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Understanding Regional Peace and Security:
A Framework for Analysis

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INTRODUCTION

We live in a disarranged world. In a world population of 6.1 billion people, the richest 20 percent have 74 percent of the world income, while the poorest 20 percent only have 2 percent of it. In 2000, more than 1 billion people lived on less than 1 USD/day (poverty line) (Human Development Report, 2005). Coupled with this, wars are still a prevalent mechanism used by political actors to express discontent and attain strategic goals. In 2004, there were 30 ongoing armed conflicts in 22 locations (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2005). In contrast, some communities have managed to live within high levels of peace and security, as Scandinavia or Western Europe.

Since the beginning of human kind, men and women have engaged in different strategies to cut the Gordian knot that would provide them security and welfare. This has been a process far from homogenous and continuous. In order to attain peace and security, different actors use different strategies and are ultimately stimulated by different factors. The IR literature is still largely dominated by the binary discussion over national vs. the global level as the most robust epistemological tool and empirical stage from which security and peace is to be investigated and performed.

The first strategy to conceptualize security – the national dimension – has been profusely examined by the realist and neorealist schools of IR with their focus on the maximization of national power as an avenue to attain security (Morgenthau, 1967; Gilpin, 1988; Mearsheimer, 1990). The second strategy – global and collective security – fueled the creation of the League of Nations and the United Nations and it has been carefully scrutinized by the idealist school of IR (Krasner, 1983; Axelroad, 1984; Goulding, 1999; Keohane and Nye, 2001). The debate between both schools constitutes one of the most easy quotable landmarks in IR chronology (Baldwin, 1993; Viotti and Kauppi, 1999; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff Jr., 2001). The pitfalls of both orientations in attaining concerted peace and security have also been widely acknowledged (Lake and Morgan, 1997; Buzan and Wæver, 2003).

In this thesis the angle of attention is diverted onto the regional level of analysis. I am far from postulating that regionalism is a phenomenon that can be generalized and understood through one single canon. As this chapter will show, the emergence of
regionalism in international relations is a phenomenon marked by different patterns and rhythms, and driven by different agents and goals. As Marry Farrell pointed out “just as there are many models of regionalism around the world, with no dominant paradigm to which all countries and regions subscribe, so too we can find a degree of diversity in how regionalist processes are understood and conceptualized in the literature” (2005:2).

Any conceptualization of regionalism has indeed to acknowledge its complex and multidimensional nature. As the ‘new regionalism’ alerted, regions do not have static forms; they are dynamic configurations open to change and adaptation (Hettne, 1999-2001). This assumption should not curb us, however, from trying to pinpoint the patterns that may exist in the process of region building. And as my interest rests on the security and peace dimension of regionalism, I build on the heterogeneity of regionalization in order to identify what variables behave similarly in different security environments.

This paper is divided in two parts. First it investigates why peace and security should be parcelled in regions to be properly understood. Second, a new framework for analysis is introduced. It is composed by 6 variables, which when clustered together account for the regularities that emanate from regional security environments.

SECURITY AS A REGIONAL PUBLIC GOOD

What is it ‘regional’ about security? When the security debate seems to be dominated by notions of ‘global security’ and ‘national security’, what is actually left to the regional dimension of security?

I take the concept of public goods as the foundational stone to comprehend regional security. The idea of public goods goes back a long way in the history of economic thought. It can be traced back to David Hume’s 1739 discussion of the ‘common good’ present in his Treatise of Human Nature (see Ferroni, 2002:1), and to Adam Smith’s Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (see Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, 1999:3). In a landmark article, Paul Samuelson (1954) identified two composing elements of public goods. First, they are based upon non-rivalry, i.e.

\footnote{According to the cannon, I use International Relations (IR) in capitals to refer to the academic discipline, and “international relations” when referring to the international realities and interactions of global politics.}
consumption by one does not reduce the supply available to others. Knowledge, a street sign, or a lighthouse, are typical examples of public goods whose use by some does not reduce the supply available to others. Second, public goods are non-excludable, i.e. once they are produced their benefits are shared by all (e.g. clean air, international legislation). A clear example of a public good is security (peace is under analysis below). Once security has been attained (either in a state, region, or at the global level), the advantages of being secure are distributed equally to all within the public space they relate to. Although some public goods are global (e.g. eradication of small pox, or curbing global warming) and others are exclusively national (e.g. national food regulations), I contend that security is essentially a regional public good.

In a pre-Westphalia era, the contact between the different polities (countries or feuds) was minimal and, therefore, security was above all a national issue, and, in most cases, had exclusive domestic implications. In an era when communication and mobility were sluggish (or inexistent), the increase of security in a country (or feud) had no positive or negative direct impact on the neighboring countries. In the post-Westphalian world, this configuration has been profoundly altered. The formation and consolidation of states led to their securitization and, consequently, national security became, hence, a relational concept. States played out their security strategies vis-à-vis other states. The UN Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change observes, in accordance, that “today, more than ever before, threats are interrelated and a threat to one is a threat to all. The mutual vulnerability of week and strong has never been clearer” (2004:14).

To be secure is by definition, to be secure from threats. As early as in the Roman period security was regarded as “the absence of distress upon which happy life depends” (Cicero cited by Wæver, 2004:54). And threats have different providers and receivers, which may result in ten different types of conflicts (Figure 3.). The types of conflicts where the regional level plays the dominant role, either as the provider or/and the receiver of the threat (1.-1.2, 2.-2.1/2.2/2.3, 3.-3.2), are shadowed in Figure 3.

Attentive minds would call attention to the fact that, presently, most conflicts are, however, civil wars (1.-1.1.0 in Figure 3) or are associated to terrorism (3.-3.1 in Figure 3), which, at first sight, have no direct connection to the regional level. In opposition to this argument, I claim that in the present globalized world a threat (or an attack) to the national security of one state (be it perpetrated by a domestic opposition
force or by a global terrorist organization) has an inevitable seismic reaction in neighboring states. According to the Uppsala database (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2005), in 2004 there were 30 armed conflicts, 27 of which were intrastate, and 3 were internationalized interstate. Despite this overwhelming incidence of internal conflicts, the majority of them were either induced by, or had an impact on, neighboring countries. The European Security Strategy seems to be sympathetic with this idea when it advertises that domestic disputes are likely to become regional conflicts and that the problem of state failure “adds to regional instability (2003:4). Along the same lines, the UN Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, points out that to prevent wars within states, “we will have to build on the successes of regional organizations in developing strong norms to protect governments from unconstitutional overthrown, and to protect minority rights” (2004:3, italics added).2

Bad governance in one national setting could, hence, have externalities that affect other neighboring countries. It may cause cross-border spill-over effects, such as asylum seekers and refugees (according to the UNHCR, at the end of 2004 there were 19.2 million refugees and asylum-seekers). The regionalization of conflict is hence a major trend in international relations (see Chapter 1).

Another major threat which does not seem to be correlated to the regional dimension is terrorism (3.-3.1). Although terrorist attacks are, in most cases, perpetrated neither by regional groups nor directed solely to a particular region, a terrorist attack to one state provokes a prompt chain reaction in other states, with whom the attacked state has strong economic, political and religious ties (and such linkages are even stronger within regions). The terrorist attack to London on 7/7, which led the majority of European countries to raise, within a few minutes, their levels of national alert, illustrates this idea. This idea of ‘security dissemination’ is also present in bilateral (neighboring) conflicts, as bilateral disputes habitually have regional externalities (1.-1.1.1). Thus, either directly or indirectly, both the origin and the target of threats have a regional dimension. And once regional threats have been coped with, regional security will emerge. Security is, therefore, a regional public good.

Orthodox realism and political conservatism may be tempted to maintain that security is still a national issue, and should therefore be treated as a national public good. According to this view, all threats (be them national, regional, or global) should be handled nationally. This is misleading for two reasons. First, some threats simply

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cannot be tackled by strictly national mechanisms. International terrorism, economic crisis, or ethnic problems (as in the Great Lakes in Africa) have a manifest supranational dimension that cannot be coped with exclusively at the national level. As the European Security Strategy observes, “no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own (…) coherent policies are also needed regionally, especially in dealing with conflict. Problems are rarely solved on a single country basis, or without regional support (…)” (2003:1/13. Italics added). Second, an increase of national security in one country (national public good) might send the wrong message to neighboring countries, which may feel threatened by the upgrade of security in their neighboring country. This may rise a climate of fear (regional public bad), which ultimately creates insecurity in the first country (national public bad). This logical construct known as security dilemma constitutes one of the key concepts in IR, and particularly in the broad and influential school of political realism. The essence of this dilemma is that a state can increase its security only at the expense of others, so every step in building up security capabilities leads to decrease of relative security of competitors. To illustrate this, for instance, if Pakistan adopts a strictly national approach to security and attains a perceived higher level of security by raising the level of military expenditures or by closing its frontiers, this would inevitable pave the way to regional instability (India would promptly respond), which, in the end, would have a negative impact on Pakistan’s national security. If the provision of national security might ultimately lead to an increase of insecurity, fear, and distrust, there are other associated factors why we should be wary of when coining national security/defense as a public good: as observed by Ruben Mendez, monies allocated to defense mechanisms are, invariably, fountains of negative externalities, such as environmental damages, disruptions in the social fabric, diversion of domestic resources, which could otherwise have been used to enhance national human welfare (Mendez, 1999:383-388).

It would be pertinent to ask whether the increase of regional security would not also have a similar negative domino effect in other regions (and, in this case, whether regional security should be interpreted as a regional public bad). Unlike the Cold War era, when a regional security block could play a decisive role in the security configuration of another security block (e.g. NATO and Warsaw Pact), in the post Cold War world regional security organizations have a different orientation: (a) they are built from the inside in, and are more open to outside influences; (b) they do not
conceive their intra-regional strategy as a negative sum game with neighboring security blocs, and (c) they are more interested in materializing their intra-regional security through civilian and cooperative means than setting off on an arms race to prevent extra-regional threats/attacks. As we shall see below, if a regional group has any contagion effect on another region, this is more likely to be a positive, rather than a negative, externality (Figure 4, 2.-2.2.)

Security is therefore a regional public good which is attained when threats (be they directly or indirectly regional) are coped with. And, as we shall analyze thoroughly later, the main providers of security as a public good are regional agents (as regional organizations and regional civil society) and/or individual and national actors whose scope of action is markedly regional. The instruments used by these agents to achieve security also have regional implications as it will be ascertained below.

In many cases the mobilization of collective action to provide regional public goods is easier. This is partly because cooperation among neighboring countries incurs in less information problems. Moreover, countries within the same region often have more in common which tends to reduce the incapacity of mobilizing collective action with actors with diverse interests.

In a nutshell, security shall be treated as a regional public good (regional security) because:

a) In a globalized world, security is a relational matter. Threats to security have, directly or indirectly, a regional dimension;

b) The providers (agents of peace and security) and, consequently, the receivers of security are primordially regional.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVIDER OF THREAT</th>
<th>RECEIVER OF THREAT</th>
<th>EXAMPLE</th>
<th>INCIDENCE (high/medium/minor)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.0. Inter-national</td>
<td>Inter-state conflicts</td>
<td>High (conflicts). Minor (war)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.0. Regional</td>
<td>Illegal migration, regional water disputes, drug trafficking, arms smuggling ('regional conflict formations')</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.0. Global</td>
<td>Global proliferation of WMDs by a state</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Saying that *most* threats have directly or indirectly a regional dimension, is not the same as defending that *all* threats fall in some way or another into a regional pattern. The outline that I present there, does not put aside the possibility that the direction of some threats (from the provider to the receiver) might indeed either extrapolate the regional level or be reduced to strict domestic concerns (see also Lake and Morgan, 1997:6). Although this caveat is less likely when threats have a politico-military nature, other threats of economic, societal and environmental source might, in fact, have little association to regional patterns of security (see Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998 for different sectors of security). For instance, the pollution of a river in one country produces a negative security externality upon the country in which the river has its mouth. Security, in this example, will be limited to a pure bilateral issue,
from which it is hard to infer a regional dimension. In other cases, although ethnicity may serve as a igniter of regional tensions, it may be equally possible that the existence of national minorities in one country do not hold the aspiration of a societal threat but to the specific country it relates to. How much does the Corsican struggle affect European (or even Southern European) security? Some threats may also spring from, and affect primordially, the global level. A shortage of oil production and the consequent increase of oil prices all over the world (economic threat), has only a residual regional amplitude. Finally, examples exist where one state threatens (or wages a violent conflict in) other country with whom it does not share the same regional environment (e.g. US led war on Iraq or US handling of North Korea and Iran). Despite these caveats the regional level is still the most effective paradigm to analyze security. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) have a similar view:

“The overall picture indicates that regional security complexes dominate the military, political and societal sectors; that they are potentially strong in the economic one; and that they are present in the environment sector.” (p.166)

**PEACE AS A REGIONAL PUBLIC GOOD**

If security is attained when different threats are successfully coped with, peace is achieved when political agents have a significantly high level of wealth and development. Both concepts feed into each other (see Wæver, 2004). It is the successful management of threats that leads to a state of welfare, a state of improvement, and development. In short, it leads towards peace. It is classical the distinction in peace studies between negative (lack of violence) and positive peace (improvement of life, the achievement of social justice, freedom and equality) (Galtung, 1996). When we the term ‘peace’ is used it refers to the latter interpretation. As security and peace are such intertwined concepts, the idea of regional peace also originates, first of all, by the intensification of mobility of people, ideas and goods. The provision and reception of welfare are also a regional phenomenon. As a public

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3 These two interpretations germinated two schools of thought. The American School focuses firmly on the issue of preventing and reducing the incidence of war, in the tradition of the Western Roman theory of *pax as absenitia bellum*. On the contrary, the Scandinavian School focuses mainly on peace and the structural and cultural conditions of violence by following a Greco-Arabic-Hebraic pattern (Ferguson, 1986:334).
good (non-excludable and non-rival), the capacity to produce it and the people who can benefit from it does not extend generally further than a region. Regional zones of peace are indeed a notable feature of international relations (Kacowicz, 1998).

Peace (and security) are occasionally treated as a global public good (see Mendez, 1999). I do not challenge the idea that peace (and security) is a state (or a value) which, if produced globally, would benefit virtually everyone (non-excludable) and would not entail a reduction of supply available when consumed (non-rivalry). This idea marginalizes, however, the crucial question of production of peace and security as a public good. As Olson cautioned “the desire for peace (...) for orderly financial arrangements for multilateral trade, for the advance of basic knowledge, and for an ecological viable planet are now virtually universal, yet these collective goods are only episodically or scantily supplied” (cited in Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern, 1999:14).

Who is able to produce and sustain global peace? The only global organization which could legally provide such arrangement is the United Nations. But, since its foundation in 1945, the UN has proven incapable of working as a collective security organization insomuch as the national security agenda of great powers leads them, regularly, to engage in military disputes which are incongruent with the collective security principles. Not surprisingly, thereby, the UN is consigning the responsibility to handle ‘regional conflicts’ to regional organizations (see ‘regional organizations’ and ‘regional conflict management’ below). At the Sixth High-level Meeting between the United Nations and Regional and Other Inter-governmental Organizations, held in July 2005, the UN Secretary General stated that strengthening the UN relationship with regional and other intergovernmental organizations was a critical part of the effort to reform the UN. He added that “the demands of war-stricken countries often outstrip the United Nations capacity to deal with them. Moreover, other organizations may be better suited to respond to certain situations. For example, the African Union is trailblazing a leadership role in Darfur” (Press Release SG/SM/100014). Even though Ruben Mendez is right when he argues that “there is a danger where global interests are involved that these [regional] institutions will give priority to the region they represent rather than the interest of peace in general” (1999:397), it seems that UN is willing to take that risk and pass on that responsibility. Another reason why peace and security shall not be interpreted as a global public good is because, unlike for example knowledge or the eradication of a disease, once it has been produced (most likely at national or regional levels) it does not immediately extrapolate and
benefit everyone at the global level. Public goods have a spatial component, they
benefit primarily the people who live in the political sphere where the provider(s) of
the good originate from. Ruben Mendez, a subscriber of the idea that peace is a global
public good, is too enthusiastic about the outreach of peace, when he argues, for
instance, that peace in Cyprus, “enhances peace in Greece, Turkey and the
Mediterranean, and it contributes to peace in the world” (1999:389. Italics added).
Finally, we could also add that global peace is less sustainable than regional peace.
Whereas global peace is an academic chimera, regional zones of peace are an
emerging facet of international relations (Kacowicz, 1998).
As we can see in Figure 2, by combining the different levels from which welfare can
be provided and received, the region level stands out once again as the dominant level
(shadowed). In the only exception to this rule, when the national level is both the
provider and receiver of welfare (1.-1.1.0), the region where a wealthy/non-wealthy
state is integrated is an inevitable indirect recipient of externalities. For example, good
governance and the successful implementation of public policies in one state may
serve as a reference point or model to neighboring countries. This is the principles of
common sharing and common learning that is behind the Peer Review practice in
international organizations as the AU or the OCDE.
As there are no totally secure countries in regions of insecurity (neighborhood
effects) also there are no wealthy/peaceful countries in regions marked by deprivation.
An attentive look at the Human Development Indicators (2005) is elucidative in this
regard: countries coming from the same region tend to have approximate positions in
the Human Development Index. In the slot of the 32 countries that score highest, 23
are Europeans. Also in the Andean Community, the HDI seems to group up by region;
all states stand relatively together in the HDI: Colombia 69th, Venezuela 75th, Peru
79th, Ecuador 82nd, Bolivia 113th. Also more evidently, in South Asia there is a strong
regional tendency: Sri Lanka 93rd, Maldives 96th, India 127th, Bhutan 134th, Pakistan
135th, Nepal 136th, and Bangladesh 139th.
While a significant body of literature has recently emerged on the ‘regionalization of
conflict’ (Lake, 2002; Kanet, 1998, Diehl and Lepgold, 2003; Sriram an Nielsen,
2004), the ‘regionalization of peace’ still remains poorly investigated. An exception
of this is Kacowicz (1998). The author does not provide, however, any explanation

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4 The only probable exception to this assertion is Costa Rica. It is a safe country with no army, and throughout the turbulent
1980s, as wars and rebellions raged elsewhere in the region, it managed to stay largely neutral and peaceful.
why peace is more prevalent in the regional level (and not the national or global levels). His approach is primarily dominated by the attempt to explain (regional) peace through the identification of independent variables. In a distinct way my approach is not aimed at pinning down the independent variables that cause regional peace. I look, instead, at regional peace and security as a complex morphology that it may be composed by different variables (indicators of peace and conflict being one of them).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVIDER OF WELFARE</th>
<th>RECEIVER OF WELFARE</th>
<th>EXAMPLE</th>
<th>INCIDENCE (high/medium/minor)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. National</td>
<td>1.1.0. Intra-national</td>
<td>Democracy. Sound public policies. Education</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1.1. Inter-national</td>
<td>Bilateral cooperation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2. Regional</td>
<td>Bottom-up emergence of ‘zones of peace and welfare’</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.3. Global</td>
<td>Normative image of a peaceful and wealthy country projected globally (Scandinavian countries, Canada)</td>
<td>Minor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Regional</td>
<td>2.1. National</td>
<td>Impact of ROs on national development policies</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.2. Regional</td>
<td>Inter-regional strategic partnerships in different areas</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.3. Global</td>
<td>ROs working with the UN on development and peace</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Global</td>
<td>3.1. National</td>
<td>UN agencies working on development and peace in national states</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2. Regional</td>
<td>UN working with ROs on development and peace</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.3. Global</td>
<td>e.g. International HR conventions</td>
<td>Minor</td>
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Figure 2: Typology of welfare
SUMMARY OF LITERATURE

Other authors have substantially different views on how to conceptualize the regional component of security. In the literature one can find a wide range of descriptive studies of the actors and processes that are associated to security in a given region. While Africa (and sub-regions in Africa) claims the most unwavering and constant attention (Laakso 2002; Francis 2001; Maclean 1999); Asia (Hettne, 2002) and Latin America have also been the focus of a significant bulk of literature. Other authors have tried in a very explorative and non-schematic way to shed some light over the possibilities of regionalism to handle inter-state tensions, failed states concerns and, for example, intra-state conflicts (Stadtmüller, 2005). Press-Barnathan argues, complementarily, that current US unipolarity has created incentives to invest in security regionalization (2005). These studies do not provide, however, any explanation why security is indeed a regional process. The only exceptions of this are Lake and Morgan (1997) and Buzan and Wæver (2003).

Regional Orders: David Lake and Patrick Morgan
To Lake and Morgan, a regional system is “a set of states affected by at least one transborder but local externality that emanates from a particular geographic area” (1997: 48). They built on the concepts of ‘neighborhood’ and ‘spill over’ effects to define ‘externalities as “costs (negative externalities) and benefits (positive externalities) that do not accrue only to the actors that create them”’ (p.49). A regional security system is thereby produced if a “local externality poses an actual or potential threat to the physical safety of individuals or governments in other states” (p.49). My critical remarks on Lake and Morgan in what regards the conceptualization of regional security can be spelt out in the following way:

- Lake and Morgan are solely interested with negative externalities, i.e. the actions that are intended to reduce the welfare of a second state. The process of securitization, however, also produces positive externalities. For example, in case Portugal increases its naval capacity in the Atlantic, the move will be applauded by its Mediterranean neighbors, which would deposit in Portugal the confidence in hindering arms smuggling, illegal immigration and drug trafficking. In my view, an analysis of regional peace and security has to
address the connection points between ‘desecuritization’ and the enhancement of welfare. Lake and Morgan’s view is reductive;

• In what agency is concerned, Lake and Morgan’s approach is strictly state-centric. For these authors, externalities can be understood as “a security action take by one state and not solely intended to reduce the welfare of a second” (p.49). In our perspective, the agents of peace and security, i.e. the actors who have a capacity to be the providers of peace and security as a public good range from states, to regional organizations, civil society, economic agents or individuals with regional credibility (see below);

• Lake and Morgan’s approach indicates that states relate to each other in security terms by the expression of an externality. And as they seem to hint that it is possible to pinpoint in a neat way the externality that it was produced, their regional approach seems to be founded on (different) bilateral security contacts. I have more of a regional seismic wave than a precision guided weapon perspective. Regionalization of security is a more multifaceted phenomenon than the authors suggest. Moreover, to accentuate the difficulty in explaining why regional security is, indeed, regional, Lake and Morgan argue that “externalities are not necessarily limited in their effects to states within a particular geographic neighborhood (e.g. the US is part of the Middle East security complex) (p.50);

• In my perspective, in regional security two types of externalities are involved: positive (welfare) and negative (threat/use of force). Although the first is likely to be a voluntary externality and the latter a non-voluntary one, empirical evidence might shows us otherwise. The bottom line is that externalities may be either voluntary or non-voluntary. Contrarily, to Lake and Morgan “externalities occur only when one state is not a fully consenting party to actions initiated by another (or the mechanism of compensation is imperfect)” (p.51). Also unlike Lake and Morgan, in our framework acts of aggression may be considered externalities.

**Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT): Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver**

Lake and Morgan’s interpretation of externality as the bedrock to understand regional security is not far from Buzan and Wæver’s assertion that security is a regional
phenomenon since “most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones (...) processes of securitization and thus the degree of security interdependence are more intense between the actors inside such complexes than they are between actors inside the complex and those outside it” (2003:4). With this focus on ‘security interdependence’ rather than on ‘externality’ Buzan and Wæver rectified Lake and Morgan’s camouflaged bilateralism. As can be easily recognized, this paper shares with Buzan and Wæver the idea that regional security can only be deciphered if we look at the way threats are generated and handled. Even so, my interpretation of what is ‘regional’ about ‘regional security’, disputes Buzan and Wæver in the following way:

- If threats travel more easily over short distances, how does their model explain/describe international terrorism? Instead of basing regional security on the spatial idea that the range of a threat is geographically limited to a region, my interpretation justifies the use of the regional dimension in the sense that most threats are either originated in, or have an impact on, the regional level (as is the case of terrorism);
- Similarly to Lake and Morgan, Buzan and Wæver approach is limited to management of threats. They do not address the correlation between ‘desecuritization’ and ‘welfare generation’ and how this can be patterned at regional level.

In 2003, Buzan and Waever pointed out that, RSCT is useful for three reasons: “First it tells us something about the appropriate level of analysis in security studies, second it can organize empirical studies, and third, theory-based scenarios can be established on the basis of the known possible forms of, and alternatives to, RSCs.” (2003:45). They also added that, “RSCT might be the only existing theory of regional security” (p.83).

No major theory on regional security has yet emerged that challenges RSCT. Unlike RSCT, the regional orders (Lake and Morgan, 1997), zones of peace (Kacowitz, 1998; Singer and Wildavsky, 1993), and security communities literature (Adler and Barnett, 1998) are not able to grasp the full spectrum of security dynamics at regional level. This paper does not aim to challenge RSCT. But it endeavours to address its missing points. My main criticism with the regional security literature is not that it fails in its
explanative and descriptive assumptions or that its implications are not verifiable. Rather, the central problem is that the literature only addresses incompletely the central goal of understanding regional peace and security. By walking in the forest of theories no map is provided on whether the process of regionalization - in security terms - is associated to regional zones of peace and regional zones of conflict, or is related to the operative capacity of regional agents of peace as, for instance, regional organizations. Furthermore, all theories are limited in terms of regional agency and security processes. In order to generalize and simplify regional peace and security I will put forward potential variables.

A NEW APPROACH

Unlike the vast majority of theories and approaches on regional peace our model grasps the regionalism/peace nexus by having an encompassing and multidisciplinary nature. We contend that to encapsulate the phenomenon of regional peace and security variables have to be identified and assembled. In this paper I propose that the genetic constitution of regional security environments is composed by six discrete (nominal and ordinal) variables:

- Regional security pattern (conflict formation, security regime, security community);
- Regional conflict pattern (violence prone, absence of violence, conciliation);
- Regional peace pattern (deprived region, moderate region, wealthy region);
- Peace and security instruments (e.g. regional balance of power, regional hegemony, regional integration (identity, preferential trade areas, institutionalization) regional conflict management, micro-regionalization);
- Peace and security agents (e.g. state, regional organization, regional civil society, regional economic agents);
- Level of regional integration (low, medium, and high).

By measuring the weight of these six variables in regional peace and security, the main goal is to identify transversal regularities and patterns. As hypothesis, it is assumed that all these variables change in mutual correlation and that they are systematic and not particular. I propose, thus, the introduction of the concept regional
peace and security clusters (RPSC) defined as set of interrelated agents fixed in a territory that share the same regional security environment. The security environment can be described by the variables alluded to above. My main objective is to discover whether a distinct way to schematically describe regional peace and security can be achieved.

Security Pattern

As security shall be carved up in regionally to be properly comprehended, the first important variable that compose regional peace and security clusters is the intra-regional security pattern. The characterization of security variations within each region has been carried out in a authoritative way by Buzan and Wæver (2003). In a widely used terminology in security studies (which does not require dispute), the authors abbreviate regional security relationships “along a spectrum according to
whether the defining security interdependence is driven by amity or enmity” in the following way:

- **Conflict Formation**: in which interdependence arises from fear, rivalry, and mutual perceptions of threat. East Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, post-Soviet space, and North America after decolonization are conflict formations;
- **Security Regimes**: in which states still treat each other as potential threats but have made reassurance arrangements to reduce the security dilemma among them. Southeast Asia and the Southern Cone in South America are security regimes;
- **Pluralistic Security Community**: in which states no longer expect or prepare to use force in their relations with each other. Europe is an archetype.

Although the pattern of security of a region may be intrinsically associated to its pattern of conflict (and sometimes both terms are used interchangeably\(^5\)) in the sense that the level of security has an inverted correlation to the level of conflict (i.e. high levels of security are associated to low levels of conflict), a careful examination of the inherent meaning of both concepts would suggest their conceptual fracture. In the politico-military sector of security examples exist where variations in the level of security are not attached to variations in the level of conflict. In other words, a decrease in the level of security does not imply an increase in the level of conflict. Several regions are conflict formations but have, nonetheless, no record of military violence for a considerable time period. For instance in East Asia, despite the problematic cases of Korea (North/South) and Taiwan, and the permanent circulation of threats between the states with interests in the region, war has not broken out for 50 years. As the correlation between security and conflict is thus not perfect, we have to introduce the variable ‘conflict pattern’ to account for this incongruousness.

### Conflict Pattern

The conflict pattern of a region will be measured by aggregating two sets of variables: conflict intensity and peace durability. To measure conflict intensity the Uppsala

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\(^{5}\) For example the Charter of the UN uses the term ‘international peace and security’ frequently. Peace in this context means absence of violent conflict.
Conflict Database classical definition of armed conflict that comprises a distinction between ‘minor armed conflict’, ‘intermediate armed conflict’, and ‘war’ is used. According to the database “an armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. This lays the ground to distinguish between ‘minor armed conflict’, with at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict; ‘intermediate armed conflict’ with least 25 battle-related deaths per year and an accumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths, but fewer than 1,000 in any given year; and, finally, ‘war’ that presupposes at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year.

To measure the second variable, peace durability, the Uppsala database will also be used. Although it is difficult to pinpoint accurately the end of a conflict, the database will help us determining the moment a conflict comes to an end. This can be attained through a combination of factors: peace agreement, victory, ceasefire agreement, no activity, or low activity (lower than 25 battle-related deaths per year).

By combining conflict intensity and peace durability a typology emerges on the conflict pattern of each regional security environment:

- **Violence prone**: region discernible by inter-state and intra-state war(s) and/or intermediate armed conflicts. Most of the armed conflicts have spill over effects which engulf the region into a state of enduring conflictuality. The most clear-cut examples of violent prone regions are South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. According to the Uppsala database (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2005), in 2004, in the South Asian region, there were two active wars, and seven minor conflicts. In the Middle East, one war, two intermediate conflicts and four minor ones.
were active. In Africa, three wars\textsuperscript{11}, three intermediate armed conflicts\textsuperscript{12} and five minor ones\textsuperscript{13} were in place.

- **Absence of violence**: region marked by absence of any inter-state war, intermediate armed conflict, or minor conflict between states, although intra-state conflicts still exist (with minimal or non-existent spill over effects at regional level). The absence of armed conflict does not necessarily presuppose the creation of conditions for conflicts not to emerge again. Currently, South America and Southeast Asia are at this stage. In the first region, only a armed conflict is reminiscent (war in Colombia\textsuperscript{14}), whereas in Southeast Asia armed conflicts exist in Indonesia\textsuperscript{15}, and the Philippines\textsuperscript{16}. Notwithstanding, none of these conflicts is the epicenter of ‘regional conflict formations’, i.e. their spill over effects are minimal.

- **Conciliation**: region equipped with internal dispute resolution mechanisms, whose regional actors are enveloped by similar norms, values, and a loose identity. In a region that has achieved a level of conciliation, regional agents create mechanisms for violence never to break out between them; also intra-state violence is inexistent. At this level regional actors struggle for a better attainment of regional peace, i.e. improvement of life, achievement of social justice, freedom, development and equality: the variable ‘conflict pattern’ becomes, therefore, related to variable ‘peace pattern’. The European Union is the most conspicuous example. Peace is enduring in Western Europe since the end of the Second World War\textsuperscript{17}.

\textsuperscript{11} In Sudan against the JEM (Justice and Equality Movement), and against the SLM (Sudan Liberation Movement): both over government. In Uganda against the LRA (Lord’s Resistance Army) over government.

\textsuperscript{12} In Algeria against GSPC (al-Jama’ah al-Salafiyah lil-Du’wah wa’l Qital: Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) over government. In Burundi against the Palipehutu-FNL (Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People-Forces for National Liberation) over government. Finally, in Sudan against SPLM (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement) over government/territory (southern Sudan).

\textsuperscript{13} In Angola against FLEC-FAC (Front of the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda-Armed Forces of Cabinda) over territory (Cabinda). In Ethiopia, against ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation Front) over territory (Ogaden), and against OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) over territory (Oromiya). In Ivory Coast against Forces Nouvelles (New Forces) over government. Finally, in Nigeria against Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa (Followers of the Prophet) over territory (Northern Nigeria).

\textsuperscript{14} The Uppsala database catalogues this armed conflict in terms of ‘war’ against the FARC, ‘intermediate armed conflict’ against ELN, and ‘minor’ against EPL.

\textsuperscript{15} Intermediate armed conflict against GAM (Free Aceh Movement) over territory (Aceh).

\textsuperscript{16} Intermediate armed conflict against CPP (Communist Party of the Philippines) over government, also intermediate armed conflict against MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) over territory (Mindanao), and a minor conflict against the Abu Sayyaf Group over territory (Mindanao).

\textsuperscript{17} The only clear exception is the Northern Ireland conflict, which erupted in 1970. Violence came to an end in 1998.
Peace Pattern

The concept of peace is interpreted as non-static idea, i.e. as a variable whose quality can be accounted for. As explained before, the concept of peace will be encapsulated by taking into consideration its structural pillar. As peace is more profound than absence of violence, structural peace shall be linked to welfare, improvement, well-being, and fulfillment. Its indicators relate, thereby, to education, health, safety, economic opportunities and political legitimacy. As codified by the United Nations Human Development Reports, they are, inter alia, people victimized by crime, internal displaced people, estimated earned income, education index, school enrolment ratio, GDP per capita, rate of HIV/AIDS, poverty index, illiteracy rate, income inequality measures, infant mortality rate, life expectancy at birth, literacy rate, physicians per capita, sanitation, mortality rate, unemployment and population using water.

An important tier of the structural component of peace is the way people relate to their political rulers. In this wake we have also to take into consideration popular legitimacy, political participation and popular acceptance (e.g. Gallup International Poll on Voice of the People). The aggregation of these indicators at regional level, has the following outline:

- **Deprived Region:** Region stricken by poverty and a widespread low level of development. The level of public trust in governments and political participation is also nominal. Regions rank low in HDI. South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa are perfect specimens.
- **Moderate Region:** Regions where citizens have, on average, satisfactory living conditions (potentiality fragmented between rich and low-income classes). The majority of population is above poverty line and have access to basic human resources (housing, clothing, food). Southeast Asia, and the Americas are good examples.
- **Wealthy Region:** Region distinguished by a high level of development and political participation. The basic needs of the populations are fulfilled and the access to superfluous resources is widespread. Public opinion plays a major role in
the format of governmental orientations. HDI ranking is high. Europe is a case in point.

The choice to include the variables ‘security pattern’, ‘conflict pattern’ and ‘peace pattern’ in our RPSC framework comes in synchrony with the recent tendency to use these concepts distinctively. As pointed out by Jahn et. al “security came to take the place of peace in the traditional sense of war prevention (…) security settled in between peace and peace, between negative and positive peace (cited in Wæver, 2004:60).

**Instruments of Peace and Security**

Peace instruments are *regional* initiatives, policies or methods that permit the management of threats and/or the construction of peace, or *national* instruments whose goal to being about peace has an impact on a certain region. These instruments are used to tackle the threats enumerated in Figure 1 and to attain welfare as described in Figure 2. They vary substantially in terms of effectiveness and scope:

- War
- Balance of Power
- Hegemony
- Military Alliances
- Regional Conflict Management (conflict prevention, mediation, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, disarmament, minority rights, democratization, counter-terrorism, organized crime, non-military threats, peace)
- Federalism and Local Representation
- Regional Integration: Trade Arrangements
- Regional Integration: Normative Engagement and Institutionalism
- Regional Integration: Regional Identity
Agents of Peace and Security

Agents of peace are actors who may provide a voluntary or involuntary contribution to peace within a region (the region where they originate from or other). Actors are of three kinds: individual, national and regional. Individual agents are persons who use their recognition and credibility on behalf of peace (intra-regional peace). National actors operate within the premises of a state (or the state itself) but their active capacity spills over national borders. Regional actors transcend the geographic and political limitations of state-centrism and have regional ‘actorness’

- State
- (Regional) Civil Society
- Economic Agents
- Regional Organizations

Regional Integration

Regional integration is the process that pertains the establishment of linkages and the surrender of sovereignty of political agents in a contiguous territorial area. In the ongoing phase of ‘new regionalism’, the process of regional integration is conducted by a panoply of different agents, which are propelled by distinct objectives. Regional integration may be experienced in different sectors (social, economic, political/institutional) and be classified in progressive levels of intensity:

- **Low Level of Integration**: national policies are designed and put in practice with disregard for neighbor political agents. In a low level of integration states prioritize self-sufficiency to the detriment of regional cooperation. National sovereignty is considered a fundamental pillar on which governmental policies are built upon;

- **Medium Level of Integration**: national policies are conceived with awareness of the regional environment and political agents are willing to sacrifice chunks of their sovereignty on behalf of regional cooperation. Integration is attained in non-sensitive technical areas.
High Level of Integration: national governments have lost full control over the implementation of policies at national level: national goals are believed to be more effectively attained if a regional body coordinates and manages the policy-making process. National sovereignty is transported to a higher regional institution.

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

These six variables are interrelated and vary in a fairly consistent and symmetrical fashion. Changes in one of these variables leads to alterations in the value of the other variables. The fundamental question is, however, how to group all these variables together in a way that, first, account for the security dynamics of regional environments, second, may be applied to all regions of the world, and third, are suitable to historical variations and processes. When using a model structured upon six variables to comprehend regional peace and security I do not mean to suggest that the value of the variables changes linearly and deterministically according to causal laws. The descriptive model introduced is a simplified representation of the real world. Unlike positivist/causal models, it was not created by speculating about processes that could have caused the observed facts. No RPSC is similar to other in the level of variation of its defining components. However, despite the dynamism and the specificity inherent to RPSCs, four major descriptive types of regional clusters can be observed in international relations: ‘regional complex’, ‘regional society’, ‘regional community’ and ‘regional institutionalized policy’. By conjugating together the six variables, the regional clusters are described as follows:

Regional complexes are marked by low levels of regional integration, embroiled by inter-state and intra-state conflicts. They correspond to regions where the main international actor – the state – struggles for security, survival and power. Peace is regarded as an absence of war and the instruments used to attain it are effective in their deterrence capacities but inadequate in attempting to spur more equity, welfare and development. The role of other agents beyond the state is normally downplayed. States may not be ruled by plural and democratic institutions. As peace and security are regional public goods that need
mechanisms of cooperation to be produced, the supply of these goods in a regional complex is scarce and deficient. The contemporary case of South Asia, plagued by ethical and political internal divisions in Sri Lanka, Nepal, Pakistan and India, and by the longstanding interstate confrontation between India and Pakistan, is a case in point

• **Regional societies.** The growth of interactions and linkages are portrayed in the establishment of formal (regional organizations) or informal ties (sharing of common rules and values) between the state, civil society and market actors. The attainability of positive peace is still not their main concern, but the region is more discernible by patterns of amity that enmity. Several regions in the world are currently at this level such as Southeast Asia or South America.

• **Regional communities.** At this level the existence of a zone of peace is recognized and interstate negative peace is taken for granted. Regions gain an international posture and therefore start serving, for example, as aid donors, peace facilitators or engaging in peace-keeping initiatives. The member states of the region are plural democracies and are enmeshed in high levels of regional integration. The EU is so far the only evident case here.

• **Regional institutionalized polities.** Traditional sovereignty is abandoned and the new supranational mechanisms of policy-making not only embrace former independent states but also local communities, micro-regions and possibly civil society organizations. Political and ethnic groups that maintained hostile relations with the core power at the state level will have new avenues to discuss and materialize their demands.

**CONCLUSION**

Over the last decade four trends have marked international relations: regionalization, regional zones of peace, regional zones of conflict, and the growing involvement of regional organizations in conflict management. The model I introduce is a pertinent way to bring these four features of international relations together into a concerted framework. Even though each one of these trends has received a considerable amount of attention in the literature: regionalization (Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995; Gamble and

In our model, the extension of each variable is able to cover each one of these trends. The first trend, regionalization, is covered by the variable regional integration and by the variable peace and security instruments (regional integration: trade arrangements), the trend regional zones of peace and zones of conflict are addressed by the variables patterns of peace, patterns of conflict, and patterns of security. Finally, the model also encompasses peace and security agents as, for instance, regional organizations, to which the last trend is associated. By using this model, four apparently unattached tendencies in international politics become part of the same whole.
REFERENCES


