Security and migration: the development of the Eastern dimension
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This article analyzes the role that fields of discourses have played in constructing migration as a security problem, with a specific focus on the development of the Eastern dimension. It does so by looking at three relations: sub-region/region; speech acts/securitization; and professionals/insecuritization. Speeches and documents testify to the security narrative and consequent security governance associated to the enlargement process and to relations with neighboring countries to the East. Moreover, an analysis of the rationale behind governmentality practices regarding migration accounts for the wide usage of technological and risk assessment tools, adding up to the security construction of migration. The overall security governance that has arisen through and out of these processes allows an evaluation of a securitized approach to migration and the impact this has on European Union objectives on that sub-region, such as stability and human rights protection.

Keywords: security governance; migration; discourses and practices; borders; Eastern dimension

The evolution of security as a term and the connection of migration as an issue in that evolution has been debated extensively in the literature. What has received less attention, however, is a ‘contextualization’ of the links between security and migration, to gauge the different ‘structures of security governance’ at play, investigating the rationale behind them, and therefore providing grounds for comparison. For such an aim, the theoretical and analytical framework suggested by the article ‘Putting Security Back in’ looks all the more appropriate; ‘context’ is put at center stage, thus allowing the consideration of different security logics at play, diverse governance patterns and the impact thereof. In particular, two concepts will inform the analysis: securitization and governmentality. According to main advocates, a securitization process encompasses two actors: a ‘securitizer’ and an ‘accepting audience’. It occurs when somebody (securitizer) presents an issue as an existential threat requiring immediate actions, and the audience accept the speech act. Thus, the issue is conceived as a security matter even though it may not objectively endanger survival (Wæver 2004). Governmentality refers to ‘a particular way of arranging social relations’ (Huysmans 2006, p. XII). Thus, security would become a ‘technique of government’ (Huysmans 2006, p. 7), where the relevant question would be: ‘how the category of security articulates a particular way of organizing forms of life?’ (Huysmans 1998b, p. 231).

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This article will consider three sets of relations: first, between the sub-region and the region under investigation; second, between speech acts and securitization processes; and third, between the role of professionals and insecuritization framings. More specifically, it seeks to shed light on the ‘security’ construction of migration within the Eastern dimension, considering this a sub-region of the broader European region. The analysis will thus uncover overlapping and merging security discourses specific to the sub-region giving birth to often conflicting governance policies as well as contested arguments. In particular, this sub-region is constructed as a security challenge through discursive fields related to migration. The analysis of documents (speech acts) and of practices (the role of security professionals) constituting or shaping the security dimension of migration shows the manifold nature of the Eastern dimension and the securitization/insecuritization processes set in motion. Thus, the internal market, enlargement and integration processes and foreign policy objectives all trigger different security discourses and practices in the sub-region, rendering it a fundamental challenge to the European Union’s (EU) credibility and normative tenure as peace and security actor.

Framing in/security: constructing regional structures of security governance

The overall objective of this Special Issue is to link the process of security construction in, or its application to, specific dimensions, with one avenue for enquiry connected to ‘regions or sub-regions’ of security governance expressed in discourse and practice (Christou et al. 2010). In this sense security logics can arise from a general discourse over an issue in terms of security or/and from a specific reference to the context as especially relevant for the securitization of that issue. Thus, the constitutive processes of ‘security’ and of ‘dimensions’ and their relationship to each other need to be looked at more thoroughly. Reflection over the nature of security has brought to the table questions related to its definition and understandings that go beyond the much cited ‘widening’ and ‘deepening’ processes. The real debate should aim at defining how the security interpretation of an issue changes the way it is understood and addressed, and at uncovering the rationale behind processes of security framing, that is, investigating the discursive and practice modalities through which the process of securitization is carried forward and guides specific patterns of governance. The ‘constitutive’ process subsumed in both strands of the securitization process as well as the multilevel procedures enticed by them, ultimately help to reflect upon the building of structures of security governance.

The use of security language changes the understanding of a problem and this change depends on a framework of meanings that the security language implies (Huysmans 2006, p. 25). From this point of view, the fact that specific issues such as migration or climate change may not be an ‘objective’ security threat is irrelevant. As far as they are treated as ‘security’ threats, they determine a specific mode of organizing relations, which can compete with other organizing principles. Thus, the questions are different, the priorities change and the actors and operating field divergent. The security framing of an issue has an inevitable bearing upon its way of governance, but the process of how this comes to be made evident and of how the securitization process impacts on policy solutions has divided scholars.

The emphasis on security discourses, on speech acts/securitizing moves and on an ‘accepting’ audience are probably the best-known components of the
‘securitization processes’. Applying the argument to empirical cases implies demonstrating that practices and governance processes are always determined by the discursive definition of major threats enticing discontinuity with the past, demanding urgent and exceptional policy responses (Huysmans 2006). However, those scholars who take ‘practices’ seriously argue that a security issue does not only arise from an explicit definition of a security threat. It is not an act which determines a shift in understanding on this view, but instead the context in which a question is inserted which inevitably influences the object of research: the solutions and available technologies do to some extent define the problems and they develop to some degree independently from the politicization of events. Thus, insecurity derives not only from speech acts, but also from contexts that arise out of specific government techniques of administering freedom, that is, ‘domains of insecurity’ (Huysmans 1998a, 2006, Bigo 2000, 2006, Neal 2009). While the Copenhagen school leaves open the rationale behind security discourses, thus opening up the possibilities of multiple interpretations, the Paris school confers a major role to security experts and their production of security knowledge (the definition of policy problems) to the framing of domains of insecurities (Huysmans 2000). Thus, struggles among institutional and administrative agencies for the production of real knowledge and for proper regulation techniques result in the creation of technical and administrative devices. The latter, applied to an issue, contribute to its redefinition as well as to its management. In addition, techniques and practices permit the linkage of different issues, thus transferring insecurities, and thereby producing a security continuum (Bigo 2000, 2006). For example, using the same practice for two different issues encourages their correlation (fingerprints: terrorism-illegal migration). The use of similar instruments and the connection among different threats favors the formation of networks, agreements between countries and security agencies and private insurance mechanisms so that there no longer exists a real separation between internal and external security and related practices (Bigo 2000, pp. 183–184).

That said, how do these processes of security framing relate to regional and sub-regional dimensions? Germane here is the literature on regional security complexes (Lake and Morgan 1997, Buzan and Waever 2003). According to the understanding and construction of an issue as a cross-border security matter, a ‘security interdependence’ originates among the actors of a region, and makes states very sensitive to neighboring states’ policy provisions. Actors within a region are therefore prone to cooperate or coordinate their actions to avoid security challenges or ‘security distortions’, an expression often referred to in official documents (see below). The interdependence among processes of securitization would constitute a regional or sub-regional security complex (Huysmans 1998b).

The discursive field around migration shows that the Eastern dimension can be considered as a sub-region of the broader European region from which security challenges are constructed. Multiple securitization processes related to migration render this sub-region of peculiar interest for assessing European security governance and for uncovering and evaluating Europe’s role as a security provider in that specific context.
The Eastern dimension: the securitization of migration

The security logics guiding the governance of migration, and the construction of an Eastern dimension deemed necessary to face potential risks can be traced back to the enlargement process. This, in turn, implies looking more closely at the debates around the integration process within the EU. In this sense, the first security discourses on migration appeared under the Schengen Agreement, which provided the parameters for creating and joining an internal space free of controls. The Schengen Agreement, together with the Schengen Convention and the Schengen acquis, projected the security relevance of ‘protecting’ external borders by undertaking ‘complementary measures’ to safeguard internal security. The logic, broadly debated, was that the elimination of internal checks would have permitted the easy transit of both persons and related threats. Thus, previous controls at the internal borders were to be exported to external borders, allowing the internal market to work effectively in a secure environment. Given the timeframe covered by the development of the Schengen provisions (1985–99), the securitization process was developed and strengthened further by the impact of end of the cold war and the fear of massive inflows of peoples from Eastern Europe. Thus, words such as protection, challenges, massive and uncontrolled inflows and urgent measures, were all spoken to securitize the political debate on migration.

The Schengen Agreement was clear in emphasizing that the parties were to take the necessary steps ‘against illegal immigration and activities, which could jeopardise security’ (Schengen Agreement 1985). It was made clear that ‘checks on persons shall include not only the verification of travel documents and the other conditions governing entry, residence, work and exit, but also checks to detect and prevent threats to the national security and public policy of the Contracting Parties’ (Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985, 1990, art. 2 (a)). The words spoken by the Schengen package emphasized two governance processes of the utmost importance because of this security logic: preventative actions, and reliance on information systems. Thus, tools to foresee inflows and risk assessment instruments were to become the bedrock of internal security. In addition, the Schengen Information System (SIS) was to be established, allowing access to alerts on persons and properties for border and police checks: ‘the purpose of the Schengen Information System shall be in accordance with this Convention to maintain public policy and public security…’ (Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985, 1990, art. 93). The coordination of measures at the borders was promoted in the form of harmonization and training practices (Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985, 1990, art. 7). Thus, the necessity to comply with the Schengen package of measures for security reasons fostered cooperative dynamic and coordination efforts.

The importance of the link emphasized between freedom and security for the EU’s citizens was further underlined by the work of the Executive Committee setup for the correct implementation of the Convention, which decided in 1998 on the creation of a Standing Committee (later on the Working Party on Schengen Evaluation) with the same purposes. The establishment of such a body was paramount, given the launch of the first post-cold war enlargement process in 1997 (Hungary, Poland, Estonia and the Czech Republic) and of a second one in 2000 (Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria). In the words of the Executive Committee, the structure was necessary to
‘fight’ against substantial waves of illegal immigration (Decision of the Executive Committee 1998). Thus, the Schengen package, and the security rationale behind it, was acquiring a new relevance with a view to enlargement and the perceived related opportunities for criminal trans-border organizations. The importance of external border measures was to be emphasized in all documents referring to migration management. While underlining the necessity of a balanced approach to migration, to consider security as well as human rights, the Commission repeatedly emphasized the importance of undertaking measures against transnational challenges, including illegal immigration. ‘[T]he citizens of Europe rightly expect the European Union, while guaranteeing respect for fundamental freedoms and rights, to take a more effective, joint approach to cross-border problems such as illegal migration and trafficking in and smuggling of human beings, as well as to terrorism and organized crime’ (Commission of the European Communities 2005a). The relationship between external borders and enlargement was thus established, arguing that ‘the new challenges to internal security force a European Union in the process of expansion to regard external borders as a priority question’ (Commission of the European Communities 2002a). Both the European Council and the Commission, relying on this relationship between freedom and security, contributed with their words to the progressive securitization of migration, and to the implications for the Eastern dimension.

Always welcomed as a great opportunity for Europe, the enlargement process was accompanied in official speeches by two security logics. The first security logic emphasized the ‘stability’ role that this expansion could bring to the region. Looking for solutions to regional peace and prosperity, engaging major actors in that context would have been a priority for a smooth accession process and for European security (Council of the European Union 1995). The Documents thus referred to intraregional cooperation and promotion of ‘bon voisinage’ (European Council 1994). The 1999 European Council in Helsinki ‘urged’ candidate countries to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border dispute and other related issues (Council of the European Union 1999b), establishing the scheduled enlargement date of 1 May 2004 as the deadline for the settlement of all disputes. The second security logic, though, pointed out that the stability of the Union would have been guaranteed by candidate states’ full accomplishment of standard criteria and the effective implementation of all Schengen measures on the future border of Europe providing, in this sense, new impetus and ‘urgency’ to the link between freedom and security. In Copenhagen, the Council of the European Union (1993) established the criteria, which had to be met in order to become a member state of the Union, strongly emphasizing the importance of undertaking measures on the borders. These were often repeated in following Councils, where such criteria were upgraded to the basic condition for progression in the accession process (Council of the European Union 2000). Multilateral (structured dialogs) as well as bilateral relations were intensified through the pre-accession strategy with countries of Central and Eastern Europe thanks to a significant contribution provided by the Poland and Hungary – Assistance for Reconstructing their Economies (PHARE) Programme (European Council 1994). Under PHARE, the Commission funded many ‘twinning’ projects together with a PHARE Multi-Country Programme on ‘Migration, Visa, External Border Control Management’ foreseeing the collaboration between migration experts of member states and administrative bodies of candidate countries and training activities.
The sense of ‘urgency’ attached to the implementation of measures on borders is observable in all documents explaining the rationale for the SIS system update, decided in the second half of the 1990s. The Commission used these words to explain this urgency: ‘it is imperative to develop SIS II and it must be completed on time, because the future Member States cannot be accommodated within the present SIS and must therefore be integrated in SIS II in order to be able to participate in the area without internal frontiers’ (Commission of the European Communities 2001). In this sense, terrorist attacks in the USA and Europe after 2001 only reinforced the importance and urgency of controls at the borders (see below).

The emphasis on controls at the borders gained priority over the logic of amicable relations with non-member countries in the enlargement process. Thus, enlargement would not only constitute a great opportunity, but would also ‘add new challenges as regards external border protection’ (Council of the European Union (Justice and Home Affairs [JHA]) 2001, Commision of the European Communities 2002b) given the extended land borders in a difficult regional scenario (Commission of the European Communities 2002a). The progressive insertion of a ‘migration issue’ within the external policy of the Union was to guarantee that European objectives in this field were prioritized over other matters. In addition, this implied an effective engagement of third countries in managing what was labeled as a ‘challenge’ (Council of the European Union 1999a). With the impulse of the Seville Council of the European Union (2002), Regional and Country Strategy Papers with third countries were ‘urgently’ to incorporate migration aspects, while programs such as Odysseus and Argo were established to step up operational cooperation and promote joint projects with third countries, including readmission measures (Council of the European Union 2002 Commision of the European Communities).

From a governance perspective, coordination among member states was essential to face up to ‘security distortions’: ‘better management of the Union’s external border control will help in the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration networks and the traffic in human beings’ (Council of the European Union 2001). It was emphasized that coherent, effective common management of the external borders of the member states of the Union would boost security and the citizen’s sense of belonging to a shared area and destiny . . . (Commission of the European Communities 2002b). Moreover, coordination with third actors was the element of the security governance process developed to address several issues: ‘weak frontiers, the need to develop infrastructures in candidate countries and third countries and to tackle illegal immigration and the dangers of organized crime and terrorism [which] have an impact on all member states . . .’ In this context, much of the focus was placed on ‘enhanced operational co-operation, on issues such as forgery, detection, and strengthening of capacity in third countries . . .‘ (Commision of the European Communities 2002b). The EU’s security arguments promoted the idea of an ‘Integrated Border Security Model’, an understanding of border management which covers four tiers: activities in third countries, countries of origin and transit, bilateral and international cooperation, measures at the external borders and further activities inside the territory ‘to safeguard internal security and in particular prevent illegal immigration’ (Council of the European Union 2002c).

Part of this task was framed in the Commission Communication on Wider Europe, which underlined the necessity of a new framework for relations with the Eastern neighbors (Commission of the European Communities 2003), and those
states that would become the new external border of the Union following enlargement. In the post-enlargement period, the geography of Europe changed greatly. The green border dividing Poland and Ukraine was vast, and measures were to be undertaken as soon as possible with a view to Romania’s accession, in that case having to deal with the tricky issue of managing both the Moldovan and Ukrainian borders. The emphasis in official documents was still on ‘internal security’ and general references were made to ‘cross-border problems’, the solution to which was to be found through coordination and coherence between internal and external dimensions (Council of the European Union 2004). All provisions, including external relations, were to be used consistently to establish the area of freedom, security and justice (Council of the European Union 2004). The extension of stability outside European territory was to be achieved by advancing European standards (capacity building, development of border management and an asylum system), as freedom, security and justice were said to lie at the heart of international stability and security (Commission of the European Communities 2005b). Accordingly, a first pilot Regional Protection Programme, aimed at creating the conditions for one of the three Durable Solutions to refugees (repatriation, local integration or resettlement) was designed to enhance the protection capacities of the Western newly independent states (Ukraine/Belarus/Moldova) (Commission of the European Communities 2005c). As explained by the Commission ‘this region already constitutes a strong priority across Community external relations policy and financial assistance which includes ongoing work on protection issues financed by the Community and Individual Member States’ (Commission of the European Communities 2005c, art. 4 (12)). In 2006, negotiations began over readmission agreements, with visa-facilitation opportunities (Commission of the European Communities 2006) for Ukraine, and Moldova (in 2007). By 2007, with huge evaluation missions on SIS and non-SIS provisions of the new member states, the complete fulfillment of the Schengen acquis was achieved. As a result, the external border of the Union on the Eastern front was setup. It was at that point in time that the Global Approach to Migration, adopted and implemented in 2005 toward Africa and the Mediterranean region, was extended to the Eastern and Southeastern regions neighboring the EU. It emphasized the need for a more comprehensive approach (taking into account development opportunities; Council of the European Union 2007). In accordance with the extended border of the Union, it was underlined that dialog on migration issues with Central Asia and Asian countries of origin and transit was to be intensified, thus enlarging the understanding of the ‘Eastern’ dimension. Nevertheless, this broadened understanding of the sub-region could not but emphasize the security interpretation of migration, as the new borders of the Union directly exposed it to troublesome geographical contexts from where new and massive flows could have arisen.

The aim of fostering a more ambitious partnership than the one created with the neighborhood policy provided the basis for the creation of the Black Sea Synergy and the ‘Eastern Partnership’ within the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). The first initiative promises a regional cooperation framework increasing coherence and coordination in a series of activities, among which is the ‘movement of persons and security’ (Commission of the European Communities 2007). In fact, its founding document states that this represents ‘a region... with insufficient border controls thus encouraging illegal immigration and organized crime’ (Commission of the
European Communities 2008). The countries included in the Eastern Partnership were Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Armenia.

The extension of domains of insecurities to the East

The way in which an issue is framed has a lot to say about its interpretation. Thus, defined practices inform the governmentality process played out, and uncover the security rationales subsumed within. The whole body of coordination and management of the issue together with the consideration of levels and actors enacted by the security logic make sense of the governance process in motion. More than tipping events or imminent threats, the governmentality of security is led by the specific framing of an issue, which in turn is deeply influenced by the political space left open by the end of the cold war and by the European integration process (Christou et al. 2010). In this context, the role of security agencies is paramount: the governmentality logic behind the framing of an issue creates insecurities both for EU citizens and for migrants perpetuated by institutional routines and technological tools at play.

Two points are of particular interest in the construction and security governance of the Eastern dimension: the security logic behind borders; and the role of security agencies and their tools employed for governmentality purposes. While both elements have been fundamental for the governance of the Eastern dimension, they are not necessarily linked, but have evolved from the overall process of migration framing in security terms.

In the above section, I examined the Schengen package rationale in general to understand how relevant and compelling it became for the accession of candidate states. What needs deeper reflection here is the logic sustaining it. In particular, a fundamental role is conferred on borders (either physical or not) as a guarantee for internal security. The logical response to the abolishment of internal controls is the setting up of ‘compensatory’ measures at the external border: inflows of migrants would be tackled by building up solid measures at the external border. While not necessarily proven, this connection has shaped the framing and handling of migration. Many authors define the process of extending European logics and standards eastward to candidate countries as ‘exportation’ or ‘transfer’ (Grabbe 2000, 2003, Lavenex 2002).

The changing geopolitical situation, such as the end of the cold war, wars in the Balkans and in Iraq and terrorist attacks did influence European constructions of ongoing challenges. The possibilities that such threats could affect European security passed again through the concept of ‘borders’ because of the construction as ‘crossing-border security threats’. Thus, in the wake of 11 September 2001 attacks the JHA Council urged member states ‘to strengthen controls at the external borders…to exercise the utmost vigilance when issuing identity documents and residence permits…to apply procedures for the issuing of visa with maximum rigour…to provide more systematic input in the system of alerts (SIS – Schengen Information System)…’ (JHA 2001). The logic behind that, though, was not new.
It was as early as the 1970s when ad hoc groups were charged to discuss the consequences of ‘unwanted’ migration and possible related dangers. One of these loose intergovernmental structures, the Trevi Framework (1975–93), a structure working on terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime, was an important stepping stone as a first cooperative attempt on the matter. It created the basis for the later assumed connection between unwanted inflows, international terrorism and organized crime. Similarly, another important coordinating group was created at that time, the ad hoc Group on Asylum and Immigration. While there is a connection between illegal immigration and organized crime, explicable through trafficking practices, the presumed link between immigration and terrorism has been more difficult to prove, even though it deeply influenced the governance of migration. In the wake of the terrorist attacks, the movement of people was quickly associated with the foreign nationality of the terrorists, and the finger was pointed at the porous nature of borders: the most suitable way to control people on the move and prevent similar events happening was, it seemed, to get the most information on them, and on their travels.

The collection and exchange of information and preventative measures aimed at individualizing possible risk situations and possible loopholes in border control systems were considered paramount instruments to control immigration. Within the Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA) the creation of the Centre for Information, Reflection and Exchange on Asylum (CIREA, in 1992) and of the Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration (CIREFI, in 1992), were two leading examples. It was established early on that the instruments employed to govern migration could be utilized to govern terrorist threats and organized crime by undertaking strict control on borders. The security links thus created influenced deeply public debates on enlargement and on the Eastern dimension, while technological tools have been the bedrocks of the governance process there, further enforcing security linkages.

Yet in Schengen it was suggested that those in charge of immigration control, and police authorities, could strengthen their cooperation through the exchange of information. Issues concerning external borders, police cooperation, and the development of SIS and the issuing of visa were assumed to be related (Schengen Agreement 1985). After 11 September 2001, that connection was rendered explicit in public documents stating that ‘the Council is already inviting the Member States to exchange information on the practical measures adopted at national level to combat terrorism (controls at airports, cross-border controls, controls on express roads, controls at the external borders of the European Union . . .)’ (JHA 2001). Indeed the Laeken European Council conclusions emphasized that the ‘better management of the Union’s external border controls will help in the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration networks and the traffic in human beings’ (Council of the European Union 2001). In view of the imminent enlargement, and after 11 September 2001, it was emphasized that ‘the first pillar security measures such as the strengthening of common external border checks and the third-pillar measures, such as the police and judicial co-operation in the area of freedom of movement, are complementary and must progress together’ (Commission of the European Communities 2002a). At The Hague it was confirmed that ‘freedom, justice, control at the external borders, internal security and the prevention of terrorism should henceforth be considered indivisible within the Union as a whole’ (Council of the European Union 2004).
Commission Communication on ‘a strategy on the external dimension of the area of freedom, security and justice’ (Commission of the European Communities 2005b), underlined that ‘the external dimension of the area of freedom, security and justice is developing to address the principal external challenges, namely: Terrorist attacks . . . The ever-growing sophistication in organized crime . . . Illegal immigration’ (Commission of the European Communities 2005b).

As seen above, technological devices and risk analysis tools were the instruments through which the governmentality of security was played out. In this sense, they deeply influenced relations with the Eastern dimension. The evolution of the SIS is telling for this purpose. The SIS, considered as one of the fundamental ‘flanking’ measures of the Schengen package, was built upon the idea that the possibility of having access to alerts on persons and properties for border checks and other police and custom checks was paramount to increase security in an environment without internal controls. Indeed, the alert system was particularly important for the process of visa and residence permit issuing. For new member states it was mandatory to comply with all SIS measures because once they dismantled internal borders, they had had to dispose off reliable instruments to monitor flows and keep other states informed. The SIS system employed in existing member states, however, was not viable for a number of new member states. Thus, in 1996 it was clear that a new system, SIS II, would be necessary, and developing it by 2006 was made an EU ‘priority’. Aside from enlargement, other reasons to modify the system were the new information technologies at disposal and the possibility to insert new functions. Thus, technical expertise was first encompassed in a preliminary study on the possible development of the SIS in 1998 and in following preparatory work and feasibility study commissions. Among the proposals for upgrading the system was its extension to a wider range of authorities (security and intelligence services, Europol, judicial authorities, Eurojust and asylum authorities; Commission of the European Communities 2001). In addition, proposals were made to insert new categories of data to broaden SIS to the general movement of persons within the Schengen area. It is in this context that a very preliminary system for exchanging information on visas issued was constructed (the future visa information system). With such a system the problem of ‘overstayers’ was directly addressed; nevertheless, the system was also seen to be useful as an identification tool for combating terrorism, organized crime and improving the process of visa examination and application at external borders. The system could have developed taking into account another data-sharing tool built up for the purpose of asylum application, European Dactyloscopy (EURODAC). Indeed, interoperability among these systems, and therefore the sharing of important information and data, would not only have construed a reliable barrier against illegal immigration (providing measures to control the entire possible path toward illegal immigration, including illegal entry, overstaying and asylum shopping), but would have also contributed to providing significant information for police and other crime related authorities. Although technical advances and the experience achieved in using the SIS system should have accelerated the upgrading of the system, in practice, it did not emerge within the scheduled timeframe (see Ätger 2008). Instead, the Portuguese national SIS system (SISOne4all) was introduced for new member states in 2007. The spillovers arising out of the upgrading of the system contributed to the framing of relations with Eastern countries, insisting more and more on visa, asylum and illegal migration common standards and data sharing.
By their own nature, technological devices and the tools employed in the management of borders require the participation of third actors (Bigo 2002). Technically speaking, the ability to patrol the movement of people (either for detecting illegal immigration, criminal organizations or terrorist cells) through information sharing among agencies is efficient only if it envisions effective cooperation among member states, and the participation of third actors touched upon by the flows of people. Thus, the governance of security in the Eastern dimension passed through the creation of instruments aimed at improving controls over flows, foreseeing cooperation of third countries and ways to provide risk analysis assessments for preventive purposes (Council of the European Union 2002b, Commision of the European Communities 2002b). The evaluation procedures of the practices undertaken by member and third countries, by Border Guards or other public or private agencies, the degree of adaptation to standard measures and risk analysis assessment would perpetuate insecurities (Scott 2005, Broeders 2007, Åtger 2008, Gatev 2008, Jeandesboz and Bigo 2009). In this sense, agencies ‘filter who will be accepted and who will not’ (Bigo 2008, p. 100) with the consequence that EU citizens and migrants are both insecuritized.

The most popular measures were joint operations at the external borders, a common visa identification system, a common consular offices initiation of pilot projects, preparation of a common risk analysis model to produce a common integrated risk assessment, training measures for border guards, adaptation to measures spelled out in the Schengen Catalogue and the Common Manual. Following those tasks, different bodies were created including: SCIFA +, the Common Unit for External Borders Practitioners executing common and integrated risk assessment, coordinating joint operational actions and watching for operational coherence among member states. In addition, different centers were established: the risk analysis centre (RAC), aimed at producing a tailored risk analysis of the future external borders of the EU for 2004, the Centre for Border Guard Training (ACT) and the Land Borders Centre (CLB). This latter organization, based in Berlin, foresaw from 2004, focal point offices to be located in identified external ‘hot-spots’ on the green border, and promoted the coordination of joint operations in member states particularly affected by migration from the East. In 2004, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX) was created to coordinate joint operations on borders (most of them in Eastern Europe): URANUS, JUPITER, SATURN, GOOD WILL, NORTHERN LIGHT, and training activities and risk assessments. Its establishment was aimed at promoting a more consistent operational body for managing external borders. It was based in Warsaw, in the state where the EU has the most extended land border. Beyond that, priority is given to neighboring third countries and those third countries, according to risk analyses, considered being either countries of origin or transit in terms of illegal immigration or other kinds of serious cross-border crime (FRONTEX, External Relations, 20). An EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) was established in 2005 within the framework of the EU–Ukraine Justice, Freedom, and Security (JLS) partnership. The end objective was to increase cross-border cooperation between Ukrainian and Moldovan Border Guards. Through various ENP Action Plans with Ukraine and Moldova, strategic agreements have been concluded with EUROPOL and FRONTEX. In 2006, the International centre for Migration Policy Development reported a significant development of agencies in
Central and Eastern Europe in terms of staff, infrastructures, technical devices and organizational sophistication (Jandl 2007). Following up on ENP provisions with neighbor countries, the new Eastern dimension proposes, among other measures, to help bilaterally third countries establish high-standard border management, promote the sharing of information with EUROPOL and EUROJUST and achieve special status in relevant EU agencies.

Security logics and governance processes: impact on the Eastern dimension

The two sections of the article so far have recorded the ‘securitization’ of migration, whether through the securitizing move, or the subsequent emergency measures and governmentality processes. Different security logics have been shown to influence the governance of migration. Some of them give emphasis to emergency measures and some others look more like the transferring of technocratic processes of regulation. It is doubtless that the security governance processes enacted have impacted on the framing of the Eastern dimension and on specific relations with countries believed to be part of this framework. First, a mainly internal contradiction among European policies, competences and priorities have been observed; and second, an apparent contradiction with ‘human rights protection’ commitments as spoken out by the Union has surfaced.

A first problematic point emerges by looking at two clashing security governance processes related to the Eastern dimension which conflict over the concept of ‘European stability’ (see Apap et al. 2001, Grabbe 2003). As seen above, promoting stability and prosperity in the region is considered as essential to European stability (Commission of the European Communities 2003). Nevertheless, the security logic that prevailed and the security governance resulted out of it pushed towards the establishment of huge barriers likely to exacerbate relations with the Eastern neighborhood, opening up issues of divisions that might have been stabilized by and through the end of the cold war (Potemkina 2003). A major role in this contradiction is attributed to the movement of responsibility to interior and justice personnel of tasks that could have pertained to foreign affairs personnel (Guiraudon 2003, p. 268).

Given the new neighbors of the Union after the two waves of enlargement, it is clear that questions regarding the movement of people, especially for trade reasons, were problematic. In particular, the borders between Ukraine and Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania, the borders between Moldova and Romania, those between Estonia and Russia and the issue of Kaliningrad, Lithuania and Poland constitute a particular reason for concern. Complex issues regarding minority rights arose in states such as Moldova and Romania, raising the difficult dilemma of how to protect the internal security of the Union while respecting the delicate equilibrium that had been reached (Åtger 2008). Citizens of the candidate countries of the ex-Soviet bloc were previously free to circulate in the region, and the same applied to Russian, Ukrainian and Moldovan citizens within the candidate states: the objective was to set the basis for positive and fruitful relations in the region. Candidate states have always been vocal about the likelihood of new barriers appearing after accession, but were caught between these concerns and their desire to join the EU (Grabbe 2003). The requirements of the Schengen package imposed a visa regime on all states of the East, which meant the imposition of visa provisions by the outside countries. Throughout accession negotiations it was made clear that no flexibility would be allowed in
relations with the ‘neighbours’; no visa-facilitation agreements were foreseen. It was only within the broader aim of improving relations with the Eastern neighborhood for the purpose of readmission agreements, that opportunities opened up to workout visa-facilitation possibilities (even though for a limited categories of persons). Readmission and visa facilitations with Moldova and Ukraine entered into force in January 2008. With Russia, a visa-facilitation agreement was negotiated in 2007; for Belarus, the prospect of reaching an agreement remains a distant one.

Poland has been one of the states for which the accession process has meant a huge overhaul of border infrastructure as well as border relations. A double fear concerned European states and determined specific policy provisions: on the one hand, the belief that Polish accession into the EU could attract further inflows of immigrants has made this country the laboratory of border management provisions. On the other hand, and pre-dating that, the fear of uncontrolled inflows of migrants from would-be member states before accession triggered a series of early bilateral provisions, increasing exponentially responsibilities over these countries. It was as early as 1993 that Germany, undoubtedly the most active actor in Poland and the Czech Republic, concluded a readmission agreement with Poland. As Grabbe (2003) points out, it is impossible to gain asylum in Germany if arriving through Poland. Thus, way before the accession negotiations candidate countries felt obliged to modify relations with their neighbors. Yet, previous enlargement processes had not supported these fears; in addition, the International Centre for Migration Policy Development reported through its yearbook on illegal immigration, human smuggling and trafficking in Central and Eastern Europe (Futo and Jandl 2007), that fears related to escalating migration after 2004 enlargement were disproved by actual data on flows. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that because of further enlargement processes, the intra-European flux of migrants has exerted some impact on EU’s security perceptions. Indeed, the process has interested different European countries with different intensities. Thus, for example, Polish citizens ended up choosing the UK for their movements, while Romanian and Bulgarian citizens have opted for Mediterranean countries such as Italy and Spain. A feeling of uneasiness toward new communitarian citizens has recently been expressed by some European governments such as Italy and France, especially referring to the Roma community (Corriere della Sera 2010, La Repubblica 2010).

Also, troubling EU’s security perceptions are negotiations for the accession of Turkey, which in the case of membership would mean the possibility of free mobility for a huge amount of people, most of them Muslim. Here again, security discourses end up clashing: on the one hand, Turkey is a strategic European partner, fundamental to project Europe on the Asiatic Continent (Posh and Grgic 2004). On the other hand, Turkey’s membership is conceived as problematic as it would embody some critical situations (the one with Cyprus and the Kurds) and as it will essentially allow free circulation of people. To contribute to this understanding is the acknowledgment that most of the organized crime, irregular immigration and asylum seekers coming from Asia is transiting through Turkey and poses particular challenges to Greece (Kirişçi 2007, Įçduygu and Sert 2010).

It was the bilateral pattern that was most used to export European security governance, either through state-to-state relations (i.e. twinning programs and readmission agreements) or EU–state relations (i.e. readmission programs, ENP structures, the Eastern dimension and FRONTEX joint operations). Although the
Eastern Partnership inaugurated efforts at speaking about a ‘regional’ framework in 2008, (thus offering the possibility of a better tool toward stability in the region), the main instruments to manage border controls are bilateral; also, Russia is not part of this dimension as it shares with the Union a separate ‘strategic partnership’. One of the main multilateral (regional) frameworks regarding the movement of people in the East is the Budapest Process. This consultative forum of about 50 governments and ten international organizations was initiated by Germany in 1991. First thought to reduce irregular migration from Eastern and Central Europe, it was then employed to help candidate countries adapt to the EU *acquis* (IOM 2001). It was only with a view to the imminent enlargement (Jandl 2007) that attention shifted to both improve relations with new neighboring states as well as to better identify and address (through its working groups) new risks related to irregular immigration.

As seen above, the need to manage better-perceived cross-border threats/risks required active participation by neighbors on the East: the general path followed has foreseen the promotion of European security governance on migration in this region. A good insight can be gained by analyzing the governance pattern with Ukraine. The EU put Ukraine onto the ‘black list’ of visa-requiring countries essentially for fear of migration after the end of the cold war. In 1998 a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was negotiated; in 2001, an EU Action Plan on JHA was specifically tailored at border measures. The first JHA troika between EU and Ukraine was in 2002, and focused on readmission and migration, money laundering, trafficking in human beings and drugs and border management. Ukraine hosts liaison officers, intelligence specialists and other figures from member states helping the country in border guard training and technical assistance. The same form of cooperation that saw Germany ‘instructing’ Poland on border activities has seen Poland doing the same with Ukraine. Poland, though, has always talked of taking a more accommodating approach toward Ukraine, because of common borders and on the low likelihood of membership within the Union. Among the objectives of these forums and those with other third countries was an effort at making these countries share the Union’s idea of security as related to border management (see Scott 2005) and making them share responsibilities. Among the results of these security governance patterns, two are of great importance: the first has seen Ukraine strengthening its Eastern border toward Russia; the second has promoted the construction of multiple forms of detention camps at the borders of Europe.

As for Ukraine, the imposition of controls through the establishment of numerous border guards has been impressive in the last years not withstanding the preference by Moscow of an open/liberal approach to visa travel for citizens of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (Gatev 2008). This process of ‘governance exportation’ is to a certain extent similar to the one encouraged by the EU on the southern border of Libya. The rationale behind these polices is encompassed in the process of ‘de-localization’ or ‘policing at distance’. Indeed, the build-up of variegated forms of camps is indicative of these de-localization processes. As seen in previous sections, the EU has chosen Ukraine/Belarus and Moldova for a pilot project on a Regional Protection Programme, foreseeing a wide participation by competent organizations, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The UN Refugee Agency did approve the European plan to workout Regional Protection Programmes, but emphasized that attempts at creating them cannot substitute the possibility of getting asylum in Europe (UNHCR 2005).
Thus, there is a general feeling that European policies on border controls contradict the aim at making human rights protection one of the flags of European security governance onwards, not least because of the fact that some of the most important organizations on migration matters, such as the UNHCR, have been marginalized (Lavenex 2002). Protests by Human Rights groups and organizations have been quite vocal in pointing the finger at minority rights violation, and at the specific work of agencies, such as FRONTEX (Jeandesboz 2008). Even though the agency clarifies that, for example, basic training content for border guards have been developed with the support of international organizations such as UNHCR, IOM or the Committee on the Prevention of Torture, problems persist over its evaluation (FRONTEX 2008). The technical nature of most of the agencies dealing with borders management adds to the problem of poor transparency and democratic accountability. More than that, readmission pacts and expulsion practices toward transit regions raises the point of ‘compatibility’ with agreed international safety standards. Although most of the countries included in the EU’s ‘Eastern dimension’ policy cannot be considered as ‘safe places’, protests about the dangers in the East are much less vociferous and obvious than that for the South. Ukraine, again, stands as an important example. The UNHCR reports that notwithstanding the fact that Ukraine is developing legislation, institutions and structures to build an effective asylum system, major problems remain regarding the interpretation of the national legislation vis-à-vis international standards, in particular that people are unlawfully denied access to asylum procedures (Human Rights Watch 2005, UNHCR 2006). The same applies to Georgia, for which a draft on visa facilitation and readmission agreement has been proposed by the Commission at the end of April 2010 (Press Release 2010). There are a huge number of detention centers both within and especially outside of the Eastern border – hosting people escaping from tragic situations. Ukraine is a huge transit country, similar to Libya in the South, where refugees and migrants from all over the world transit to; from Russia, China, Georgia, Afghanistan, Turkey, Syria, Palestine, Somalia and Uzbekistan (Düvell 2008).

Conclusion

The contribution of this paper to the Special Issue was to explore the security construction of migration within the Eastern dimension. The use of two analytical tools, security speeches and practices has allowed an understanding of how different security logics have played out in terms of governance. These approaches have provided insights into the building and framing of the dimension, while none alone can fully account for the structures of security governance created.

This article has shown that through time the ‘Eastern dimension’ has been approached differently, not least because of different constructions of the East, according to the prevailing security logics at play. The analysis of documents has emphasized concerns related first to the enlargement process, and then to relations with new neighbors: migration and the overall movement of people have been associated with security threats, to be faced through policies and provisions on the borders. Accordingly, relations with third countries have been framed around this objective. The sense of ‘urgency’, often referred to in EU documents has led to accelerated governance processes, mainly aimed at strengthening this sense of internal security. Different points in time, such as 2004 (first wave of enlargement) and 2007 (elimination of internal
controls of new member states) have seen particular emphasis given to the security dimension of migration, de-linking the freedom—security nexus: while measures on the borders became necessary for accession, this would not mean enjoying the area of freedom. Accordingly, two layers of measures were to protect the ‘security’ of member states: the imposition of the entire Schengen package at the new European border; and the assurance that internal checks with new member states would not be dismantled until all security measures against indiscriminate flows were undertaken. In the future, this double security dimension will exert its influence on the process of European integration and on EU relations with third countries.

The section on practices has provided some points for reflection over the security governance of migration in the East. It has uncovered the rationale behind reliance on borders as a peculiar governmentality of migration, constructed by security professionals. In this sense, it has been shown that security governance to the East has played out through the ‘exportation’ of that governmentality. Encompassed here is the logic of a security-continuum among migration-terrorism-and organized crime promoted in and by security agencies. The prevalence of such governmentality logic of security has allowed the utilization of technological devices as tools of governance toward the Eastern dimension. The broad use of these practices suggests that in the future the external frontier of the EU would increasingly be considered as a barrier, as a place selecting those who can enter and those to be kept outside. This understanding, in turn, would affect security perceptions. Technological devices and agencies cooperation will underplay the role of public scrutiny. In addition, it is to be expected that relations with countries outside of the European border will vary according to whether illegal immigration is prioritized with respect to other issues.

If previous approaches inform ‘exceptional’ or ‘non-politicized’ governance processes, both lead to an understanding of migration as a ‘security’ matter as far as relations with third countries are concerned. Thus, they both lead to two general remarks on the security governance of the Eastern dimension: first, there is a sharp contradiction between the objective of internal security for the Union and that of regional stability in the East. Second, the governance patterns enacted following security interpretations to the matter emphasize a scant attention to human rights concerns, raising doubts about the normative force of the EU.

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