UNU-CRIS Working Papers

W-2014/6

Multilateralism 2.0: Finding Some Evidence

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Abstract

Multilateralism is a poor, ugly duckling among concepts used to study International Relations. After defining the object of this study through a literature review, the paper selects a metaphor derived from the ICT world – *multilateralism 2.0* – to describe its characteristics and highlight its recent transformation. The essay then proceeds to try to find evidence of the existence of mode 2.0 of multilateralism in practice. It seeks to achieve this by means of a set of criteria, based on the trends that are currently shaping international relations. The paper concludes that multilateralism 2.0 in practice has outpaced our understanding of its existence.

Key Words: multilateralism, metaphor, sub- and supra-national representation, openness of IGOs, non-State actors.
Acknowledgements

I would like to express my very great appreciation to Dr. Luk Van Langenhove – Director of the United Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS, Bruges – Belgium) and my research supervisor – for his patient guidance, enthusiastic encouragement and for his valuable and constructive suggestions and critiques during the planning and development of this research work. The present working paper was written in the framework of an Internship Program (October 2013 – February 2014).
Introduction

Multilateralism is a concept which has been given increasing attention in the last decades. It is a concept that is going through a profound set of changes as a result of the emergence of new multilateral actors, the development of new multilateral playing fields and the birth of a new kind of multilateralism. This has had consequences for world politics: the world has moved from unipolarity towards a networked form of multipolarity. Another notable effect is that the multilateral system is moving from a closed to an open system, of which the main characteristics are the diversification of multilateral organizations, the growing importance of non-state actors such as sub-state regions and supra-national regional organisations, the increased inter-linkages between policy domains and the growing space for civil society involvement.

Looking at this state of affairs, it is worth further research to deepen our knowledge on the changing circumstances that are shaping international relations, acknowledging the new hybrid and fluid world’s configuration and turning it into a cluster concept. In order to go through with this study, it is necessary to find some evidence of the existence of this state of affairs in practice. In this respect, the study could represent a valid contribution in the observation of current international relations and in grasping the meaning of the most recent developments in the international arena.

The paper begins with a review of the existing literature on multilateralism and proceeds by exploring a metaphor – multilateralism 2.0 – that amply captures its newest developments and characteristics. Drawing on this metaphor, the paper looks at three ways in which this new kind of multilateralism reveals itself in real politics, in order to deduce evidence not only of the theoretical appropriateness of the term, but also of its manifestations in the international arena.
Multilateralism Defined

The first documented use of the term "multilateral" to describe an international agreement dates back to 1690, when multilateral arrangements were proposed to manage property issues, such as the governance of oceans. As early as the 17th century, they sprung up through history mainly to manage relations between States in areas where interdependence was inevitable.

Multilateral cooperation, however, was relatively rare until the 19th century, which witnessed a surge of new treaties on trade, public health and maritime transport. The International Telegraph Union, the Universal Postal Union and the International Office of Public Hygiene all had their origins in the 1800s. 19th century multilateralism was spurred by the political, social and economic changes generated by the Industrial Revolution: rising volumes of international transactions not only increased the opportunities for disputes between States, but they also prompted States to protect their sovereignty, even as they agreed to common rules to facilitate economic exchange. Most multilateral agreements in the 19th century did not generate formal organisations.

The most important — the Concert of Europe — was an almost purely informal framework in which four European powers — Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia (later joined also by France) — agreed to consult and negotiate on matters of European peace and security. The result was peace in Europe for nearly forty years. However, the Concert was imposed by statesmen on docile publics and its legitimacy was highly damaged by the revolutions of 1848 and the surge in nationalism they generated. The Concert never became a truly multilateral organisation, but it paved the way for 20th century multilateralism by establishing that issues of peace and security could be addressed in international fora and by recognizing the special roles, rights and obligations of Great Powers.

In contrast to prior forms of interaction, multilateralism in the early 20th century developed into multiple formal strands and was transformed: it came to "embody a procedural norm in its own right — though often a hotly-contested one — in some instances carrying with it an international legitimacy not enjoyed by other means".

The noun form of the word — “multilateralism” — only came into use in 1928, in the aftermath of the First World War, and drew the attention of academics and practitioners only after the end of the Cold War. For this reason, it cannot be stated that multilateralism is a core concept of International Relations (IR). It is not, for example, in the same league with sovereignty, anarchy and interdependence — indeed, perhaps one “reason for the paucity of theory concerning multilateralism is that there may be so little multilateralism in practice”. However, nowadays it does constitute an objective and distinctive ordering device in IR.

In 1992, Caporaso complained that multilateralism was being used to describe a wide range of forms of international cooperation, even if it was still not adequately conceptualised. Therefore he tried to analyze the term, stating that the noun “comes in

1 JOHN RUGGIE, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution”, International Organisation, 46, 3 (Summer 1992), 584
2 JAMES CAPORASO, “International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: the Search for Foundations”, International Organisation, 46, 3 (Summer 1992), 600
the form of an ‘ism’, suggesting a belief or ideology rather than a straightforward state of affairs. In this way, he tried to restore a melting pot of “sociology, experimental psychology, organisation theory and game theory” in order to plug the gap. His observation has found support in a definition put forth in US foreign policy in 1945. Here, the concept of multilateralism was labeled as an “international governance of the many”; its central principle being the “opposition of bilateral and discriminatory arrangements that were believed to enhance the leverage of the powerful over the weak and to increase international conflict”. However, this exercise – despite being creative and interesting – failed insofar as multilateralism continued to be used in a variety of ways to refer to different kinds and forms of cooperation.

Although much has changed since the end of the Cold War, the most basic definition of multilateralism has not. In 1990, Keohane argued that multilateralism had developed a *momentum* of its own. He defined it as “the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more States, through *ad hoc* arrangements or by means of institutions”. It thus involves exclusively States and often – but not exclusively – institutions, defined as “persistent and connected sets of rules, formal and informal, that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity and shape expectations”. When enduring rules emerge, multilateralism becomes institutionalised. Institutions thus “can be distinguished from other forms of multilateralism, such as *ad hoc* meetings and short-term arrangements to solve particular problems”. By implication, multilateral institutions take the form of international regimes – with explicit rules agreed by governments on particular IR issues – or bureaucratic organisations.

In 1992, John Gerard Ruggie agreed that Keohane’s definition was an accurate one, but then dismissed it as ‘nominal’ because it neglected the qualitative dimension of the phenomenon: indeed, the preamble of the UN Charter implies that multilateralism means “establishing conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained”. Therefore, this concept involves justice, obligation and a certain kind of international rule of law. What makes the concept unique is not merely the number of parties or the degree of institutionalisation, but the type of relations it brings forth.

In Ruggie’s opinion, multilateralism’s distinctive quality lies in its coordination of three of more different national policies on the basis of the guiding lights of an existing framework for relations among those States. Multilateralism represented a generic institutional form and implied institutional arrangements that “define and stabilise property rights of States, manage coordination problems and resolve collaboration problems”.

Caporaso, publishing at the same time as Ruggie, articulated the same theme more succinctly, explaining that “as an organizing principle, the institution of multilateralism is distinguished from other forms by three properties: indivisibility, generalised principles of conduct and diffuse reciprocity. Indivisibility can be thought of as the scope (both geographic and functional) over which costs and benefits are spread... Generalised

1 Ibidem, 600-601
2 Ibidem, 604
3 MILES KAHLER, “Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers”, International Organisation, 46 (Summer 1992), 681
5 Ibidem, 733
6 Ibidem, 733
7 Ibidem, 733
8 UN CHARTER, Preamble
principles of conduct usually come in the form of norms exhorting general if not universal modes of relating to other States, rather than differentiating relations case-by-case on the basis of individual preferences, situational exigencies, or a prior particularistic ground. Diffuse reciprocity adjusts the utilitarian lenses for the long view, emphasizing that actors expect to benefit in the long run and over many issues, rather than every time on every issue”\textsuperscript{11}.

Whatever statement of meaning is involved or used, the question of what makes multilateralism effective inevitably arises. Martin (1992) observed that multilateral organisations vary both in the degree to which they are effective and to which they are institutionalised: “one may be strong, the other weak”\textsuperscript{12}. Multilateral organisations may also be forums where actors become socialised to the principles of multilateralism: the admission of China to the WTO might be a case in point. Multilateralism can be a means, a tool or a strategy to achieve other goals, such as good governance, migration control or economic liberalisation.

However, multilateralism is not a so-called panacea. Smith (2010) demonstrated how it can have atrocious effects: adherence to the ‘same rules for all’ within the UN Human Rights Council – with European support – led to the toleration of human rights abuses, to the discredit of both the UN and EU. There is empirical evidence to suggest that dictatorships that practice torture “are more likely to accede to the multilateral UN Convention against Torture than dictatorships that do not”\textsuperscript{13}. Thinking retrospectively, Kahler insisted that multilateralism can be a chimera: “the collective action problems posed by multilateral governance were addressed for much of the postwar era by minilateral great power collaboration disguised by multilateral institutions and by derogations from multilateral principles in the form of persistent bilateralism and regionalism”\textsuperscript{14}.

Naim’s more contemporary and positive view is that “minilateralism, which seeks to develop cooperation only between the States that really matter in an issue-area, is often more effective than inclusive multilateralism involving all or most States”\textsuperscript{15}. To give a concrete illustration of this token, if the goal is to promote development in Africa, the States vital to the task and their number might be different than those required to strike a multilateral agreement on nuclear proliferation.

As we have seen, numerous attempts have been made to define the essence of multilateralism while still allowing for its nuances and limitations. Meanwhile multilateralism has flourished in practice. In the roughly thirty years after 1970, the number of international treaties more than tripled, leading to a significant increase – by about two-thirds – in international institutions. Yet, there still exists no single, accepted definition of multilateralism, let alone a coherent, conceptually-driven research program to investigate it.

\textsuperscript{11} JAMES CAPORASO, “International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: the Search for Foundations”, International Organisation, 46, 3 (Summer 1992), 601
\textsuperscript{12} Ibidem, 602
\textsuperscript{13} J.R. VREELAND, “Political Institutions and Human rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the UN Convention Against Terror”, International Organisation, 62 (1), 73
\textsuperscript{14} MILES KAHLER, “Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers”, International Organisation, 46 (Summer 1992), 707
\textsuperscript{15} M. NAJM. “Minilateralism: The Magic Number to Get Real International Action”, Foreign Policy, 173, July/August 2009, 135
In fact, multilateralism may be most clearly understood when we consider what it is not: it is not unilateralism, bilateralism or inter-regionalism; it contrasts with imperialism or cooperation based on coercion, as in the case of the Warsaw Pact. Multilateral cooperation is voluntary. It is not entirely *ad hoc*: it is based on rules that are durable and that – at least potentially – affect the behavior of actors that agree to multilateral cooperation. Ultimately, all interpretations stress three main dimensions: the importance of rules, inclusiveness in terms of the parties involved or affected, and voluntary cooperation that is at least minimally institutionalised. As such, multilateralism in its modern, 21st century appearance may be defined as “three or more actors engaging in voluntary and institutionalised international cooperation governed by norms and principles, with rules that apply equally to all States”\(^{16}\) (Bouchard & Peterson, 2008).

Nowadays, multilateralism has been increasingly accepted as the *modus operandi* in world politics: over the last few decades, nations have come to understand that the challenges of security, peacekeeping, disease control, human rights violations and climate issues, among others, are too vast and complex for any nation or group of nations, no matter how powerful, to effectively manage on its own. “Multilateralism is no longer a choice. It is a matter of necessity and of fact”\(^{17}\).

Multilateralism offers short-term utilitarian value: it provides developing States with a greater voice in international matters; it enables developed States to synchronise implementation of new policies; it facilitates mutually-beneficial trade-offs between the developing and developed States. More noteworthy than these short-term benefits, however, is the promise of multilateralism to provide the most tempered, egalitarian and sustainable future to us all. As Forman states, “in this age of accelerated globalisation, multilateralism offers the most effective means to realise common goals and contain common threats”\(^{18}\).

This of course does not mean to suggest that it is a simple system for international cooperation. There is no easy system when so many actors are involved and the issues at stakes are so great. Among the many complex options, multilateralism is one of the most demanding, as “it requires States to resist the temptation of immediate national interest gratification”\(^{19}\). However, “the very features that make it strategically difficult to establish multilateral arrangements in the first place may enhance their durability and adaptability once in place. An arrangement based on generalised organizing principles should be more elastic than one based on particularistic interests and situational exigencies. It should, therefore, also exhibit greater continuity in the face of changing circumstances, including international power shifts”\(^{20}\).

\(^{16}\) BOUCHARD, CAROLINE & PETERSON, JOHN. “Conceptualising Multilateralism – Can we All Just Get Along?”, 2011, MERCURY, E-paper No. 1, 10.


\(^{18}\) *Ibidem*, 440

\(^{19}\) JAMES CAPORASO, “International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: the Search for Foundations”, International Organisation, 46, 3 (Summer 1992), 604

Web 2.0 as a Metaphor for a New Kind of Multilateralism

Nowadays, the ‘changing circumstances’ recalled by Ruggie truly reflect the actual transformation of international relations. As outlined by Langenhove (2011), two major developments are currently shaping the multilateral system. On the one hand, there is a trend towards multipolarity, as expressed by the rising number of States that act as key players. On the other hand, an increasing number of new types of actors – NGOs, international organisations and regional organisations – are changing the nature of the multilateral playing field. He notes that: “Together these two developments illustrate that multilateralism is no longer only a play between States”.\footnote{LUK Van LANGENHOVE, “Multilateralism 2.0: The Transformation of International Relations”, 2011}

Modern multilateralism differs from its earlier version: the same rules might apply to all States, but States are not the only actors that partake in multilateralism (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Non-state actors – multinational corporations, non-governmental and international organisations – may push States to make multilateral commitments or even agree to such commitments between themselves. One example is the agreement by airlines within their trade association, the Air Transport Association, to cut net emissions by 50% from 2005 levels.

Alternatively, non-state actors may act as roadblocks to new multilateral agreements, such as on climate change, or even seek to scupper existing cooperation as, for instance, on whaling. In the view of Higgot: “Major global public policy problems exist on all fronts: from nuclear proliferation (Gartzke and Kroenig, 2009) and ongoing terrorist challenges to the international system; through planetary deterioration occasioned by global warming and energy security (Youngs, 2009), crises in the global economy across the policy spectrum from instability and chaos in global financial markets to the growth of nationalist/protectionist sentiments in the global trade regime (Baldwin, 2009; AU REF 2009)”.\footnote{RICHARD HIGGOT, “Multipolarity and Transatlantic Relations: Normative Aspirations and Practical Limits of EU Foreign Policy”, GARNET Working Paper No. 76/10, April 2010} In any event, non-state actors have become progressively more assertive in demanding a voice at the top decision-making tables (Thakur, 2002).

A multiplicity of actors is already having a much greater say in how citizens live the world over. They range from established and emerging great and middle powers to coalitions of States, cities and regions, private actors, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as well as networks, particularly social networks. The international agenda is changing as new centers of global influence assert their demands and voice their specific concerns and aspirations. These demands will come not only from governments, but also from citizens, particularly from a newly-emerging global middle class, which has been empowered by education and the information society. This class is giving rise to new ways of making its voice heard and establishing various interconnections to create a new structure of influence.

As we have seen, 21st century multilateralism is not an exclusively intergovernmental phenomenon anymore, and these challenges constitute, collectively, a challenge to global governance. Thus, as the world is undergoing a deep transformation – shifting from an essentially Western-driven international system to a polycentric one – so must the concept of multilateral governance. This is the reason why it has been necessary to
develop a less anachronistic and more updated concept of multilateralism, in order to be in tune with today’s reality.

Therefore, the key trends described above represent the core of the birth of a new kind of multilateralism – the so-called multilateralism 2.0 – where States still hold the policy authority for tackling global issues, but the potential solutions to the challenges of globalisation are more and more often developed at a transnational, regional or institutional level (Thakur and Van Langenhove, 2006).

The metaphor used to describe this new kind of modus operandi refers to the ICT world. In the view of Van Langenhove “There is a long tradition within international relations of using metaphors such as ‘balance of power’ or ‘concert of nations’.” As stated by Fry and O’Hagan (2000: 10), “metaphors that are deployed to understand world politics should also be seen as contributing to the constitution of world politics”.

In the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor (CTM) (see Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; cf. Kovecses 2002, 2005, 2006), metaphor is defined as a systematic correspondence between two different domains of experience, one of which (the target domain) is partially understood in terms of the other (the source domain), so that the former can be said to be the latter. Metaphor is an important language tool that supports the creative nature of human thought and communication, enabling us to reason in novel, imaginative ways: they have power and structure and are ubiquitous.

Linguistically, the term Web 2.0 is, first of all, an example of a semi-phasem (Mel’cuk 1995: 182). That is, it is a phrase, or poly-morphemic word, whose overall meaning includes the literal meaning of one its constituents, whereas the other constituent denotes a concept which it does not denote in other environments. A good example of a semi-phasem is black coffee, whose meaning, “served without milk or cream” (American Heritage Dictionary), includes the meaning of the constituent coffee but not of black: the defining characteristic of black coffee is not black color but the absence of milk or cream. Of course, it is clear that the meaning “served without milk or cream” is metonymically related to the meaning “black”. Nevertheless, the former is a non-standard meaning of black, which can only be found in the collocation black coffee. Even in a very similar collocation – black tea – “black” does not refer to the absence of milk or cream, but to the full fermentation of tea leaves.

In a very similar way, the meaning of Web 2.0 can be said to include the meaning of the constituent Web but not of 2.0. Given the extant variety of definitions and having

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23 LUK Van LANGENHOVE, “The Transformation of Multilateralism Mode 1.0 to Mode 2.0”, 2010
24 LUK Van LANGENHOVE, “The Transformation of Multilateralism Mode 1.0 to Mode 2.0”, 2010
25 Web 2.0: Web 2.0 is a trend in the use of World Wide Web technology and web design that aims to facilitate creativity, information sharing, and, most notably, collaboration among users. These concepts have led to the development and evolution of web-based communities and hosted services, such as social-networking sites, wikis, blogs, and folksonomies (the practice of categorizing content through tags). Although the term suggests a new version of the World Wide Web, it does not refer to an update to any technical specifications, but to changes in the ways software developers and end-users use the internet. (http://www.stiltonstudios.net/glossary.htm#w)
Web 2.0: A term coined by O’Reilly Media in 2004 to describe a second generation of the web. This describes more user participation, social interaction and collaboration with the use of blogs, wikis, social networking and folksonomies. (http://www.webdesignseo.com/blogging-terms/web-20-terms.php)
synchronised these various strands of meanings it can be argued that the term Web 2.0 means “second generation of the Web or Web-based services”. That “second generation” cannot be the standard meaning of 2.0 since it has nothing to do with the fact that the numbers 2.0 cannot verbalise the concept “generation”. Therefore, the point here is that the constituent 2.0 implies that Web 2.0 is a new software version of the World Wide Web that was released in 2004. This impression arises because the practice of assigning new numbers to a new version of the same software is a hallmark of the process of software versioning. Accordingly, 2.0 in Web 2.0 suggests that in 2004 there took place a release of the new software version of the Internet that was downloaded and installed by all (or at least a very large number of) Internet users.

However, as can be inferred from the above definitions of Web 2.0, the term was coined as a catch-all term for changes in the use of the existing Internet technology, not in the technology itself: as explicitly stated in one of the definitions, “although the term suggests a new version of the World Wide Web”, it does not refer to an update to any technical specifications, but to changes in the ways software developers and end-users use the Internet”. Nonetheless, the linguistic focus of the term Web 2.0 is not on technology, but on new web-based services such as social networks, folksonomies and wikis. Web 2.0 technologies empower learners to create personalised and community-based collaborative environments. Social networking technology affords learners to weave their human networks through active connections to understand what we know and what we want to know. Participatory Web 2.0 technology accentuates the features of digital multi-modal representations and syndications, to empower the learner to manage their learning spaces.

The multilateralism 2.0 metaphor – a descriptive and, at the same time, normative and dynamic one – is therefore particularly appropriate when talking about the new hybrid and fluid world’s configuration. It tries to grasp how not only the structure, but also the uses, the ideals and practices] of multilateralism are currently undergoing a revolution similar to the Web’s one. In order to better capture the essence of the similarity and to stress how the playing field and the players are changing, it is useful to recall the shift from multilateralism mode 1.0 to mode 2.0 highlighting the main differences between the two types and focusing on what’s new in the more up-to-date version.

As already seen for the change the Web is undergoing, the essence of introducing the Web 2.0 metaphor in international relations lies both in stressing the emergence of network thinking and in the transformation of the playing field from a closed to an open system.

In multilateralism 1.0, the protagonists in the inter-state space of international relations are States, with national governments being “the ‘star players’; intergovernmental organisations are only dependent agents whose degrees of freedom only go as far as the

Web 2.0: A term that refers to a supposed second generation of Internet-based services. These usually include tools that let people collaborate and share information online, such as social networking sites, wikis, communication tools and folksonomies. (http://mytooltest.blogspot.com/)
States allow them: the primacy of sovereignty is the ultimate principle of international relations.\textsuperscript{26}

The shift to a new type of governance implies that the times of national or local government behaving as singular and unique actors are coming to an end. The new \textit{modus operandi} finds its grassroots in cooperation between governments at different levels and also between governments and other society actors. Indeed, in multilateralism 2.0, sovereign States are not the only actors that play a role in the world. On the contrary, the system becomes much more open, coming to include regions, regional organisations, sub-national regions, just as Web 2.0 becomes more and more participatory. Sometimes, these actors also end up challenging the notion of sovereignty. “What was once an exclusive playing ground for States has now become a space that States have to share with others.”\textsuperscript{27} As seen in the case of Web 2.0, this playing ground stays the same, but the actors need to use it in a different way.

Therefore it can be deduced that the main difference between the two modes of multilateralism is that, whereas mode 1.0 is a closed one, multilateralism mode 2.0 is so open to different types of actors that their number is constantly changing and their interactions are constantly overlapping.

The concept of the mixed actor only really gained currency during the late 1980s, although it was introduced much earlier by Oran Young in his seminal article ‘The Actors in World Politics’ (1972)\textsuperscript{28}. Identifying a movement away from Realism, Young proposed a conceptual framework challenging the single-actor model of the State-centric view of politics. According to Young (1972: 136), the basic notion of a system of mixed actors requires a step away from the assumption of homogeneity with respect to types of actor and, therefore, a retreat from the axiom of the State as the fundamental element in world politics. Instead, the mixed-actor world view pictures a situation in which different types of actors interact in the absence of any settled framework of dominance-submission or top-down hierarchical relations.

Young (1972: 136-137) also mentions the growing complexity and dynamism of the international system as important factors in contemporary macro-politics:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Given the diversity of the component units, the qualitatively different types of political relationships, and the prospects for extensive interpenetrations among actors in systems of mixed actors, it is to be expected that such systems will be highly dynamic ones...In this sense, also, the mixed-actor world view tends to involve greater complexity than the State-centric view.}
\end{quote}

Young's model, however, does not contemplate the decline of States. He argues that there is every reason to suppose that States will continue to occupy positions of importance in the world political system. According to him, the main question relates to the empirical conception that States are currently in the process of receding from their previous role as the dominant units in the system to a new role as important – but not dominant – actors in world politics (Young, 1972: 137). Through this proposition, Young directly challenges the State-related principles of actorness, i.e. sovereignty, legitimacy,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{26} LUK Van LANGENHOVE, “The Transformation of Multilateralism Mode 1.0 to Mode 2.0”, 2010
\item \textsuperscript{27} LUK Van LANGENHOVE, “The Transformation of Multilateralism Mode 1.0 to Mode 2.0”, 2010
\item \textsuperscript{28} It is worth mentioning that Keohane and Nye also start from a mixed-actor perspective in their work on Power and Interdependence (1977).
\end{itemize}
recognition, international representation and the control and use of force.

While Young’s mixed actor model advanced a very interesting point of departure for the development of a new paradigm – a model based on a variety of actors – he did not succeed in developing a true general theory of a mixed actor system. A most inspiring effort to present such a theory or re-conceptualisation of world politics has been undertaken by James Rosenau, who is one of the most influential spokesmen for change in the conventional models of the international system and for the breaking away from what he calls the ‘conceptual jails’ of the State-centric paradigm (Rosenau, 1990: 5-6). In his leading book, Turbulence in World Politics (1990), Rosenau takes Young’s ‘mixed actor model’, as well as earlier pluralist efforts, a step further. By bringing many of these earlier pluralist developments together, he presents an integrated paradigm for the analysis of an international system where non-State actors are direct participants.

Rosenau argues that the present time is characterised by some fundamental and profound changes in the functioning of world politics, fostered by the impact of modern technologies and the expansion of people's analytical skills. Since World War II, the world has gradually entered into a new period – the post-industrial era – which is characterised by high political turbulence and complexity and where simultaneous patterns of change and continuity are at work. As the traditional realist model can no longer effectively account for the changes in the international system, Rosenau (1990: 244) sets forth a basis for stepping outside the State-system axiom and framing an alternative one through which to assess the early indicators of a new form of world order, that we are now referring to as multilateralism 2.0.

On a theoretical level, Rosenau contends that the greater interdependence of the international system, and the increased interaction capacity that goes along with it, has led to the ramification of global politics into what the author calls 'the two worlds of world politics': an autonomous multi-centric world composed of sovereignty-free actors now coexists, competes and interacts with the old State-centric world characterised by States and their interactions (Rosenau, 1990: 247). This multi-centric world can be said to exist because the importance of actors is determined by their capability to initiate and sustain actions rather than by their legal status or sovereignty. Although they are located within the jurisdiction of states, the sovereignty-free actors of the multi-centric world are able to evade the constraints of States and pursue their own goals. Their adherence to State-centric rules is mostly formalistic (Rosenau, 1990, p. 249).

James Rosenau's two-world conception presents an international system in which State and non-State actors coexist. In this sense, his model offers an interesting attempt to formulate a general theory of international relations because it takes a first step in merging realist and pluralist elements into a single theoretical framework. A major weakness of his work is that he does not elaborate a clear typology of international actors. While acknowledging the growing diversity and importance of sovereignty-free actors in the multi-centric world, he does not clearly distinguish the different categories of non-state actors. This is in fact one of the major deficiencies of the pluralist paradigm in general. Few scholars agree on what units should be included under the rubric of non-State actors. However, a clear conception of non-State actors is needed more than ever, especially as this category of actors has become a prerequisite for enhancing the understanding of contemporary international relations and – as outlined by Van Langenhove (2010) – one of the four characteristics of multilateralism 2.0. Other
fundamental elements of mode 2.0 are the diversification of multilateral organisations, the growing interconnectivity between policy domains horizontally and the increasing involvement of citizens (Van Langenhove, 2010).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle Actors</th>
<th>Multilateralism 1.0</th>
<th>Multilateralism 2.0</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>States, national governments</td>
<td>States, regional organizations, sub- and supra-entities, NGOs, civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of openness of the system</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative principle</td>
<td>Subsidiarity</td>
<td>Mutuality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line of governance</td>
<td>Bottom-up, hierarchical</td>
<td>Vertical level of governance + horizontal interconnectivity between policy domains</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Fig. 1 - Differences between Multilateralism 1.0 and Multilateralism 2.0

After having defined the object of our study from different points of view and having highlighted its characteristics, the essay will proceed trying to find some evidence of the existence of multilateralism 2.0 in real politics.
Finding Some Evidence of Multilateralism 2.0

In order to find some evidence of the existence of multilateralism 2.0 in real politics, the present study has focused on three trends that are currently shaping international relations. The first one has been identified with the birth of new kinds of diplomacy, a fact supporting the existence of multilateralism 2.0 both for the actors involved and the principles regulating these new typologies; the second one concerns the evolution of sub- and supra-national entities. Finally, the third trend is the openness of international organisations to non-state actors, with a special focus on the observer status of the EU at the UN Security Council.

New Kinds of Diplomacy: Sharing Responsibilities

Multilateral diplomacy has undergone a substantial expansion in the past decades. As the global agenda has widened to include issues far beyond the traditional politico-security sphere, the borders between foreign and domestic policy have been challenged. At the same time, as seen before, new actors and networks have increased in influence—supported by the development of new technologies.

Indeed, in this new context, individuals are able to represent themselves and they are doing this more and more. With the aid of the Internet and the use of social media, individuals enter the blogosphere and are able to represent themselves to others—known and unknown—in other parts of the world. They physically go abroad more too, in their own capacities or as agents for others. International representation is becoming an equal opportunity activity along with the tension that exists between State and Self in the diplomatic world that has vastly expanded. As predicted by Eric Schmidt, executive chairman of Google, and Jared Cohen, a fellow of the Council of Foreign Relations, "soon everyone on earth will be connected". They argue that citizens, as individuals and presumably as a massed citizenry, will have more power than any other time in history.

Unlike formal diplomatic communication between State representatives, individual or mass self-communication that is entirely private mostly ignores 'international' lines—except when these may be emphasised by governments attempting to block communication by jamming radio broadcasts or cutting off Internet access. In contrast with the image of the giant Sovereign-figure on the cover of Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan—a “Commonwealth” whose form contains all of the State’s population—a social graph from Facebook, a network of individuals with their faces shown, indicates no political boundaries whatsoever. It could be worldwide in scope. On a social-networked globe, persons—'netizens'—communicate directly, and cluster independently, and in new and unpredictable patterns. Can there be, in a globalised world, “Diplomacy without Diplomats?” as the American diplomat George Kennan asked in a Foreign Affairs article.

Technological development has highlighted the importance of public diplomacy. The media influences both formal processes and opinions of citizens and pressure groups, and creates entirely new forums for the management of international relations. New
technology has changed the time perspective and reduced the importance of geographical distances. In the networked environment, the meaning of boundaries has been challenged – calling for a redefinition of State sovereignty. At the same time, this has created pressure to further ‘traditional’ inter-governmental agreements.

All these developments, together with the systemic change in the geopolitics of the international system, have had an important impact on the objectives, methods and practices of diplomacy. The changes in global governance and contemporary diplomacy have preoccupied practitioners and researchers, in particular, during the last two decades. Analysts agree that the international system as well as the ways to participate in its mechanisms – global governance – have become more complex, at least compared to the widely shared Cold War-era view of international relations. Most analysts also agree that ‘traditional diplomacy’ has lost importance, both as part of the global governance system (as a primary institution of international relations) and as a management tool (challenged by other means of action). Even traditionalists such as G.R. Berridge (2011), who emphasises the primacy of inter-State diplomacy, acknowledge the change, although claiming that the development still fits within the realm of ‘traditional diplomacy’. Anyway, it needs to be acknowledged that diplomatic practices have changed and are changing, regardless of whether one defines diplomacy narrowly as inter-State representation and negotiation carried out by professional diplomats (Berridge, 2010), more comprehensively as any peaceful interaction between (primarily) States represented by officials (Der Derian, 1987), or very broadly as any activity with the aim to influence global governance in the international system (Sharp, 2009; Pigman, 2010).

Already since the beginning of the 20th century, the most significant change recorded has been the birth of new kinds of diplomacy. We will use this change to find evidence of the existence of multilateralism 2.0. A clear sign of this change is the proliferation of the number of international organisations and multilateral agreements. At the same time, the call for more comprehensive global governance has become stronger. Not only governments, but also intergovernmental organisations and NGOs, often with the support of the media, can raise issues to the international agenda. In parallel with formal negotiations, informal processes can be run, sometimes with conflicting objectives. In other words, not only professional diplomats, but also activists, scientists, politicians, mayors, soldiers, secret police agents, journalists and business leaders can take part in diplomatic processes. The role of the diplomat as the official ‘gatekeeper’ evolves increasingly into the role of a ‘facilitator’ or ‘consultant’ who brings various parties together and monitors processes in networked complex systems (Hocking, 2006).

These new kinds of diplomacy were born mostly from the urgency of sharing responsibility. Since people are at the center of a global project for peaceful and regulated interdependence, State sovereignty may be limited and shared in the name of human well-being. Single nation-States face challenges that transcend their policy-making and executive capacities. Preserving the environment and the oceans, fighting against international terrorism, illegal arms and drug trafficking, dealing with refugee flows and mass migrations, overcoming the vicious cycle of poverty, and coping with humanitarian disasters – all these are problems that cannot be handled by single States. These entities no longer hold the monopoly over the creation of rules or the diffusion of values. Instead, they must struggle with and co-opt other non-governmental actors, both national and international, with a recognised ‘right’ to define the international agenda.
States can no longer appeal to a nebulous but unitary notion of ‘national interest’ to conquer legitimacy, because they are no longer seen as the sole protectors of this interest. There are many signs of new kinds of diplomacy in the international arena today.

An example could be found in the so-called ‘academic diplomacy’. The production and dissemination of new knowledge through research and innovation (“knowledge production”) is changing rapidly. This is in response to the new paradigm arising from a global revolution in the world of knowledge production. Universities and think-thanks, as well as scientific centers, are rethinking their place in the world as knowledge production has become more competitive, but also more collaborative. These actors are enhancing their strategic location in international networks, facilitating cross-fertilisation between their research and teaching within the growing diversity of key players in the global scene. The success of international collaboration lies partly in the ability of partners to nurture an original perspective and partly in the diversity of knowledge styles fostered within local and national communities. Moreover, nowadays academic diplomacy is viewed as more trustworthy and more neutral than government communication, as well as more capable of reaching and influencing broader audiences and guaranteeing long-term positive impacts.

A further example lies in ‘economic diplomacy’. Global trade flows are increasingly governed by rules that limit sovereignty and require a constant process of multilateral negotiation. The WTO was created and has become the frame of reference for global trade regulation. This organisation is driven forward by the need to negotiate complex global economic interdependence, thus fostering this new kind of ‘economic diplomacy’. The WTO regulates almost 90 per cent of world trade and has been notified of over 400 regional agreements. Understanding these agreements is no longer an option, but rather a necessity for effective competition in the global market.

By the same token, it can be stated that human rights are to the political realm what trade is to the economic realm. They have been the main generators of challenges to traditional conceptions of sovereignty, since they are revolutionizing the way in which we view representation, citizenship and the status of individuals in international society. Moreover, they establish a form of conditionality that is not, as yet, as stringent, but similar to that relating to trade relations. A nascent universal jurisdiction – and thus another new kind of diplomacy – can be observed in the fact that it is considered legitimate for the international community to intervene to establish peace in order to avoid human rights violations, or to seek justice. Evidence of this shift can be found in such organisations as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), the International Criminal Court, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and, more generally, the concept of humanitarian NGOs. These organisations link different levels of society, not in order to undermine the sanctity of sovereignty, but to make multilateralism a positive development for the international arena. Indeed, this new typology of ‘humanitarian diplomacy’ is persuading decision-makers and opinion-leaders to act, at all times, in the interests of vulnerable people, and with full respect for fundamental humanitarian principles. Effectively implemented, humanitarian diplomacy can persuade governments, organisations, business groups, community leadership and public to act differently and to change in some way their policy or approach to further issues.
A diplomacy concerning sustainable development has also arisen in the last decades: in line with the definition from Bruntland’s report “Our Common Future”, development is recognised as meeting “the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. For this reason, many stakeholders have begun addressing at an international level this kind of challenge. The involvement of NGOs in UN conferences provides evidence of the great public interest in and capacity for civil society to mobilise around such issues. Once again, this is indicative of the growing relevance and power of non-State actors in multilateral negotiations.

Another notable expression of the new power of these organisations is the birth of what we will call ‘corporations’ accountability diplomacy’. Until recently, multinational corporations had immense power but were subject to little or no public scrutiny. Transnational advocacy networks have changed that. NGOs, together with a mobilised public opinion, are now holding multinationals accountable for the labor and human rights of their employees in foreign territories, encouraging them to adopt codes of conduct and guidelines for investment, monitoring compliance with such rules and even helping employees to take violating companies to court. This kind of pressure has led many companies to adopt a code of conduct that re-defines the scope of corporate responsibility, extending it beyond the traditional duty. Moreover, it has prompted international multilateral institutions like the UN to take a stand.

The last example of the new kinds of diplomacy fostered by multilateralism 2.0 is the one involving business actors. Indeed, activist networks are not the only civil society actors willing to reshape multilateral rules and governance. The ever-increasing role that private business associations and groups are playing in international trade policy formulation provides an example of the growing power of private actors in multilateral negotiations. Moreover, the new emerging role being played by multinationals in protecting labor rights and taking a stand on national human rights issues exemplifies how business actors can make a major contribution to human well-being, above and beyond the trade and economic realms.

Taking the evidence together, it becomes clear that the presence of NGOs and other civil society actors in international relations and national political life can foster State accountability and democratise political relations. As individual citizens realise that their opinions matter and can change the behaviour of powerful institutions, their willingness to intervene and participate increases, raising the level of responsibility that ordinary citizens feel regarding international issues. This provides ample evidence of the existence of multilateralism 2.0, a situation where – as seen before – States are no longer the only actors and the normative principle regulating this networked form of multi-polarity is mutuality.

**Evolution of Sub- and Supra-national Representation**

States still own the policy authority for dealing with global issues, but the potential solutions to the challenges of globalisation are more and more often developed at a transnational, regional or institutional level. This trend, described in the first part of this paper, introduces us to the second sign of the shift to multilateralism 2.0: the evolution of sub- and supra-national representation. These institutional arrangements must be
appropriate to – and indeed should grow out of – the specific historical, social and cultural circumstances of the country or group of countries in question. They need to be seen as part of a complex system of multi-level governance. Moreover, sub- and supra-national representation shall arise when a system needs to have a level of problem-solving and stabilisation capacity which is adequate for dealing with the problems that are likely to be generated in pursuing agreed integration objectives of a certain level of ambition.

It is a trite observation that the most outstanding case of sub- and supra-national representation can be found in the European Union (EU). This can be derived from the fact that multilevel governance is a result of two sets of developments, European integration and regionalism. As far as sub-national representation is concerned, one of the most important consequences of European integration has been the multiplication of extra-national channels for sub-national political activity. Regional governments are no longer constrained to bilateral political relations with national State actors, but started to interact with a variety of actors in diverse arenas. There have been many signs of these in recent years. Local and regional governments from several member States have set up independent offices in Brussels. Another striking example is the Representation of the Flemish Government in the United Kingdom. Moreover, in Austria, Belgium and Germany, regional governments participate directly in their country’s representation on the Council of Ministers; and sub-national governments are represented in highly visible (though still highly symbolic) assemblies, most notably the Committee of the Regions established in the Maastricht Treaty.

Looking for some more evidence of non-national representation, we draw attention to EU representation. The EU is represented through 139 Delegations and Offices around the world. For over 50 years, these Delegations and Offices have acted as the eyes, ears and mouthpiece of the European Commission vis-à-vis the authorities and population in their host countries. These representations are essential to the promotion of EU interests and values around the world. They are in the front line in delivering EU external relations policy and action, from the common foreign and security policy through trade and development cooperation to scientific and technical relations.

Both formal and informal political channels for regional actors have multiplied beyond recognition. These channels now stretch far beyond the boundaries of their respective States, but there are wide differences in the territorial uniformity of this operation. At one extreme, regional governments are weak in Greece, Portugal, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries, and they are ‘virtually silent’ at the European level. At the other extreme, Belgian regions, Austrian Länder, Spanish comunidades autónomas and German Länder are well-funded, strongly institutionalised, entrenched within their respective States and active in the European arena. However, in general, the institutional changes outlined above have brought sub-national actors directly into the European arena. National States still provide important arenas for sub-national influence and the participation of regional governments at the European level reflects their institutional capacity within their respective political systems. National governments, however, no longer play the critical role of intermediary between sub-national government and international relations; sub-national governments are no longer nested exclusively within national States. Instead, sub-national governments have created dense networks of communication and influence with supra-national actors and with other sub-national actors in different States.
As far as supra-national representation is concerned, the example of the EU was made concrete by Robert Schuman when the French Government agreed to the principle of supra-national representation in the Schuman Declaration. The French Government at that stage accepted the Schuman Plan, as confined to specific sectors of vital interest of peace and war. Thus the European Community system commenced.

Three factors in the development of European supra-nationalism can be outlined. The first was the early consolidation of ‘hard cores’ around which the regional system could develop, exploring cooperation in new areas by softer means if necessary, adapting in the face of crises, but without undoing the longer-term commitment. These ‘cores’ were, first, the establishment of a customs union and, second, the consolidation of the Community legal system.

The second factor in the development of European supra-nationalism was the fact that Europe faced successive pressures. These prompted a series of historic package deals. These were based on fundamental political deals which seemed inevitable at the time (international competitiveness and national veto rights in the Single European Act; monetary union and German unification at Maastricht) These deals resulted in broad agreements including changes in substantive competences, decision-making procedures and diverse compensatory mechanisms.

The final factor was that the very logic of the system made the deepening of formal supra-nationalism in some dimensions seem inevitable. In particular, greater majority voting has strengthened the case for stronger involvement of the European Parliament. However, this self-perpetuating logic of the institutional system has not been matched by a corresponding internalisation on the part of the European public.

Considering a wider global aspect at the beginning of the 21st century, different regional attitudes to formal supranational institutions have important differences. Supra-nationalism as it has been experienced in the EU is generally not being adopted. In some cases, this is probably an appropriate choice, in view of the real level of regional commitments and the real needs of regional cooperation. In other cases however, adoption of an appropriate form and degree of supra-nationalism is probably required in order to make ambitious sub-regional schemes work. A certain number of ‘rationally-based’ factors can be identified to shed light on when supra-nationalism is likely to be adopted and is probably appropriate to the needs. These are: the numbers of actors involved; their relative sizes; the difference in their level of development; the type of impact; time perspectives; the degree of real interdependence; the political framework and; perceptions, values and norms. Moreover, perhaps the most important single factor in the adoption of supra-nationalism is the pursuit of credible commitments.

By contrast, the formal structure of the African Union (AU), which was created on the basis of the former Organisation of African Unity (OAU), is superficially modeled on the EU. Yet there is, appropriately, little supra-nationalism even formally built into the system. The powers of decision, monitoring and enforcement are attributed to the Assembly as the political summit meeting of the Union. However these powers can be delegated to other organs. In the case of the Parliament, there is no ambition to replicate the European Parliament, either in terms of its nature or its powers. Article 2 of the relevant Protocol states that: “the ultimate aim of the Pan-African Parliament shall be to evolve into an institution with full legislative powers, whose members are elected by
universal adult suffrage.” However, until such time as the Member States decide otherwise by an amendment to this Protocol, “the Pan-African Parliament shall have consultative and advisory powers only.” It remains to be seen what will occur with the proposed Court. What is perhaps most interesting about the pan-African case is the creation of innovative intergovernmental approaches. The African regional agenda seems primarily committed to the promotion of peace and good governance. Key goals – such as democracy, respect for human rights, rule of law, sustainable development and the separation of powers and effective – were laid down in 2001 through an African Peer review Mechanism in the context of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development; these objectives are also accompanied by indicative criteria, examples of indicators and standards.

Central America presents quite a different case. Having begun independent life as a Federation in the early 19th century, Central America has made several efforts to achieve unification of one sort or another. Indeed, in Guatemala and El Salvador – the most integrationist of the Central American republics – the constitutions of those states not only recall an historical unity, but also oblige the countries to pursue unification. However, the ambitions of local leaders, territorial conflicts, political differences and competing economic structures have resulted in factors militating against integration. The Central American Parliament – first created with European support in the 1980s – has often attracted attention and still has strong links to the European Parliament. However, this superficially supranational body lacks a real supranational legal or institutional system. It remains to be seen whether any new steps will be taken to introduce more supra-nationalism – in the sense of mechanisms to ensure compliance with common norms. If this were to be achieved, it would certainly increase the viability and credibility of the customs union and deeper integration.

As far as sub-national representation is concerned, Western Australia has by far the most offices overseas, standing in marked contrast to New South Wales, the most heavily populated of all Australian States, which has significantly curtailed its representation in the last twenty years. Much of the explanation can be provided by geographical location. Indeed, Western Australia is geographically distant from the Sydney-Melbourne corridor where most of Australia’s population resides. The Western Australia capital, Perth, is not significantly further from Singapore than from Sydney. Not surprisingly, the Western Australian government has been more active in establishing links with the Southeast Asian countries than have the other Australian States. Its interest in the Indian Ocean is quite obvious, as a significant exporter of minerals that has particular benefits in the major Asian markets such as Korea, as well as China and Japan. This is another example of a sub-national government entrenching foreign relations, thus creating a sort of ‘paradiplomacy’.

The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has always rejected supranationalism and the idea of strong regional institutions: this can be noted by the fact that the ASEAN Secretariat is below, rather than in any sense above, the national level. The ASEAN agreements provide for no pooling of sovereignty. In October 2003, the member

States agreed to create a set of three Communities by 2020: an ASEAN Security Community, an ASEAN Economic Community and an ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. Yet they explicitly reaffirmed ASEAN’s principles of non-interference, consensus-based decision-making, national and regional resilience, respect for national sovereignty, the renunciation of the threat or the use of force, and peaceful settlement of differences and disputes. The Economic Community remains a Free Trade Area, and is said to be based on a convergence of interests among ASEAN members. Concerning sub-national representation, ASEAN can proudly boast the existence of 40 representative Committees in third countries and international organisations all over the world. It has also just opened its doors to Europe through the ASEAN Welcome Office based at Crealys – the science park in the province of Namur, Belgium. This office aims to enable Asian companies wishing to test out the European market to benefit from equipped facilities that offer the opportunity for personal support in their native language.

In the context of globalisation, it is not only States and international organisations that have expanded to a sub-national level. Universities, as main actors of academic diplomacy, as outlined above, have created a range of representation offices. For instance, the University of Warwick is supported in increasingly varied ways by offices in Hong Kong, Pakistan, New Delhi and Saint Petersburg. These representatives help students with their preparation and provide valuable support for the work of the academic departments as they develop their activities. NGOs driven by the fact that, in order to reach their goals they need to 'get their foot in the door' have extensively expanded their offices throughout the world. The IFRC has offices in 189 countries, Oxfam works with local partners in 94 countries and Greenpeace is also represented through offices all over the world.

In conclusion, have States now realised that the challenges posed by globalisation are too vast and complex for any State – no matter how powerful – to effectively manage on its own? On the evidence presented, it really does seem that the evolution of sub- and supra-national representation is, at the very least, pushing States in this direction, leading to multilateralism 2.0.

The Openness of Inter-Governmental Organisations to Non-State Actors

In the last decades, we have witnessed an expansion of globalised political rule-making. In the emergence and expansion of global governance, inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) have played an important role. They were amongst the first institutionalised arrangements between States to deal with complex political issues. Further after their creation, they have become important actors of global governance themselves (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Hawkins et al., 2006; Hurd, 2011; Martin and Simmons, 1998; Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992).

While IGOs produce a growing output of formal and informal regulation for a variety of actors, one can also witness changes in their internal processes of policy-making. First, in the 1970s, but especially since the 1990s, IGOs are no longer exclusive places of State diplomacy (Charnovitz, 1997; Willetts, 2011). Instead, non-state actors like NGOs, scientists and lobbyists are taking part in formal and informal IGO meetings (Steffek, 2012; Tallberg et al., 2013). Second, even when IGOs do not interact with non-State
actors directly, there is a trend towards more IGO transparency (Grigorescu, 2003). These developments towards more non-State participation and transparency in IGO governance are welcomed by some as evidence for increased momentum of emerging global democracy. Others are more skeptical, criticizing the growth of opaque and unaccountable governance arrangements.

These empirical findings, however, demand explanations. Why do State representatives and IGO administrations, the main gatekeepers of change in IGOs, want increased access to the organisations? This question has been partially answered by previous research. For example, Kal Raustiala (1997) shows how States can benefit from non-State participation because they provide valuable resources during important phases of IGO policy making. By opening themselves up, States gain political resources and become more active global regulators. However, in a recent study, Tobias Böhmelt (2013) argues that a need for non-State expertise alone cannot explain the high participation in the case of environmental governance. From a more structural perspective, Kim Reimann (2006) sees larger structural and normative changes in the global governance system that explain rising non-State participation. On the one hand, it is growing opportunities for funding and special programs that have created incentives for the creation and participation of non-State actors. On the other hand, she describes the emergence of a new norm prescribing non-State actor participation. This norm describes non-State actors as crucial partners in the field and as enforcers of good, democratic governance. In a rich way, the edited volume by Jönsson and Tallberg (2010) presents a selection of empirical analysis on how NGOs and other actors participate in different IGOs. Also, the book by Tallberg et al. (2013) presents a very detailed large-scale study of the opening of a number of IGOs. Finally, concerning transparency, Alex Grigorescu (2007) shows how States, IGO administrations and NGOs influence IGOs to commit to more transparent processes. He also suggests that there appears to be a causal link between shared democratic norms of IGO member States and the likelihood that the IGO will adopt more transparent processes.

In the extreme, the openness of inter-governmental organisations to non-State actors has taken to the process of evening out the rights of a State to those of a regional organisation. Indeed, this happened in the framework of the EU’s acknowledgement as observer member with speaking rights at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). This status include the right to speak in debates among representatives of major groups, before individual States, to submit proposals and amendments, the right of reply, to raise points of order and to circulate documents.

Following the vote, representatives of Bahamas (representing CARICOM), Nigeria (representing the AU) and Sudan (representing the Arab League) stated that the Resolution set a precedent to allow other regional organisations to upgrade their role at the UNGA. Future requests for greater participation by regional bodies must still be voted upon by the UNGA on a case-by-case basis. Where international organisations have created an exception to this rule, they normally only allow membership for regional organisations with a relatively high degree of integration and decision-making power, such as the EU.

As we have demonstrated, there are an increasing number of new types of actors, such as Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and regional organisations. These are changing the nature of the multilateral field, in particular the fact that some of them, like the EU, can obtain the same rights as a State. This has once again found evidence of the
changing circumstances posed by multilateralism 2.0, where States are no longer the only key drivers of decision-making.

**Conclusions**

As we have seen, multilateralism has been defined and understood in different ways. We concur with Ruggie (1994: 556) that ‘there is unavoidable ambiguity in defining this term’. Scholarship on multilateralism still suffers from a lack of an agreed conceptual framework, a common language and a set of references with which to examine its development.

However, one of the main findings of this study, derived from our path through the existing literature on the term, has been understanding multilateralism as a collective, cooperative action by actors of the international arena. Such action is taken to deal with common challenges and problems when these are best managed collectively at the international level. International peace and security, economic development and international trade, human rights, functional and technical cooperation, and the protection of the environment, among others, require joint action to reduce costs and to bring order to international relations. Such common problems cannot be addressed unilaterally with optimum effectiveness: this *rationale* persists because all States face mutual vulnerabilities and share interdependence. They will all benefit from, and thus are required to support, public goods. Even the most powerful States cannot achieve security, environmental safety and economic prosperity as effectively in isolation or unilaterally. Therefore, the international system lies upon a network of regimes, treaties, international organisations and shared practices that embody common expectations, reciprocity and equivalence of benefits. In an interdependent, globalizing world, multilateralism will continue to be a key aspect of international relations.

Starting from this acknowledgement, the paper has made an attempt to better define the object of the study and to highlight its characteristics through a metaphor derived from the ICT world. Indeed, it was found that the multilateralism 2.0 metaphor grasps the main developments that are currently shaping the multilateral system. Nowadays, the principal actors in the international arena are States, regional organisations, sub- and supra-national entities, NGOs as well as civil society. This fact demonstrates the increasing degree of openness of the system, regulated by the normative principle of mutuality, where policy domains are both vertically and horizontally interconnected. Recalling the shift from multilateralism mode 1.0 to mode 2.0 has proved to be particularly useful to better capture the essence of the similarity and to stress how the playing field and the players are changing.

The core section of the paper proposed a set of useful criteria to find some evidence of multilateralism 2.0 in real politics, focusing on the trends that are currently shaping international relations. The first criterion – the birth of new kinds of diplomacy, mostly arisen from the urgency of sharing responsibility – has proved evidence of the existence of multilateralism 2.0, since States are no longer the only actors of the international arena, but they are ceaselessly challenged by individuals, intergovernmental organisations, NGOs, business actors, activists, scientists and academic actors. A further proof of the shift to mode 2.0 has been offered by the observation that all these actors – creating a networked form of multi-polarity – are regulated by the normative principle of mutuality. The second criterion – the evolution of sub- and supra-national representation
– has come into being as a tangible outcome of the existence of multilateralism 2.0: the need to face globalisation’s challenges has been put into effect through the creation of an extra level of problem-solving and stabilisation capacity. Finally, the third criterion – openness of intergovernmental organisations to non-state actors – has found evidence for the existence of multilateralism 2.0 by focusing on the fact that States are no longer the only key drivers of decision-making. This is to such an extent that some regional organisations can obtain almost the same rights a State has in intergovernmental organisations.

Taking the evidence together, we can state that those criteria analyzed are clear signs of the existence of multilateralism 2.0 in real politics. Moreover, this metaphor has proved to be particularly appropriate when talking about the new hybrid and ever-changing nature of the world’s political configuration.

The main challenge created by multilateralism 2.0 is that scholars and policy makers need to be aware that the multilateral system has undergone radical changes that affect global policy-making. These changes, however, bring with them new potential for an increased efficiency and legitimacy of multilateralism. Moreover, the heterogeneous actors participating in varying depths in the international arena – multilateral organisations, regional organisations, States, NGOs and so on – will have to adapt to this new reality and join their forces to further shape to the mode 2.0 of multilateralism.

The ability to answer effectively the research question about the existence of multilateralism 2.0 in real politics could have been undermined by the fact of building a limited set of criteria. It should be acknowledged that such limitation should not be viewed as a weakness, but rather as a choice related to qualitative research design. Indeed, in qualitative research design, a non-probability sampling technique is typically selected over a probability one. Looking forward, this limitation could be overcome through future research, as suggested in the next, final section.

In continuing the aim of this research project, further areas of study could focus on building other criteria aimed at finding more evidence of the existence of multilateralism 2.0. A first, potential path to do so could be identified in looking at the birth of new sub-disciplines – such as European Studies – as a proof of the fact that new actors have gained almost the same importance of States in the international arena. Another way to foster the research could be a more historical one, studying the evolution of sub- and supra-national representation in time in order to determine a more precise date of the birth of multilateralism 2.0. Finally, exploring whether a quantitative approach – concerned with the collection and analysis of data in numeric forms – is feasible and relevant to the study could definitively keep the research open.
References


