Energy security and security issues seem to be increasingly inter-twined in today’s international relations. How are global and European discourses on wider as well as more traditional security and energy interlinked? Which challenges are policy-makers faced with in dealing with this? Central to the emergence of energy on the security agenda are the debates about shifting global power patterns. Rising or emerging powers (especially the BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) are improving their status internationally - hence the label ‘rising’ powers - through a combination of fast-growing economies, resources and a certain degree of acceptance of the liberal order (China and Russia, however, are already substantial military powers and oppose the liberal order). In Europe, this debate has been particularly focused on the return of Russia as an aspiring great power, a status that is in part a result of increased state revenue from its vast energy resources. The discursive linking of energy security and ‘realist’ power politics also has contributed to empowering Russia and its return as a regional and global actor, some argue. The past months’ crisis between Russia and Ukraine, also indirectly involving Europe and the West, definitely has put the issue of energy security on the international and European agenda.

Seeking to address how energy and security have been connected in discourse and practical policy, two cases stand out as particularly illustrative: the Russia-Ukraine gas crises, which have recently acquired a more traditional security dimension, and the 2013 attack on the Statoil facility in Algeria, linking energy extraction, energy security and terrorism. Whereas the former is an example where energy is being used

1 Thanks to NUPI research assistant Wrenn Yennie Lindgren for providing valuable input and assistance in my research for this policy briefing paper.
strategically to put political pressure on another country and to demonstrate power internationally, the latter is an example of how petroleum extraction is a high profile business engagement and a potential target for terrorism, especially in ‘high-risk’ areas. Both cases are likely to have direct impact on future energy flows to Europe as well as on EU energy policy in the long- and in the short-term and are therefore interesting in any discussion on how energy, energy security, and wider as well as ‘hard’ security concerns are interlinked.

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

The global and regional context

In times of peace, energy security generally belongs to the political, economic and business realm. When linked to security, this has usually focused on broader security concerns, such as societal security – where the general well-being of people in their daily lives, not the security of state borders and territories is a central theme. In this constructivist inspired reading, resources do not necessarily trigger rivalry or conflict but may encourage states to engage in closer cooperation to solve common challenges. Aligned with this thinking, ‘inter-polarity’ – a system where global and regional powers (including the EU) are committed to cooperate ‘to manage deepening interdependence and build a viable and effective order based on multilateralism’ – is seen as a possible scenario.4

In the realist reading, such a commitment is questioned. States with ambitions and capabilities traditionally have pursued foreign-policy ends, demanding – either explicitly or implicitly – a place for themselves in the world. Resources are strategic commodities which may be converted into political power: ‘[W]hen social actors acquire resources, they seek to convert them into something that has more value to them than the mere possession of material things’.4 Energy is a resource that could be converted into power. Playing the ‘energy card’ – for instance by issuing threats about cutting off energy flows to existing or potential buyers - could, as a strategy, be pursued to obtain a specific goal, such as a price increase, or to deliberately change a certain policy or decision. This strategy can also be employed to send a general political ‘message’ to the recipient country of energy about the latter’s dependence on the supplier and its ‘goodwill’ in providing the resource, as well as a reminder of its weaker position in the relationship. The ‘energy card’ strategy appears to be particularly effective during the winter season, as illustrated by Russia’s gas disputes with the Ukraine and also Moldova, and one that has become increasingly visible in the new geopolitical ‘power game’.

Denial of energy exports implies that energy is politicised and, potentially, securitized. Securitization means that the issue is removed from the daily economic and political sphere where business agreements between private or public actors are negotiated usually take place and is heightened to the level of the heads of state and government, or ‘high politics’.4 In a situation of securitization, there is a sense of urgency where ‘normal’ decision-making rules do not apply (instead involving mainly top-level decision-makers, secrecy compliance, involvement of democratic institutions etc.). In addition, a situation of securitization often reverberates internationally and is felt beyond the parties involved, as in the Russian-Ukraine crisis.

But energy security and security are also linked in a very concrete way, where the protection of critical infrastructure, transit areas and pipelines off-shore and on-shore from sabotage or terrorist attacks are at stake. The In Amenas attack in Algeria in 2013 may be an example of how vulnerable petroleum installations and plants potentially are to violent attacks. As such, it highlighted not only the issue of protection and security on-site but also the broader security questions about resource extraction in states or areas where governance is ‘thin’ or authority is disputed.

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Case 1: Ukraine-Russia – energy disputes with a political dimension

A number of energy security disputes with implicit security aspects have taken place between Russia and Ukraine within the past nine years. Whilst there appeared to be no grand plan to assert dominance over Europe, where the Soviet Union was a credible supplier of natural gas for decades, this changed in the mid-2000s. The 2005-2006 dispute concerned natural gas supplies, prices and debts, and occurred in January 2006 when Russia halted gas supplies to Ukraine for three days after Ukraine refused to pay the gas price demanded by Gazprom. The crisis was, however, solved relatively rapidly when by 4th January flows were returning to normal. In the next gas dispute in January 2009, one of the most serious disputes, Russia and Ukraine failed to agree on a price for the Russian gas supply to Ukraine and a tariff for the transit of Russian gas to Europe before previous agreements expired on 31 December 2008, leading to a cut off of gas exports to Ukraine on 1st January 2009. In sharp contrast to the 2006 dispute, the 2009 dispute had more serious consequences, potentially also for Europe. Both sides allowed the dispute to escalate from disagreements about debts, prices, and transit tariffs to the point where supplies to Europe were completely cut off. Then, they allowed this situation to continue for two weeks in the middle of winter, with serious adverse human consequences (especially) for south-east European countries.

These incidents tarnished Russia’s reputation as a supplier to Europe as well as Ukraine’s reputation as a key transit country for Russian gas to Europe. In addition, Gazprom’s high price policy led to a fall in export sales to Ukraine between 2008 and 2012 (from almost 100 bcm to 64 bcm), and to Europe (from over 180 bcm to 150 bcm) during the same period. On 10 November 2013 Ukraine stopped importing gas from Russia again, following a pricing dispute. The stoppage came two weeks before Kiev was due to sign an association agreement with the EU, indicating politicization, if not securitization, of energy. The halting of supplies caused unrest across the EU because it came at a vulnerable moment and represented a threat to winter gas consumption, yet the flow of gas to Europe was uninterrupted.

The Russian energy disputes with Ukraine in 2006, 2009 and 2013 were interpreted as efforts to discipline Ukraine by forcing it into its ranks and by, indirectly, objecting to NATO’s Open Door Policy. The situation escalated when the pro-Russian government decided to halt integration with Europe and instead seek closer relations with Russia, leading to the fall of the pro-Russian regime. The subsequent Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula in March 2014 represented a violation of international law that shocked the Western world. In hindsight, it has been argued that Europe and the West should have understood that the precedent gas crises were Russian warnings against Ukraine’s independent ‘block politics’. However, as argued by others, the annexation could also have been president Putin spotting a window of opportunity in the midst of political chaos following the fall of the Ukrainian regime. As of April, what appears to be a campaign aimed at de-stabilising Ukraine — which some claim is concerted and coordinated from Russia — and where rebels and men with uniforms without insignia demand Eastern parts of the Ukraine re-aligned with ‘mother’ Russia creates a political backdrop for Russian-EU energy relations that will most certainly affect them.

Case 2: Algeria, energy security and terrorism

The second case where the linkages between energy and security have become more explicit over the past years is related to energy extraction and production. This brief will look briefly at the Algeria/In Amenas terrorist attacks in 2013.

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Attacks on energy infrastructure are rare, making the attack in Algeria all the more spectacular.\textsuperscript{10} In some parts of the world like Central Asia or the Caucasus, local sabotage against pipelines is a well-known risk but incidents have seldom affected the security of locals or foreigners who work for companies engaged in energy production. But European firms have expressed a general concern about operating in Algeria in recent years.\textsuperscript{11} The conflict in Mali as well as political upheavals in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, as part of the ‘Arab Spring’ in particular, also contributed to Algeria’s heightened risk profile. This concern was made very real when, in January 2013, radical Islamists attacked the production facility at the gas field In-Amenas. The magnitude and degree of violence exercised in the attack was a shock to the international community. A number of people were taken hostage for several days, 38 of whom were killed, including foreigners.

The In Amenas terrorist attack has contributed to a securitization of the energy discourse. In explaining or understanding how the attack could happen, several arguments came to the fore. One was the argument that the ‘war on terror’ and subsequent anti-Western sentiments related to the US and Western campaigns, especially in Afghanistan and in Iraq, were indirectly to blame for the attack. Linkages between security and energy were explicitly made but where the energy facility in this case appeared to be an arena for attacking foreign and particularly Western engagement, rather than a goal in itself.

Another argument focused on Algeria as a ‘failed state’, where security for international business engagements generally had deteriorated. The attacks highlighted the lack of sufficient international focus on the local context when planning and conducting international business engagements. What kind of protection should international companies expect from the local government and central authorities in the host country? The attack was a major humiliation for Algerian authorities and confirmed the lax and routine methods of control that had worried a number of western oil and gas companies. A lack of clarity over a broader government attitude to security nevertheless has prevented the return of foreign workers to the area. As of July 2013, BP and Statoil have kept personnel out of In Amenas.\textsuperscript{12}

A third argument concerned the ‘duty to protect’ of the government of the home country of energy companies. The terrorist attacks against the facility in In Amenas increased the general focus on the security of citizens residing or working abroad and the state’s duty to protect them should natural disasters, hostage situations or other types of violence occur. How economic and political globalisation affects the state’s responsibility to protect its citizens abroad – in this case those who enable energy diversification and energy production – has received little general attention by decision-makers or scholars. Neither has the problematique yet manifested itself in institutional practices at the national or international level, indicating a lack of governance. In response to the globalization of labour markets and business engagements, including resource extraction, new national policy actors have been increasingly involved in managing the broader dimensions of security, such as the ministries of Justice and Transport and Petroleum (or Energy). However, issues would often fall between the areas of responsibility of and attention of these ministries, as well as of the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence. During the terrorists’ occupation of the facility, which was partly-state owned (Statoil), there was continuous dialogue between the Norwegian company management in Norway and the Norwegian government (also involving the Prime Minister), and with the government in Algeria. In Norway, which lost five Norwegian Statoil personnel in In Amenas, in the aftermath of the attack it became clear that none of them had this kind of situations as their central focus.

Fourthly, and related to this, when the security of energy installations is questioned, private security is often the answer, either in the form of local guards or Private Security Companies (PMCs). The expansion of the reliance on private security to protect industrial and energy plants and facilities abroad over the past decades has followed globalisation and liberalisation trends, challenging how the ‘duty of care’ is to be


assessed and implemented. Is security primarily a concern for the business companies, meaning that energy and energy security in the end hinges on private initiative and protection? It is worth noting that the terrorists who attacked the In Amenas production plant in 2013 apparently were provided with important information about security routines and access to the plant from locally hired guards. Post-In Amenas, the protection of critical infrastructure and transit area and lines, from sabotage or terrorist attacks even in less risk-prone or Western countries has become an issue.

EU governance?
Generally, there has been little systematic coverage of energy security in analyses of CFSP and CSDP. Apart from the Russian-Ukrainian disputes, energy security policy generally has been an internal affair in the EU, where individual countries have experienced disruptions in supply due to accidents, natural disasters, strikes or human error. In NATO, a politico-military organisation, the decision to develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including the protection of critical infrastructure and transit area and lines, cooperation with partners, consultation, as well as contingency planning, was made when the Strategic Concept was adopted in 2010. In the Alliance, new security threats such as energy security, cyber security, terrorism and proliferation are seen as interconnected and organised in the Emerging Security Challenges Division. However, many of the new NATO-members with sensitive relationships with Russia have been reluctant to include energy security in the Alliance portfolio, fearing it would provoke Russian reactions.

In light of the past months’ events in Ukraine, also involving Russia and energy, analyses of the linkages of foreign and security policy and energy security are likely to be in demand. With the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and on-going efforts to de-stabilise the Ukrainian economy by denying Russian natural gas deliveries and by supporting – allegedly – pro-Russian rebels in the Eastern parts of the Ukraine, politicians and analysts have claimed that a new ‘Cold War’ is emerging. Does this imply the end of EU-Russia energy cooperation? And what does it mean for EU energy governance?

EU policies towards Russia and Eastern Europe in the field of energy have a considerably long history. The Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment partnership (E5P), proposed in 2009, was aimed at boosting their support for energy efficiency and reducing harmful emissions (as well as modernizing heating systems and increasing energy saving measures in public buildings etc.). In October 2013, Ukraine received one third of available E5P funds. Energy efficiency and cooperation have also been part of the European Neighbourhood Policy and of general EU enlargement policy. With regard to EU policy towards Russia, it has been criticised for being incoherent, a main reason being the heterogeneity of opinions among the member states about the content of that policy, including the relationship between energy policy and foreign policy. The most important initiatives are the EU-Russia energy dialogue from 2000 and the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). The former was aimed at offering an agenda for dialogue at various levels but has been met with shrinking interest from Russia over the years. And Russia withdrew from the ECT in 2009, because of divergent Russian and EU perspectives on energy and how it should be governed.

EU-Russian relations cooled off following the 2006 dispute between Russia and Ukraine and especially so in the aftermath of the 2009 dispute. Europe has not been directly affected by the gas crises but has felt the enhanced level of tension between Ukraine and Russia. At a time when the Ukrainian government had sought closer political relations with the EU, the Russian decision to stop gas delivery in 2013 was clearly politicised. The crisis in 2014 in Ukraine, where masked men or men wearing identical uniforms without insignia were active in the Russian annexation of the Crimea and then in the occupation of public buildings

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15 Dreyer and Stang (2014), op. cit, p. 79.
17 Kuzemko (2014), op. cit.
18 Boersma (2013), op. cit.
and riots in the Eastern parts of Ukraine, also show that Russia is operating according to a different set of norms. This has brought EU-Russia and indeed Western-Russian relations to unprecedented high levels of tension in the post-Cold War era.

What does the current crisis mean for Europe in an energy context? Although imports from Russia have been in decline since the early 2000s, Russia remains the most important external energy supplier to the EU and until recently was seen as likely to continue to be one in realistic future scenarios.\(^19\) In 2011 it supplied the EU with 177 mtce of oil, 107 mtce of natural gas and 52.7 mtce of coal. In the aftermath of the 2009 and 2013 gas supply crises European consumers’ efforts to diversify away from Russian gas intensified. Russian gas currently represents approximately 25% of Europe’s gas consumption and about 7% of Europe’s total primary energy consumption.\(^20\) Given the recent shale gas developments, Europe can now rely less on Russian gas and more on its unexpected surplus of LNG supply cargoes that were originally destined to the US.\(^21\) Doing so allows for the diversification of supply, which is a key component of energy security.

Less reliance on Russian imports appears to be an attractive option in light of recent developments in Ukraine. The Russian-Ukraine crisis had other direct effects on Russia-European energy relations. In a letter of 10 April 2014 president Putin called for talks with European economy, finance and energy ministers on the Ukrainian economic crisis and, especially, the gas debts: ‘Gazprom is compelled to switch over to advance payment for gas delivery [...] We fully realize that this increases the risk of siphoning off natural gas passing through Ukraine’s territory and heading to European consumers.’\(^22\) Putin’s explicit warning that gas deliveries could be disrupted unless Ukraine pays its gas debts (USD 2 million) and his demand that Europe must take ‘concerted actions to stabilise Ukraine’s economy’ and ensure Russian gas deliveries, are examples of speech acts where energy is securitized. Although not posed as a threat to Europe, it is a message that Putin is not afraid of using the ‘energy weapon’ to further de-stabilise Ukraine politically and also, as the US State Department holds, ‘as a tool of coercion against Ukraine’.\(^23\)

The events in Ukraine also resulted in a rethinking of the EU-Russia strategic partnership. For instance, the EU-Russia summit scheduled for June 2014 and high-level bilateral meetings were cancelled and the EU endorsed sanctions on Russia’s energy, financial and defense sectors. These developments come with consequences for both consumers of Russian gas and for Russia’s domestic market.

Scholars and politicians alike have pointed out that Russia’s worldview and priorities differ significantly from that of Europe, also regarding energy relations. The EU energy policy paradigm – like the integration process in general – has been largely influenced by ideas about liberalization, deregulation and competition.\(^24\) Russian energy policy, on the other hand, is based on the conception of oil and gas as strategic commodities where state actors, not market forces, regulate and define the framework conditions. With reference to the distinction between realist and other approaches to international relations, the EU adheres to ‘markets and institutions’ as well as norms in governing the energy field, while Russia pursues a realist ‘regions and empires’ approach with the state as the prime decision-maker and stakeholder.

However, even for Russia, the ‘energy weapon’ – stopping deliveries – may not be a desirable or viable strategy in the long term. Energy resources have contributed to half of Russia’s federal budget, and economic growth and the reduction of poverty have been essential to Putin’s rise to power and

\[^{19}\text{Boersma (2013), op.cit.}\]

\[^{20}\text{Op.cit.}\]


\[^{22}\text{‘President Vladimir Putin’s letter to leaders of European countries. Full text’, 10 April 2014. Available at}\]


\[^{24}\text{Kuzemko (2013), op.cit.}\]
popularity.25 While Russia may well manage international political isolation, Western and EU sanctions against Russia following the crisis with Ukraine may over-time prove to be more serious.

After the attack in In Amenas, Sonatrach, Algeria’s state energy monopoly, was quick to assure key partners that another attack of a similar scale was highly unlikely. Apart from this statement, however, Algerian authorities have been reluctant to communicate about Algeria’s security environment.26 Algeria was the EU’s third largest gas supplier in 2011. Although the country remains a potential risk of political instability, it has huge conventional gas reserves and estimates tell of vast shale gas reserves, making Algeria a potentially important supplier in the future.27

To conclude, regarding energy security and security concerns writ large, how the EU manages to balance short to medium term reliance on gas imports from Russia with a long term message of low or no demand is both an important and problematic question worthy of further empirical investigation. The Russian-Ukrainian crisis in 2014 and the In Amenas attacks in 2013 have emphasized the importance of stable suppliers, secure production facilities, and energy diversity. The past 4-5 months’ rhetoric and action on the part of Russia are clear examples of the framing of energy into a question of security, or securitization. Russia has encouraged the West and Europe in particular to grant financial support to Ukraine to ensure future energy flows – also to Europe. This is an example of a speech act, which establishes a close connection between energy, energy security and more traditional ‘hard’ security.

Sabotage or attacks on energy production and facilities, of which the incident in In Amenas in 2013 was a grave example, have attracted less attention in the world media than the Russia-Ukrainian crisis. Indeed, the latter is still on-going and brings daily flashbacks to the Cold War and is of direct concern to a number of peoples’ societal security (access to stable gas supplies for use in households, industry etc.) and, potentially, national security. However, in a situation of enhanced need for diversification, energy production in states with unstable or weak governments is likely to continue. To ensure a safe and secure work environment on the ground for those who work to ensure such diversity, common policies rather than leaving security to individual business companies and private contractors (e.g. PMCs) are needed. Based on experience from both cases, further analysis of the linkages between foreign policy, security and energy seems required, also in the EU context.

Policy Implications and Recommendations

Policy Implications

It is not the intention of this brief to voice the view that securing reliable energy supplies to Europe is posing a new security threat to Europeans. However, the recent developments in Ukraine and a ‘forward’ leaning Russian foreign policy, where the use of force to underpin national interests and political goals no longer is only implicit, create a new context for Europe’s and its relations with Russia as an energy supplier. In a situation where a country refuses to abide by international law or norms, or when individual groups (e.g. terrorists) deliberately breech them through actions of violence in their pursuit of political or other interests like in Algeria, ‘business as usual/normal’ may be difficult. The currents situation may have implications for EU policy, national policies and individual business companies, at several levels.

First, increased operating costs of international corporations and companies to secure the site and facility, as well as intelligence should be expected. The question is who will pay the price for such increased costs. For the international community and the EU, a stronger linking of energy, energy security and more traditional security concerns in analysis and policy formulation is needed, especially regarding energy

engagements in ‘failed states’ or states with ‘thin’ or contested authority that are vulnerable to rebel and terrorist groups.

Second, improved coordination mechanisms between actors involved, such as authorities in the host country (national and local), ministries in the home country of the company involved, and between these should be adopted. Here, the EU may potentially play an enhanced coordinating role. Third, the security related consequences of engagement abroad for the security of individuals and maintenance of the state’s ‘duty to protect’ its citizens should be given priority on the global, EU and national agendas.

**RESEARCH PARAMETERS**

The merger of energy security with security implies a merger of two very distinct policy fields, where different logics apply, and where a different set of actors is involved. Hence, in a short brief like the current one, the long-term, more profound policy debates and literature reviews in each discipline are not possible. Being aware of these constraints, the research for this policy briefing paper rests on secondary and primary sources. Primary sources include public documents, official texts, and official websites, whereas secondary sources mainly include scholarly literature (books, articles), newspapers and web-sites. The methodology used is qualitative, where the aim has been to provide an overview of how energy and security are interlinked as concepts and in the political domain, by focusing on two cases involving both dimensions.

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Further Reading
All working papers, policy briefing papers and other publications are available on our website: www.greenfp7.eu/papers