In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 2001 attacks, the EU and its Member States quickly committed themselves to doing all in their power to combat terrorism under the *EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism*. As Den Boer and Monar argued, September 11 was regarded as the first truly ‘cross-pillar’ test of the Union’s role as a security actor, involving not only the second and third pillars, but even the first insofar as the fight was also against the financing of terrorism.¹ New structures obligated all Member States to introduce legislation bringing the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) into force by 1 January 2004, and sought to create faster and simpler procedures.² Moreover, following the bombings in Madrid, and then subsequently London, the EU further accelerated efforts to construct a common response to terrorism.

This institutionalisation of the EU’s counter-terrorism strategy has not occurred in a vacuum. It has both had impact on, and been shaped by, member states as they have attempted to institutionalise it to greater and lesser degrees within their security cultures. All too often security has been juxtaposed with liberty inside and outside the Union and the precedence of human security within the EU context has declined, partly in response to this reluctance of members states but also because of the falling away of the key proponents of human security in the EU. Within such a context it is necessary to ask serious questions about the manner in which member states’ security

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² European Commission, 2005, European Arrest Warrant replaces Extradition between EU Member States, Justice and Home Affairs/ Extradition.
cultures have been affected by evolving counter-terrorism strategies. In order to do this, this brief focuses on the cases of the UK, Germany and France. What it reveals is that in spite of greater emphasis on cooperation in the field of counterterrorism and the existing aspirations of human security, both the EU and members states fail to place human security at the centre of strategic dialogue on counter terrorism because at the member state level the security of the state is still prioritised and enthusiasm at the EU level has waned.

This failure undermines the ability of European states to respond to international humanitarian crises and atrocities collectively and clearly because it narrows security thinking to traditional notions of intervention while ignoring the human aspects of conflicts that inevitably contribute to the complexity of conflict prevention and resolution. This brief suggests that it is now crucial to clearly conceptualise a human-centred approach to security as supporting sovereignty and national interests rather than as weakening them. Establishing a Europe-wide human-centred security strategy would galvanize the EU’s efforts to support local actors to resolve crises and could overcome reluctance at both member state and EU levels. Such a unified strategic dialogue would act as a unifying point for European approaches to counterterrorism that encompasses a broader understanding of security and increases the options available to address the causes of insecurity.

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

The EU and Counterterrorism

The European Union’s approach to counter-terrorism has been characterised by incremental change throughout the late twentieth century and into the twenty-first. It was not until the 1970s that the issue of terrorism was first considered at the European level, leading to the TREVI framework being established in 1975. This loose intergovernmental cooperation framework, focused on ‘information exchange and occasional cross-border coordination of measures’, which subsequently, as a result of the Maastricht Treaty, in 1993, was ‘incorporated into the EU as part of the provision on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) cooperation in the context of the new third pillar, Title VI of the TEU’.3 The 1970s saw further European attempts to coordinate a policy towards terrorism, such as those that followed in 1977. As the Council of Europe increasingly endeavoured to harmonise law across Europe, it initiated the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. Until 1977 the working principle held by European democracies was that terrorism was predominantly a political crime, and therefore extradition should not be guaranteed. However, the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism was ‘the first step towards abandoning this principle in regards to terrorist crimes’.4 Although this was largely considered to be a failure, the importance of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism was that for more than 24 years, with all Member States as signatories, this would be the sole common denominator for Europe in the field of terrorism.5

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Before September 11 2001, terrorism was a tertiary security issue within the EU and dealt with mainly by member states. It fell within the purview of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHS) pillar following the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, but terrorism was dealt with as one of many issues; with a particular emphasis on how it impacted upon the issues of border control and organised crime. Thus, whilst the EU increasingly attempted to demarcate its role as an autonomous security actor, it had not securitised “terrorism” as an existential threat, but rather dealt with terrorism amongst other integration issues. This fundamentally changed after September 11 2001, the 2004 Madrid bombings and 2005 London Bombings. Herein, “terrorism” was securitised by the EU, and rafts of institutional changes within the Union have followed as a direct consequence, as well as attempts to institutionalise a more active common foreign and security policy beyond the Union. In March 2004 members agreed to a Declaration on Combating Terrorism, which included a solidarity clause stating that all member states will ‘act jointly … if one of them is the victim of a terrorist attack’, but went on to assert that Member States should also ‘mobilise all instruments at their disposal, including military resources’. Furthermore, by December 2005 the Justice and Home Affairs Council had adopted the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy to take the 2004 Action Plan into the ‘next phase’.

The strategy sought to simplify what was by now a wide plethora of initiatives for member states to institutionalise, under the auspices of four key pillars defined by the EU as ‘Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Respond’. This resulted in uneven and deficient implementation because in the pre-Lisbon Treaty era the EU had limited powers in the domain of Justice and Home Affairs to undertake proceedings to remedy national implementation deficits among some member states. The Lisbon Treaty actually aims to remove the pillars structure and, after a 5 year transition, to extend the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice to the interpretation and review of justice and home affairs legislation. This will increase the judicial oversight of security policies and the EU’s capacity to address national enforcement deficits. Yet Argomaniz argues that despite appearances the Lisbon Treaty will not have the impact that this suggests. As Monar notes, despite the successes seen in the third full year of the implementation of the 2010–14 Stockholm programme, there are still considerable implementation deficits in the counter terrorism field. In addition to these implementation issues, the United Kingdom has opted out of EU criminal law and policing measures adopted by the Lisbon Treaty, which poses a risk to “the major treaty objective of the ‘area of freedom, security and justice.’”

The EU and Human Security

Nevertheless, the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, which came into force in 2009, did represent a new evolution in the EU that could be harnessed. Designed to amend the Maastricht Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty sought to develop greater coordination in EU foreign policy. It established a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the External Action Service to form a diplomatic corps for the EU. It is this progress towards developing collective policymaking that ‘has contributed to both the advancement of human security on the policy agenda and as part of the security toolkit,’ according to Kaldor, Martin and Serra. In fact there are indications that the idea of human security has formed part of official EU discourse since the late 1990s. The main drivers of human security concerns in the EU in the

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6 Hassan, 2011.
9 European_Commission, 2006
post-Amsterdam Treaty era were Javier Solana and Benita Ferraro-Waldner. In this climate the Barcelona report presented by the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities in 2004 proposed a human security doctrine for Europe.\textsuperscript{13} The momentum behind human security continued to grow and it was included explicitly in the European Security Strategy of 2008.

Yet there are now questions about whether human security has really penetrated more than the language of foreign policy thinking.\textsuperscript{14} There are indications that the political interest in making human security the foundation of EU policies is weak. Christou notes that although EU officials believe they are implementing human security in practice it is still perceived as conceptually too ambiguous and the EU sees the ‘responsibility to protect’ concept as more workable.\textsuperscript{15} Consequently, with the departure of the two main proponents of human security, Solana and Ferrero-Waldner, along with the economic crisis in the Euro zone, the focus began to shift away from integrating human security into the EU’s external relations strategy after 2008.\textsuperscript{16}

A further challenge to the incorporation of human security concerns into European counterterrorism policies is that despite the development of more collective policymaking processes post-Lisbon, there is a tendency to address security matters at the national rather than the EU level. The national experience of security has influenced the extent to which human security has influenced counterterrorism responses across different EU member states. This has complicated efforts to reach a common EU strategy for either counterterrorism or the incorporation of human security as a guiding principle in security policies. Yet, as this brief posits, incorporating the security of the individual into national and EU counter terrorism policy making offsets the tendency of securitisation to narrow the agenda with negative consequences for liberty and, in fact, security. Since the EU joint defence and security approach is still superseded by national security agendas this report will now consider how security culture, particularly counterterrorism experience, contributes to the challenges facing the potential incorporation of human security into national counterterrorism agendas by examining the cases of the UK, Germany and France.

**United Kingdom**

**Security Culture and Counter Terrorism Experience**

Thinking about security in the UK has evolved significantly since the end of the Cold War. A shift away from viewing state actors as the main threat and relying on the nuclear deterrent has been a part of this. In the 1990s and early 2000s there was an apparent shift in approaches to security that broadened the conception of security and added concepts such as the ‘force for good’ approach.\textsuperscript{17} Subsequent interventions such as that in Kosovo did have a humanitarian motivation and framing but many argue that the UK failed to prioritise the humanitarian aspect on the ground. Sierra Leone is cited as a more successful human security intervention and indicated that the new language of security evident in government reports was being internalised and influencing practice.\textsuperscript{18}

This trend was disrupted by 9/11 as a result of the privileging of counterterror discourses in security thinking. One of the first consequences of 9/11 was the invasion of Afghanistan. Unlike the interventions in the 1990s this was not framed in humanitarian terms but in a more traditional approach focused on the defeat of an enemy through military means. This was followed by the war in Iraq, which was a pre-emptive strike on global terrorism and again, was not framed in humanitarian terms. The more recent intervention in Libya in 2011 saw a return to a more humanitarian-based framing. The motivation was set out as protecting civilians from Colonel


\textsuperscript{14} Christou, George. 2012. *The EU’s Human Security Discourse: Where are we now?*

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid. p.3.

\textsuperscript{16} Kaldor, Martin and Serra, 2013, P.5.


Gadhaffi. Yet the means employed, especially aerial bombing, were controversial in light of the aim to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure. According to a Human Rights Watch report, 72 civilians died as a result of NATO air strikes, including 24 children. The president of state-owned ISP Libya Telecom & Technology (LTT) and mobile operator Libyana pointed to the substantial damage suffered by Libya’s telecommunications as a result of air strikes targeting Libya’s communications infrastructure.

The efforts to shift security thinking in the UK demonstrate Britain’s tradition of placing emphasis on human rights. However, the UK also has several unique factors that shape its response to terrorism. The first is its long experience with the IRA; the second is the special relationship with the United States; and the third is the experience of terrorist acts carried out in the UK by militant Islamists, such as the 7/7 bombings in London and the Woolwich murder of a soldier in 2013. These factors contribute to the tendency to prioritise the security of the state against actors who present international and national threats to the security of UK national interests.

Challenges for Human security

UK approaches to interventions and security strategies to address terrorism have demonstrated that there is a concern to balance the use of force with the goal of being a force for good. Britain’s counter-terror strategy (CONTEST) is divided into four strands - Prepare, Protect, Pursue and Prevent – that demonstrate an attempt to create a holistic counterterror approach. However, in practice there is still a tendency to privilege state security over individual security. Consequently there is little evidence of a consistent practice of human security. In a 2008 report, “Security in an Interdependent World”, a national security strategy outlined security threats as interrelated and emphasised the ‘responsibility to protect’ concept that requires the international community to act in times of humanitarian crisis. While it did not mention human security it did provide a potential foundation for the consolidation of a human security discourse, but this has remained subordinate to national security in the counterterrorism agenda. Two reports detailing the UK’s security strategy were published in 2010 but neither mentioned human security, suggesting this concept has not penetrated counterterrorism thinking deeply. Nevertheless, human rights concerns are ever-present in counterterrorism approaches. This has been consistently demonstrated in the legal wrangling and public debates over control orders and the deportations question. The European Court of Justice has often played a role in this, demonstrating that member states are not having these debates and working out policy practices in isolation from the EU and vice versa. This ensures both that the EU must respond to the dialogue on security and rights as they are played out in different member states and at the institutional level and also that members states are influenced by the discourse and practice of the EU.

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19 Human Rights Watch, May 2012, Unacknowledged Deaths, Civilian Casualties in NATO’s Air Campaign in Libya.

20 Telegeography, May 2011, Telco claims NATO air-strikes have caused USD1.2bn infrastructure damage; ‘human shields’ used to defend facilities, online: http://www.telegeography.com/products/commsupdate/articles/2011/05/20/telco-claims-nato-air-strikes-have-caused-usd1-2bn-infrastructure-damage-human-shields-used-to-defend-facilities/


25 Marhia and Davies, 2013. p.68.


Germany

Security Culture and Counter Terrorism Experience

While the UK is often considered the most accepting of the use of force in security matters, Germany is frequently considered far less accepting and tends towards civil means and dialogue. The main explanations for this difference include Germany’s legal system which is less accepting of derogations from international legal instruments. Second, Germany has invested heavily in the European project, preferring to take a European approach to security, which means that approaches to security is often framed beyond the national level and also that cooperation with America is not a key priority. Third is Germany’s historical security experience. Germany has not suffered directly from terrorism acts to the extent that France, Spain and the UK have. This has perhaps contributed to Germany’s ability to maintain ‘one of the most liberal and democratic counterterror policies.’ Additionally, Germany’s development as a post-fascist state led to the enshrining of the dignity of the human person and the establishment of an accountable and transparent system. Terrorism is framed as criminality more than a political problem yet Guido Steinberg argues that this one-sided approach fails to address the complexity of the problem in Germany, particularly in terms of identifying vulnerabilities to radicalisation processes.

Like other European countries and America, Germany introduced a series of measures in the wake of 9/11. In January 2002, Germany introduced its Security Package I (Sicherheitspaket I). This extended the powers of security authorities, enhanced data exchange, prevented entry of extremists and increased options to withdraw residency rights. It also amended laws governing private organisations to enable the shutting down of extremist religious or ideological groups. In the same month, Security Package II, also known as the Prevention of Terrorism Act, was introduced. This further limited the activities of extremist associations. However, German courts have consistently found provisions in these and other laws to be unconstitutional because they prioritise security over liberty. In 2010 in a case examining the validity of the Telecommunications Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure enacted in 2007, the court ‘found the security-oriented provisions unconstitutional and void.’ Furthermore, unlike Britain, Germany has not sought to increase periods of pre-charge detention. Terrorist suspects, like all suspects, must receive a judicial hearing within 48 hours of arrest. However, there has been some criticism over the laws governing deportation.

Challenges for human security

Human security principles are implicitly present but do not directly form part of the German debates over national and global security or counterterrorism measures. In 2003 new defence political guidelines were issued in an effort to set out Germany’s new orientation post-cold war and post-reunification. These guidelines included a clear concentration on peacekeeping missions and the insistence that any military engagement should be part of a UN, EU or NATO mandated mission. The main criticism of this and the 2006 White Paper on defence was the vagueness of the language as preventing a definitive understanding of Germany’s security outlook. While this does not exclude the development of a human security approach, it does not promote it either. Due to Germany’s consistent role in peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction missions, such as in

33 Heinz, 2007.
the Balkans and Afghanistan, more could have been expected in terms of developing and enshrining the core of human security approaches to security. There is a sense that Germany is well placed to develop a human security approach but that an absence of pro-active strategic thinking on security has prevented the prioritisation of human security as a framework for counterterrorism policy making. In fact, as Guido Steinberg indicates, devising counter terrorism strategy remains within the domain of the Ministry of Interior and security services resulting in a narrow approach. Adopting human security-focused policies would widen the scope of counter-terrorism measures by necessitating deeper cooperation between different governmental institutions and increasing the capacity to respond to radicalisation processes and to incorporate foreign policy thinking within a comprehensive counter terrorism strategy. At present Germany is not well placed to address the full range of challenges posed by terrorism without having a detrimental effect on individual rights because it is yet to undertake a substantive debate on how this could be done.

France

Security Culture and Counter Terrorism Experience

France has a strong military culture, colonial tradition, and global political role that all feed in to France’s approach to security and counterterrorism policies. France seeks an independent international role and at the same time prioritises close cooperation with Europe and especially Germany. France also has significant experience of terrorism within its territory. France is often viewed as closer to the UK in terms of willingness to undertake and lead military interventions and adopt strong counterterror measures but its closer relationship to Europe and desire to remain independent from America differentiates French security culture. Of particular influence on French security thinking is the Cold War legacy and particularly the nuclear deterrent. The 2008 White Paper on defence is a continuation of Cold War thinking that gives priority to territorial security against outside aggression, especially in terms of prioritising nuclear means of protection. Yet it did mention the responsibility to protect and a commitment to respecting human rights. The first anti-terrorism legislation was introduced in France in 1986. This law did not define terrorism but understood terrorist offences as crimes already existing in legal codes that become terrorist acts when committed within a specific context. Later legislation did codify certain distinct terrorist offences. All terrorism-related cases are heard in specialised courts in Paris. A new anti-terrorism bill was introduced in 2012 which extended the provisions of the Temporary Act of 2006 to include monitoring telephone and Internet data. The 2012 law notably introduces the offence of ‘criminal association with a terrorist group’.

The new White Paper of April 2013 closely adheres to the traditional French position that a nuclear deterrent is the best guarantee of French sovereignty. The paper sets out three priorities for France’s defence strategy; protection, intervention, and dissuasion. But the language indicates that the purpose of this three-fold strategy is to protect against all aggression by other states and terrorist actors against French national interests and does not privilege any notion of global human security. This continued reliance on a narrow definition of security that focuses on military aspects and particularly the nuclear deterrent can be partly seen as a consequence of the failure to adopt a human security agenda that could broaden France’s counterterrorism policymaking response.

Challenges for Human Security

France clearly has a global role but its security and counterterrorism strategy is based on protecting national interests rather than human interest at the global level. According to Frank Foley, French counterterrorism measures are less subject to public scrutiny than in the UK where debates over the balance between liberty and security are more common. Consequently, there is less public pressure to incorporate human rights or human security considerations into counterterrorism policy making. While the UK has struggled to deport some terror suspects, most

36 Reinke de Buitrago, 2010, p.78.
infamously Abu Qatada, France has deported a larger number with less public criticism. However, observers do raise questions over French security interventions, particularly pointing to ambiguities in the aims and results, and they also criticise France’s lack of transparency. The main factor that has prevented the development of human security thinking on terrorism in France is the inability to move away from viewing terrorism as threat to French national interests. Schmeder argues that French policies demonstrate that security is for specific individuals, not humans as a whole.


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