasible and expectations cannot be met. In addition, the double-heading of the EUPOL and EUSEC mission was judged as “not effective.” Beyond that, another interviewee critically mentioned that the sharing of the gender advisor “could be . . . for camouflage reasons, for the member states to be happy, that we somehow say that it is still collocated.”

Thus, regarding coordination within the European Council and with regard to current activities in the DRC, evidence reveals that first of all, the strict separation of the two EUPOL and EUSEC missions can be understood as a consequence of inconsistencies between Council entities. This separation is challenged by several interviewees in Brussels, while it is taken for granted by the interviewees in eastern DRC. Furthermore, personalities seem to play a major role in Brussels, although coordination is considered to be important. In contrast to that, coordination at the field level is perceived as rather unnecessary. Consequently, various obstacles regarding coherence become visible. While the policy objective of both missions is to support the security sector reform in the DRC, a clear division has been established between the EUSEC and EUPOL missions. Whereas the former concentrates on providing advice and assistance for the defense reform, including the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC), the latter aims to mentor in the field of the Congolese police and its interaction with the justice sector. The formal separation of the missions bears the risk of causing institutional incoherencies within the EU’s external actions, although the same overall goal (the reform of the Congolese security sector) is pursued. This is even more astonishing since there seems to be an understanding by the Council about the importance of a successful reform of the security sector. This after all is the impulse behind the establishment of the two missions. In other words, and as highlighted by the interviewees, institutional incoherencies decrease the efficiency and effectiveness of the EU missions and hence of the overall European approach in the DRC.

The imperative for effective coordination mechanisms is closely linked to and aggravates the strict separation of the missions. Hence, the politically backed separation of the two missions makes high demands on effective coordination mechanisms if a coherent approach regarding the reform of the Congolese security sector were to be pursued. However, the empirical findings highlight that coordination between EUPOL and EUSEC is insufficient, causing incoherencies. This is even more remarkable regarding the fact that horizontal coherence seems to be given due to a common policy objective, at least when it comes to the approach of the European Council.
Coordination and Coherence between the European Commission and the Council

Although desirable, coordination within the European Commission and within the Council of the EU is problematic. Focusing on the inter-institutional coordination between these two institutions, it seems to be obvious that, theoretically, Commission departments could benefit from the particular strengths and experiences of the various Council departments and vice versa. The Commission, on the one hand, has profound experience in development cooperation and humanitarian assistance and possesses comprehensive knowledge concerning the specific situation on the ground due to long-time practical experience in developing and implementing programs. The Council of the EU, on the other hand, has the means to conduct civil and military missions under the Common Security and Defence Policy, which can be launched comparatively quickly and enhance the EU’s visibility in the region. In other words, both Commission and Council entities could complement one another. However, practical coordination is limited, and both sides accuse each other of narrow-mindedness.

The separation of Commission and Council activities starts at the Brussels level. According to one Commission representative, the coordination of Commission and Council activities in the DRC is not only made impossible because of the two different structures and the two different chains of command but also because of a permanent struggle for power between the two entities. This statement and disregard toward Council activities is underlined by the comment that “we [the Commission] are not there [in the DRC] for the show but there to address the problem.”60 Another interviewee from the Commission expressed his point of view even more clearly by stating, “To be honest, I think that the EU operations have no impact on the situation in the DRC.”61 Both the lack of regular coordination meetings with the Council, except for the case of an acute crisis, and the rather technical approach of CSDP missions followed by the Council is criticized as being inappropriate, in contrast to the political approach applied by the Commission. Sources accuse the Council of launching short-term operations under the CSDP, which are neither adequately backed politically nor accepted by the Congolese authorities. What is needed instead is long-term support for the political process in the DRC. Consequently, the Commission, not the Council, is considered to be the appropriate actor.62

However, according to one source, the member states fear to further empower the Commission. Therefore, CSDP operations are initiated as a mere intergovernmental practice, representing the member states with their own interests rather than the EU as such. For example, the EUPOL RD Congo mission was mentioned: “Despite huge costs, things didn’t move. And what was all behind that? The struggle for power!”63
While a representative of the Council Secretariat generally agreed with the position that the relationship between the Commission and the Council can be described as “a very, very, very bad example of coordination and cooperation. Almost not existent,” the reason given for that contrasts with the previous statement: “Traditionally, the Commission is jealous of civilian ESDP. Military they can accept because it’s military and they are not in charge. But civilian, they say we can do it as well.”

Following up these different statements, serious discrepancies regarding the relationship between the Commission and the Council are visible. Both sides raise concerns regarding the approach of the other and their mutual stances are characterized by mistrust and disrespect. Since roles and responsibilities are rarely distributed between the two entities, both follow their respective (and differing) approaches. This in turn leads to a detachment of the two entities and complicates or even inhibits any effective coordination at the Brussels level. A lack of coordination provokes horizontal and institutional incoherencies.

However, in contrast to the predominantly negative assessment of coordination from a Brussels perspective, the situation on the ground looks more promising specifically regarding the EUSR and the “Rejusco” program, to which we now turn.

The European Union Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region

The EUSR for the Great Lakes Region is of particular interest since the EUSR’s role is to promote coherence between CFSP/CSDP actors and to support the overall political coordination of EU activities. Regarding the EUSR, the majority of interviewees both in Brussels and in the field highly valued the work that was done by the Special Representative and his political advisors. Only one interviewee in Brussels did not consider him to be of significance, while acknowledging that theoretically the EUSR should be a link between the different actors and entities.

In contrast, the EUSR was consistently complimented as being “a fantastic example of somebody taking the coordinating role” since he provided information, coordinated EU activities in an informal way, and got all relevant actors around the table:

Once a month calling us [the CPCC] in, us, the CMPD, the Commission and then he talks about the two missions, what he is doing and what else could be done . . . it’s good that he gives us the opportunity to also sit around the table regularly, to talk about our missions, about his work and about how it’s been all along. So a beautiful, very good example of coordination.

Since the conflict situation in the DRC obviously entails a regional component, another Council representative highlighted the importance of having a Special Representative with a regional mandate since the EUSR can both find its way
to negotiate with the local authorities in the Great Lakes Region and to do lobbying at the EU level in Brussels:

We [CPCC/EUPOL] are so closely interacting with him [the EUSR] because whenever he meets with the Congolese counterparts, we also discuss about the mission, so that’s an important aspect and we all normally meet very often and interact, exchange our views and we coordinate our actions. So he is constantly updated about our plans, initiatives and so on.68

Although no staff member of the EUSR office is officially stationed permanently in the DRC, two of his political advisors alternately work in Goma “on mission” where they have de facto taken over a “low-key coordination role to ensure the flow of information.” Furthermore, the interviewee highlighted that the relationship between the EUSR and EUSEC, as well as EUPOL, was particular insofar as the EUSR gave political direction to the missions and formed the “glue” between them. This meant that the two missions provided the office of the EUSR with technical information that was in turn analyzed and brought forward by the EUSR. Furthermore, the office of the EUSR coordinates the strategic review of the missions, which in turn provides the basis for the member states’ decision whether or not to extent the missions.69

Regarding the relationship between EU actors, the political advisor of the EUSR highlighted that the work done on the ground and specifically in Goma was more action oriented and that it was “more apparent that we work towards a common goal since institution wrangling is less apparent.”70 While the interviewee stated that the relations in Brussels and specifically between the Commission and the Council are predominantly affected by hierarchy, the benefits of coordination and cooperation were appreciated at field level. Although “everyone works on its own capacity regarding humanitarian, political, military and police issues, there are direct implications on each other,” which in turn necessitate coordination.71 As a consequence and to facilitate effective coordination, the office of the EUSR organizes a weekly meeting in Goma, where all EU actors get together. This facilitates an exchange of information and allows for the coordination of the different strategies between the representatives of ECHO, the EU Delegation, EUSEC and EUPOL, but also with regard to the staff of the British, Dutch and French embassies, which is also station in “on mission” in Goma. Thus, the EUSR undertakes efforts to involve and link all European actors to overcome the prevalent institutional separation:

It’s separated [Council and Commission activities] but there is the Special Representative for the African Great Lakes Region, Roeland van de Geer. And he, he knows exactly the situation in eastern Congo. He knows very well that justice is extraordinary important for the consolidation and the stabilization of the region. Therefore, why should we set aside the experience and the input we
Beyond the appreciation expressed in eastern DRC, the significance of the EUSR is also highly valued from the perspective of the EU Commission Delegation in Kigali, Rwanda. According to one representative of the Delegation, the EUSR’s strength is his ability to meet with many different actors involved in the Great Lakes Region. As an example, one source stated that Roeland van de Geer at times met with Kabila and then brokered with other states. Therefore, the EUSR was considered to hold a valuable position that allowed for a super exchange of sensitive information.

The significance of the EUSR taking over the coordinating role was furthermore emphasized by one EU representative working in Bukavu, South Kivu, where no political advisor of the EUSR is stationed:

Finally, we realize that everyone does the same thing, without any dialogue. Consequently, what bothers me a little bit is that we can detect that there is a loss of energy and loss of money by doing so, because here, we do not know how to coordinate ourselves. That’s it.

Consequently, the EUSR constitutes an important role regarding coordination, taking over the role and responsibility to harmonize the EU’s approach both in Brussels and at the field level and thus diminishes institutional incoherencies. However, it has to be questioned if it is sufficient to have one rather small-sized institution straightening out what gets out of control at the EU level.

The Programme to Restore Justice in Eastern Congo (Rejusco)

From 2007 until the end of March 2010, the European Commission conducted (in collaboration with the Belgian, British, Dutch, and Swedish development agencies) the so-called Rejusco program (*Programme de Restauration de la Justice à l’Est de la République Démocratique du Congo*). The program targeted the eastern provinces of the DRC with the aim to fight against impunity and ordinary crime through capacity building activities in the justice sector. On the basis of the Rejusco program, both the separation of Commission and Council activities at the Brussels level and the possibility to link them on the ground can be illustrated. While Rejusco was mentioned only once by a Council representative in Brussels, it was constantly emphasized by European actors in eastern Congo.

According to the former general coordinator of Rejusco, the collaboration with EUPOL RD Congo started in June 2008, when the police mission was not yet very present in eastern Congo. However, collaboration was initiated immediately because “they were policemen, gendarmes from Europe which could help us [Rejusco] regarding the training of police officers. And since they also had the objective to do such activities, we combined our activities.” The
relationship to the EUSEC RD Congo mission is described in a similar way. The two entities collaborated regarding the training of military judges, since this was again an intersecting objective. Furthermore, “it was convenient and comfortable to have three European partners who could work together and articulate activities together. This also demonstrated a good presence of the European Union with regard to the Congolese partners.”

At the same time, sources were aware of the situation in Brussels, where the Council and the Commission are rather separated:

“There [in Brussels] is a great tension between the Commission and the Council. And then, when there are entities of the Council who are here, I was told by the Delegation “be careful, they are European, but well, it’s not the Commission, it’s the Council.” So, there should not be confusion in the mind. That is actually the politics of the Delegation in Kinshasa, to create a separation. But here on the ground, I do not see why, I mean we are . . . three European programmes. If we do the same activities, what should prevent us to do them together? We know each other and we organize together. It’s always the European house that is visible.”

In contrast to the EUSR’s mandate, which implies a coordinating task both in Brussels and in the field, the Rejusco program managed to integrate different European actors in North Kivu independent of their affiliation with either the Commission or the Council but rather exclusively based on the desire to implement the program in the most effective way. By doing so, the two civil Council missions were, at least to some extent, linked with the Commission-run Rejusco program. Thus, both sides were able to benefit from the synergy and reduced costs. Furthermore, formerly different approaches regarding the reform of the security sector were aligned. In turn, existing institutional incoherencies, as displayed before, were decreased.

Coordination and Coherence between the European Union and the Member States

Following the analysis of coordination and coherence within and between EU entities both in Brussels and in eastern Congo, it is of further significance to analyze the vertical relationship between the EU and the national member states, to analyze how member states’ national policies in terms of bilateral relations with the DRC and policies agreed on on EU level relate to one another.

It is striking in this regard that all sources listed the same member states in relation to policies targeted at the DRC. Mentioned in connection with strong national interests were first and foremost Belgium (the former colonial power), France, the UK, and the Netherlands, while the Swedish and
German approach was highlighted in terms of technical development cooperation. Portugal was named regarding its political interests in and relations with Angola, neighboring the DRC. Although none of the sources clearly pointed out the interests of specific member states, several people interviewed hinted at national interests in relation to former colonial interests and influence in the region, current demands in Eastern Africa in terms of the anglophone-francophone divide, and interests connected to the Congolese wealth regarding natural resources and raw materials. One interviewee further highlighted the British interest in the DRC, stating,

"The UK is amazingly strong although they do not have this colonial legacy. . . . But they are very professional looking at where the big power is and where not. And, of course, Congo is the big power house in terms of natural resources but also in terms of political problems spreading into the region."79

This British interest was also reflected in bilateral aid disbursement: The program of the Department for International Development (DFID) targeted at the DRC was scaled up from around £20 million (€24 million) in 2003–2004 to £94 million (€114 million) in 2008–2009.80 Within the EU, the UK has become the second largest bilateral donor after Belgium, which provided roughly €122 million in official development assistance to the DRC in 2008.81

Against this background, one source questioned the true interests behind both the EU’s and the member states’ activities in the DRC and highlighted that clear political guidelines and defined roles regarding the member states were needed. “To be a dynamic power means to work together with the member states and under a clear chain of command.”82 At the same time, the institutional divide between the Commission and the Council undermined such ambitions. For example, one representative of the Council Secretariat mentioned that under the Commission and more specifically in the Directorate General for External Relations (DG Relex), the financing of the civilian CSDP missions was administered by a Belgian officer. According to this source, national member states’ interests, and in particular Belgian interests, interfered with and influenced the European missions in the DRC: “With the Congo, he constantly mingles into our operational business and we have constantly fights with him. . . . I think it’s a Belgian problem. Belgians have a mental problem, somehow emotional problem, legacy with the Congo.”83 In contrast to this statement, which outlined the criticism that member states’ interests interfered with Council missions through the Commission side, another interviewee, from the Commission, rather highlighted that member states try to influence the EU’s activities under the cover of the Council because they feared to further empower the Commission.84 Thus, both sources, although presenting different arguments, criticized member states’ interests and the way these interfered with CSDP missions. In other words, CSDP missions conform first and foremost to individual member states’ interests.
This argument has been articulated by Catherine Gegout, who states that the EU’s conflict management policy toward Africa is dominated by influential member states, such as France, setting the agenda and exploiting the EU to be still perceived as an ethical actor.85 The reason for this is that “the EU provides even the larger states (especially those with colonial histories) a means to re-engage in areas of former colonial influence in Africa.” Thus, “by acting as an agent of European foreign policy, Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal, and the Netherlands could claim more credit for their dual national/European roles in troubled areas in the African Great Lakes Region.”86 In addition, the cooperation with other EU member states in Africa is considered to allow for more influence on the continent compared to potential unilateral interventions.87

However, and in terms of EU activities in the DRC, the role and interest of several member states does not only become visible in the launch of specific CSDP missions but also in the refusal to implement a certain mission. An example is the denial on the part of the EU to send troops to the DRC in 2008 to stabilize the deteriorating situation in eastern Congo.88 While Belgium strongly supported the idea of sending an EU mission, most other states rejected the approach and thus prevented it.89 This example highlights the significance of member states’ interests when it comes to the launch of CSDP missions. One source, working with the CSDP missions in eastern Congo, who correctly speculated that there would be a prolongation of the EUPOL RD Congo mission (its mandate officially ended June 30, 2010), argued this decision would be taken based on the fact that Belgium held the Council Presidency during the second half of 2010 rather than being based on an appraisal of achievement.90

However, a rather different picture is drawn by humanitarian actors. National interests seem to play no significant role in relation to emergency assistance: The EU member states are the donors providing the money for ECHO’s work all over the world, and coordination is manifested in regular meetings with member states representatives, strategies are jointly formulated in workshops, and implementation reviews are constantly provided.91 In addition, the Rejusco program is considered to be a positive example in terms of efficient coordination. As highlighted, Rejusco was implemented by the European Commission in cooperation with the Belgian, Dutch, British, and Swedish development agencies. Although this configuration on the one hand hampered the administration of the program, for example regarding country-specific and thus differing regulations in terms of accounting, it allowed for greater flexibility, on the other hand, exemplifying how vertical coherence between the EU and member states can be used in a positive manner.

Consequently, the empirical findings in terms of vertical coordination and coherence between the EU and its member states reveal, first of all, with the exception of humanitarian activities, that national interests continue to play a
decisive role regarding the EU’s activities in the DRC. On the one hand, member states provide bilateral development assistance, while on the other hand the same member states contribute to the EU’s approach toward the DRC. Both approaches enable them to foster national policy interests, though to a different extent. Member states have to trade off the advantages and disadvantages of bilateral approaches against the advantages and disadvantages of multilateral approaches under the umbrella of the EU. In terms of development assistance, to what extent bilateral and European approaches are effectively coordinated or impinge on one another remains questionable. Furthermore, regarding activities under the CFSP and specifically in relation to CSDP missions, it has become clear that the interests of specific member states play a decisive role whether or not missions are launched. Therefore, coordination between the member states and EU entities is of great significance to achieve coherence between EU and member states policies. Nevertheless, this might be hampered by strong national interests not least connected to colonial legacies and to material and political interests in the Great Lakes Region.

CONCLUSION: TOWARD MORE ACTORNESS

The study at hand had its point of departure in the question of how coherent the EU is in terms of its development and security policies toward eastern Congo. Following this, the aim was to draw conclusions on the EU’s current role and capacity as an actor in global politics. Against this background, the research has identified several patterns of institutional, horizontal, and vertical incoherencies regarding the EU’s development and security policies in eastern DRC. These incoherencies mainly result from differing and often-times uncoordinated approaches between Commission and Council entities provoked by the institutional setup of the EU. Furthermore, the prevalent short-term/long-term divide in terms of instruments applied by the different European entities leads to a lack or overlap of activities. In addition, conflicts of personalities and dissension prevail and further limit a coherent approach.

In terms of Commission activities, the difficulties to practically coordinate short-term humanitarian assistance and long-term development programs were highlighted. A striking example regarding Council instruments was the launch of the two separate CSDP missions in the DRC, EUSEC and EUPOL RD Congo, which are both targeted at the reform of the Congolese security sector. Besides these challenges within either the Commission or the Council, the research revealed further complexities regarding the coordination of those activities carried out by the Commission and the Council, even though both follow similar objectives. However, instead of implementing joint initiatives, separate approaches dominate. Furthermore, as the example of Rejusco demonstrated, coordination and thus coherence was found
on the ground in the Congo rather than in Brussels. In addition, by focusing on the vertical relationship between the EU’s policies and those of the national member states, the significance of national concerns was pointed out. In other words, by utilizing the European umbrella to advance interests, a few dominant EU member states shape the EU’s approach toward the DRC.

Based on these empirical findings, it can be concluded that the EU cannot be regarded as a coherent actor but rather as an institution wrangler. In other words, the EU does not fully exploit its potential as a peace and development actor in the DRC. The research confirms actoriness theory on the one hand by acknowledging the necessity of coherence as a precondition for capability (and thus actorness). On the other hand, the shortcomings revealed are mainly traced back to the complex institutional structure of the EU. Since actorness theory rather underemphasizes these institutional aspects, the findings suggest that further research on the institutional setup of the EU when analyzing the EU’s capability as a global actor is required.

Besides capability and as outlined in the theoretical framework, the notions of opportunity and presence further constitute important aspects of actorness. The empirical findings identifying the institutional setup as key for actorness can also be linked back to both aspects. Regarding the notion of opportunity, it has been demonstrated that it is the institutional setup as well as EU member states’ national interests that provide the context that enables or hampers EU action. Furthermore, the EU’s presence, meaning the ability of the EU to exert influence externally, is not only dependent on the broadening of its scope of policies and geographical enlargement but also on internal factors determining the efficiency and legitimacy of policy processes.

Consequently, and in terms of implications for future research, it will be of specific interest to further focus on the institutional structure and its implications on the EU’s capacity to act. In this regard, the implementation of the institutional changes agreed on in the Lisbon Treaty and specifically regarding the implementation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) provides incentives for future research. This newly established committee aims at enhancing the coherence of the EU’s external actions by integrating Commission and Council officials as well as member states’ diplomats under the authority of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. It aims to tackle the current problem of institutional complexity and division by uniting the different entities under one authority. However, the exact design of the EEAS has, by the time of writing, not been agreed on, and it remains questionable if the creation of the EEAS will effectively manage to unite the scattered and oftentimes competing resources in the EU’s system of external relations.

The study outlines the importance of detailed case studies that focus on specific fields regarding the external relations of the EU. Since this research
focused on one single case, any generalizing conclusions have to be treated with caution. This highlights the need for other case studies analyzed under the same framework with a specific focus on the institutional setup. It would be of interest to compare the EU’s approach toward the DRC with other EU approaches both elsewhere on the African continent and worldwide while simultaneously taking other policy areas beyond those of development and security into consideration. By doing so, it could be revealed whether the empirical findings highlighted in this article recur in other circumstances, both from a geographical perspective and with regard to policy. This, in turn, would deepen and broaden our understanding of the EU as a global actor in security and peace.

NOTES


8. Ibid., 24

9. Ibid., 29


11. Two field trips were conducted in spring 2010. A first week-long research visit was carried out in Brussels, Belgium, at the beginning of March 2010. During the following months of April and May, the second field trip, which lasted for five weeks, took place in Rwanda and in the eastern provinces of the DRC. During these two research visits, a total number of 17 semistructured interviews were conducted with a wide range of EU
actors being directly involved in EU policies targeted in the DRC. Seven of these interviews were conducted with officials based in Brussels; eight officials were interviewed in the DRC and two in Rwanda.

12. According to Hettne, a further significant distinction can be made between **actor-ness** and **actorship**. The latter implies a broader and more complex phenomenon, taking into account **actorness** understood as the capacity to act purposively while adding the two aspects of **regionness**, implying internal integration, and international **presence**. For a detailed description see Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum, *The EU as a Global Actor in the South* (Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies).


14. Ibid., 27.


18. As outlined, Bretherton and Vogler distinguish between the concepts of “**consistency**” and “**coherence**” in their approach to actor-ness. Although this distinction will be retained unchanged in the theory section, the conceptual framework of the research project exclusively applies the term “coherence” following the general interchangeability of the terms.


20. Ibid., 32.


27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. OECD, *Policy Coherence*.


33. The figure illustrates the institutional actors in Brussels and in the field which are directly involved in decision-making and decision-implementing with regard to the DR Congo. Consequently, the selection of units displayed is based on their relevance with regard to question of coherence and coordination in development and security policies targeted at the provinces of North and South Kivu. The diagram simplifies and develops further the figure elaborated by Anesi/Aggestam, The Security-Development Nexus, (SIEPS, 2008: 7), 117, and concretises the actors working in Eastern DRC. Since the figure is simplifying, it does not pretend to be exhaustive.


36. The distribution of the provided funds results from the objectives outlined in the so-called Country Strategy Paper (CSP). Therefore, 50% of the money provided is targeted at infrastructure issues, while 25% focus on governance aspects. The remaining funds are divided between the health sector (10%) and unclassified aspects (15%), which include, among others, environmental aspects and the management of natural resources as well as the support of regional economic development and integration. Government of the DRC and European Commission, Document de Stratégié Pays et Programme Indicatif National 2008–2013 (Kinshasa: Government of the DRC/European Commission, 2008).

37. Council of the European Union, EU Launches the “Artemis” Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Brussels: Spokesperson of the Secretary General, High Representative for CFSP, S0131/03, 2003).


40. EU Council Secretariat, EU Police Mission for the DRC (EUPOL RD Congo) (Brussels: EUPOL RDC/08, 2010).

41. EU Council Secretariat, EU Mission to Provide Advice and Assistance for Security Sector Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC DR CONGO) (Brussels: EUSEC RDC/08, 2010).


44. Council of the European Union, The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid.

46. In the current EU Commission (2010–2014),Kristalina Georgieva is Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response while Andris Piebalgs is head of DG Development. From 2004 to 2009, the Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid was Louis Michel, who was replaced by Karel de Gucht in July 2009.


49. Interview with a representative of the European Commission in Goma, DRC, April 12, 2010.

50. Until today, EUSEC RD Congo, created in 2005, is managed by the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), while EUPOL RD Congo, which followed on from the EUPOL Kinshasa mission in 2007, is lead by the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). Whereas the CMPD was created at the end of 2008 to take over the roles and responsibilities of the former Directorate General E (DG E) VIII working with “Defence Aspects,” the CPCC emanated from DG E IX which was responsible for “Civilian Crisis Management.”


52. Interview with a political advisor of the EUSR for the GLR in Goma, DRC, April 14, 2010.


54. According to the same interviewee, the civilian side, the DG E IX by that time, was planning and conducting several missions while DG E XII was only carrying out the military EUFOR ALTHEA operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, while DG E IX “was sort of saturated,” DG E XIII was “hungry, hungry, hungry to do something.”

55. Interview with a representative of EUPOL RD Congo in Bukavu, DRC, April 8, 2010.

56. Interview with a representative of EUSEC RD Congo in Bukavu, DRC, April 8, 2010.

57. Ibid.

58. Interview with a representative of EUPOL RD Congo in Bukavu, DRC, April 8, 2010.


63. Ibid.

64. Interview with a representative of the Council Secretariat in Brussels, Belgium, March 4, 2010.
65. Although the EUSR’s mandate is of a regional nature, its main focus is on the eastern provinces of the DRC since “everything has a Congo link,” as one political advisor of the EUSR highlights (Interview in Goma, DRC, April 14, 2010).


68. Interview with a representative of the Council Secretariat in Brussels, Belgium, March 1, 2010.

69. Interview with a political advisor of the EUSR for the GLR in Goma, DRC, April 14, 2010.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. Interview with a representative of Rejusco in Gisenyi, Rwanda, April 15, 2010.


74. Interview with a representative of EUPOL RD Congo in Bukavu, DRC, April 8, 2010.


76. Interview with a representative of Rejusco in Gisenyi, Rwanda, April 15, 2010.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid.


85. Catherine Gegout, “EU Conflict Management in Africa.”


88. The reason for the deteriorating situation was the resurgence of fighting between the Congolese Army and the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), a Tutsi rebel group. Thus, from August 2008 on, some 250,000 people were displaced and Goma, the provincial capital of North Kivu, was surrounded by rebels. By that time, MONUC, the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in the DRC, had 17,000 personnel stationed in Congo. However, additional troops were needed immediately, and therefore the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, called on the EU to send troops until the intended enlargement of the MONUC contingent by 3,000 additional soldiers was implemented.


90. Interview with a representative of EUPOL RD Congo in Bukavu, DRC, April 8, 2010.