

Final Report on Terrorism

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EU-GRASP Coordination Team: Luk Van Langenhove, Francis Baert & Emmanuel Fanta

Editorial Assistance: Rik Vanhauteghem

United Nations University UNU-CRIS

72 Poterierei – B-8000 – Bruges – Belgium

Email: fbuert@cris.unu.edu or efanta@cris.unu.edu

Additional information available on the website: www.eugrasp.eu

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Table of Contents

1.0 Introduction	4
2.0 Discourse	5
3.0 Security Governance	8
4.0 Discourse and Security Governance.....	10
5.0 Impact and Future	12
6.0 Conclusions.....	15

Final Report on Terrorism

Stuart Croft

University of Warwick

1.0 Introduction

1.1 This Final Report on Terrorism is focussed on the findings of the examination of terrorism as an issue in security governance through which the European Union acts. It builds upon previous discussion and decisions concerning the role of theoretical considerations, method, case study criteria, and case study selection, that were established through a series of meetings in November 2008, February 2009, and July 2009, through which the Leuven meeting was particularly crucial. This Final Report is also based on the Interim Report delivered at the Gothenburg meeting, and takes comments made there into account.

1.2 There are five research papers that form the analytical basis for this Final Report, as follows:

I. Clashing EU security logics: complex EU and Hamas relations, by Michael Schulz, University of Gothenburg

II. The European Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt in relation to terrorism discourses, by Michelle Pace, University of Birmingham and University of Warwick.

III. The European Union and Turkey's Kurdish Issue: the Case of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), by George Christou, University of Warwick.

IV. Report on EU policy towards Afghanistan over Terrorism, by Oz Hassan, The University of Warwick

V. Terrorism: Chechnya, by Cerwyn Moore, University of Birmingham and University of Warwick.

Each author followed a common structure for the research report, which has helped to facilitate the findings of this Report. Each work developed a combination of securitisation and insecurity theory that offered for each a fruitful framework of analysis.

1.3 In the Report of the Gothenburg meeting, it was reported that these Final Reports would be produced according to headings referring to Discourse, Security Governance, the relationship of discourse to security governance, impact, and future issues, and this is the structure that will be followed in this Report.

2.0 Discourse

2.1 EU discourses over terrorism issues has varied according to the nature of the location of the terrorist organisation and offences, although there are of course a series of common principles. This issue of difference will be mapped through the various case studies.

2.2 With regard to *Hamas*, it was not until its first suicide mission in 1993 in the West Bank, and even more after the April 1994 attack inside Israel, that the EU took real notice of Hamas as a political challenger vis-à-vis PLO. At this time, the EU mainly perceived Hamas as a spoiler to the peace process that made it difficult for President Arafat to achieve success at the negotiation table with Israel. Equally, Israel was given full support, and *de facto* acceptance of Israel's measures to prevent further Hamas attacks on Israeli civilians. The EU conflict analysis gave itself the role of being the party that primarily should provide development assistance to the PA, and ensure that the PA would transform into a democratic forthcoming Palestinian State when the interim period, according to the Oslo Accord, should be completed in September 1999. When the Oslo interim period came to its end, the EU Berlin Declaration came in 1999 to support again that the two-state solution should be implemented, thereby giving support to the Palestinian, and in particular the Arafat led PA. With the outbreak of the Palestinian uprising, the so-called *al-Aqsa intifada*, in September 2000 the EU ended up in a new situation in which it also had to questions some of its key position. Nevertheless, during the entire period and up to the Hamas election victory, the EU came to support the PLO/PA and even supported Arafat until his death, and after that he was imprisoned by Israel in his own office in 2002. The EU thereby went against Israeli and American

positions that preferred to see Arafat as the key problem of the situation and the stalled peace process since he failed, or even did not want, to prevent Hamas and other terror organizations attacks on Israel.

2.3 In relation to *Egypt*, under the multilateral framework of the 1995 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the EU and its Mediterranean partners, Egypt included, 'agreed to combat terrorism'. The Islamic Egyptian Group, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, had embarked on a terrorism campaign during the 1990s, including the targeting of tourists and foreigners. For the EU, Egypt's unique geographical position, its historical and strategic relations with Arab countries and its key role in the Middle East Peace Process, give the impetus to further cooperation with this key Arab ally on regional and international issues, its fight against terrorism being a priority. The fight against terrorism is in fact a key to the Mediterranean dimension of the European Union's internal security and has engrossed most of European policy making in recent years. Following the 9/11 events, EU foreign policy towards its southern neighbourhood has been overshadowed by counterterrorism strategies. The key objective for the EU has been to impede terrorism from reaching EU territory. The attacks in Madrid and London reinforced public and political security concerns. Arab leaders on their part, like former President Mubarak in Egypt, legitimised cooperation with their European counterparts on the back of domestic challenges they face with Islamic opposition groups (the Muslim Brotherhood being the case in point in Egypt). Thus, the EU's securitisation of terrorism acts opened a window of opportunity for Arab leaders to join the global fight against terrorism and thus legitimise internal domestic challenges with their political opponents, often of Islamic faction.

2.4 In *Turkey*, two dominant EU logics have been identified in its treatment of the PKK. The first, indirect logic, relates to the EU accession process, whereby the EU (or at least the Council and the Commission) has treated the Kurdish issue predominantly as one of transforming cultural and social rights through democratic change, rather than as an ethnic conflict. In this sense the logic has been to desecuritize the environment in which the Kurdish issue is being played out through rights-based inclusion, thus leading to a gradual erosion of the construction of the Kurdish minority as an 'Other' that threatens the identity of the Turkish state, to that of acceptance as an 'equal' within the Turkish political space. The underlying rationale here is that the PKK would be de-radicalised through a gradual incorporation into Turkish political structures, which would moderate their behaviour and transform them from 'terrorist' organisation to legitimate political group.

2.5 Over *Afghanistan*, the discourse presented by the EU contends that the evolution of EU engagement with Afghanistan, in its current form, can be traced back to 2001 following the removal of the Taliban regime in the US military action in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Accordingly, official EU documents often treat the events of September 11, 2001 as a moment of “crisis” or “rupture”, and use these events as the “catalyst” or “beginning” of its narrative from which to explain both its counter-terrorism policy “inside” and its foreign policy action “outside” the Union. Such a position, however, often narrates out the ebbs and flows of the significantly longer relationship the European Community has had with Afghanistan, and the manner in which this relationship was securitised throughout the 1980s, returned to “normal politics” in the early to mid-1990s, only to be securitised again in the late 1990s and into the twenty-first century. In effect, the EU’s official discourse de-contextualises its relationship with Afghanistan, which not only obscures the complexity of its relationship with Afghanistan, but undermines an understanding of how the EU has long attempted to link being a normative power in global politics with the manner in which it constructs ‘security’. Such a point is particularly fecund with regards to the EU’s relationship with Afghanistan, because the nexus between normativity and security have come to define the EU discourse and the institutionalisation of its counter-terrorism policy in Afghanistan.

2.6 With regards to *Chechnya*, the three major events of the First War ¹were not viewed, principally, as acts of terrorism. Rather, they were viewed as conflict-related events. Indeed, declarations and statements by the EU repeatedly urged participants to ‘seek a political settlement to end of the hostilities’ noting that another European organisation, namely the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) could act as a potential mediator and monitor. Accordingly, EU ‘speak’ emerged towards the case study as part of a broader package of dialogue about relations with Russia, while also drawing attention to the evolving focus on the role of political mediation as a facet of security governance. The attacks of 9/11 led to a number of new EU initiatives born out of securitization in order to counter the threat posed by ‘global’ terrorism, however, the case study draws attention to a number of intriguing discursive themes. On the one hand, discussion of the case of Chechnya, and terrorism related to it, are framed as an internal issue; that is, a problem outside of the sphere of influence of the EU and firmly within the sphere of influence of Russia. Underscoring this, on the other hand, is an embedded concern over ‘human rights’ violations and a need for a political settlement to the conflicts which frames discussion of Chechnya. Analysis of

¹ Namely the Budyonovsk mass hostage-taking raid by Chechen fighters, led by Shamil Basayev (June 1995); the Kizlyar raid and subsequent mass hostage-taking in Pervomaiskoe (January 1996) led by Salman Raduyev and the Avrasya ferry hijacking by pro-Chechen gunmen (January 1996).

statements related to the case study illustrate that the EU primarily viewed the two conflicts as political issues, a stance which did not change even taking into account spectacular acts of the terrorism.

3.0 Security Governance

3.1 For the EU, the shifts of *Hamas'* position on key issues have not passed unnoticed and have rather increased an internal debate on lifting Hamas away from the blacklist. Moreover a debate on the need break the isolation that began in the spring of 2006, and to open dialogue with the movement has increased. However, the dilemma for the EU is that a unanimous decision has to be taken before Hamas can be lifted of the blacklist. For every backlash, either during the Gaza war in December 2008-January 2009 between Israel and Hamas, or after the Israeli raid on the Gaza flotilla in May 2010 the discussion intensifies, but also makes it more difficult to reach a consensus within the EU. Rather the EU has ended up to at least sideline with the Quartet, and at best orally criticize Israel but not really threaten to break any trade or diplomatic relations, or open dialogue with Hamas.

3.2 EU-*Egypt* relations have been governed, from the start to date, through a number of bilateral, regional and multilateral fora. From 1977 to mid-2004, EU-Egypt bilateral relations were governed by a Co-operation Agreement, which provided for economic co-operation between the parties and established provisions for non-reciprocal trade liberalization and market access. Such an agreement has been designed to support economic development processes in Mediterranean countries. Under its provisions, Egypt enjoyed free market access for its industrial exports to the EU, while EU exports of industrial products enjoyed Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment (Egypt Ministry of Trade and Industry). On a more regional level, in 1994, a joint French-Egyptian initiative led to the Mediterranean Forum which played a role in giving southern partners a voice and a platform to air their concerns about EU-Mediterranean relations. This created an environment where the Forum's non-EU members' preoccupations with envisaged stricter EU immigration policies could be expressed. Encouraged by progress on the Middle East Peace Process (1991 Madrid conference peace talks, the ensuing Oslo agreement of 1993 and the Israel-Jordan peace treaty of 1994), the EU launched a comprehensive economic, political and social and cultural initiative in 1995: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), or Barcelona Process. The EMP was very much focused on form and procedure: the EU at this stage was keen to ensure that the governing of migration flows from the south was kept under control.

3.3 In relation to *Turkey* and the *PKK*, the security governance arrangements are complicated by discussions over Turkish accession to the EU. If the accession process underpinned by a right-based discourse is going to lead to a transformation of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, then the EU must engage more directly with the Turkish state through this process and, whilst removing the PKK from its terrorist list might prove difficult given the overarching narrative within which it is embedded ('global war on terror'), it must ensure that it provides an alternative and nuanced narrative that allows for political re-engagement with the PKK. This is not easily achievable in an environment where the Turkish state perceives itself to be under threat, not just from the PKK, but also other criminal and military networks (e.g. Ergenekon), but it is possible in the medium to long-term if the EU at least begins to consider and debate the desecuritisation of terrorism, which would allow for the possibility of alternative frames and thus security governance to emerge to tackle terrorism through other means than that of exclusion and marginalization. In the case of the PKK the claim that it 'threatens Europe' is more imagined than real; desecuritisation would allow greater flexibility for engagement with the PKK's political strand, and provide space for discussion on achieving a democratic opening that genuinely provides the Kurdish community with the individual and collective 'ethnic' rights that they desire. More than that, it could catalyse an end to the violent cycle of protest in train at the moment, thus removing or providing less justification for security governance underpinned by the threat narrative.

3.4 In relation to *Afghanistan*, the international community's inability to negotiate a peace settlement throughout the 1990s proved catastrophic for the Afghan population. Multilateral efforts were inconsistent and ineffective, permitting Afghanistan to become the world's largest refugee crisis whilst widespread human rights violations and humanitarian problems continued throughout the mid-1990s. It was within this milieu that the Taliban emerged in 1994 and began to challenge warlords in and around Kandahar province. Through securitising its relations with Afghanistan, the EU had begun to view its development aid to the country as a technology of security governance before September 11, 2001. Whilst the EU securitised its relationship with Afghanistan and sort to carve out a security governance role in the areas of development, politics and security, it was significantly stymied by the US's bilateral emphasis. This has undermined the CFSP/ESDP, leading to the EU working more closely with multilateral bodies to exert influence. However, this marginalisation has in and of itself helped shape the EU's security discourse, in part adding to a sense of uncertainty and at time self-deprecation by some sections of the Union, but also allowing the discourse to adopt a particularly critical role.

3.5 In relation to *Chechnya*, 9/11 led to a number of new EU initiatives born out of securitization in order to counter the threat posed by 'global' terrorism, however, the case study draws attention to a number of intriguing discursive themes. On the one hand, discussion of the case of Chechnya, and terrorism related to it, are framed as an internal issue; that is, a problem outside of the sphere of influence of the EU and firmly within the sphere of influence of Russia. Underscoring this, on the other hand, is an embedded concern over 'human rights' violations and a need for a political settlement to the conflicts which frames discussion of Chechnya. Analysis of statements related to the case study illustrate that the EU primarily viewed the two conflicts as political issues, a stance which did not change even taking into account spectacular acts of the terrorism.

4.0 Discourse and Security Governance

4.1 In relation to *Hamas*, it is clear that the EU has a vision of how the overall IPC should be solved. The two-state solution was already on the table before the EU was established in 1992. The key actors of the IPC were according to the EU conflict analysis Israel and the Palestinians. Due to EU's strong pro-PLO position in the sense as perceiving them as the sole representatives of the Palestinian people made it difficult for the EU to recognize the challenge that Hamas constituted vis-à-vis the increasingly PLO dominated PA that was established as a result of the entire Oslo process between Israelis and Palestinians.

4.2 From the EU's part, in all its talk about the fight against terrorism, there is a big gap by way of a shared narrative which requires deeply entrenched communication at the political, economic and social level beyond elitist networks of government officials. Activists in Egypt and across the Mediterranean have been attempting to fill in this void through the flourishing of an independent civil society and other social networks: In the case of Egypt, bloggers have been quite efficient in this regard. Arab governments, for their part, have been fully aware of their vulnerability to their people's political, economic and social frustrations. With the aim of offering people some hope (albeit at an artificial level), and as a measure to speed up the liberalization of trade at a sub-regional level, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan formed the Agadir Initiative in 2002 to provide for free trade between these four countries, with the European Commission providing technical support for its implementation. Underlying such an initiative is however the flawed assumption that somehow economic development will automatically lead to political change, stability and security in the Mediterranean. This has been the 'European talk' and message that Arab regimes have been only too happy to oblige and transmit to their societies. The recent protests in Egypt,

Tunisia, Yemen, Libya, Iran, Algeria and across the Middle East/ Gulf region (Bahrain) attest to another reality. People have been long frustrated by all the guise that goes behind their regimes' and the West's talk of the 'fight against terrorism' as well as the discourse of economic liberalism. The people's January 2011 revolution in Egypt had been organized by the youth of this large Arab country over three years through the dissemination of debates using internet, blogs, facebook and twitter. The security apparatus of the Egyptian regime found the 'fight against terrorism' a good excuse to isolate the ruling elite from the people's needs on the one hand and to distract and divide the homogeneity of the Egyptian people (Copts and Muslims) on the other hand. But these routine practices of securitisation did not stop the frustrated masses from taking to the main square in Cairo (Tahrir Square) and to topple the Mubarak regime during the January/February 2011 protests.

4.3 The EU's securitized approach to the *PKK* since 2001 has clearly contaminated the EU's rights-based approach to the Kurdish issue more broadly. The proscription of the *PKK* as a terrorist organization has limited the EU's approach to governance practice that prioritises marginalization and exclusion, as well as emphasising illegitimacy. Indeed, it has simply reinforced and supported the dominant logic of the Turkish state towards the *PKK*, and provided justification for the arguments from traditional and conservative forces within Turkey that do not recognise a Kurdish problem in Turkey. Furthermore, the terrorist designation has undermined the progress made through the EU-Turkey accession process in catalysing reforms that have provided the Kurdish community with 'ethnic' rights that were previously inconceivable within the Turkish political system.

4.4 The EU's discourse surrounding its relationship with *Afghanistan* and its counter-terrorism policy more broadly provides a particularly mixed impression. The EU has elevated the threat of terrorism to existential levels and securitised the issue in a manner fundamentally different to that which preceded September 11, 2001. However, that the Union was able to make such a move does not logically follow on from the events themselves, and the consequences of this move have had dramatically different impacts internally and externally of the Union. Notably, the EU's securitisation move was enabled through the performative manner in which the EU was able to construct a security discourse that demonstrated a threat to the Union itself. That is to say, that in the aftermath of September 11 2001, the EU discursively articulated itself "into" the very crisis and constructed itself as a character in its unfolding drama.

4.5 The European Security Strategy serves to reinforce enlargement policies, indicating that the EU should 'now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region.' At the same time, the document illustrates the need to work with partners, illustrating that working towards 'closer relations with Russia' could play a 'major factor in our security and prosperity. Respect for common values will reinforce progress towards strategic partnerships.' Therefore the document recognises the strategic importance of Russia, but plays up the need for enlargement as part of a more complex post-Soviet security environment. More generally, it has been the global war on terror that has provided the broad framework within which Chechnya has been placed. While the case study overview highlights that there is little or no evidence of a link between Chechen extremists and Al Qaeda - that the war since 1999 and the ensuing regional Islamist insurgency which has evolved out of it are indigenous in form and character - the conflict has been shaped by an external actors (notably, members of the Arab mujahideen) while Chechnya is often cited as a *cause celebre* in the broader Salafi-Jihadi literature. The Chechen issue is linked implicitly, therefore, in a series of cases where groups have been radicalised

5.0 Impact and Future

5.1 In relation to *Hamas*, The way the EU analyses its security concerns, and how it "speaks" security shapes its security governance policies. However, due to its inabilities, not least due to conflicting positions among the EU members themselves, the capacity to shift its security governance policies either come to late or not at all. Also, the EU impact in the conflict zone itself creates several warning signals but seemingly do not reach Brussels in time, or are not convincingly enough for the located EU officials to signal to Brussels on what need to be changed. This implies that we have one Brussels security governance, with its own life and linked to its previous security discourses and multilateral understandings, and one EU Israel Palestine Conflict security governance on the ground with a different logic and understanding. Also, in line with the dilemmas the EU faces with its perception of being a 'force of good', and acting in a contradictory fashion in the field in relation to its normative overarching principles. This creates a view of an unclear EU position at best, and double standards in the eyes of the conflict parties, making it difficult for the EU to become a trustworthy mediator in the conflict. The relationship between these two security governance logics and their impact seem to be of importance and hence should be of further empirical research interest. Hence, with the recent Lisbon treaty, at best creating an increased

coherent EU security and foreign policy vis-à-vis the parties of the IPC, does not necessarily increase the EU's mediation capabilities, unless a change follows in the way the EU is conducting its own conflict analysis and how it speaks about the IPC.

5.2 EU policies in regard to the MENA region more broadly and in respect of Egypt more specifically have, in recent years, been characterised by a markedly 'securitised' discourse in particular in the field of counter-terrorism where the EU's external action is perceived through an increasingly narrow security lens. This in turn has led to ineffective, EU defensive and exclusionary policies. So, EU-Egypt bilateral, regional and multilateral policy frameworks such as the Barcelona Declaration of 1995 failed to reverse the trend in Egypt 'towards additional restrictions on political liberties that over the 1990s led to increasingly repressive amendments to the penal code, a rise in death sentences and executions, the increasing control of professional syndicates and heavily rigged elections'. In a damning report entitled *Europe and the Middle East, perspectives on major policy issues*, Eberhard Kienle reiterates that 'There is no doubt that the renewed interest in stability shown by Europe and the US has contributed to the renewed and deepening erosion of liberties in the Southern Mediterranean. The United States and various European governments cooperate with the entirely unaccountable 'security' forces in Arab states to obtain what they consider crucial information to fight terrorism'. It is clear different EU foreign policy objectives have been leading to an erosion of Europe's ideals about democracy and human rights. The recent and ongoing protests in Egypt show how the people in the region have long been frustrated not only about their own regimes but also about international organisations like the EU who deem to be promoting democracy in the MENA while at the same time opening up opportunities for authoritarian regimes to abuse democratic ideals and human rights through the endorsement of the 'fight against terrorism'.

5.3 In order for the EU to facilitate movement towards desecuritization in relation to the *PKK*, it must somehow decontaminate the securitized from the political, and reconstruct a policy that captures the nuance in the *PKK* movement. The vicious circle that exists at the time of writing can only become virtuous if the EU helps to facilitate movement towards a change in the approach of the *PKK* through gradual (re) legitimisation of its political wing; and exerts pressure on the Turkish state to commit itself to a comprehensive programme of democratization. This will allow for an environment whereby ethnicity is no longer seen as a threat to Turkish identity, and will, in the process, allow those political actors in pro-Kurdish parties and within Kurdish civil society to

challenge any violent PKK activities in the name of pursuing equality for the Kurdish community. Indeed, support for any such activity within such a context is likely to diminish.

5.4 In *Afghanistan*, if the EU wants to strengthen and legitimate itself as a global and regional actor in security and peace, it must move away from a Cold War heritage and towards a new model for the twenty-first century. Such a model must further strengthen the CFSP/ESDP if the Union is to build its security governance capabilities. This will require building coordination, management and regulatory frameworks beyond the current scope of EU capabilities. For example, it is clear that the EU and India share common objectives for the destiny of Afghanistan. This is an area that the EU should look towards expanding its relationships. As such, the EU should not simply be tempted to securitise areas that it has traditionally been comfortable with, such as development, but must look for a wider array of partners, foreign policy tools and technologies to achieve its objectives. If the EU wants to build its deontic powers in the international realm, it cannot simply expect them; it must take on greater responsibilities and have the capability to do so. This is fundamental because, as the EU's experience in Afghanistan has demonstrated, the Union risks becoming seen as irrelevant to external action and ignored. With in such a context, the EU needs to look beyond traditional boundaries and build new multilateral frameworks for solving global problems, just as much as it must turn inwards and scrutinise its own policy. Indeed, worse than simply being marginalised as a security actor, the EU has demonstrated its ability to allow stagnant and ineffective policy to continue too long in Afghanistan. This in itself sends the wrong signals to partners, which will question the utility and legitimacy of EU security governance if it is ineffective and unresponsive. Therefore, whilst the Union is seeking to improve its external action in security, it must accompany this with suitable and effective systems for managing such action in the future.

5.5 The *Chechen* case has shown that while terrorism itself has been securitized in the post-9/11 era, a linked reading of insecurity has also emerged, particularly related to questions about radicalisation and the international character of contemporary terrorism. Various agencies have been involved in establishing new forms of governmentality – both within the EU, but also between the EU and other external actors. A significant shift occurred in EU policy towards Russia following both 9/11 and the Dubrovka House attack. Terrorism related to Chechnya has played a limited role at best in the development of an EU-orientated approach to CT, and has done little to impact on larger strategic relations and policies of security governance in either the EU or Russia. In a way, it is the silence on the issue of terrorism related to Chechnya which is of greatest interest.

6.0 Conclusions

6.1 It is the clear conclusion from the papers produced for this study that there is an urgent need for a review of EU policy in the area of terrorism. The approach developed since 9/11 has, after a decade, a track record of failure in a large number of areas but this is perhaps most apparent in the contemporary explosion of revolutionary demands for greater democracy and freedom throughout the Middle East and North Africa. The EU has emphasised stability; the people of those regions have spoken and acted with determination and bravery demanding a different value to dominate their lives.

6.2 One of the issues of immediate concern and focus for a study of this sort is to reappraise the framing of a security issue. Of course, from the theoretical work that underpins EU-GRASP, this is a logical place to start. There is no objective requirement to construct a political issue as a security one; but once that work is undertaken, it has important and often immediate security implications at the level of practice, in policy and in the implications of that policy for everyday lives.

There are a variety of means through which the EU frames a policy in a particular fashion, as with any political actor. Of course at the most obvious level, there are collective and personal interests in play, and then there are the behaviours by key individuals that lead to particular outcomes. But this is the superstructure of the framing of an issue. The deeper set of issues concerns, in the case of the EU, a variety of different pressures. Undoubtedly – as we have seen in the case of Iran – there are historical or, to phrase this more appropriately, genealogical discursive structures which lead to the appropriation of particular tropes and expectations as short hand ways of shaping understanding. Those work at a meta- level (which is to say, on a „European“ or indeed even on a „Western“ basis), but also within national discourses, shaped as so many are in Europe by a range of post-colonial heritages and practices.

If there are interest and behavioural explanations of the framing of an issue, and also genealogical possibilities, there are also two other important drivers. The first is the role of the Other; and perhaps above all in the issues of terrorism, of the United States. America plays an important role in the construction of Europe, as a partner, friend, but also of a different pole of power. Clearly the framing of an issue in terms of terrorism can be shaped by the attitudes and behaviours, observable and imputed, of the United States. Finally, if there are drivers from the Other (and increasingly of course this is not only the United States, but also other poles such as Russia, China and India), there

is the important issue of the Self. It is from the adoption of certain values as contributing to the core of European (Union)-ness that so much policy framing comes. Europe as a normative power, as a force for the good, as a democratic and rights based endeavour that can be beneficial to the world – such values and expectations (although sometimes obvious in their contradiction) that shape issues in security terms.

6.3 Security, then, frames an issue, but an issue can through these means also come to frame security; what we have seen in the mutual constitution of issues as securitised, and of security as being seen in terms of terrorism. And this Report has shown just how strongly terrorism has been securitised by the EU, and also securitised to the level by which terrorism is deemed to be an existential threat. That is, in a sense, terrorism has been fully securitised – it is the ultimate threat to the existence of Europe and of European values. The interplay of values in the securitisation of issues is something that is clear in a number of contexts as illustrated by the case studies in this Report.

6.4 First, the emphasis on democratic values has led to an abhorrence of violence used for political means. Therefore those actors whose relationship with violence is seen to be too close – Hamas, the PKK – are deemed to be inappropriate partners, to be in a sense anti-democratic and thereby anti-European. This inevitably means that despite all intentions of mediation and even handedness, there is an inevitable taking of sides. One clear and obvious example has been that of the PLO/Palestinian Authority over Hamas. The democratic claims of Hamas – whether electorally or in terms of being an embodiment of large sections of popular opinion – cannot be seen other than through the security lens. This, of course, means that it is impossible to show great flexibility – how can one be flexible about one's core values? – and so diplomatic positions ossify. Even if there is evidence that there is scope for change – for example, of the popularity of Hamas, its flexibility in position taking on coming to power, or of the corruption levels in the Palestinian Authority – it is exceptionally hard for the EU to change its course because the issue has been securitised so deeply in its framing. And yet for other actors, the EU seems to be acting in a contradictory manner. In discussions about asylum within the EU, for many Russians, the EU has chosen to support Chechen terrorists over the demands for stability in the Russian Federation. And so when in response to the terrorist attack on the Chechen Parliament in October 2010, the EU declares the need for greater cooperation with Russia over international terrorism, this carries little weight in Moscow. Indeed, the very phrase „international terrorism“ seems to offer the prospect that some of the violence in

Chechnya is potentially legitimate, that it is only the violent Islamist inspired terrorist groups in which the EU is interested.

6.5 Second, what is very important in the understanding of contemporary EU political possibilities is the way in which issues became seen through terrorism, and by which terrorism became securitised to the highest level. This was not done „to“ the EU; it was an EU discursive choice. That is to say, it was the EU that chose to insert itself into a „war on terror“ narrative (though of course struggling to find other ways of describing it) post-9/11, through describing the attacks on the United States in collective terms. Al Qaeda did not attack America; it attacked „our“ values and institutions, and thereby it was not the case that Al Qaeda was anti-American – rather it was and is an anti-democratic institution. This was not an inevitable choice: but constructing the conflict in such ways inevitably spread the zone of conflict to Europe.

6.6 Third, this decision to insert itself into the conflict brought into profile the way that framing takes place with reference to the driver of the Other in understanding security governance. „Solidarity“ with the United States – on value grounds – was of course an identity claim. Therefore, in the framing choices made about terrorism from September 2001, „international terrorism“ was bound to be elevated to the highest form of securitisation. But not only that; solidarity implied a power relationship with the United States that promised some measure of equality. But the normative danger is that the Americans might not understand solidarity in that way, act largely unilaterally, and allow Europe to be portrayed as subserviently following and not sharing. These were exactly the political battles of 2003 within Europe in the run up to, and conduct of, the Iraq War, and they were choices and divisions brought onto Europe by Europe itself. Being held jointly responsible with the Bush Administration for American actions has been the fate of Europe in the eyes of many actors throughout the world. Europe’s ability to act has been constrained by the choice of a policy of solidarity in the sense in which it has been deployed. Yet with a frame in which terrorism has been fully securitised, there is a requirement on the EU to lead. How can the EU not lead in an area in which its very existence has been called into question? „Solidarity“ seemed to imply some joint leadership; but there was no real scope for that under the Bush Administration, and arguably, little in terms of substance has changed with the Obama Administration. For Europe, this puts two discursive logics into direct confrontation over terrorism: integration, and transatlantic solidarity.

6.7 Fourth, the way in which an issue is framed leads to the way in which governance structures are established; therefore the nature of security governance in relation to terrorism has depended upon the way in which the issue has been framed. Practice follows: in the proscription of the PKK as a terrorist organisation with which the EU cannot engage, in the emphasis on Security Sector Reform over other developmental tactics, and the emphasis on maintaining a legal framework seen in the stress on pressing the Palestinian Authority, for example, to arrest Islamic Jihad activists. Importantly, shaping policy fields through a securitised terrorism discourse has seriously limited the emancipatory potential of the EU's own development policy.

What this adds up to is a political reality with regards to terrorism of a Europe that is marginalised and sidelined; whether that be in relation to the Israeli Palestinian Conflict; or in relation to policy in Afghanistan, where the EU has little role, and representations/ tropes of Taliban led futures, or narcostate outcomes, dominate over those of peaceful democratic structures emerging in the country.

6.8 So what policy issues arise from this analysis in terms of alternative routes for EU policy? One aspect is clearly to debate the desecuritisation of terrorism. That is not to ignore terrorism; it is to adjust the frame, to argue that although terrorist attacks can of course be deadly, they are not existential threats to Europe. From such a reframing, security governance practices can be different. Development policy can be freed from the securitised terrorism lens, and debated for its ability to emancipate people in the world. Smaller scale counter terrorism policies – a focus on tighter constraints on small arms and light weapons in the Caucasus for example, with Chechnya and surrounding areas providing a strong training ground for bomb making. Emphasis on counter narcotics policy not as an adjunct to counter terrorism policy, but as an area of importance in its own right, leading potentially to greater democratic, developmental, and emancipatory outcomes.

6.9 Perhaps, above all, the desecuritisation of terrorism offers a route out of policy dilemmas that currently seem irresolvable. For example, in Turkey, listing the PKK as a terrorist organisation – when terrorism is seen in existential terms – requires both the EU and Turkey to see relations in Kurdistan in securitised terms. Medium term solutions that may revolve around desecuritising the PKK seem impossible to reach under such circumstances. The securitisation of terrorism has seen the reconstruction of many forms of security governance – democracy promotion, development assistance, even cooperation in the Mediterranean and with Central Asia – as security first issues. And this has deepened the emphasis on stability. Not until 2009 did the EU comment on the

demand to remove the state of emergency in Mubarak's Egypt; and then only very lightly. And yet, by early 2011, it was clear that this was a core demand of a huge number of people in the country. In the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia, the securitisation of terrorism has led to EU external policy being seen increasingly through thicker and thicker security lenses, and the consequent emphasis on stability has, in countries like Egypt, seen an increasing erosion of rights, until the revolution. EU policy and framing of terrorism has in all those parts of the world just described, opened space for more, and not less, violations of human rights. It is time, ten years after 9/11, for a fundamental reappraisal of the securitisation of terrorism in EU security governance.

EU-GRASP

Changing Multilateralism: the EU as a Global-regional Actor in Security and Peace, or EU-GRASP in short, is an EU funded FP7 Programme. EU-GRASP aims to contribute to the analysis and articulation of the current and future role of the EU as a global actor in multilateral security governance, in a context of challenged multilateralism, where the EU aims at “effective multilateralism”. This project therefore examines the notion and practice of multilateralism in order to provide the required theoretical background for assessing the linkages between the EU’s current security activities with multi-polarism, international law, regional integration processes and the United Nations system.

EU-GRASP Deliverables

Contact: EU-GRASP Coordination Team

72 Poterierei – B-8000 – Bruges – Belgium

www.eugrasp.eu