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Changing Multilateralism: the EU as a Global-regional Actor in Security and Peace, or EU-GRASP in short, is an EU funded FP7 Programme. EU-GRASP aims to contribute to the analysis and articulation of the current and future role of the EU as a global actor in multilateral security governance, in a context of challenged multilateralism, where the EU aims at "effective multilateralism". This project therefore examines the notion and practice of multilateralism in order to provide the required theoretical background for assessing the linkages between the EU's current security activities with multi-polarism, international law, regional integration processes and the United Nations system.

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Introduction

With the publication of the European Security Strategy in 2003 the EU clearly stated that in order for Europe to be "more secure in a better world" it needed to make more use of effective multilateralism (European Council 2003). This was in fact not the first time that the EU expressed its willingness to engage in multilateral cooperation. In 2001 the Commission had already published a document stating its eagerness to work in the field of development and humanitarian affairs with the UN as an embodiment of multilateralism. Similarly the Council, via its Joint Declaration on EU-UN cooperation in Crisis Management, expressed its attachment to multilateralism and its readiness to work with the global organisation.

This report takes stock of the previous report on the EU and global cooperation and integrates to it some of the findings of the case studies as highlighted in the Horizontal reports drafted for each of the security issues (as presented in Gothenburg February 2011). In doing so this reports focuses on the 5 points agreed during the workshop in Gothenburg. Namely, it focuses on (1) the EU's discourse, including the framing and development of the issue; (2) the security governance established by the EU and in particular, the means being used to deal with the issue, the actors involved, the differences that may exist between Brussels and the field or with the member states, the relations with other international organisations and the EU's actorness; (3) the relations between the EU's discourse and its security governance, (4) the impact of the EU's engagement and (5) the future after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the lesson learned in the process.

Regional conflicts and Global Cooperation

In the case of the security of regional conflicts, the case studies have demonstrated the need to differentiate between the EU's framing and managing of conflicts occurring on the African continent and its approach of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (IPC). It is interesting to note in this regard that the EU's discourse on the African conflict is much more influenced by its participation in global cooperation than what is the case for the IPC. The EU's frames conflicts in Africa mainly through a discourse that relies heavily on the concepts of Human Security, State fragility and the belief in the existence of a development-security nexus all of which have been heavily influenced by the work undertaken by the UN in the field of peace and security. More specifically, when looking at more particular cases such as the conflict in the Great Lakes region or the Sudan-Chad-CAR triangle, it also becomes apparent that the EU's discourse is very similar and somewhat follows the one from the UN. For example, both the UN and the EU refused to label the situation in Darfur an ongoing genocide. On the other hand, in the case of the IPC, the EU's framing of the conflict has somewhat differed and been more independent from the EU's participation in cooperation at the global level, partly because the IPC is seen as a main security priority for the EU.

The EU has developed a series of instruments to deal with the different regional conflicts in which it has been involved. And in this regard its engagement with the UN features prominently especially in the cases of African regional conflicts. For example, both in the case of the conflict in the Great Lakes region and in Sudan-Chad-CAR, the EU decided to deploy a Special Representative that was tasked, among other things, to liaise with the UN's effort at resolving the conflict and also took part in the mediation attempts. Moreover, in these same two cases the EU also deployed ESDP missions (both civilian ones and military ones) in support to the work undertaken by the UN. In the case of the IPC the EU also cooperated heavily with the UN through their respective participation in the Quartet. It is also interesting to note that several of the European institutions became involved in the case of regional conflicts. The Council through its High Representative and its envoys, the Commission through DG Relex and even more DG Development, and even the Parliament (by sending fact finding missions for example) took part in one way or the other in cooperation frameworks with the UN. The member states themselves also played an important role such as France's involvement in New York to get the UN's approval for deploying a peacekeeping mission in Eastern Chad and in CAR. Nevertheless, if the EU's engagement with the UN was promoted heavily at the Brussels level and contacts took place at the highest level, in practice, at the field level, the EU encountered much more difficulties in cooperating with UN institutions. This was also notable in

the EU's attempts at providing support to missions of the UN already deployed in the regions (such as MONUC, MINURCAT, UNAMID).

In what concerns the management of Regional conflicts, and especially in the case of conflicts in Africa, it seems to be the case that the EU‟s discourse is very much linked to the security governance it has established to deal with this issue. This is also reflected when one looks at the global level of cooperation. The EU frames its discourse on Regional conflicts by also stressing the threat that these conflicts pose to international stability and also how they affect Human security, and in doing so it also underlines the need to engage with a variety of actors acting at the global level, and most importantly the UN. This central role given to the UN in handling the conflicts such as the Great Lakes region, in Sudan-Chad-CAR or in the Horn of Africa is clearly visible in the EU‟s attempts at upholding some of the UN resolutions and deploying troops at the request of the global institution (EUFOR Chad/CAR, Operation Atalanta, etc.). The fact that the EU shares the UN approaches on Human security, the linkages between security and development and the fear of state failure, partly explains why the two institutions have been able to cooperate (although shakily)to resolve these regional conflicts. It should also be noted that, whereas in the case of the African conflicts the case studies have demonstrated that there was somewhat of a consensus at the European level which was also shared by the UN, in the case of the IPC, the member states themselves have not always had a consistent view regarding the conflict itself and its causes.

Focusing on the impact of EU's security governance in the three African cases, it has to be concluded that in general, the Union‟s security governance strategies have a rather marginal impact and its engagement at a global level of cooperation through the UN has not resulted in substantial changes of the situation on the ground. It should be noted that even when the EU deployed ESDP missions in support to existing UN missions and in accordance with demands expressed by the UN through Security Council‟s resolutions, the EU has not managed to have any crucial impact on the long term trend of the conflicts. Both the EUFOR Chad/CAR mission and Artemis in the DRC had very limited mandates focusing mainly on the stabilisation of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in a geographically confined area within a short-time period. However, those missions (which both were in support to existing UN operation) with a rather long-term perspective and broader mandate are considered to be less efficient and successful. The impact of EU‟s security governance in the IPC manifests itself in the way the EU is understood by the core parties of the conflict. Thus, the Israelis believe that the EU is supporting the Palestinian Authority while the Palestinian Authority in turn believes that the EU supports Israel. The EU‟s involvement

in the Quartet along the US, Russia and the UN has not had any major impact either and has not changed the Israeli or Palestinian perception of the EU either.

WMDs and Global Cooperation

Although the issue of WMDs is one of great importance for the entire world, it appears that cooperation at the global level is somewhat absent of the EU‟s framing of the issue. In fact it seems to be the case that the EU has developed specific discourse where it securitizes the issue of WMDs in regard to some specific countries while at the same time not having a generic or global approach on the issue of WMDs. This somewhat contradicts the EU‟s own Council‟s document "Basic principles for an EU strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction" (2003), which effectively guides the action of the EU on non-proliferation of WMDs, and clearly states with regard to the international and multilateral frameworks that they represent the first line of defense in controlling the spread of WMDs.

In reality, the EU develops its discourse more according to the states that are in possession or plan to acquire WMDs than by having a common understanding on WMDs. For example, the case study on Iran highlighted that much of the debate has been framed more about political assessments over the ultimate goals Iranian nuclear weapons might have, rather than nuclear weapons per se. In reality, there is a process whereby EU statements construct linked and differentiated signs that enable the Other to be marked clearly as problematic because it exhibits traits opposite to Europe‟s own, and thereby the Self is demarcated, justified and legitimated. As a result, the EU‟s framing of the issue is much more linked to its own perception than to a global one shared by the entire, or the majority, of the international community.

The EU has in fact provided direct support for the effective implementation of existing agreements and for the activities of various international agencies. This commitment to multilateralism is important because it sees the international non-proliferation regime as having a value in itself. Simply put, the non-proliferation regime is not merely a means to achieve international security; instead the objective of achieving of non-proliferation is subsumed to a broader objective of establishing an effective multilateral system.

In the field of WMDs, the EU institutions that have been mostly involved are the Council and the High Representative. Both of whom have addressed the issue of WMDs with a view on the global

level of cooperation. For example, the Council underlined the need for implementation and universalisation of the existing disarmament and non-proliferation norms that have been agreed at a global level. Meanwhile, the High Representative has participated in several global efforts to deal with WMDs as was for example the case for the talks on Iran.

Apart from the above mentioned EU institutions, one needs to also take into account the role played by the Member states themselves in cooperating at a global level to address a WMD crisis. This was particularly the case in regard to the question of Iran where the "big three", namely, UK, France and Germany, took the lead in participating in negotiations with Teheran on the question of the Iranian nuclear programme. It is the case that with WMD policy, Europe struggles to find ways of speaking with one voice. President Chirac argued in favour of Europeanising nuclear weapons policy; and sparked a major backlash from Germany and Scandinavian countries, who did not wish to be so involved.

The EU has also at times encountered internal problems when trying to deal with WMDs issue at a global level. For example, in the case of Iran, the EU 25 format was deemed unfit and in contrast, the idea of establishing a Directoire, while not new to the EU was particularly striking at a time when the catchword for the Union‟s external actions was multilateralism. In terms of European security governance this self-proclaimed contact group, the E3, had only a partial legitimacy within the EU, since it was considered as not representing smaller parties. The E3 collaboration with other international actors including the US, Russia and China similarly failed to find a truly multilateral agreement and actually ended up in the EU aligning itself with the US vis-à-vis a softer Russian-Chinese approach.

There is a clear discrepancy between the EU‟s governance in practice and its discourse on the WMDs and on the best way to handle this security issue. Whereas, in its discourse the EU regularly stresses the need for an international and multilateral approach that would be in line with a multipolar view of the world, in practice it has not been so much the case. The practice in which the EU has been engaged to deal with the issue of WMDs actually leaves little room for global institutions to participate and help in abating the crisis. Rather, the EU has often sided with the US and favoured a more bipolar approach in its handling of the different cases.

Moreover, different attitudes on WMD – and on Iraq, in particular – meant that the EU has struggled with ways of developing its „coordinative discourse‟ – its ways of speaking with one voice. This has also hampered its ability to cooperate on this issue at a global level since the member states have

their own policy regarding WMDs which are sometimes opposing one another. And even in cases where there might exist a European consensus about a country‟s possession of nuclear weapon, the difficulty remains that this view will not be shared by the rest of the international community. Even more so if we take into account the fact that the EU‟s construction of the "security problem" is as much about the EU‟s own perception of Self and the identity it ascribes to the Other.

Terrorism and Global Cooperation

Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the EU has adopted has securitised the issue of terrorism at its highest level considering that it represented an existential threat to the EU. Moreover, the EU has sidelined with the US in its severe condemnation of 'international terrorism' and expressed its willingness to take part in the 'global war on terror'. It could therefore be expected that in regard to terrorism, the EU's framing of the issue as primordial security question would involve some aspect of cooperation at the global level. However, such has not really been the case since the EU's definition of terrorism is very much informed by the US and its own experience of recent terrorist attacks and its reading of what caused these attacks. As a result, the terrorist attacks are believed to target as much physical damage as affecting the core values of Europe and the US.

In the European discourse on terrorism it becomes visible that the EU's actually differentiate itself from Others that would not share its same values. This "Western/solidarity/singularity‟ discourse relies on "values‟ as border demarcations, rather than geography, which obfuscated the EU and US as separate characters in the EU‟s narrative. The borders of Europe and the US conflated into a single unit and with a single common "Western" identity. Of course this poses some question regarding the possibility for the EU's view to be applicable at the global level and whether the 'global war on terror' is effectively global. It is also interesting to note that the EU and its member states do not for example ascribe to the narrative of terrorism that other states have tried to push forward at the global level. The fact that there is still no international convention on terrorism reflects the existence of these different readings of what terrorism is and what it actually threatens. A particular point of disagreement at the global level concerns the recognition (or not) of state sponsored terrorism, a view to which the EU doesn't ascribe for example.

In 2004, two documents: the 'Declaration on Combating Terrorism' adopted by the European Council in March 2004 and 'Integrating the fight against terrorism into EU external relations policy' adopted by the Council, marked the EU's external strategy focus on "deepen[ing] the international consensus and enhanc[ing] international efforts to combat terrorism‟ and "target[ing] actions

under EU external relations towards priority Third Countries where counter-terrorist capacity or commitment to combating terrorism needs to be enhanced". In order to do so and in regard to its cooperation at the global level, the EU has used a variety of its instruments to push other states to actively participate in the fight against terrorism through the sharing of information and the imposition of some restrictive measures to limit the possibilities of financing international terrorism.

The EU also appointed an EU counter-terrorism coordinator that was specifically tasked with dealing with the issue of terrorism and facilitate the coordination of the EU's response in this regard including at the global level.

The discourse used by the EU on terrorism that emphasises the sense of a community of shared values with the US while excluding in the process the Other with different values has clearly geared the EU towards a more bipolar view. The excluding terms being used in the European discourse, moreover, makes it difficult to accommodate a truly multipolar approach of the issue of terrorism.

The EU's perception of terrorism has also affected its capacity to cooperate at the global level also because of its selective identification of which groups qualify as terrorists and which ones do not. In the case of Palestine for example, the EU's decision to consider Hamas as a terrorist group that was a peace spoiler prevented Hamas from taking part in some global efforts at finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. The EU's upholding of the Oslo Process put it very much in favour of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority while at the same time sidelining Hamas and refusing to consider it as a major political player in the area. The security governance that the EU puts in place to deal with terrorism is also influenced by the EU's identification of this security issue as a threat to its own values. It therefore differentiates between 'international terrorism' that warrant a global securitised response and acts of terrorism at the national level (outside of Europe's border) that need to be solved through political engagement rather than a securitised counterterrrorism, This becomes particularly visible in the cases such as the PKK in Turkey and Chechen terrorists in Russia where the EU's views are that both Turkey and Russia need to resolve the Kurdish and Chechen problems through an inclusive political process whereas these two states see these terrorist groups as challenging their very existence as states.

In addition, the emphasis that the EU has put in combating terrorism at a global level has also led the EU to engage in collaborative frameworks with various third states which have used counter-terrorism to suppress dissent within their own borders. For example former President Mubarak in

Egypt, legitimised cooperation with its European counterparts on the back of domestic challenges they face with Islamic opposition groups (the Muslim Brotherhood being the case in point in Egypt). Thus, the EU"s securitisation of terrorism acts opened a window of opportunity for Arab leaders to join the global fight against terrorism and thus legitimise internal domestic challenges with their political opponents, often of Islamic faction.

The fact that the EU has become so attached to the securitised understanding of terrorism while at the same time underlying the community of values it constituted with the US, has also meant that the EU has somewhat become dependent on the US' approach and is unable to desecuritise its discourse and its governance. What this adds up to is a political reality with regards to terrorism of a Europe that is marginalised and sidelined; whether that be in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict; or in relation to policy in Afghanistan, where the EU has little role, and representations/ tropes of Taliban led futures.

The fact that the EU has fully securitised terrorism in both its discourse and in the governance it has set in place to address this threat has also had some impacts on other issues that are important in regard to the global level of cooperation. For example, out of concerns in the possibilities for terrorists to enter the EU space a more restrictive approach of migration has been adopted at the European level which has in turn affected the global cooperation frameworks dealing with migration. The EU's counter-terrorism strategy has also opened up the space for more not less violations of human rights and other international obligations by the Mubarak regime in Egypt and elsewhere across the Middle East and North Africa region as well as in the Gulf states. The approach developed since 9/11 has, after a decade, a track record of failure in a large number of areas but this is perhaps most apparent in the contemporary explosion of revolutionary demands for greater democracy and freedom throughout the Middle East and North Africa. While the EU was so keen in engaging with states that seemed to ascribe to its discourse on the threat of international terrorism, the result of its engagement while turning a blind eye to various other issues, may have backfired and resulted in instability in large part of the worlds which may in turn create new threats for the EU.

Human Rights and Global Cooperation

Through its history the role that the EU has ascribed to Human rights has been consistently growing up to the point that it is now considered to be one of its founding principles. Moreover, the

EU is concerned about the issue of Human rights internally but also in the rest of the world and it has now become one of the cornerstones of the EU‟s foreign policy. It is interesting to note that the founding principles for the EU‟s international action derive from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ratified by the United Nations in 1948 and its following Covenants of 1966, which established that the rights of individuals can be above those set by their national authorities. While human rights have long been defended and promoted as a value in their own right, the evolution of global politics has increasingly shown that human rights abuses can also become „international security‟ issues and threaten the stability of the international system. The link with the global level of cooperation is therefore easily made and has been even more so important following the securitisation of Human rights. The discourse used by the EU in its securitisation of Human rights is in fact very much influenced by the global discourse on Human security and humanitarian crisis.

In all four crises, the EU adopts the language of human security, although at varying degrees. In Darfur and Zimbabwe, the reference to dimensions and components of human security is strong. On the contrary, it appears that in the case of Gaza and Lebanon, the human security focus – although present – was much less developed and structured than in the other two instances. In Sudan and Zimbabwe, the attribution of responsibility for violence is rather straightforward in the EU discourse. The al-Bashir and Mugabe governments are directly identified as the driving forces behind the human rights violations and the ensuing humanitarian crises. By contrast, in the case of Lebanon and Gaza, the EU rhetoric is much less assertive with respect to the causation of human rights abuses, thus limiting itself to a mere recognition of the humanitarian situations. Official declarations are rather generic, calling for bilateral ceasefires and failing to identify clear responsibilities for human suffering. By espousing a solely humanitarian framework, the (perhaps unintended) effect is to de-politicise human rights in general as well as the unequal distribution of forces and the underlying condition of power driving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The analysis of the European discourse on the four cases studied also reveals that whereas the EU shares the general view of the UN on the issue of Human rights, the discourse of the two institutions can actually vary according to the cases. It therefore appears that in regard to the situation in Darfur and Zimbabwe, the two discourse were similar and both highlighted the security threat posed by human rights violations being committed by clearly identified perpetrators. On the other hand, when dealing with Lebanon or the situation in Gaza, the EU‟s position is less forceful than the UN one.

In order to deal with cases of Human rights violations and on concerns about threats to human security, the EU has deployed a variety of its instruments that form part of its security governance. One of the most important features in this regard has been the delivery of humanitarian aid to the crisis area mainly through the humanitarian branch of the Commission. In addition, in some cases the EU also deployed ESDP missions (both civilian and military) that were tasked with the protection of human rights and the safeguarding of human security. In some specific instances, the EU has also had to develop new instruments as part of its security governance approach of human rights. This was also done in agreement with the EU‟s engagement and cooperation at the global level. For example, in dealing with the situation in Gaza, in June 2006 the EU put in place the Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) at the request of the Quartet. The TIM was aimed at channelling funds to the Palestinian Authority, thereby circumventing Hamas.

At a multilateral level, individual European countries and representatives of the EU Commission contributed to the elaboration of common policies vis-à-vis the conflict during various international meetings, most notably the G8 summit held in Saint Petersburg on 15-17 July 2006, the International Conference on Lebanon held in Rome on 26 July 2006, and the Stockholm Conference on Lebanon‟s Early Recovery on 31 August 2006. During the crisis, five EU Member States were also members of the UN Security Council (France, United Kingdom, Denmark, Greece and Slovakia) and as such played a central role in the negotiations that led to UNSCR 1701. It is also this same UN Resolution that allowed the deployment of the UNIFIL II mission in which several European countries took an active role and contributed a number of troops. Similarly, in the case of the situation in Darfur, the EU participated in several of the mediation efforts involving the UN and a variety of other international actors while some of its member states lobbied at the Security Council for the adoption of UN Resolution calling for the deployment of a forceful mission in Darfur. Eventually, they only succeeded in getting a resolution calling for a deployment of a peacekeeping force in Chad and in Central-African Republic which was itself almost entirely managed by the EU. It is also interesting to note that this ESDP mission was also tasked to collaborate with the existing UN operations in the region and had as its mandate the protection of UN personnel and equipment.

In addition to the role played by the UN, in the field of Human rights, and in particular in the case of the situation in Darfur, the EU has also upheld the role of another global institution, namely the ICC. The EU has been a long time supporter of the ICC and actively backed the work of the Court in investigating the situation in Darfur and the ensuing decision to indict members of the Sudanese government including President al-Bashir. As a result, this move by the EU was heavily criticised by

some members of the international community, and in particular the AU and its member states, which considered that this decision was detrimental to the finding of a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Darfur. This lack of consensus between the EU and other potential partners has in some cases prevented the actual setting up of a governance that included the global level. This was for example the case in regard to the situation in the Gaza strip and the human rights violations in Zimbabwe.

In the case of Human rights, the European discourse seems to very heavily weigh in favour of a multipolar approach. In each of the case reviewed, the EU has stressed the international dimension that the human rights violations entailed and the need for the international community as a whole to engage with the issue. The EU also made repetitive calls to various international actors to cooperate in order to find a solution to the crisis. Such was for example the case in regard to Zimbabwe, were the EU called for the UN, the AU and SADC to play a more active role. However, the EU has not always been very successful in getting these calls being answered positively. In different cases, the lack of agreement between the EU and other about what would be the preferred course of action has prevented the actual implementation of a truly global answer to the problem.

From looking at the EU‟s securitisation of the issue of human rights and its engagement with different actors at a global level of cooperation, it appears that the EU has in some cases been able to translate its words in actions. The EU‟s readiness to deploy its own civilian and military operations in Chad-CAR, in Gaza and its contribution and support to the UN‟s own peacekeeping operations (UNIFIL II, UNAMID, MINURCAT) shows how it has cooperated at the global level to respond to cases of human rights violations. The EU‟s focus on the importance of generating consensus on UN Security Council resolutions and its readiness to take the lead in executing it could also be interpreted as an explicit attempt to reinforce the role of the UN as an international / global institution and as the guardian of the rule-based international order – i.e. to work towards two of the principles listed in the ESS as core components of "effective multilateralism".

In fact, the EU has been both a "pusher" and an "implementer" of UN policies in human rights. On the one hand, the EU and its member states have actively engaged with UN institutions in order to influence the global organisations and get it, among other things, to adopt strong resolutions on given human rights violations. While at the same time different European institutions were active in implementing UN decisions as was for example the case in the EU‟s Council decision to impose restrictive measures on the Sudanese government following a resolution in that sense previously adopted at the UN Security Council.

The impact of the EU on issues related to human rights violations is rather limited. Even when the EU has managed to engage with the global level to deal with this issue, its involvement has not yielded any major changes. Several explanations can be given to such a bleak result. First, the EU has not always managed to be perceived as an impartial actor and has even in some cases been at loggerhead with the government of the countries where the human rights violations occurred. Secondly, the EU‟s instrument and policies have not always been in line with the grand discourse on human rights. In addition, the double standard syndrome that has long afflicted the EU‟s foreign policy and more mundane *realpolitik* concerns come to the surface, invariably limiting the credibility of the Union as a genuine defender of human rights.

This being said, one should not underestimate some of the immediate impact that the EU‟s involvement has had. This is particularly the case when it has been directly engaged on the ground either through its delivering of humanitarian aid (as was the case in the Gaza strip for example) or through the deployment of fully fledged ESDP missions (as was the case with the deployment of EUFOR Chad/CAR). With these instruments the EU has effectively been able to address some of the human rights violations that had been taking place even though it has been at a very local level and usually within a limited time-span linked to the duration of the mission itself.

It should also be noted that the EU‟s involvement and the stances it has adopted has in certain cases has a negative impact. This was particularly apparent in regard to the cases on Darfur and on Zimbabwe. In both these cases the EU entered into somewhat of a confrontational stance with the respective governments which greatly hindered its capacity to act and as a result also affected its possibility to cooperate with other international actors. The EU‟s decision to uphold the ICC‟s indictment of the Sudanese president may have strengthened the Court itself, but it has been at the cost of the EU‟s cooperation with the AU and with Sudan.

Migration and Global Cooperation

In the case of Migration it is interesting to note that even though the European discourse on this issue has very much been influenced by international events, the EU's view have actually tended to be at loggerhead with the position of international organisations focussing on migration. Whereas the emergence of terrorism as an overarching security issue (especially following the 9/11 attacks in the US and the bombings in London and Madrid) has very much influenced the EU's securitisation of migration, this view is not shared by the entire international community. For

example such institutions as the IOM and UNHCR tend to oppose the security narrative regarding migration. However, the EU's engagement in global cooperation has also participated in its framing of the issue of migration. One such example is its embracing of the concept of "transit migration" which was actually framed by the IOM in the 1990s. Other aspects of the EU's discourse on migration can be traced back to the global level of cooperation while they are not part of its 'security' discourse (for example, the issue of Asylum seekers and existing international convention on this topic, or on Human Rights and migration).

In terms of the security governance that has been set up by the EU to deal with migration as a security issue it only marginally relates to the global cooperation level. The EU has deployed a variety of instruments and actors to deal with the issue of migration from a securitized perspective but has been unable to find a global counterpart for any of these instruments or actors. Nevertheless, as part of its more general approach of migration, the EU has engaged with a variety of global institutions such as the IOM, UNHCR and the Global Forum on Migration. This has also allowed the EU to make its view point heard at the global level and try to find common agreement with the rest of the international community.

For what concerns the EU's actorness a contradiction somewhat exists between the EU's expressed willingness to participate to the management of migration at a global level and the fact that it has been unable to find a truly global partner institution and has had to favour bilateral linkages. Moreover, the creation of a 'new Northern axis "Fortress Europe-USA"' also seems to favour bipolarism rather than multipolarism. Given the lack of consensus between the EU and its potential global partner institutions on the securitisation of migration, the EU has found it difficult to establish a security governance that would encompass the global level. For this reason, and despite the existence of an EU's 'Global approach to Migration', the greater part of the EU's governance of migration has occurred at the bilateral level. The only opportunity for the EU to engage with such global institutions as the IOM or UNHCR has been to deal with issues that are not strictly security issues. For example, the treatment of refugees and the question of *non-refoulement* can be dealt with with the UNHCR and form part of the overall approach of the EU on migration.

When analysing the impact that the EU has had on the issue of migration and global cooperation, the picture is somewhat bleak for the EU. Despite its several attempts to engage international organisations working on migration to adopt a more securitised approach, the EU has not been able to find a positive response from these institutions especially given that the majority of their own membership refuses the security narrative on migration. Therefore, in what concerns migration, EU

has been unable to have any impact at the global level of cooperation through its security governance of the issue.

Energy Security and Climate Change and Global Cooperation

The cases deal with the securitization of energy. Not with the securitization of climate change.1 Climate change is discussed in the context of renewable energy and carbon capture and storage. The latter endorses the objectives of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol, but can hardly be used to explain developments in the security realm. But the latter show the eagerness of the EU to play a leading global role on the issue of climate change and how the EU is in its discourses and practices a strong advocate of the UN framework towards climate change.

Energy security became a prominent issue on the EU agenda in the 1970s due to the Arab oil disruptions. In spite of the West‟s concerted response through the creation of the International Energy Agency in 1974, Europe itself did not react in a unified manner. In fact, the oil crises effectively prompted the fragmentation of the European energy market. The period afterwards let to a normalization of the issue of energy security, even up to the point that observers stated that „energy security has moved off the title page and is at best a footnote to today‟s and tomorrow‟s global security issues‟ (Mitchell et. al. 2001: 176). The emergence of new economic powers and their hunt for energy changed this perspective dramatically in the recent decade. Metaphors used in the discourse are quite revealing (scramble over resources, China going to Africa, new scramble of Africa, new great game, new Silk Road, the energy weapon). Geopolitical considerations are in this respect back on the global agenda. Recent energy interruptions from Russia have led to a number of actions on the EU side and a further securitization of the discourse of energy.

In January 2006, a dispute between Russian gas giant Gazprom and Ukrainian national gas company Naftogaz over terms and conditions of gas transit to Europe led to an interruption in supply and non-delivery of gas reports by European companies. One year later, in January 2007, a disagreement between Russia and Belarus over terms and conditions of oil transit caused disruptions in oil supply to Poland and Germany, sparking angry reactions from the EU. In January 2009, the EU experienced its worst energy cut when a similar dispute between Gazprom and Naftogaz led to a two-week interruption in the supply of natural gas. The recurrence of these disputes has prompted concerns on whether existing energy security arrangements and

instruments are adequate and increased calls for diversification. This concern for diversification brings Central Asia in the picture, home to impressive oil and gas reserves.

European security governance on the issue of energy dates back to the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, the European Commission intensified its efforts for the reintegration and reorientation of Europe‟s energy policy. One of the first times that this was openly and comprehensively addressed was through the launch of the European Commission‟s Green and White Papers on a European Energy Policy of 1995. After these initial attempts to streamline EU governance actions, a large amount of new policy documents were introduced. But these documents can still not overcome the tension that exists between the plea for a more unified approach and the bilateral actions of certain member states. A more concerted action on the EU level led to suggestions to set-up a Schengen for energy, energy NATO or energy OSCE. A second issue is that EU-Russia relations are based on a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. This document is outdated and represents an incomplete reflection of the status quo between Brussels and Moscow. This lack of clarity is exacerbated at international level by Moscow‟s recent withdrawal from the Energy Charter Treaty. Given the importance attached to Russia‟s participation, the Charter‟s role in international energy security governance has been called into question and a proposal for an alternative Treaty has emerged.

The Partnership on Climate Change explicitly lays out six priority areas for technical cooperation between the EU and China. One area to which the Partnership attaches firm weight is renewable energy development and energy conservation.

Of great importance for the future of a common EU energy security policy is the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty. It is imperative in this regard that energy becomes instrumental in the work of both the High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP), as well as the European External Action Service (EEAS).

EU-GRASP

Changing Multilateralism: the EU as a Global-regional Actor in Security and Peace, or EU-GRASP in short, is an EU funded FP7 Programme. EU-GRASP aims to contribute to the analysis and articulation of the current and future role of the EU as a global actor in multilateral security governance, in a context of challenged multilateralism, where the EU aims at "effective multilateralism". This project therefore examines the notion and practice of multilateralism in order to provide the required theoretical background for assessing the linkages between the EU's current security activities with multi-polarism, international law, regional integration processes and the United Nations system.

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