



**The EU and Multilateral Crisis  
Management: The Case of the  
Democratic Republic of the Congo**

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**Working Paper N° 14**

**June 2010**



UNIVERSITY OF  
GOTHENBURG



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## Abstract

The paper deals with the new actorness of the EU as a peacekeeper and supporter of the overstretched regime of UN-peaceoperations. It questions the added value of the new security governor "EU" in the classic field of security policy and analyses the inter-organisational governance of EU and UN as partners in crisis management. The case studies are the operations in the DR Congo, namely MONUC (since 1999), Artemis (2003) and EUFOR DR Congo (2006).

Keywords: European Union, ESDP, United Nations, crisis management, peace keeping, MONUC, EUFOR DR Congo, Artemis, DR Congo

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# The EU and Multilateral Crisis Management : The Case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

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In June 2003 an ESDP<sup>1</sup> operation called Artemis prepared for its launch. This mission was unique in three ways: For the first time, EU member states committed troops to an autonomous<sup>2</sup> ESDP operation. For the first time an ESDP operation was authorized to support the traditional crisis manager<sup>3</sup>, the United Nations. For the first time an EU mission was deployed 4,000 kilometres from Europe - behind the zone of vital interest, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This involvement was an expression of the EU's new role as a military crisis manager in the classic field of security. It emphasized its new character as a global civil-military power, striving for peace in the name of *good governance* and under the umbrella of *effective multilateralism*. The prototype of a potential post-Westphalian order positioned itself as a provider of security.

This paper aims to question the added value of the new security governor "EU" in the classic field of security policy, based on the ESDP operations ARTEMIS (2003) and EUFOR DR Congo (2006). Has the EU been able to support the overstretched traditional peace-keeper, the UN? Have the efforts to build a stable and secure environment been efficient? Did the lessons learned have a positive effect on the development of the ESDP and EU-UN-cooperation? The *nucleus* of the study is not the EU as a lonely actor but the EU in the new multilateral setting of EU-UN-cooperation in crisis management. The EU as regional *system sui generis*<sup>4</sup> and the UN as global organisation are understood as entities

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<sup>1</sup> For more information about the institutionalisation and competences of CFSP/ESDP, see: e.g. Smith (2006).

<sup>2</sup> Autonomous from NATO assets.

<sup>3</sup> "Crisis management" is an unclear defined term that fits in almost every policy field. In the context of this article it is understood as synonym to the also often misunderstood UN term "peace operations" in the context of wider and robust peace keeping.

<sup>4</sup> The EU is a new form of organisation. The ESDP is in the article's context a collective actor which is inter-governmentally organised.

in the complex web of global relations that are not only arenas for states' actions or platforms of national diplomacy but have actor's qualities themselves.<sup>5</sup> They are collective actors.

Section one discusses the political objectives that influenced the involvement in the DR Congo. In section two, the ESDP operations are analysed in regard to the questions asked above. Part three summarizes the main findings of the study.

## **New objectives, new partners, new spheres**

*"We in the EU believe that the UN lies at the heart of the multilateralism we espouse." (Ferrero-Waldner 2004)*

The political objectives of the EU that influenced the decision to be militarily engaged in the DRC must be mentioned shortly: the EU-UN-partnership under the shibboleth *effective multilateralism* as well as the new focus on Africa.

### ***EU and UN: A deepened multilateral partnership***

Although the two collective actors, the EU and the UN look back on a long history of ever-deepening relations in the field of low politics<sup>6</sup>, the cooperation in crisis management is a new inter-organisational field. It needed certain constellations in world politics and some opportunities within the institutions themselves to think about a closer relationship in this classic field of security.

In terms of external *stimuli*, the terrorist attack of 9/11 was the central wake-up-call for both institutions. After the shock of 9/11, the organisations found themselves in a very unsettling environment. Only now did the world realise the fundamental and deep-rooted changes and shifts in international politics that had been occurring successively since 1990. The threats of the twenty-first century, in this article's context "failed/failing states" and "regional conflicts" (European Council 2003; United Nations 2004a; United Nations Secretary General 2005)<sup>7</sup>, increased the pressure to cooperate more closely on all security matters. The new reality emphasized three

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<sup>5</sup> For the debate about the actor's quality of organisations, see: Barnett & Finnemore (1999); Gehring (2008); Rittberger (2004).

<sup>6</sup> For more information about the EU in the UN and its involvement in low politics, see: Laatikainen & Smith (2006) and Wouters, Hoffmeister, & Ruys (2006).

<sup>7</sup> ESS and HLP enumerate as 'the cluster of threats' in the new century: international terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, failing/failed states, organised crime. Additionally, the UN underlines the risks of climate change and poverty etc. in line with the paradigms of human security and good governance.

paradigms: first the international community realised that all security challenges are cross-linked and interrelated; secondly the states figured out that “every threat is a threat to all” (United Nations 2004a: 14); and thirdly they recognized that no one can tackle the security challenges unilaterally. Given that they both faced demands which exceeded the capacity of a single international actor and their new interdependence in the globalizing world, the EU and the UN identified the factual imperative of cooperation.

The year 2003 gave an additional internal reality check for both organisations and another signal to cooperate. The deep differences within the organisations during the crisis over Iraq in 2002/2003 triggered a need to reconstruct their external images, on one hand, and to strengthen their internal effectiveness, on the other. The EU took the line of promoting closer integration in the young policy field of external action and declared the full operational capability (FOC) of ESDP in the same year as the worst internal conflicts over Iraq.<sup>8</sup> The major powers of the EU, especially France and UK, searched for more visibility in the global sphere and for test cases for the new ESDP structures. The United Nations, under strain even more, recognised its relative organisational weakness and seized the opportunity to appeal for a renewed multilateral system. As the vast majority of states intoned the swan song after the inner conflict during the Iraq crisis the UN repeatedly emphasised its core and irreplaceable role in the multilateral system (United Nations 2004b).<sup>9</sup> It paved the way for strengthening itself through partnerships with strong and prospering multilateral partners, namely the EU. In 2007 Ban underscored this commitment to UN-centred multilateralism when he said: “The pendulum of history is swinging in our favour. Multilateralism is back. An increasingly interdependent world recognizes that the challenges of tomorrow are best dealt with through the UN. Indeed, they can only be dealt with through the UN” (United Nations Secretary General 2007). Aside from the internal learning processes, during this historical split in 2003, both organisations understood the necessity to share burdens in the face of global threats and their own overstretched capacities. They found common ground in securing the classic system of collective security. They discovered that via inter-organisational cooperation they might manage to perpetuate and deepen their status as global organisational actors and to influence world politics.

A strong common ground of this partnership lies in the promotion of the norm *multilateralism*<sup>10</sup> as the organisational skeleton and constitutional political objective of both organisations. Since the

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<sup>8</sup> For detailed information about the EU after Iraq, see: Dembinski & Wagner (2003); Ehrhart (2004).

<sup>9</sup> For an analysis about the UN after Iraq, see: Berdal (2004).

<sup>10</sup> About the concept of multilateralism and its development, see: Acharya (2006); Adler (2006); Caporaso (1992); Cox (1997), Keohane (1990, 2006); Kratochwil (2006); Newman (2007); Oudenaren (2004); Ruggie (1992,1998, 2003).

announcement of the “European Security Strategy” and the European Commission’s Communication, “The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism”, the EU has continuously been pronouncing its commitment to the UN as the traditional and relevant, but enfeebled linchpin of the international system under the shibboleth *effective multilateralism*. The Council Presidencies have underscored this specific connection to the UN on a yearly basis since 2004 in the General Assembly with the same rhetorical module: “The E.U. is deeply committed to the U.N., to upholding and developing international law, and to effective multilateralism as a central element of its external action” (EU Presidency 2004; 2005; 2006). Multilateralism is not a policy of exclusively using civilian means. It includes the military option as a last resort, used to provide *human security*<sup>11</sup> in a global measure and in line with the United Nations *responsibility to protect*<sup>12</sup>. Solana therefore labels this special European meaning as “multilateralism with teeth” (Ellner 2005).<sup>13</sup> The European Union uses *smart power*<sup>14</sup> in security policy. It perceives itself as a global multilateralist that has to strengthen international institutions, trying to prevent the system of collective security from failing. The European Union according to the ESS must make more efforts to pro-actively, effectively, coherently and consistently prevent conflict, keep the peace and promote good governance – in using the various preventive and persuasive instruments of security governance (European Council 2003).

These similar roles and mind-sets of EU and UN, the compatible normative principles underlying external action, the common perception of threats and challenges, the reciprocal will to change and to make the world more secure through multilateralism are the political catalysts and motives of the inter-organisational partnership. The concurrent capabilities of EU and UN as well as the concordant interests and even overlapping institutional structures,<sup>15</sup> boost the cooperation. The

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<sup>11</sup> “Human security refers to the quality of life of the people of a society or polity. Anything which degrades their quality of life – demographic pressures, diminished access to or stock or resources, and so on – is a security threat. Conversely, anything which can upgrade their quality of life – economic growth, improved access to resources, social and political empowerment, and so on – is an enhancement of human security.” (Thakur 1997: 53/54). See also Barcelona Report 2004 and United Nations 2008.

<sup>12</sup> “R2P aims to articulate governmental and intergovernmental responsibilities to prevent or react against the four most serious categories of international crimes, namely genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing. In contrast to humanitarian intervention, the concept of R2P delineated in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 Outcome Document puts the accent on sovereignty as responsibility.” (Peral 2008: 2) The “Responsibility to protect” was created by ICISS 2001.

<sup>13</sup> About the European perception of multilateralism, see: Biscop & Andersson (2008); Biscop & Driesken (2005); Eide (2004); Newman, Thakur & Tirman (2006); Ortega (2005).

<sup>14</sup> “Smart power” is defined as “a strategy that combines the soft power of attraction with the hard power of coercion” (Nye 2008: 1353).

<sup>15</sup> Overlapping institutional structures with a common intersection catalyze cooperation but might lead to more rivalry also (Biermann 2007).



military operations in the DRC paved the way for stronger EU-UN-cooperation in crisis management.

### *Global security governor: A closer look at Africa*

The African continent has been the traditional recipient of European aid since the very beginning of the European Union.<sup>16</sup> The EU is Africa's largest donor and its biggest trading partner. Apart from this involvement in development, the EU entered the African stage as a new security governor in 2003.<sup>17</sup> It changed its focus on the Balkans in the field of crisis management. Sub-Saharan Africa, especially the former colonies of Belgium and France in Central Africa, is increasingly becoming the focus of the CFSP/ESDP. It has been the location of civil and military crisis management operations since 2003.<sup>18</sup> These involvements implement the political promises to act as a comprehensive security governor not only in the sphere of vital interests (e.g. the Balkans) but abroad in less vital areas too.

To give an example of the committed political efforts to strengthen the security partnership with Africa, the central commitment must be mentioned: After two years of negotiations, in December 2007 the European Council, together with the African Heads of State, approved the Joint Africa-EU Strategy with the central *telos* of security and peace in Africa. The rationale of the First Action Plan (2008-2010) states: "Peace and security lie at the foundation of progress and sustainable development. The objective of the Joint Strategy is to cooperate in enhancing the capacity of Africa and EU to respond timely and adequately to security threats, and also to join efforts in addressing global challenges." (Council of the European Union 2007) Based on the development-security-nexus, this objective connects and combines the traditional European development instruments with new efforts in crisis management to develop a new comprehensive approach. For instance the EU installed a "Peace Facility for Africa", with a budget of 250 Million Euros, to support African-led peace operations and to enhance the institutional capabilities of the African Union. Moreover, the new focus reflects a change in the traditional paradigm "development first" to a new approach of "security is the first condition to development" (European council 2003: 2).

The central focus of the EU's shift to become a new global security actor is the DRC. This is one of the most threatened states in the whole international community. During the decision making

<sup>16</sup> For detailed information about EU-Africa-Relations, see: Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (2007).

<sup>17</sup> To learn more about this new role in Africa, see: Faria (2004).

<sup>18</sup> Military and Civilian Operations: Artemis (2003); EUFOR DR Congo (2006); EUFOR Chad/CAR (2008/2009); EU NAVFOR - Atalanta (since 2008); EUSEC DR Congo (since 2005), EUPOL DR Congo (former EUPOL Kinshasa) (since 2007); Support of AMIS II Sudan/Darfur (2005/2006), EUSSR Guinea Bissau (since 2008).

process for operation EUFOR DRC the European member states declared: “The EU is pursuing a comprehensive approach in its efforts to support the peace and reform effort in the DRC” (Council of the European Union 2006). They underscored their multilateral commitment as they announced: “As noted in the European Security Strategy, regional conflicts need political solutions, but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post-conflict phase” (Council of the European Union 2006). The EU’s move to widen its outlook in terms of peace and security to the African continent is something, which brings the EU and the UN closer together.

In a nutshell, the findings are as follows: The growing common perception of global threats and challenges was the central *stimulus* prompting the EU’s new involvement in Africa. Also, the ongoing integration of ESDP in all fields of security policy led to more demands for an external role for the EU, where it could demonstrate its operational capabilities. The DRC, with its fragile statehood and its war-torn society, has been a test case for EU security governance and ESDP military capabilities abroad over six years. The UN and the EU met in the middle of the African continent.

## **Combined efforts to keep the peace in DR Congo**

*“No stability in Central Africa without a stable DRC, and conversely.” (United Nations 2004c)*

In line with the questions that lead the article, the following aspects of the operations are of particular interest: the motives of the EU and the UN for launching Artemis/EUFOR DRC, the purpose- and goal-orientation of the mandates, the actions on the ground and the positive impacts for the overstretched UN and the DRC itself, the deficits of the operations and the lessons learned for future cooperation, and finally, the effects on the development of the ESDP and EU-UN-cooperation.

First of all, some facts about the DR Congo are presented. Then MONUC’s strong demand for support is elaborated.

### *The crisis-ridden DR Congo*

The former Belgian colony with 2.345 410 sq km is the third largest state by area and with a total population of 62.6 million is the fourth most populated nation in Africa.<sup>19</sup> It harbours over 250 ethnic groups, implying extensive explosive substance for ethnic tensions and conflicts. In spite of currently being one of the least developed countries, with a Human Development Index position of 167, the DRC is potentially the economic glasshouse for the whole continent. It owns the largest area of forest in Africa and one of the biggest river systems worldwide. The Englishman Marlow in Joseph Conrad's novel "Heart of the Darkness" described the Congolese powerful nature: "Going up that river was like travelling back to the earliest beginnings of the world, when vegetation rioted on the earth and the big trees were kings. An empty stream, a great silence, an impenetrable forest." (Conrad 1902: n. pag.) Moreover it holds a huge amount of various natural resources, e.g. Gold, Coltan and Diamonds<sup>20</sup>. The richness of its natural resources is the Congolese curse, but could be the Central-African blessing, if the DRC turned into a stable and predictable state. "This stillness of life [to which Marlow referred above] did not in the least resemble a peace." (Conrad 1902: n. pag.) After a phase of relative stabilization in the 1970s/1980s following the civil war (1960-1965), a regional conflict in the Great Sea Region with the centre DRC broke out in 1998. The US government labelled it during a SC meeting about the situation in DRC as "Africa's first world war" (United Nations Security Council 2000: 4). About four million people, almost all of them civilians, died. Looking for the root causes of this conflict is like watching the diverse colours and forms of a kaleidoscope. Central to this analysis are the following sources of conflict: The conflict affected the whole Central African region like a "central web of wars" (Ulriksen, Gourlay & Mace 2004). The DRC's neighbours (Angola, Rwanda and Burundi), who are very interested in the Congolese natural resources, were especially involved. For instance, Rwanda and Uganda controlled the North-Eastern regions of the DRC, namely the Kivus and Ituri, where Operation Artemis was located. Also Rwandan rebel groups of Hutu and Tutsi have been fighting on Congolese territory in the Kivus. The Congolese army, FARDC, which was built with support provided by UN and EU is one of the main conflict parties. The FARDC as "a state within a state" is evidence of the country's weakness and corruption. The Congolese statehood is still very fragile. It fulfils all failed state indicators on the social and political as well as the economic level.<sup>21</sup> The DRC ranks fifth<sup>22</sup> on the failed state index in 2009. This is even worse than preceding years but is nevertheless a relative improvement of the

<sup>19</sup> More information about the history of the DRC and its conflicts, see: Hugo (2006); Nest & Grignon (2006); Tshomba Ntundu (2009); Turner (2007).

<sup>20</sup> DRC is one of the problem states of the Kimberley process.

<sup>21</sup> For the indicators, see: Fund for Peace 2009.

<sup>22</sup> After Somalia (1.), Zimbabwe (2.), Sudan (3.), Chad (4.) (Fund for Peace 2009).

situation compared with 2005, when the DRC ranked second. Against this background, the following must be asked: Did the EU and the UN manage to change the “heart of darkness” (Conrad 1902) into the heart of brightness?

### *MONUC 1999 et seq.: Unrealistic Expectations and Lacking Capabilities*

The United Nations has understood itself as the African advocate for peace and security since the 1960s. During the Congolese wars of the 1960s the UN was engaged with its first robust peace-keeping operation ONUC.<sup>23</sup> On the contrary, the Europeans remained reluctant for a long time. After first steps in an enhanced involvement of European states in UN peace-keeping in Africa, they drew back their commitment after the breakdown in Somalia and Rwanda. As the case studies of the ESDP operations in the DRC show, the Europeans are still unwilling to serve in UN peace operations.<sup>24</sup> The UN was consequently the only security governor in this war-torn region over a period of decades.

The UN started its largest and most expensive peace operation MONUC in 1999 with resolution 1279 after the Lusaka Peace Agreement. As with many previous operations, the global community had high expectations about the prospects and capabilities of the UN. The gap between expectations and capabilities was therefore wide. This is the norm of UN peace-operations, not the exception. But the constraints and deficits of UN peace-keeping were presented to the eyes of the international community on a silver platter in the DRC. During the last escalation in winter 2008, the number of voices amongst UN-staff, NGOs and politicians, declaring the total failure of the United Nations in the DRC grew. The various causes of this were well known to the ears of UN staff. In order to understand the specific challenges that EU operations faced in supporting MONUC, some of the reasons for UN overstretch must be mentioned. First of all there had been extensive mission creep. The situation of MONUC was getting worse because its mandate was constantly being renewed<sup>25</sup> and extended until it became nine pages in length, with many detailed and demanding responsibilities lying in the limited hands of MONUC (United Nations 2008). It had various objectives ranging from classical peace observing, to wider and robust peace keeping, to peace building and post conflict reconstruction. Even when the Security Council authorized troops to increase, MONUC had neither the necessary personal resources nor the adequate logistical and transport utilities to tackle the situation. The reluctance of UN-member states to contribute to UN

<sup>23</sup> For more information, see: <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onuc.htm>.

<sup>24</sup> The Belgium government, for example, agreed in the aftermath of the Rwandan trauma to stay uninvolved in future UN peace-operations in Africa.

<sup>25</sup> Since the resolution from 30 November 1999 the SC agreed on fifty resolutions regarding the DRC and MONUC.

missions led to an insufficient number of personnel and military equipment. The contributions were ridiculously small when compared to the challenging tasks. For instance, during the recent crisis in North-Kivu the ratio of peacekeepers to locals was 1: 1,000. There was one blue helmet per 120 sq km. In direct comparison to NATO-led operations, the huge mismatch becomes obvious: in the east of Croatia with a population of 125,000, 5,000 UN-peacekeepers were employed; Kosovo, with an area that is twenty times smaller than the DRC and with a population of 2 million, was secured by 47,000 NATO-troops (MONUC 2008: 39). Therefore Bernath and Edgerton evaluated: "The troop strength in MONUC [even with the increase from 500 in 1999 to almost 19.000 troopers and policemen in 2009; M.S.] is a drop in the bucket." (Bernath & Edgerton 2003: 9) Often the promised and agreed-upon troop increase was not fulfilled by the Troop Contributing Countries. As a high-level member of MONUC stated, MONUC is still waiting for the strengthening of MONUC in the North-Kivus, authorized in December 2008.<sup>26</sup> Moreover, the SC forgot that it has to deal with incompetent partners, as is often the case. For instance, almost every TCC authorized by the first MONUC-mandates 1999-2002 and even the member states of the European Union and the members of the SC themselves labelled the mandate as a Chapter VI-mission. But the text of the resolutions states in no uncertain terms that MONUC has been authorized under Chapter VII from its very beginning. The misunderstanding of the mandate led to various misunderstandings of its role to play in DRC. Therefore the actions of MONUC were not according to the situation, but incoherent, inefficient, often risky and passive.<sup>27</sup> These shortcomings became critical as a crisis broke out in Ituri 2003. The robust, well-trained and well-equipped rapid reaction forces with local language-skills, which were urgently needed to "stabilize and secure the environment", are not part of MONUC. Far from it - MONUC has been constantly operating on scarce resources since 1999.

In the past, such a situation often resulted in the total failure of UN-peacekeeping. But for a short time now, the DPKO has been using the instrument of subcontracting other organisations or multinational coalitions of the willing<sup>28</sup> - this includes the EU as a new partner that received a UN-request for the first time in 2003.

### *Artemis 2003: Bridging MONUC*

The ESDP operation in 2003 concentrated on the North-East of the Province Orientale, near the Congolese-Ugandan border. In contrast to the remarkable progress of stabilisation in the main

<sup>26</sup> Interview with MONUC staff in Kinshasa, 21 July 2009, per telephone.

<sup>27</sup> Interview with an NGO located in DR Congo, August 2009, per telephone.

<sup>28</sup> For instance: Interfet in Sierra-Leone.

Congolese area, the crisis in Ituri, especially around the capital Bunia, escalated in springtime 2003. This was provoked by a security vacuum left after the pull-out of the Ugandan troops in the beginning of 2003, which had been approved in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement 1999. The SG had warned the international community of a potential crisis which could be caused by a security vacuum a long time before the Ugandans began withdrawing their troops. But the SC did the opposite and urged the Ugandan forces to draw back “before sufficient peacekeepers had arrived to replace them.” (Holt & Berkmann 2006: 171) As a staff member of UNDP in DRC noticed, comparing it to the Rwandan catastrophe in 1994: “Likewise, Operation Artemis (...), would have been unnecessary had the United Nations Security Council acted in accordance with the Lusaka Accord of 1999.” (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007: 32) The vacuum was filled by rebels of Hema and Lendu fighting each other. Armed conflicts also broke out between the 1998 established rebel movements RCD-G, the FARDC and Kabila’s militia. A humanitarian crisis took its toll with nearly 600.000 displaced persons and 100.000 dead civilians. Gegout spoke about Ituri as the conflict with the highest death rate of any conflict region (Gegout 2005). Blue helmets were victims of aggression. Also MONUC’s headquarters in Bunia was attacked in May 2003. Ituri became “the bloodiest corner of Congo” (Human Rights Watch 2003).

The command level of MONUC reacted quickly and transferred the 700-strong URUBATT to Bunia. The Peacekeeping Best Practices Section (PBPS) subsumed in its lessons-learned-report: “Since doing nothing was not an option, the only available alternative was to redeploy the Uruguayans from other parts of the country.” (PBPS/MD 2004: 7). But, as the SG stated, this could only be a “limited, interim and emergency measure.” (United Nations 2003a: 13) URUBATT had only observer capabilities and was, in face of the humanitarian catastrophe, almost ridiculously small in size, faced with 28.000 rebels. In his report S/2003/566 the SG published an urgent demand for MONUC’s extension to a brigade-sized formation, named “Ituri Brigade”.

### **The decision: motives and driving forces**

In a letter to the SC dated 15 May 2003, the SG called for an additional multinational rapid reaction force for a limited time and scope to share burdens with MONUC. He underscored the aspect of limitation and pointed out these troops were not requested to replace MONUC (United Nations 2003b). The latter was stressed by the EU several times. At the same time the SG received a letter from the government of the DRC asking for an international rapid deployment force (Ulrich 2003: 9). In fact, the multinational force was to be an interim solution during MONUC’s increase in size and capabilities as authorized in resolution 1484 of 30 May 2003.

The decision-making-process began with a bilateral dialogue between the SG and France. France remained the driving force behind the first autonomous ESDP operation until the end of the mission. It was obvious that France, as the African advocate in the SC, was a potential leader of a multinational operation. Africa was traditionally a focus of French foreign policy to underline its global political leadership qualities (Utley 2002; Mair 2002).

At first France and the UN negotiated a French-led operation labelled Mamba until France brought the idea of an EU-force into the discussion. After the Europeanization this IEMF was called "Artemis". The French-led ESDP operation is often labelled a French operation. This classification misconceives the new European character of Artemis as the first military ESDP-mission worldwide. Despite being led by the French, the political-strategic direction of Artemis lay in the hands of the PSC.

The Europeanization of operation Mamba was the result of a well calculated cost-benefit-calculation of the EU-motor France. In recent times France has tried to change its old image of a unilateral military interventionist into the role of a multilaterally acting crisis manager. It lay in France's interest to emphasise the EU's visibility as new security actor. In this regard, one has to keep in mind that the further development of the ESDP has been a French-British child since the summit of St. Malo. In the aftermath of the Iraq crisis France sought to balance the US-predominance by turning the EU into a strong security actor (Gegout 2005: 437). Apart from the French view, the EU itself had strong motives for acting as a security governor alongside the UN. Artemis was seen as the litmus test of the new global role of the EU as a multilateral security governor. Solana underlined during a SC-meeting on the DRC: "The fact that a multinational force was deployed by the European Union – the first operation of the European Union outside Europe – sends a clear and strong signal to all those who are concerned that the world is not reacting as it should to those who undermine peace efforts by engaging in destructive acts, which have cost lives of thousands of innocent civilians." (Solana 2003: 4) The EU, in particular Solana, as well as the Commission (which has been engaged in the DRC for years), called for humanitarian responsibility to stabilize the situation. They referred to the central importance of a stable DRC for the whole region of the Great Lakes. For instance, the EU promotes stability in the region through its Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region and via financial support for the African Union's military involvement in Burundi as well as through financial contributions for the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme for the Great Lakes Region (World Bank) and the UNDP-disarmament program in Congo Brazzaville (European Union 2005). Solana said: "The



European Union is getting ready and is prepared to face this important challenge. (...) yet we are determined to succeed in helping the UN overcome the current humanitarian crisis in the Ituri region.” (Solana 2003b) Artemis put the European affirmation to the test. It demonstrated the political will on the part of the member states to deepen the EU-project after the serious differences which arose during the Iraq crisis.

### **The mandate: authorisation of IEMF/Artemis**

The UNSC resolution as the legitimizing basis for the operation clearly enumerated the competences of Artemis. As demanded by the lead-nation, France, the operation was mandated under Chapter VII “to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate.” The bridge-building-operation was authorized “on a strictly temporary basis [until 1 September 2003; M.S.] to allow the Secretary-General to reinforce MONUC’s presence in Bunia” (Homan 2007: 2). By this, Homan means that this time limitation was demanded by France. The area of action was also limited. Artemis should “contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation” in the capital Bunia only. It was authorized to ensure the protection of the airport as an essential logistical hub and of the IDPs in the camps, as well as “if the situation requires to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personal and the humanitarian presence in town.” This catalogue was endorsed very efficiently with the Joint Action 2003/423/CSFP of 5 June 2003 after legitimisation by the UNSC.<sup>29</sup> The members of the European Union agreed upon 2,000 soldiers from 12 European and 5 Non-European countries, mostly deployed to Bunia (1.100). France, as framework-nation of Artemis, contributed nearly 90 percent of the force - the biggest part of the operation. 850 logistical and technical personnel were stationed in the Ugandan Entebbe (750) and Kampala (100). 1,000 French soldiers already in service in Africa were on stand-by as reserve capability.

### **On the ground: achievements**

In analyzing the practical test case, Artemis, in regard to the EU’s performance as a new security governor and partner of the UN, numerous positive impacts can be identified. At first, Artemis was a check for the ESDP itself. As noted above the FOC was tested outside the European area. The EU led an autonomous operation and installed the framework-nation-concept with France as the leader and largest troop contributor for the first time. It worked smoothly. The strategic direction and political control of Artemis was given to the PSC which made its decisions in accordance with

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<sup>29</sup> For a model of inter-organisational cooperation in the planning phase of an autonomous ESDP-operation in support of an UN peace-operation see Annex, figure 1, of this paper.



Article 25 EUT. The military direction lay in the hands of the EUMS – this was also the first time in the short life-span of the ESDP. Considering now the quality of Artemis as a supporter of MONUC, the results are satisfying. The clear mandate with feasible objectives avoided a capabilities-expectations-gap. After the authorisation by UNSC and EC, the EU reacted on the field level just as quickly and rapidly as on planning level. In contrast to MONUC there was almost no delay in troop-deployment. For instance, the first troops landed in Bunia only four days after the Joint Declaration to launch the mission, although it took three months until Artemis was fully operational. Moreover all promised troops were really in the field. All soldiers were well-equipped, well-trained and familiar with the local Congolese conventions. The French had the ultimate plus as they could speak with the people in their own language to build confidence between the locals and the foreign troops. But did Artemis also act in line with the UN mandate and the objectives of rules-based crisis management? Artemis tried to act in line with the UN mandate. The ESDP-troops supported the return of about 100,000 IDPs to Bunia. Moreover it contributed to a safer and more secure environment by patrolling the streets of the capital. One visible output of the success of a SASE was the installation of a transitional government during the time of Artemis. In addition, public life awakened and the people of Bunia developed economic activity. In line with the robust mandate and in contrast to the reactive blue helmets, Artemis delivered results. MONUC's chief of the Humanitarian Affairs Section confirmed: "They [Artemis; M.S.] were very aggressive, and would shoot to kill...The people in Bunia *did* feel that these people (...) were there to protect them." (Holt & Berkman 2006: 71) Thus, the best results were achieved in an additional objective, declared by the Artemis operational direction after combat between Artemis and rebel groups a few days after the first deployment. To stop the aggression, EU FCdr Brigadier Jean-Paul Thonier declared his aim to make Bunia a "ville sans armes" and issued an ultimatum to the rebels (Tanner 2004: 1). From 24 June 2003 onwards, Artemis prohibited "the open bearing of arms in Bunia" (Solana 2003c).

### **On the ground: deficits**

Bearing in mind that the EU's performance during Artemis has to be measured against the political declarations, the review of Artemis must be more critical. Did the EU talk too big and operate too little? At first let's have a short look at the day-to-day contacts between the operations. The inter-organisational communication is essential for smooth progress in collaboration in the field. To cut a long story short: the exchange between the headquarters has to be urgently improved in future co-operative initiatives. Apart from the fundamental problem of different operational structures<sup>30</sup>, the

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<sup>30</sup> The different structures of the chains of command and the official ways of consultation in UN- and EU-operations are represented in Annex, figure 2.

communication between Artemis and MONUC was almost non-existent, particularly at the very beginning. For instance MONUC was surprised by the arrival of the first Artemis troops at Bunia airport. The EU FHQ had preferred to act unilaterally because of a deep mistrust towards the UN-provided security information. To name another capital error as an example: the UN and the EU did not institutionalise their field cooperation through an exchange of liaison officers. A great opportunity for reciprocal institutional learning passed unutilized. These problems were discussed in the aftermath of Artemis during the lessons-learned-process.

Apart from the technical cooperation, the actions in the field must be questioned with reference to the mandate. Analyzing the role of Artemis on the ground means entering a grey area between the mandated sphere of responsibility and the expected impact of the EU acting as a good governor and crisis manager. During the operation some concerns were raised by the UN, NGOs and European states, expressing mistrust towards the multilateral-normative objectives of the EU action. A series of observations call the credibility of Artemis into question. For instance, even if the French language skills led to the assumption that confidence between Artemis and the locals would grow immediately, there was deep mistrust between the European troops and the Congolese citizens. The French did not communicate with the locals with respect. Moreover this mistrust was sowed because Artemis did not patrol on foot to come into contact with the citizens but in armoured cars. Artemis' own objective of a "ville sans armes" had no lasting effect. The declared disarmament caused no de-militarization in Bunia. Since the "rude house searches" (Sow 2004: 212) for weapons were the exception and not the rule, the rebels hoarded their weapons in privacy. If Artemis stated that Bunia looked like a weapon-free zone, this observation would be true. But the rebels transferred the weapons to only a few kilometres behind the area of Artemis. Sow monitored "no significant progress (...) to stop killings outside Bunia." (Sow 2004: 211) By contrast, after the withdrawal of Artemis the situation in Bunia destabilised.

The most frequently heard criticisms refer to the shortfalls of the operation caused by the mandated limitation of space and time. They raise the question of the credible objectives of Artemis. However, it should be noted that the following criticism goes beyond the mandated competences of Artemis. The question frequently asked is not "Did Artemis fulfil the mandate?", but "What should Artemis have done to the SASE?" The grey zone between a mandate-oriented analysis and a good-governance-led evaluation is obvious. However, this question must be discussed. First of all, it had to be clear from the beginning that safeguarding Bunia would only have been successful if the hinterland was being secured too. To operate in Bunia only risked the pull-out of the rebels

into the hinterland where MONUC's presence was thin. It shifted the problem locally and postponed it, but did not solve it. The limitation of time is even more questionable. The EU acted strictly in line with the mandate as it began to withdraw its troops after exactly three months. Was this behaviour appropriate from a moral point of view? At the time of the European withdrawal only about 25 percent of the Ituri Brigade had been deployed. It was obvious that the rebels would use the security vacuum left by Artemis to test the new robust power of MONUC. This fact carries weight because of the "glaring disparity between MONUC and the IEMF" in terms of Special Force capabilities and reconnaissance aircraft (PBPS/MD 2004: 21). The PBPS/MD wrote in the lessons-learned report: "Had there been a component ready to stay on with MONUC, greater continuity would have been established, emphasizing to all the confluence of the IEMF and MONUC mission." (PBPS/MD 2004: 14). Moreover, the alternative to re-hat with MONUC was not an option for any Artemis-participant. This European reluctance to re-hat, in close line with the national reluctance to join a UN operation, is a phenomenon of ESDP-operations per se. It proved true in EUFOR DRC also. This fact is all the more important as there is an enormous difference between refusing to contribute troops to the UN in a new setting and rejecting this possibility while operating in the region – even in a cost-benefit-calculation.

## Future developments

The first autonomous ESDP operation had some effects on the EU involvement in the DRC<sup>31</sup>, on the development of MONUC and the ESDP as well as on future EU-UN-cooperation. Beginning with the direct effects on the future of MONUC, Artemis had significant impacts. Due to the strong European demand in the SC, the extended MONUC mandate 1493 was as robust as the mandate of Artemis. Solana insisted on a robust mandate to preserve the achievements of Artemis. He said: "That force should have a mandate and rules of engagement similar to those of the European Union force (...). It should have the equipment and military resources necessary to accomplish its mission (...). If we wish to secure the region beyond the city limits, we will also have to deploy larger forces." (Solana 2003c: 2)

Moreover, Operation Artemis was a milestone in the development of the ESDP. It was the precondition and the role-model for the battle-groups-concept which was born after Artemis. The lessons learned from the difficult ad-hoc-financing of Artemis and Concordia (Macedonia) resulted in the creation of a financing mechanism for ESDP operations, labelled Athena.<sup>32</sup> The positive test of

<sup>31</sup> As this involvement is a motive for EUFOR DRC, it is discussed in the next chapter.

<sup>32</sup> For a detailed analysis of Athena, see: Bendiek/Bringmann 2008.

the ESDP capabilities and the confirmation of its status as a global security governor led to the ESS, published in December 2003, and the EU's commitment to be a driving force of *effective multilateralism*. The European member states testified their responsibility for peace and security in Africa as they wrote: "State failure and organised crime spread if they are neglected – as we have seen in West Africa." (European Council 2003: 7) They drew a lesson from Artemis and emphasized the *culture of prevention* as the best way to tackle the new threats. Also they paved the way for stronger support of the United Nations under the shibboleth of *effective multilateralism*. The Europeans referred to the lessons learned from Artemis as they formulated the objective to "support the United Nations as it responds to threats to international peace and security. The EU is committed to reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts, and to enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management situations." (European Council 2003: 10) The UN joined in the multilateral testimony of the EU after the cooperative initiative in the DRC. It supported the concept of burden sharing with other collective actors in the Report on Threats, Challenges and Change (United Nations 2004a). The UN-EU-cooperation in the DRC resulted in new initiatives to inject new life into Chapter VIII of the Charter.

At the very least, Operation Artemis was the direct stimulus for the decisive step towards a deepened EU-UN-cooperation. The lessons learned led to an EU-UN agreement on crisis management to institutionalize the partnership in the following fields of cooperation: *planning* an operation; inter-organisational *communication* on a regular basis; collaboration in *training* for peace operation; common lessons-learned-processes for *best practices*.<sup>33</sup> For instance the EU and the UN agreed upon an exchange of staff to enhance inter-organisational knowledge and they made arrangements for building up inter-institutional access. This was important for future cooperation in crisis management as the DFS diagnosed: "Clear understanding of respective autonomous processes supports effective and efficient cooperation in the implementation of UN-authorized mandates." (UNDPKO/DFS 2008: 2). A direct lesson from the Congolese cooperation was the clause to cooperate closely in the sensitive and difficult phase of planning a crisis management operation, e.g. in the form of combined fact-finding-missions, the adjustment of logistic and communications utilities and the interoperability of equipment. The European Council (EC) specified this arrangement during the Summit of June 2004. It published a declaration on EU-UN military crisis management cooperation, followed by an announcement regarding civilian crisis management.

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<sup>33</sup> It was announced by EU President Berlusconi and SG Annan on 24 September 2003. During the German Presidency in July 2007, the declaration was renewed. Moreover, it was deepened with the "Guidelines for joint UN-EU planning applicable to existing UN field missions" from June 2008 and the "Recommendations for the Implementation of the Joint Statement on EU-UN co-operation in crisis management" (5293/1/08 REV 1 28 July 2008).

Both agreements proposed possible ways to implement the vague declaration on an operational level. The paper about military teamwork conceptualised four scenarios for UN-EU-cooperation. Two of them, the “bridging model” and the “over the horizon model” were realized in the DRC.<sup>34</sup>

It is interesting to note that all advances to work on conceptualising the partnership were made by the European Union or one of its motors. The United Nations played no leading role in deepening the institutional relationship due to a lack of interest in institutionalising the partnership on a level beyond case-by-case-contacts.<sup>35</sup>

In short: The first steps of the new crisis manager on the global stage were both confident and efficient, but sometimes too self-centred and not effective. A new opportunity to improve the performance presented itself in 2006.

### ***EUFOR DR Congo 2006: Supporting MONUC***

In 2006 an ESDP operation was deployed to the DRC during the first presidential and parliamentary elections since the DRC gained independence from Belgium. These elections were seen both by the Congolese as well and by the international community as key for the DRC’s successful transformation from a fragile state into a stable state. Calling the elections posed additional challenges for MONUC to stabilize the situation which was not as secure as hoped after the long-standing presence of the blue helmets.

### **Decision: promoters and brake blocks**

The UN as well as the EU placed high significance on the undisturbed progression of the transformational phase. De la Sablière, Director of the SC-mission to the DRC, emphasised that “Free and successful elections also presuppose sufficient security.” (United Nations 2006a: 2). In the operations’ master message the European Union affirmed the paradigm of good governance as its motive for renewed involvement. It spoke of the elections as the “historic juncture” and “a crucial moment for the transition” (Council of the European Union 2006: 4; 7).

At this point of time additional support for the UN-efforts was wanted mostly because MONUC only had enough troops at its disposal until the end of the election campaign. Besides, from the beginning of the elections until the end of the transitional phase MONUC had to be re-deployed to

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<sup>34</sup> For the models see “EU/UN co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations - Elements of implementation of the EU/UN Joint Declaration” (9638/1/04 REV1 9 June 2004).

<sup>35</sup> This conclusion is grounded in a detailed analysis of all non-classified documents as well as in information during interviews.

organise the complicated election processes in the whole country. So only 2,000 troops from Tunisia, South-Africa and Uruguay<sup>36</sup> stayed in the capital Kinshasa while the other 15,000 peacekeepers were concentrated in the unstable East of the country.<sup>37</sup> They had neither robust rules of engagement (which only applied to the East), nor enough capacities to deal with a potential escalation. As a result there was a latent security vacuum in Kinshasa during this crucial time. But Annan's address to the SC requesting an extension of MONUC during the transition phase was rejected for financial reasons.

Thus, for the first time the SG asked the EU for help without national detours. The British EU-presidency received a letter from Annan asking for a deterrence force and for additional skills to intensify the deterrent effect, e.g. PSYOPS. Solana as well as Ajello, the members of the Commission as well as the Parliament, asked the member states for a pro-active involvement. As Solana said, the EU "could not fail" (Solana 2007: 1). Serious moral and rational reasoning spoke against refusing the appeal. The strongest motive for responding positively to the request was the EU's already multifaceted involvement in the DRC, meaning that it had great potential to actually enhance the situation in the DRC. EUFOR fitted perfectly in the comprehensive approach of the new civil-military security governor (Council of the European Union 2006). To name some civil-military efforts: In 2005 the EU launched two small ESDP missions at the request of the Congolese government. EUPOL Kinshasa, which since 2007 has been called EUPOL DR Congo, monitors, mentors and gives advice to the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) (European Union 2005: 2).<sup>38</sup> For the elections period this mission was reinforced. Alongside that, the EU sent EUSEC, an ESDP mission of a few military experts, to organise the National Army on high level. For instance EUSEC is successfully involved in fighting against corruption and crime which were the result of missing salaries of the army. Also the Commission financed the main part of the elections and "allocated € 9 million to establish and implement a strategy of elections security to be implemented by the Police National Congolaise with the assistance of (...) MONUC." (European Union 2005: 2/3). To complete the civilian involvement, the EU sent observers for the duration of the elections. EUFOR DR Congo demonstrated the "will [to; M.S.] build on this trend" (Council of the European Union 2006: 7). Another motive for EUFOR was the abovementioned moral one, emphasized by Solana and Ajello. Solana referred to the responsibility of the "good governor EU" in the name of human security and

<sup>36</sup> Formerly deployed to Bunia as URUBATT. A high officer of EUFOR DRC said, the Uruguayans were the only useful and pro-actively engaged blue-helmets in Kinshasa (Interview with EUFOR DRC staff, 5 August 2009, Munich).

<sup>37</sup> For more information about the national contributions to MONUC, see: United Nations 2006c.

<sup>38</sup> EUPOL followed a project of the EDF which had supported the establishment of the IPU with an amount of eight million Euros.

highlighted the meaning of democratic elections per se (Solana 2007: 1). Apart from this normative motive and the promotion of a comprehensive approach to security, the EU played the geopolitical card. The DRC was characterized as the strategic heart of the whole continent (Solana 2006: 1). “A destabilization of the DRC during the elections would be a catastrophe for all of us”, Ajello appealed to the EU member states. In regard to the new declaration on EU-UN cooperation in crisis management, the Master Message of EUFOR DRC pointed to the chance that has presented itself to the EU and the UN to intensify their cooperation as “partners of peace and security” through this new cooperation (Council of the European Union 2006: 8).

In accordance with Artemis, instrumental motives of pure self-interest can be identified as well. A motivation for EUFOR DRC might have been the attempt to bolster the credibility of the ESDP after the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty. Haine and Giegerich emphasised this rationale and concluded that the situation on the Congolese ground was only of secondary concern to the EU (Haine & Giegerich 2006). Another, more obvious reason for supporting MONUC was to test the over-the-horizon-scenario. In addition to that, an autonomous European Operational Headquarters (OHQ) was institutionalised for the first time.<sup>39</sup> But these ESDP-concentrated motives should not be overrated, in face of the strong intent to act pro-actively and credibly along the lines of a comprehensive approach.

Although the motives to launch EUFOR-DRC were indisputable, the inner-European decision-process during the operational planning phase was difficult. It took almost six months from the UN-request (27 December 2005) until the decision to launch the operation (12 June 2006) was made. The discussions were so openly presented to the international community that European diplomats spoke of EUFOR as a farce (Pinzler 2006: 10). The frictions arose because of the objective to mirror the impartiality and multi-nationality of ESDP operations. Although France had been the catalyst of these discussions, and was the motor of the African ESDP engagement, it refused to lead an operation to the DRC for a second time. The French government had to avoid the impression that EUFOR was seen as a mission led by French vital interests because France was perceived as a supporter of the Kabila government. To give France the leading role would have questioned the highest bid of EU operations: the impartiality and neutrality of the troops. It was a wise decision to ask another ESDP-motor to be the lead-nation for EUFOR DRC. The next in the line, Great Britain, used its commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq as an excuse for passivity. Thus, Germany was asked

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<sup>39</sup> In “autonomous” operations the EU makes use of facilities provided by any of the five Operation Headquarters (OHQs) currently available in European Member States. These are: the French OHQ in Mont Valérien, Paris; the UK OHQ in Northwood; the German OHQ in Potsdam, Berlin; the Italian OHQ in Rome; and the Greek OHQ in Larissa.



to lead EUFOR and to use the European Headquarters stationed in Potsdam. But for a time, Germany resisted taking on the responsibility. The reluctance to engage in Africa is no surprise given the background of the German socialisation as civilian power during the German partition. Every military engagement (especially when there are no vital interests and it is far away in an African country) is viewed very critically by the German public.<sup>40</sup> The Association of the German Armed Forces stigmatized the operation as political show (Press statement of the association 1 June 2006). Moreover, the financial mechanisms of ESDP worked on the Athena-principle “to carry costs were they fall”.<sup>41</sup> That meant that the Germans had to carry huge financial weight. It was only the fear of losing its core position as the motor of the European project, which changed the German government’s mind. Defence Minister Jung warned the German Bundestag: “It is our duty!” But the general aversion remained. This strong aversion resulted in strong caveats being made as to the scope of action in the DRC. As a result, it was almost impossible for the Germans to act in line with the mandate.

### **The mandate: authorisation of EUFOR DR Congo**

The SC mandated EUFOR to support MONUC with resolution 1671 on 25 April 2006. The resolution bore the signatures of the EU member states of the SC and Germany. As in 2003, the authorization under Chapter VII was the main pre-condition for EUFOR. It was explicitly demanded in the answering letter to the UN’s request (United Nations 2006b: Annex II). The mandate was very clear in defining time and scope, the arrangement of the operation and its objectives. As mentioned in the letter of the SG the operation was limited for the time of the election (four months after the first round of the elections at the most). The operational area stretched across the whole country except for the unstable East where MONUC was gathered.<sup>42</sup> EUFOR was double-tracked. A concentrated forward element of 400 troops was deployed to Kinshasa: a Polish force protected the equipment of EUFOR; 150 Spanish soldiers were the potential combat troops of EUFOR on the ground. An over-the-horizon force (1.300) for rapid reaction stood-by in Gabon. It was a strategic measure as it “ensured the deterrent capacity and avoided an unnecessary heavy military presence in Kinshasa.” (Solana 2007) More than 1.000 soldiers were stationed in Germany and France as strategic reserves demonstrating “resoluteness through proclamation” (Nachtwei 2006). The mandate clarified the responsibilities between MONUC and EUFOR as well. It was agreed that EUFOR was only allowed to act in crisis situations if the central direction of MONUC asked for it. This special

<sup>40</sup> For more information, see: Scheuermann (2007).

<sup>41</sup> The Athena mechanism that was agreed upon 2004 contributed only 16 million Euros for HQs and forces in Congo.

<sup>42</sup> The caveats allowed the German troops only to operate in Kinshasa and Gabon.



principle of burden sharing was accepted owing to the UN's demand to be an independent and autonomous security actor and in the context of strengthening its weak image. The objectives of EUFOR authorized through resolution 1671 were close to the tasks of Artemis. EUFOR had to support MONUC in building a SASE. But in contrast to Artemis, the UN drew much more attention to the aspect of supporting MONUC. In particular it stressed the subordinated responsibility of EUFOR. The strong emphasis on the support aspect was necessary to demonstrate the impartiality of EUFOR. Moreover, EUFOR was to contribute to the protection of civilians, the protection of the airport and to the evacuation of individuals. The latter was claimed by the EU on the basis of the limited capabilities of EUFOR (United Nations 2006b: Annex II). In face of this caveat some analysts and NGOs questioned EUFOR's serious interest in supporting MONUC. They suspected that the one and only reason to deploy EUFOR had been the potential evacuation of Europeans. Apart from that, another output from the lessons-learned-process after Artemis that found its expression in the mandate was the necessity of the EU and the UN to work closely together from the prearrangements until the completed withdrawal of EUFOR. Also the mandate reminded everyone to organise the withdrawing of EUFOR in close coordination with MONUC. The fulfilment of this instruction put the concept of the EU as a credible and responsible security governor to the test.

### **On the ground: achievements**

Did the ESDP meet expectations of being a credible security governor and MONUC-supporter on the ground? The rash answer must be "yes" as the historical election resulted in a SASE without any incidents. But to glance at the impact for EUFOR first: the second operation in the DRC was a successful test for the young policy field of the ESDP. It profited from the experiences of Artemis as well as the EUFOR missions in the Balkans (CONCORDIA/ALTHEA). In contrast to Artemis EUFOR DRC demonstrated a completely European character not only within the high level but on the Congolese ground as well. Apart from a few shortcomings, the new EU OHQ operated smoothly (Viereck 7: 254). 150 soldiers from 21 states served in the strategic centre of the mission. To have a look at the day-to-day contacts between the EU Field Headquarters and MONUC which were sources of deficits during Artemis, the picture is positive. The steady communication was required in the mandating Resolution 1671 and in the Joint Action (Paragraph 6(2), 6(3) and 7(2)). MONUC and EUFOR went in direct communication with one another from the very beginning of EUFOR.<sup>43</sup> They avoided frictions and built confidence via the exchange of liaison officers. According to the declaration on EU-UN cooperation in crisis management the EU Satellite Centre produced

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<sup>43</sup> Interview with EUFOR DRC staff, 5 August 2009, Munich.

imaginary analysis for MONUC (Asbeck 2007: 12).<sup>44</sup> This collaboration was continued beyond the withdrawal of EUFOR.

Asking about the quality of EUFOR as a supporter of MONUC in line with the mandate, the results are as satisfactory as during Artemis. The realistic mandate avoided a capabilities-expectations-gap. The troop deployment was executed more quickly than the tiring planning phase had been. In contrast to Artemis the FOC was reached after four weeks, just in time for the start of the elections. A lack of airlift capabilities was solved through sub-contracting non-European states like Russia.<sup>45</sup> All troops were well-equipped and well-trained to support the overstretched MONUC in stabilizing and securing the environment. But did they fulfil this task? Did EUFOR act in line with the mandate and the principles of a norm-led crisis manager? Mainly in the very beginnings EUFOR had to deal with a core challenge: it had to create a positive image of itself. The main precondition for a successful operation is that the troops are perceived as impartial and neutral.. However, EUFOR was seen as a partial force.<sup>46</sup> It was perceived as party group of Kabila because of the huge amount of French soldiers which were suspected as supporters of Kabila for historical reasons (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007: 33). This perception arose because most of the sympathisers of presidential candidate, Bemba, lived in Kinshasa. Apart from that, the Europeans made a clever move with a deterrent strategy composed of military presence and psy-ops. To begin with the fundamental brick of the successful military part of EUFOR: The command of EUFOR coined the motto “open visor”. So EUFOR patrolled through the dangerous slums of Kinshasa on foot and without full battledress (Martin 2007: 72). In contrast to Artemis, EUFOR put in an effort to meet the Congolese. Contrary to MONUC which patrolled in heavy vehicles and tanks, EUFOR carried weapons too, but “from rubber sticks to guns” (Martin 2007: 72). EUFOR showed its military presence and emphasised its preparedness to act rapidly via the operational reserve forces in Gabon constantly. For instance it invited the Congolese government and representatives of the rebel groups, the FARDC and the Police to a “Presentation of Force” to give an imposing and permanent impression. Belgium drones observed the Congolese territory day and night. Also EUFOR arranged an exercise in Katanga to be noticed by the Congolese population. This steady military presence was for a key component of its success (Viereck 2007: 256; WEU 2006: 8). During these military operations, EUFOR endeavoured to emphasise its role to support MONUC and to only be second in line as a guarantor of security.

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<sup>44</sup> These images are a main instrument for early-warning and crisis monitoring and were essential for EUFOR and MONUC in observing strategic intersections, the Congolese infrastructure and the rebels’ troop movements.

<sup>45</sup> These shortcomings are a fundamental deficit of the ESDP-FOC and are still a central subject of discussion.

<sup>46</sup> But it has to be clear that EUFOR was not attacked by Bemba’s militia or other rebels as reported in the newspapers by mistake (e.g. FAZ.net 30 July 2006, Johnson 2006). Interview with EUFOR RDC staff, 5 August 2009, Munich.

EUFOR aimed to respect the authority of MONUC. It did not patrol at the same time as MONUC in order to underscore the distinct separation of the operations, as said by EUFOR DRC staff. Moreover, EUFOR acted in line with the mandate as it acted in various crisis situations only on MONUC's request. During the August crisis that broke out between Kabila's militia and Bemba's troops after the message that a presidential run-off would be necessary, EUFOR acted impartially and rapidly. In "a closely coordinated operation" with MONUC, EUFOR evacuated ambassadors and the commanders of the operations which were locked in Bemba's attacked residence (United Nations 2006c: 5).<sup>47</sup> To stabilise the situation, MONUC and EUFOR cooperated in mediating between the conflicting parties and institutionalized a confidence-building-commission which installed common patrols of the conflicting parties. From this time on MONUC and EUFOR patrolled with the Congolese army through the streets of Kinshasa. During the escalation EUFOR had the opportunity to demonstrate its over-the-horizon-capability as well. It deployed 300 German paratroopers from Gabon to Kinshasa strengthening the Spanish combat capabilities. The robust Western Brigade of MONUC was also deployed to Kinshasa with support of EUFOR (United Nations 2006c: 17).

As mentioned above, the other strategy was to stabilize the situation through psy-ops. EUFOR developed enormous public relations efforts to build a confident and communicative atmosphere as well as to demonstrate the credibility, impartiality, independence and autonomy of EUFOR (Viereck 2007: 255). It published its own newspaper and broadcasted its message to be "present and ready" within the few neutral radio stations of DRC. These initiatives helped to restore the image of an impartial force and contributor of good governance all over the country.

### **On the ground: deficits**

To get a complete picture of the operation, EUFOR must be measured against its political declarations. As with Artemis, the study enters the grey area of evaluating the fulfilment of the mandate against EUFOR's potential impact. Additionally some deficits and constraints must be mentioned. First of all, the two basic observations must be pointed out that confirm the general assumptions of inter-organisational cooperation and rivalry: First, the different strategic and institutional cultures hindered a smooth collaboration. Secondly, the strong demand for autonomy and visibility as a single actor, which is in every organisation's genetic code, affected the cooperation at all levels. It contradicted the strong commitment to effective multilateralism.

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<sup>47</sup> For more information about the escalations from 20 August until 22 August, see: International Crisis Group 2006.

During August's escalation the main risk of the cooperation came to the fore: As EUFOR was allowed to engage only at the request of MONUC, it was condemned to be a casual bystander in the beginnings of the crisis until MONUC asked for help. It exposed the EU to critique regarding its passive behaviour during the break-out of the atrocity. Fortunately, this time it turned out all right. But the inter-institutional procedures following such an arrangement are too complicated in face of an escalation that requires rapid reaction. The same criticism about complicated coordination processes and limited usability is voiced in regard to the over-the-horizon-modular (Tardy 2005: 65). The danger associated with both special arrangements was that EUFOR support would be asked for too late. Haine and Giegerich came to the popular conclusion that EUFOR had been only a cosmetic operation which had been "limited, brief, risk-averse and ultimately ineffective." (Haine & Giegerich 2006) The abovementioned "me first"-behaviour was demonstrated during the end of operation (shortly after the run-off and before president Kabila was inaugurated) in cold print as EUFOR began to withdraw its troops while the situation destabilised visibly.<sup>48</sup> UN-organisations like UNDP had been asking for an extension of EUFOR's end-date since July. The signal that was sent by the EU was clear: "end-date" above "end-state". The EU acted in accordance with Germany which emphasised the bid of the end-date constantly. German Defence Minister Jung said after the withdrawal: "We kept our word: Our soldiers are going to be at home with their families at Christmas." (Wiegmann 2006) They ignored the remarks of many NGOs and think tanks, of Bemba, of France, Finland and SR Ajello asking to extend EUFOR only a few weeks until the end of transformational phase.<sup>49</sup> They rejected the warnings of Sir Chris Patten who regretted that it would be madness to withdraw the troops in the most critical moment of the whole drama and in face of the violence occurring during the last weeks of transformation (Patten 2006: 2). These pleas grew from expected ESDP acting in line with the promoted principles of *human security* and the belief in *good governance*. Remembering the reluctance to re-hat during Artemis, this embarrassing scenario recurred during EUFOR as well. The bitter lesson to be learnt: Even if the Europeans were executing an autonomous operation, even if they knew the setting and the crisis situation, even if they had the required equipment on the ground, the motivation to stay engaged and act pro-active like a credible security governor is lacking.

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<sup>48</sup> The situation in Kinshasa was very fragile at this time. The troops of Kabila controlled the city and clashed with the militia of the loser of the presidential elections Bemba.

<sup>49</sup> For appeals to extend the mission, see: International Crisis Group 2006: 1; Kinzel 2006: 4, Nachtwei 2006; Stroux 2006: 7; Süddeutsche Zeitung 9 June 2006: 5; New York Times 13 June 2006.

## A central message

Besides that, it must be underlined that EUFOR did not talk too much and act too little. It fulfilled nothing less than the mandated objectives along the authorised measure of time and scope.

## A new security governor in a multilateral setting

*“To some, multilateralism is an encroachment upon national sovereignty. I say without reservation that it is an asset: a way of sharing burdens (...); of profiting from shared experiences.”* (United Nations Secretary General 1997)

This article aimed to question the added value of the new security governor, the EU, in the classic field of security policy through the examples of the two ESDP-missions in support of the United Nations. As seen during the case studies, all questions that led the analyses can be answered positively - but only on the surface. After a closer examination, the positive results must be challenged. In the end, some achievements must be discussed; some construction sites must be identified:

Even though the ESDP grew out of its very *status nascendi* during the operational premiers, it is still an adolescent project of the European Union. Its weal and woe depends strongly on the visions and will of the promoters of the EU's global actorness. The opportunity to test its quality as a new security governor lies in the hands of these motors. Both cases demonstrated that a powerful and motivated EU-member is needed to launch an ESDP-operation, to plan the operation, to equip and to implement it. Moreover, the deficits on the ground force the EU to strengthen its qualities as a credible security governor if it wants to reach the nearly impossible objective to realise its political principles. These stars may be as unreachable for the EU as they are for the UN. It is also obvious that the end-date of an operation is more important than the end-state of the UN-mission. This fact refers not only to the strong national caveats. It is almost impossible to extend an ESDP-operation, even if the situation on the ground requires it. The inner-institutional and inter-organisational decision-making-processes are too complicated and too slow to react in time. However, a realistic alternative, the possibility to re-hat, is still to be used.<sup>50</sup>

The mentioned constraints can explain the reluctance of the EU as a security governor to extend the operation. They cannot excuse the reluctance of Europeans to participate in UN-missions in general or to re-hat. Above all, it would be preferable that more European states contributed troops to UN-

<sup>50</sup> A successful example is the re-hating from EUFOR Chad/CAR to MINURCAT in March 2009.

operations than in the past. Sometimes my hope grew as it seemed to be apparent that the step to engage in MONUC was only a small one for the participants of EUFOR. It would have been a big one for UN peace-keeping. But this option remained and will remain in UN-dreamland. Another rule for future ESDP-operations in Africa (which was also confirmed during EUFOR Chad/CAR) is that ESDP-missions in cooperation with UN-missions are limited in time and space. There are several reasons for these limitations. They answer to the purpose to support the UN in a specific and limited situation and they refer to the unwillingness of some EU members, especially Germany, to be militarily engaged in African peacekeeping missions without any vital interest. The restrictions are in accordance with the reluctance of powerful EU-member states to stay militarily engaged in Africa and the strong demand for organisational autonomy. As the German Defence Minister made clear during meetings on the inter-organisational cooperation in crisis management: "Das Heft der Entscheidung will die EU bei allem Entgegenkommen aber nicht aus der Hand geben." (Jung in Nauth 2007) Apart from that, the EU as well as the UN realised the added value of cooperation. The underlying motive was the principle of burden sharing in the DRC on the basis of common norms, objectives, ideals and interests. The Deputy Secretary-General exemplified the huge potential of these organisations when he said: "The United Nations brings to this relationship its unique global legitimacy and impartiality; its longstanding presence (...). The European Union brings the admirable solidarity of its citizens with the plight of the world's poor and with the agenda of the United Nations. You [the EU; M.S.] bring resources, creativity, innovation and the inspiring example of a continent that has proved the world that peace, stability and human security can be achieved through cross-border cooperation." (United Nations 2007) The very large gap between those expectations and the reality was demonstrated by the EU's recent "No" when the UN repeatedly and urgently requested the EU to send a rapid reaction force to the war-torn Kivus, in support of MONUC. It is legitimate to refer to the high level of commitment of the ESDP around the globe and to refuse this demand for political reason.<sup>51</sup> Thus the question remains, whether it was "moral" and "clever" to refuse this request in the light of the European principles of human security, its responsibility to protect, its commitment to multilateralism and burden-sharing, as well as its comprehensive involvement and long-standing experience in the DR Congo. The answer stays open.

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<sup>51</sup> Interview with MONUC staff in Kinshasa, via telephone, 12 July 2009; Interview with EUFOR DRC staff, Munich, 5 August 2009.

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
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**Annex**

**Figure 1: Road Map for ESDP operations in support of UN Peace Operations**



**Abbreviations:**

CMC=Crisis Management Concept


MSO=Military Strategic Option

IMD=Initiating Military Directive

CONOPS=Concept of Operations

SOR=Statement of Requirements

Figure 2: Command and Communication



\* In contrast to the UN, the EU has an additional operational headquarters. The EU differentiates between the political-strategic level (EU Council; PSC; SG) and a military-strategic level in which the EUHQ is located. The UN only uses only strategic and operational level.

Source: Lux, 2007 (modified)





## EU-GRASP

Changing Multilateralism: the EU as a Global-regional Actor in Security and Peace, or EU-GRASP in short, is an EU funded FP7 Programme. EU-GRASP aims to contribute to the analysis and articulation of the current and future role of the EU as a global actor in multilateral security governance, in a context of challenged multilateralism, where the EU aims at “effective multilateralism”. This project therefore examines the notion and practice of multilateralism in order to provide the required theoretical background for assessing the linkages between the EU’s current security activities with multi-polarism, international law, regional integration processes and the United Nations system.

## Partners

EU-GRASP is coordinated by the United Nations University – Comparative regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS). The other partners of EU-GRASP are based worldwide and include: University of Warwick (UK), University of Gothenburg (Sweden), Florence Forum on the Problems of Peace and War (Italy), KULeuven (Belgium), Centre for International Governance Innovation (Canada), Peking University (China), Institute for Security Studies (South Africa) and Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (Israel).

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