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Globalizing Regionalism: Harnessing Regional  
Organizations to Meet Global Threats

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## **Globalizing Regionalism: Harnessing Regional Organizations to Meet Global Threats**

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### **Introduction**

Post-Cold War uncertainties about the future global threats have faded over the past few years. Terrorism, organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, HIV/AIDS, pandemic diseases, weak states, and conflicts over resources top the recent global threat assessments by governments, international institutions, and independent analysts alike.<sup>1</sup> While policy prescriptions for dealing with these challenges vary and often conflict, most analyses concur that today's global threats are too diverse, elusive, dynamic, and potent to be tackled with existing policies and procedures or by any one government alone. Rather, what is required are novel and multifaceted threat responses, including sturdy multilateralism.

Governments around the world have set out to re-engineer their domestic institutions and issued new ideas to meet the threats of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks were a key catalyst of security policy reforms particularly in North America, while many developing countries have sought to upgrade their health systems following the SARS epidemic of 2003 and the spread of AIDS over the past decade. Also international institutions have embarked on a reformist spree. The United Nations has shown perhaps the greatest ambition. In March 2005, Secretary General Kofi Annan issued a plan for a sweeping organizational overhaul aimed at boosting the UN's capacity to respond to today's most pressing global threats.

While these efforts have generated intense international debate, the potential role of regional organizations (ROs) to deal with global threats has received less attention.<sup>2</sup> This is a striking omission. Stronger RO involvement in global threat management would both enhance ROs' potential for attaining their more traditional regional goals, and add value to the work by individual governments and international organizations (IOs) toward a more secure world. First, the line between global and regional threats is increasingly obsolete. The very factors that have allowed globalization to flourish—communications, information technologies, and the lowering of border barriers and transportation costs—

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<sup>1</sup> See, for example, Allison (2004); Carter (2004); Krasner (2004); Soros (2004); UN (2004); Upton (2004); Deutch (2005); Eizenstatt et al. (2005); National Intelligence Council (2005); and UN (2005ab).

<sup>2</sup> I define regional organization here as "an association of states established by and based upon a treaty, which has its own special organs to fulfill particular functions within the organization, and which has a geographically delimited membership." This is adapted from *The Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, which defines inter-governmental organizations as "association of States established by and based upon a treaty, which pursues common aims and which has its own special organs to fulfill particular functions within the organization."

have also globalized threats. Today's threats are penetrating, pervasive, and tangible in every region; conversely, threats that in the past might have been classified as regional today have global repercussions. Either way, current threats are forceful enough to set back ROs' accomplishments—and hold their future success hostage. Second, the existing international security framework falls short. Threat management by national governments and IOs is proving insufficient to protect all regions at all times, which accentuates the need for new assets—committed stakeholders and sharper instruments—in international security. The system of ROs can be just such an asset.

A practical means to engage ROs in global threat management is to “globalize regionalism”—to systematically integrate threat management into ROs' agendas and programs, and to connect ROs with each other and with IOs in dealing with global threats. Globalizing regionalism would produce a distinct and unique layer of international cooperation, which, like the system of IOs, would inherently involve both inter-governmental interactions and cross-organizational linkages, but which, unlike the system of IOs, would also have intricate local expertise in and a guaranteed long-term commitment to all regions at all times. ROs reach deep; an integrated system of ROs would also reach wide—a necessity for responding to global threats. Soundly engineered, such a system would foster the efforts of the other, increasingly integrated systems of international actors—governments, IOs, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector.

Three windows of opportunity are opening for globalizing regionalism. First, the universe of ROs has grown dense. ROs have proliferated over the past few decades to become a genuinely global phenomenon: no region is today absent of ROs, and virtually every country of the world is member to several ROs. Second, many ROs, and certainly the main, multi-issue ones—the African Union (AU), South African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Organization of American States (OAS), and European Union (EU)—are already moving toward “functional globalism”, or integrating external threat management functions into their programs and plans.<sup>3</sup> They are increasingly addressing such pressing global threats as cyber-terrorism, health epidemics, and proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, and also assuming a more prominent role in managing regional threats of global consequence, including intra-state conflicts and humanitarian emergencies. In the process, ROs are taking on problems that have traditionally been handled primarily, and often solely, by IOs. Third, ROs are increasingly reaching out to collaborate with each other and with IOs in managing global threats. While this international institutional connectivity is largely proceeding in an *ad-hoc* fashion, it is also being propelled forward by the decade-long drive by the United Nations to step up its cooperation with ROs. The UN's March 2005 report reinforces this work, calling for close coordination and burden-sharing between ROs and the UN system.

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<sup>3</sup> This paper draws heavily on the Internet portals of these organizations and their cooperation partners for the references on their work on countering global threats.

The ostensibly synchronized moves and the growing cooperation among ROs on threat management provide a useful infrastructure for globalizing regionalism. Its potential will, however, require strong, conscious multilateral efforts—an international agenda for globalizing regionalism. The aim of this paper is to start developing such an agenda.

The first section of this paper elaborates on today's key global security challenges, and discusses rationales for involving ROs to fight them. The second section maps out recent trends conducive to globalizing regionalism. Section three puts forth recommendations for globalizing regionalism. Section four concludes.

## **The Regional Challenge: Globalization of Threats**

### ***Today's Global Threats: Why so Challenging?***

Today's global threats have three properties in common: they are diverse, globally grave, and highly elusive. Each of the three renders threat management an extraordinarily challenging undertaking.

First, the sheer number of potential threats is immense. Just in the area of weapons of mass destruction, threats range from a biological or chemical weapons attack by a terrorist cell to the detonation of a dirty bomb in a major city and an all-out inter-state nuclear war. The measures required to prevent and respond to any one of these threats are multiple and far from bullet-proof. For instance, preventing a dirty bomb attack by terrorists requires efforts not only to eradicate terrorism, but also to combat the proliferation of radioactive materials through such measures as protecting nuclear power plants, rigorous accounting and control of the radioactive isotopes that have potential for being used as weapons of mass destruction, and detecting radioactive materials in airports and harbors and on highways.<sup>4</sup>

Similarly, the prevention of the global epidemics and their permutations, such as the avian flu, SARS, and HIV/AIDS, requires checks at border points, extensive educational and information dissemination campaigns, and development and mass production of new vaccinations, for example. Natural disasters are equally amorphous—ranging from hurricanes and floods to earthquakes and volcanic eruptions—and demand no shorter menu of responses. The point is that whether the threat involves terrorists launching a chemical attack or *force majeure* producing a massive drought, defenders are inherently at a disadvantage to attackers: they are unable to specialize in one line of defense, but, rather, have to stave off threats on all fronts simultaneously.

Second, today's threats are globally grave—have potentially disastrous consequences and so anywhere in the world. Nuclear weapons are a case in point. The potential of a nuclear holocaust has arguably only accentuated after the Cold War. Not only are more states acquiring nuclear weapons, but few of them are beholden to the mutually assured destruction doctrine that restrained the United States and the Soviet Union. A confrontation between India and Pakistan or Israel and Iran could claim hundreds of

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<sup>4</sup> See Allison (2004).

thousands of lives and cause massive material damage throughout South Asia and Middle East, respectively; involvement by an external nuclear power could globalize the catastrophe. Globalizing the nuclear problem is the potential access of non-state actors to nuclear weapons—and their subsequent use of the weapons anywhere in the world. Russia alone is estimated to have thousands poorly controlled and stored nuclear weapons and tens of thousands of softball-size pieces of highly enriched plutonium and uranium.<sup>5</sup>

While terrorism has fortunately thus far not involved nuclear weapons, it has proven globally lethal. According to the US State Department, there were 9,484 international terrorist attacks in 1982-2003, or an average of 431 attacks per year. In 1999-2003, Africa suffered 153 attacks (and 518 casualties), Asia 419 (4,955), Eurasia 79 (716), Latin America 581 (716), the Middle East 177 (3,492), North America 6 (4,465, all of which occurred in 2001), and Western Europe 174 (975).<sup>6</sup> Even targeted attacks can have global consequences: US Department of Homeland Security estimates that spreading pneumonic plague in the bathrooms of a US airport, sports arena, and train station would kill 2,500 and sicken 8,000 worldwide. Similarly, a terrorist attack on a major financial center could disrupt economic transactions around the world, impoverishing millions.<sup>7</sup>

Claiming some 20 million lives in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, natural disasters have proven immensely lethal.<sup>8</sup> The fatalities caused by them are estimated to have more than tripled since the 1960s, while their economic damages have grown by more than eight-fold.<sup>9</sup> As vividly illustrated by the tsunami that hit the shores of the Pacific and the Indian Oceans in December 2004, the deadliness of natural disasters is accentuated today due to population growth, crowding, and precarious construction marking many cities and regions. Localized population increase can result in an exponentially higher number of deaths when disaster strikes. For instance, the Assam earthquake that killed 1,500 people in 1950 would today claim 40,000 lives. This represents a 27-fold increase—even though population in the region has risen “only” three-fold. The Shillong Earthquake of 1897 would today claim 58 times more lives against the backdrop of an eight-fold population increase. The reach of natural disasters is also global—and their likelihood greatest precisely in areas that are crowded and ill-prepared.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Allison (2004).

<sup>6</sup> While the incidence of attacks has declined over time, from a high of 665 in 1987 to 205 in 2002 and 208 in 2003, the casualties per attack have shot up. In 1999, terrorism claimed an average of 2.8 lives per attack; the figure was 15 in 2002 and 33 in 2003.

<sup>7</sup> See, for example, UN (2005a).

<sup>8</sup> This paragraph is based on “The Vulnerable Become More Vulnerable,” *New York Times*, 2 January 2005. Over the past century, droughts have been the main killer of natural disasters, having claimed an estimated 10,009,000 lives worldwide. Floods have taken 6,888,000 lives, earthquakes 1,883,000, windstorms 1,197,000, volcanic eruptions 96,000, and landslides 54,000.

<sup>9</sup> See OAS (2004).

<sup>10</sup> Regions most vulnerable to drought lie in sub-Saharan Africa, while earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and landslides are concentrated in the Pacific Rim, China, northern India and Pakistan, regions around the Black Sea, and northern part of the Middle East. Vulnerability to floods and windstorms is particularly acute in China, India, Bangladesh, the southern rim of the Mediterranean, Caribbean basin, and the Atlantic rim of South America. Risk of floods is particularly high in the 51 countries classified as Small Island Developing States, such as Cuba, Fiji, Guyana, Haiti, Papua New Guinea, and Samoa.

Communicable diseases are similarly deadly and global. According to UNAIDS/WHO AIDS,<sup>11</sup> HIV/AIDS killed 3.1 million people in 2004 alone. The bulk of the victims, 2.4 million, were in sub-Saharan Africa. AIDS is rapidly claiming lives across the globe: 540,000 people died of AIDS in Asia in 2004, 130,000 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 60,000 in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 28,000 in North Africa and the Middle East, and 22,500 in high-income countries. By the end of 2004, 39.4 million people were estimated to live with AIDS around the world—more than 50 percent above WHO’s 1991 projections.

While developing countries have the highest incidence of AIDS, they are also faced with other deadly diseases, such as malaria and tuberculosis, and tend to be the first to fall under pandemics.<sup>12</sup> However, the various illnesses are hardly localized: they can easily spread throughout the world given their resistance to drugs and the incessant cross-border migration and travel. Only international air passengers number 700 million a year.<sup>13</sup> The SARS epidemic claimed 774 lives around the world within weeks in 2003. According to conservative estimates of the US Center for Disease Control, even a “medium-level epidemic” such as a flu pandemic could kill up to 207,000 and hospitalize 734,000.<sup>14</sup> The avian flu that can spread from South-East Asia around the world with migratory birds and that has thus far killed 55 percent of its human victims—a much heavier toll than that extracted by most other epidemics in global history—would be much more devastating, killing some 16 million Americas.<sup>15</sup>

Conflicts within and between states represent another grave threat international implications. No fewer than 40 countries have been directly impacted by violent conflict just over the past five years.<sup>16</sup> The repercussions of fighting are numerous, ranging from displacements and refugee flows to the attendant spread of disease and stumped economic growth. There are some 25 million internally displaced people in the world, while the number of global refugees—people escaping conflicts, crimes against humanity, and other severe problems—is estimated at 11-12 million. For every 1,000 refugees, the host country is estimated to see 1,400 additional cases of malaria.<sup>17</sup> Countries under civil war are the source of 95 percent of global drug production and home to the main drug trafficking routes.<sup>18</sup> But also countries not under an armed conflict can impart global troubles. States that are too weak or outright fail to provide security, stability, and economic opportunity over their territories are susceptible to becoming havens for terrorist networks and drugs and arms traffickers.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> UNAIDS/WHO AIDS is a joint effort by the Joint United Nations program on AIDS/HIV and the World Health Organization.

<sup>12</sup> Besides dealing strokes of death, diseases place an immense burden on developing countries’ health care systems, and undercut their productivity, economic growth, and political stability—a fertile soil for the development of further threats. See UN (2005b).

<sup>13</sup> See UN (2005a).

<sup>14</sup> See Garrett (2005).

<sup>15</sup> See, for instance, Gerberding (2005).

<sup>16</sup> See UN (2005a).

<sup>17</sup> See Collier et al. (2003).

<sup>18</sup> See Collier et al. (2003).

<sup>19</sup> See, for example, Eizenstatt et al. (2005); National Intelligence Council (2005).

In addition to being numerous and grave, today's threats are elusive. That they are often perpetrated by non-state actors and invisible viruses makes them much tougher to detect and analyze than threats posed by governments—which, as illustrated by the frailty of estimates of Iraqi, North Korean and Iranian nuclear capabilities, are also opaque.<sup>20</sup> The dynamism of threats accentuates their elusiveness. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks showed that even the best of intelligence can seriously lag the realization of threats. The tsunami moved fast enough to elude evacuation in places such as Sri Lanka and the East African seaboard. The AIDS epidemic is spreading uncontrollably in many developing countries, in particular.<sup>21</sup> Threats stemming from man-made sources are also unprecedentedly dynamic, thanks in no small measure to the giant leaps in and proliferation of information technologies that give terrorist and criminal networks new operational latitude.

### *Role of Regional Organizations in Managing Global Threats*

Today's threats place a high burden on the existing national and international threat management instruments. Modern threat management requires up-to-date, globally and rapidly available raw and analyzed information of threats and their idiosyncratic manifestations in the different countries and regions around the world, issue-specific and rapid prevention and response mechanisms, preparation for several simultaneous contingencies, immense institutional adaptability and agility, sustained attention and perseverance, and intelligent, close coordination of institutional efforts at the national and international levels. Both governments intent on securing their citizens and IOs involved in threat management are having to spread increasingly thin—be in all places and on all issues at all times.

Regional organizations are particularly well-equipped to carry out today's threat management functions. They have solid information and expertise on their regions, inherently tailor their responses to the regional realities, and can get on the ground fast. ROs are also innately compelled to continue their engagement and monitoring of the scene when the other actors depart. And having reshaped their policies and plans over the years to meet newly emerging challenges, ROs have a record of responsiveness and institutional flexibility.

However, while individual ROs can make important contributions to fighting global threats, globalizing regionalism would push up the premium for RO action in threat management. When globalized—when working in close connection with each other against global threats—ROs would form a system of interlocutors of information and action between the national and global levels, as well as between the different world regions. For instance, connecting the APEC, OAS, the AU, and the UN to discuss efforts to prevent terrorism would provide each organization nuanced and new information of terrorist activities in the various world regions, cutting-edge lessons on the best anti-terrorism practices, and fresh ideas on ways to pose an increasingly unified global front

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<sup>20</sup> For North Korea, see, for instance, the contested article by Harrison (2005).

<sup>21</sup> See Upton (2004) on the spread of AIDS in some of the main developing countries.

against terrorism. Such regional nexus of detailed information and functional specialization can only be in the interest of RO members: it saves resources previously wasted to duplication, allows for doing more with less, and offers countries an additional and often better insurance policy than can be provided by IOs or individual national governments.<sup>22</sup>

Globalizing regionalism would also benefit the global security framework. It would allow ROs and IOs to better delineate and exploit their respective comparative advantages, paving the way for a clear international division of labor in confronting global challenges, and helping to diversify the range of global threat management tasks that can be carried out by the various stakeholders. It would also provide long-term vision and commitment to all regions in threat management, accelerate international responses, and enhance the management of the realized threats—and, as such, help alleviate the workload of international organizations. Providing IOs an exit strategy, ROs could actually enhance the willingness of IOs to take on new missions. In short, an integrated system of ROs can be a powerful tool for economizing global cooperation.<sup>23</sup> Globalizing regionalism does, however, require fresh funds and systematic, conscious efforts. Current trends are propitious for launching such work.

### **Globalization of Regionalism**

Much like the system of the 192 governments and the system of the 34 IOs, the system of ROs represents a layer of international actors and action.<sup>24</sup> Yet, it has thus far not been fully conceptualized as a system, let alone harnessed as such. Rather, ROs tend to be viewed as atomistic actors with idiosyncratic goals defined by the challenges of their respective regions. This is an increasingly anachronistic conception. Three trends are transforming the universe of ROs into an increasingly close-knit global system: ROs' growing density, functional globality, and institutional connectivity. Today, ROs cover all world regions, work on common global problems and toward similar goals, and in so doing are increasingly connected to each other. The following three parts of this section map out these three trends.

#### ***Growing Density and Diversity of Regional Cooperation***

The universe of ROs has grown dense over the past two decades. ROs have proliferated to a total of 177, and notably outnumber international and inter-continental organizations

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<sup>22</sup> Paradoxically, successful prior cooperation often presages the need for all the more sturdy regional threat management systems: when regional countries succeed at liberalizing the intra-regional circulation of goods, capital, and people, various potential regional negative externalities—such as uncontrolled migration flows and health epidemics—can become more pronounced.


<sup>23</sup> ROs' assuming some of IOs' responsibilities—and IOs' delegating responsibilities to the ROs—could arguably also help democratize the international system keenly sought by many of today's emerging markets, in particular.

<sup>24</sup> The two cases that are often contested in country calculations are the Vatican and Taiwan. The UN membership is 191 and thus does not include either of the two. The US State Department recognizes 192 independent countries; the calculation excludes Taiwan.



(figure 1).<sup>25</sup> When the three main regional development banks—African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank and Inter-American Development Bank—are included, the figure ascends to 180.

**Figure 1 – Formation of Regional, International and Inter-Continental Organizations around the World, 1900-2003**




Source: Author's elaboration on the basis of UIA data.

ROs are today a global phenomenon: each region has several ROs, and most countries belong to multiple ROs. Figure 2 shows that ROs are particularly prominent in Europe (which has 55 ROs or more than 30 percent of all ROs), Africa (55), and the Americas (37); these regions also have the highest average number of RO memberships per country. In Africa, for example, countries belong on average to 14 ROs. Virtually all countries in the world belong to at least one regional organization.

<sup>25</sup> The figure is based on UIA data. While the total number of ROs is likely higher, UIA data have several advantages: they allow for immediate cross-regional comparisons, time-series analysis, as well as comparisons between the numbers of IOs, ROs, NGOs, and other international and regional organizations.

**Figure 2 - ROs' Distribution across World Regions and the Average Number of RO Memberships per Country by Region, 2002**



Source: Author's elaboration on the basis of UIA data.

The growth in the number of ROs has been accompanied by an expansion in ROs' scope—in the number of issues that ROs deal with. Today, the larger, multi-issue ROs cover a wide array of topics from trade and education to democracy, security, and the environment. The sub-categories under these rubrics have become even more diversified. For example, security cooperation has moved beyond regional confidence-building measures to cover such issues as terrorism, drugs, traffic in persons and small arms, weapons of mass destruction, piracy, and post-conflict rebuilding. Likewise, ROs dealing with trade today address a host of disciplines beyond the market access of goods, such as investment, services, government procurement, intellectual property rights, and macroeconomic coordination. Furthermore, when assessed collectively, the more focused, single issue-ROs also have a diversified agenda. Some address humanitarian crises, agriculture, or climate change, while others work on telecommunications, energy, or education, for example. Overall, regional cooperation has grown nuanced, specific, and precise.<sup>26</sup>

These trends imply that the *system* of ROs today carries a hugely broad agenda. Indeed, the system of inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), including ROs, is today estimated to address some 700 separate issues (such as oceanography, petroleum,

<sup>26</sup> In many cases regional cooperation has also “hardened”, with commonly assumed obligations being made more binding and more closely monitored. Some examples include the European Union's adoption of the Stability and Growth Pact, which imposes a three-percent cap on public deficits; the African Peer Review Mechanism and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD); the Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism of SADC's Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP); and the dispute settlement mechanisms and safeguard clauses of the modern trade agreements.

telecommunications, and sanctions) out of a total of 810 issues addressed by either or both IGOs and NGOs.<sup>27</sup> This represents a seven-fold increase from the pre-World War II era, when IGOs of the day dealt with about a hundred issues.

### ***Toward Functional Globality: Integrating Global Threat Management into RO Agendas***

The expansion in the scope of RO action carries two novel features—a growing emphasis on global rather than only “local” and regional issues, and the willingness of many ROs to tackle the most pressing of threats.<sup>28</sup> Until recently, rather than addressing external challenges, all major ROs worked primarily on issues within and problems emanating from their respective regions and mainly aimed to facilitate intra-regional interactions and harmonize policies among the member states.<sup>29</sup> Today, however, ROs are moving to combat external threats that are inherently beyond the control of any single nation state and by and large any regional grouping, and that have traditionally been managed chiefly by individual governments and IOs. This functional globality of RO action centers on man-made and natural threats alike, and has grown particularly palpable in the areas of terrorism and organized crime, health epidemics, civil wars and other intra-state conflicts, and humanitarian emergencies.

#### **(a) *Terrorism and Organized Crime***

On the security front, virtually all recent action plans and annual reports of major ROs pay close attention to terrorism and transnational organized crime, and often also establish institutional mechanisms to combat them.<sup>30</sup> In the Asia-Pacific, APEC established a Counter-Terrorism Task Force in 2003 to coordinate the implementation of APEC leaders’ statement on Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Growth. In October 2004, the leaders pledged to dismantle transnational terrorist groups threatening APEC economies, eliminate the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, and to strengthen domestic controls on Man Portable Air Defense Systems.<sup>31</sup> APEC has also put in place the Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) initiative aimed at facilitating and securing the flow of goods and people through improved protection of cargo, ships,

<sup>27</sup> See the *Yearbook of International Organizations*.

<sup>28</sup> In addition, there is a general trend across ROs in the degree to which they regulate member state behavior. Over the past two decades, many ROs have moved from working on “negative” policies, such as cutting tariffs and erasing other barriers between the members to addressing behind-the-border issues, such as harmonizing the member states’ domestic standards, and further to “positive” policies—policies that produce developmental outcomes that no state could attain on its own and all states of the region can access. Some such “regional public goods” (RPGs) include trans-border energy grids, road networks, and fisheries. See Estevadeordal et al. (2004).

<sup>29</sup> Examples of the more traditional measures include eradicating policy barriers to regional trade and capital flows, creating nuclear-free zones, harmonizing member states’ standards, and fostering technological know-how and human development.

<sup>30</sup> Graybow and O’Brien (2001) identify more than two dozen regional security arrangements; the vast majority of these were established in the 1990s.

<sup>31</sup> In August 2004, each APEC member submitted their respective APEC Counter-Terrorism Action Plans (CTAP). The plans are essentially checklists of the members’ implementation of the 2002 Leader’s Statement. They are also employed to identify capacity building needs within APEC.

international aviation, and people in transit. For their part, ASEAN members pledged in 2004 to shape common security norms, including in the areas of nuclear proliferation, terrorism, extradition, and maritime security. They have also established the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as an annual forum for discussing global security issues ranging from terrorism to transnational crime and nuclear energy.<sup>32</sup> Activating its long-standing commitment to fight drugs, in 2000 ASEAN adopted the ASEAN and China Cooperative Operations Response to Dangerous Drugs as an action plan for regional demand reduction and law enforcement cooperation.<sup>33</sup>

In Africa, SADC members entered a Mutual Defense Pact to operationalize their 2001 Protocol on Politics, Defense, and Security Cooperation, and have recently used this umbrella to cooperate against international terrorism, in particular. SADC has also issued a Regional Drug Control Program for 2005-2010, which includes continental and inter-regional cooperation in drug control, supply, and demand. Meanwhile, the AU members have established an African Center for the Study and Research on Terrorism. In their January 2005 Summit, the AU members also decided to create an Intelligence and Security Services Committee.<sup>34</sup>

In the Americas, the OAS-sponsored Inter-American Convention against Terrorism took effect in 2003. It seeks to prevent the financing of terrorist activities, strengthen border controls, and increase cooperation among the region's law enforcement officials. The OAS member states have also established the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism, which coordinates the Hemisphere's work against terrorism and provides technical cooperation. CARICOM established in 2001 a Regional Task Force on Crime and Security to recommend approaches to deal with the inter-related problems of crime, illicit drugs and firearms, and terrorism.

Also the EU has globalized its security cooperation. While the European Council has a long-standing record of addressing domestic terrorism, more recently it has stepped up work on international terrorism and organized crime. In 2004, the EU merged its anti-terrorism action plan issued ten days after the September 11, 2001 attacks, and the European Council's Declaration of Combating Terrorism put forth in the wake of the terrorist attacks in Madrid in November 2003, with 150 concrete initiatives to combat international terrorism resulting. These include blocking terrorist financing, improved border and transportation security, intelligence sharing and establishment of global security standards with external actors such as the United States, and European legal and

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<sup>32</sup> ARF groups 24 countries—the 10 ASEAN members and 14 “dialogue partners”, such as the United States, China, Russia, Japan, Australia, and the European Union. In March 2005, Singapore proposed that in order to foster its capacity to deal with terrorist and other threats, ARF move beyond dialogue to actions, such as holding maritime security exercises.

<sup>33</sup> ASEAN sought limited cooperation on drugs already in 1972, but no concrete regional action plans were adopted. In 1993, the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) countries—China, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand, and since 1995, Cambodia and Vietnam—have pledged to cooperate on drug control, including through an extensive cross-border cooperation program. See Tsunekawa (2004).

<sup>34</sup> The key reason for the measure was to improve collaboration between the AU and the Committee on Intelligence and Security Services in Africa established in 2004 by Africa's intelligence and security services.

police cooperation, including giving Europol a stronger role in fighting international terrorist and organized crime networks.

**(b) *Health Epidemics***

ROs are turning their attention to global issues also in the area of health. Today, ROs in all regions are working to prevent the spread of globally infectious diseases and potential epidemics, such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and SARS. The EU has led the way, adopting in 1996 a six-year action plan to prevent AIDS and other communicable diseases. The 2003 ASEAN summit intensified cooperation in the prevention and control of infectious diseases, first and foremost HIV/AIDS and SARS, and boosted support for joint regional actions to increase access to affordable medicines. Also APEC Health Ministers issued an extensive strategy in 2003 to counter the resurgence of SARS and any future health crises. In their 2004 Summit, APEC leaders committed to fostering health security, including SARS, avian flu, and AIDS.

In Africa, SADC has adopted a Multi-Sectoral HIV and AIDS Strategic Framework and Program of Action 2003-2007, which aims to reverse the spread of HIV and AIDS in the member states by 2015.<sup>35</sup> The AU's January 2005 Assembly called on the AU Commission to take the lead in developing a Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Plan for Africa in response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In the Americas, CARICOM adopted in 2002 a Regional Strategic Framework for HIV/AIDS. For its part, the OAS has relied on the WHO-subsiary Pan American Health Organization to pursue the Summit of the Americas goal of mounting a hemispheric campaign against HIV/AIDS.

**(c) *Intra-State Conflicts***

Besides addressing global threats, ROs are taking on regional security challenges—first and foremost internal conflicts and humanitarian emergencies. ROs in Africa—a region that since the 1960s has been ravaged by some 30 conflicts costing seven million lives—have been particularly active. The AU, which has spearheaded the process, adopted in 1993 a declaration establishing the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution aimed at creating an institutional apparatus for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. In 2004, the AU established a Peace and Security Council as a mechanism to implement the new ideas introduced by the AU's Constitutive Act, which provides for African intervention in three instances: threat of genocide, unconstitutional armed takeover of power or a situation where an incumbent refuses to hand over power after election defeat, and internal instability that can carry regional or continental consequences.

The AU sent peacekeepers to Burundi already in 2003; another set was dispatched to Sudan the following year. By 2010, the AU seeks to have in place an African stand-by rapid reaction peacekeeping force of 15,000 consisting of five sub-regional brigades (one

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<sup>35</sup> The program's further goals are reducing the proportion of infants infected with HIV by 50 percent by 2010, and providing access for at least 95 percent of population aged 15 to 24 to information and education about HIV/AIDS by that date.

for North, West, Central, East and Southern Africa each). In addition, it has pursued a comprehensive agenda for promoting regional peace through its 2002 Conference on Security, Stability Development and Cooperation in Africa, an institution that connects AU's lines of work on peace, stability, development, integration and cooperation.<sup>36</sup>

In line with the AU's efforts to build a continental stand-by peacekeeping force, also the other African ROs have stepped up their work on peace and security. SADC has recently redefined the role of its Regional Peacekeeping Training Center in order to enhance the regional capacities for peacekeeping and -enforcement. ECOWAS, through its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution and Peacekeeping, has played a key role in peacekeeping in Liberia and Ivory Coast. In dealing with the Liberian crisis, ECOWAS agreed to establish a peacekeeping and -enforcement force, ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)—which subsequently carried out a mission to Sierra Leone, as well. In Central Africa, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) has established the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa. First conceptualized in 1999, the Council has since 2002 worked through three main organs—the Central African Multinational Force tasked with peace and security activities and humanitarian relief, Defense and Security Commission for planning missions, and the Central Africa Early Warning Mechanism for monitoring and preventing crises and conflicts. And following up on the AU's mandates, in 2003 the ECCAS Defense Chiefs of Staff resolved to create a Central African peacekeeping brigade.

ROs in Asia and the Americas, where the actual peacekeeping needs are lower than in Africa, have also accentuated their work on peace and security. For instance, in 2004, ASEAN leaders pledged to cooperate on the reduction of inter-communal tensions as well as on peace- and capacity-building and humanitarian assistance in regions under post-conflict reconstruction. The OAS and CARICOM have played a central role in staving off collapse in Haiti, and the OAS has also worked hard on defusing political tensions and preserving democratic procedures in Venezuela and Peru, in particular. Also the EU has also assumed regional peacekeeping tasks. In 2004, it took over NATO's peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, dispatching 7,000 peacekeepers.

#### **(d) *Humanitarian Emergencies***

Until recently, international management of humanitarian emergencies, whether caused by external natural and man-made shocks, was largely at the purview of the UN system and NGOs.<sup>37</sup> However, ROs are today carving a broader role also in this realm.

In Africa, the AU is pushing to create region-wide disaster management strategies.<sup>38</sup> The Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) has driven their technical

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<sup>36</sup> CSSDCA works in four major areas (“calabashes”): security, stability, development, and cooperation. Key measures include peaceful resolution of disputes and conflicts, democratic governance, and socio-economic development.

<sup>37</sup> See Graybow and O'Brien (2001).

<sup>38</sup> See Costea and Felicio (2005).

development. IGAD also operates a Regional Early Warning System (REWS) aimed at buttressing national drought and flood prevention programs in the Greater Horn of Africa. At the sub-regional level, SADC has played a particularly forceful role. In 2002, it responded to the food security crisis in Southern Africa.<sup>39</sup> Listing such problems as droughts, floods, depletion of the carry-over stocks, inappropriate food security policies, low investment in agriculture, and violent conflicts in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo as the causes of the crisis, SADC is also one of the few ROs to take on emergencies produced by man-made causes rather than only natural ones.<sup>40</sup> In July 2002, the SADC Ministers of Food Agriculture and Natural Resources recommended immediate and long-term measures for dealing with the crisis and preventing future ones through increased agricultural productivity.<sup>41</sup> The group has also established a technical Disaster Management Unit and a Disaster Response Task Force that is activated in the face of an emergency.

Also Asia shows RO activism in the area of humanitarian emergencies. APEC has recently established the Emergency Preparedness Virtual Task Force that promotes improved emergency preparedness across the Asia-Pacific region in the event of natural disasters as well as health epidemics. South-East Asia's ARF has aimed to establish early warning systems, create a relief capabilities database, and promote technical cooperation.<sup>42</sup> In the Americas, in 2004 the OAS adopted the Inter-American Strategic Plan for Policy on Vulnerability Reduction, Risk Management, and Disaster Response in order to assist the member states to improve emergency preparedness and response, including to foster economic and social infrastructures to better deal with natural hazards. The OAS Office for Sustainable Development and Environment supports vulnerability assessments and mitigation of the effects of disasters.<sup>43</sup> The OAS Permanent Council's

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<sup>39</sup> In August 2002, a SADC Secretariat official argued that 12.8 million people in Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe would starve to death by March 2003 without collective relief efforts. See, for instance, the Communique of SADC Post Season Regional Forum at [http://www.grnnet.gov.na/News/Archive/2002/August/Week4/sadc\\_meeting\\_rpt.htm](http://www.grnnet.gov.na/News/Archive/2002/August/Week4/sadc_meeting_rpt.htm).

<sup>40</sup> ROs tend to circumscribe emergencies to those stemming from natural rather than man-made causes. For example, CARICOM's definition of "disaster" excludes disasters related to war and military confrontation.

<sup>41</sup> The measures centered on the implementation of recovery programs for the subsequent season, including distribution of seed and fertilizer, mitigation and prevention facilitation of commercial food imports and food aid, commitment to increase resources allocated to agriculture, promotion of the development of irrigation systems, and preparation of policy studies to address food insecurity in the region. The Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources (FANR) Directorate at the SADC Secretariat was given the overall responsibility to oversee the implementation of these activities. SADC also worked hard on staging a series of crisis response meetings with its International Cooperating Partners and the UN Agencies. In 2002, SADC and the UN launched a humanitarian appeal for urgent financial and technical support from International Cooperating Partners for the emergency measures; the United States, European Commission, and EU Member States subsequently responded. The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) followed suit in 2003, convening a regional donor conference to identify ways to improve its food security through forecasting and mitigating the impact of emergencies and disasters.

<sup>42</sup> ASEAN has since 1975 had an institutional mechanism, ASEAN Experts Group on Natural Disasters, to discuss natural disasters. Some commentators have called for an increasingly effective disaster response system in the region, such as building a comprehensive regional risk reduction center under the recently established ARF Unit. See Friberg (2005).

<sup>43</sup> OAS first set out to provide technical support for vulnerability reduction in 1983. However, disaster reduction work in the Americas became much more tangible only in the 1990s. See Costea and Felicio (2005).

Committee on Hemispheric Security and the Inter-American Committee on Natural Disaster Reduction first convened in 1999 are working to support the OAS members in vulnerability and risk indexing initiatives.

Notably, although ROs tend to focus on mitigating the effects of disasters and, increasingly, on preventing disasters, their role in emergency management—carrying out emergency responses and providing assistance directly—appears to be growing, as well. The December 2004 tsunami in Asia, along with other recent natural disasters in vulnerable regions such as the Caribbean, may entice ROs to create readiness to dispatch help when a disaster actually strikes.

### ***Institutional Dimension of Globalization of Regionalism***

#### ***(a) The Rise of International Institutional Connectivity***

While ROs have grown more numerous, they have also become increasingly connected with each other as well as with IOs—and often so precisely in order to pool resources to combat global threats. This, in turn, means that the system of ROs has grown into an increasingly unified international layer of common plans and actions. While quantitative data is scarcer on ROs' connectivity, one proxy might be the number of citations by various ROs of each other, IOs, and NGOs in their documents and action plans. According to UIA, the average number of times that an RO cited other organizations in its documents (as counted by paragraph of organizations' entries to the *Yearbook of International Organizations*) was 30.9 in 2002, up by 63 percent from 19 times in 1992. The citations were particularly pronounced in documents discussing ROs' activities, which suggests that ROs are indeed actually working together and with other organizations, rather than just referring to one another.

There are several qualitative examples. In terms of RO-RO cooperation, the APEC Counter-Terrorism Task Force has pursued cooperation with the Asian Development Bank and ASEAN in efforts to exchange information, identify capacity building needs, provide training and assistance, and promote best practices. It has also forged ties with the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism. ASEAN has established formal cooperation links with the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia across a host of issue areas, including combating HIV/AIDS and transnational crime.<sup>44</sup> The OAS and CARICOM have worked together in resolving the political crisis in Haiti. Central America and the Caribbean are coordinating their disaster mitigation work through the Center for the Prevention of Natural Disasters in Central America (CEPREDENAC) and the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency, respectively. And the Arab League, the African Union, and the EU, along with UN, have recently consulted on means to end the conflict in western Sudan.

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<sup>44</sup> See <http://www.aseansec.org/4984.htm>.



RO-IO cooperation is perhaps even more vivid.<sup>45</sup> The APEC Counter-Terrorism Task Force has established cooperation ties with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and the UN Counterterrorism Committee. The Asian Development Bank and the UN Program on HIV/AIDS signed in February 2005 a memorandum of understanding to strengthen the response to AIDS in the Asia-Pacific. ASEAN and the UN have since 2001 held annual conferences on conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace building. The OAS Office for Sustainable Development and Environment collaborates with the UN Development Program (UNDP) and the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs on the implementation of the worldwide Disaster Management Training Program. No less importantly, the growing connectivity of ROs and IOs has been paralleled by a harmonization of ROs' policies with international benchmarks such as the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), UN Convention against Corruption, UN Standardized International Reporting of Military Expenditures, and UN Register of Conventional Arms—a trend that will provide common baselines for future RO-IO joint actions.<sup>46</sup>

**(b) *The United Nations as A Driver of Inter-Institutional Connectivity***

RO-RO and RO-IO linkages are often formed on an *ad-hoc* basis. However, ROs' inter-institutional connectivity has also been driven by the increasingly methodical efforts of the United Nations.<sup>47</sup> The UN Secretary-General's 1994 Report "An Agenda for Peace"

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<sup>45</sup> These include activities realized under formal cooperation agreements, common plans of action, and other, more *ad-hoc* linkages.

<sup>46</sup> See, for instance, APEC Ministerial Statement 2004 and OAS Annual Report 2003-2004. To be sure, ROs also consider each other's standards. For example, SADC has harmonized regional positions with those of the AU in the area of peace and security.

<sup>47</sup> UN-regional organization cooperation has legal basis in Chapter VIII (on Regional Arrangements) of the United Nations Charter, which allows the member states to form regional arrangements or agencies to deal with international peace and security, authorizes the Security Council to utilize such arrangements to enforce its actions, and requires regional arrangements to keep the Security Council informed of their activities related to peace and security. The Chapter states:

"Article 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.
3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.
4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.

Article 53

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the

made the first major push toward institutionalizing UN-RO cooperation, calling for greater RO involvement in UN activities on international peace. The UN and ROs have since held six high-level meetings; the discussions have focused on challenges to international peace and security, the role of ROs in peace-building activities in both pre- and post-conflict environments, and practical measures to promote greater coordination and cooperation in peace-building activities.<sup>48</sup> Along with a host of IOs and UN agencies, 23 ROs were invited to sixth meeting in July 2005, including the African Union, Arab League, ASEAN, ECOWAS, EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), OAS, and SADC.<sup>49</sup>

Also the UN Security Council has accentuated its attention to ROs. In 2003, it held a public meeting on topic “The Security Council and Regional Organizations: Facing the New Challenges to International Peace and Security.” In its July 2004 meeting, the Security Council invited ROs to increase their collaboration and to create strategic partnerships with the UN in stabilization processes, in particular.<sup>50</sup> The December 2004 report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change convoked by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan seconds these initiatives, arguing that the Security Council should consult and collaborate much more with ROs in peace and security matters—and, on a case-by-case basis, finance ROs’ operations authorized by the Council. Annan’s March 2005 report on UN reform makes another pitch for coordination and burden-sharing between the UN and ROs, and urges the donor community to support a 10-year plan for developing regional capacity-building particularly in Africa.

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- Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.
2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state that during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

#### Article 54

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.”

<sup>48</sup> See [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev\\_dip/fr\\_un\\_cooperation.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev_dip/fr_un_cooperation.htm).

<sup>49</sup> The complete list of invitees included the Arab League; ASEAN, AU, CARICOM, Commonwealth of Independent States; Council of Europe; Commonwealth Secretariat; Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries; Collective Security Treaty Organization; ECCAS; ECOWAS; European Union (represented by the European Commission, the Council of the EU and the Presidency of the Council of the EU); Intergovernmental Authority for Development; International Criminal Police Organization; NATO; OAS; Organization of the Islamic Conference; Organisation internationale de la Francophonie; Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; Pacific Islands Forum; South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation; SADC; and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The invited IOs and UN agencies included International Atomic Energy Agency, International Monetary Fund, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, UN Children’s Fund, United Nations Development Program, UN Environment Program, UN Office at Geneva, UN Office at Vienna/Office on Drugs and Crime, The World Bank Group, UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific (which represented the UN’s Regional Commissions); President of the UN General Assembly, President of the UN Security Council, President of the Economic and Social Council, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

<sup>50</sup> The processes include cessation of hostilities, consolidation of peace, and reconstruction and rehabilitation.

The UN and ROs already have a history of joint activities in the area of peace and security. In the course of the 1990s, they conducted more than a dozen joint peacekeeping missions.<sup>51</sup> The collaboration acquired five main modalities: consultation practiced on a regular basis, mutual diplomatic support, operational support, co-deployment, and joint operations. Table 1 provides examples of each.

**Table 1 - Examples of Modalities of Cooperation between the UN and ROs in International Peace and Security in the 1990s**

<b>Modality of Cooperation</b>	<b>Example</b>
Regular consultations	UN-AU consultations and cooperation in Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone
Mutual diplomatic support	OSCE support to UN on constitutional matters in Abkhazia; UN support to OSCE over Nagorny Karabakh; Arab League's support to UN in mediating the conflict in Somalia
Operational support	NATO's air support to UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia
Co-deployment	UN field missions deployed in conjunction with ECOWAS in Liberia and Ivory Coast, and with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Georgia
Joint operations	UN and OAS human rights mission to Haiti

Source: United Nations (1995).

UN-RO work on peace has grown more multifaceted since the 1990s. In 2001, participants to the fourth high-level meeting refined the conceptual underpinnings of the UN-RO cooperation in peacekeeping, establishing that joint activities should be based on the respective comparative advantages of the UN and ROs, and cover a comprehensive set of themes, including negotiation and implementation of peace agreements, security stabilization, good governance, democratization and human rights, justice and reconciliation, and humanitarian relief and sustainable development.<sup>52</sup> Multi-disciplinary inter-institutional measures have subsequently been implemented on the ground. For instance, the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the Council of Europe (COE) are cooperating in Kosovo on democratic reform, economic development, human rights, and the rule of law. In the Pacific, the UN Political Office in Bougainville (UNPOB) cooperated with the Pacific Peace Monitoring Group in Bougainville in its elections and the establishment of an autonomous government in June 2005.

Importantly, the UN-RO cooperation has over the past few years diversified well beyond peacekeeping and –building to better respond to today's complex global threat panorama. The high-level meetings have particularly since 2003 addressed such issues as

<sup>51</sup> See Graybow and O'Brien (2001).

<sup>52</sup> Some further, related initiatives include the 2003 EU-UN Joint Declaration in crisis management, whose four priority areas are planning, lessons learned, training, and communications; and the European Commission-UNDP recent strategic partnership agreement for conflict zones and democratic governance. Also SADC has cooperated with the UNDP on fostering Africa's capacities in conflict prevention.

international terrorism, organized crime, drug trade, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The July 2005 meeting went further, focusing on such issues as measures to build tolerance and promote dialogue among civilizations.

Besides working to build international inter-institutional linkages in a host of issue areas, the UN has in many instances served also as the catalyst of ROs' functional globality. The UN's International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction launched in 1990 propelled ROs to take on a more pro-active role in humanitarian emergency management.<sup>53</sup> In 1993, UN General Assembly called on the international community to support ROs such as SADC and the Arab Maghreb Union in dealing with humanitarian emergencies.<sup>54</sup> And the 1999 summit of the UN Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa became the launching pad for the creation of the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa.

### **Toward Globalizing Regionalism: Agenda for Work**

The main driver of ROs' growing functional globality—ROs' moves to tackle the most pressing of global threats—is the inability of the existing international security framework to face up to today's threat scenario, and, in particular, to the rapid transmission of threats across borders and regions. ROs have complemented their functional globality with closer institutional connections with other ROs as well as with IOs. These trends are hardly surprising given that most countries today belong in multiple overlapping ROs and IOs, and thus push similar priorities across the different fora—and have an interest in pooling the various organizations' resources. And IOs themselves have growing incentives to delegate threat management responsibilities to ROs. To be sure, the building of RO-RO and RO-IO ties is also facilitated by the increase in the number of organizations: there simply is a larger pool of potential cooperation partners to tap into. Moreover, cooperation tends to breed cooperation: ROs' growing connectivity owes in part to the trust and benefits gained in prior collaborative efforts.

As a result of their functional globality and institutional connectivity, individual ROs have come to pursue very similar agendas, and the collection of ROs has become a distinct system of international actors and action. The RO system is both hedging against the transmission of global threats to the regional levels, and dampening the spread of regional threats to the global level—and, in the process, shifting some of IOs' workload to regional levels.<sup>55</sup> How to cement these positive trends—how to systematically harness

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<sup>53</sup> The initiative stressed international partnerships and regional strategies for disaster management. The UN's Plan of Action to Combat Desertification proposed a role for ROs in preventing drought and the attendant famines in Africa.

<sup>54</sup> The World Food Summit of 1996 echoed this proposal from the point of view of food security, with the leaders pledging to prevent and prepare for "natural disasters and man made emergencies and to meet transitory and emergency food requirements in ways that encourage recovery, rehabilitation, development and capacity to satisfy future needs."

<sup>55</sup> UIA data also indicate that in the area of peace, war and security, organizations focused on peacekeeping and on ethics have proliferated particularly rapidly in the 1990s, while the number of those dealing with neutrality and peace studies and espionage have declined or remained stagnant. The number of organizations dealing with emergencies and the disadvantaged has also shot up.

the potential of the RO system for global threat management? How to best globalize regionalism?

It cannot be assumed that simply adding members to the set of actors involved in managing global threats is sufficient or automatically beneficial—already for the conceptual problem of free-riding.<sup>56</sup> The key challenge is to find ways in which ROs can add value to the political and financial commitments their members have made *ex-ante* at the national and multilateral levels, and, as such, to construct a genuinely productive and complementary layer of global cooperation. Five concrete measures could serve as a starting point.

The first is to strengthen the readily available global institutionalized mechanism for bringing ROs to the same table—the high-level meetings organized by the UN. They should be made annual, incorporate a larger number of ROs and IOs, and engage a wide range of officials and experts from the participating organizations. This would allow the meetings to move to discussions on the nuts and bolts of the practice of cooperation, broaden the range of threats that can be addressed jointly, and thicken and solidify the system of ROs as a tool for global threat management.

Second, the RO system convoked under the UN umbrella could establish a global RO Representation. At a minimum, the RO Representation would act as a clearinghouse of information on RO activities and on RO-IO cooperation—catalogue the planned and existing RO-RO and RO-IO cooperation ventures and their sources of funding, and place the information in a database available through the Internet. This would keep the organizations and other stakeholders informed in real time about the latest inter-institutional initiatives, as well as raise public awareness of RO and IOs' work. The Representation could also serve as a marketplace for ROs to explore cooperation ventures with each other and with IOs, as well as with NGOs and private sector actors. Such partnerships can multiply the opportunities for synergies in global threat management.

Third, the Security Council should be kept more closely abreast of RO activities.<sup>57</sup> One way of accomplishing this is to create the position of global RO Representative. The Representative would act as a nexus of information between the ROs and the UN system, conveying information on ROs' decisions, action plans, and collaboration ventures to the UN Security Council for its decision-making process in general, and for its guidance of the UN-RO cooperation, in particular.

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<sup>56</sup> For some recent assessments of the effectiveness of RO measures in countering global threats, see, for example, Hettne and Söderbaum (2005); Söderbaum and Hettne (2005); and Graybow and David O'Brien (2001).

<sup>57</sup> One prior example of the Security Council's providing input to RO activities is its work on the 1999 revision of ECOWAS's conflict resolution machinery, the Protocol on Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution and Peacekeeping. The UN has also supported ECOWAS's creation of several new organs, including the Mediation and Security Council, the Council of Elders, and a department in the Secretariat charged with peace and security. Whether ROs should solicit the Security Council's approval in each case of regional interventions in the area of peace and security is a contested issue; this paper does not take a stance on it.

Fourth, the annual high-level meetings should be accompanied by regular brainstorming sessions among RO and IO officials and top-notch independent analysts on the current and emerging global threats and the best means for confronting them. The first two issues the sessions should address are the specific modalities that globalizing regionalism should take in different issue areas (such as co-deployment or joint operations in the area of peacekeeping), and the allocation of global tasks to the various stakeholders—assigning responsibilities for the various modalities to ROs and other international actors, respectively.

Fifth, the connectivity of ROs *within* regions should be deepened. Intra-regional coordination and consultation among ROs would generate scale economies of regional knowledge, fix ideas on common platforms, pool institutional resources, and reduce duplication of functions—and potentially even select out unnecessary bodies. One example is the January 2005 CARICOM meeting on emergency response, which engaged the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Secretariat (OECS), the Caribbean Environmental Health Institute, the Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre, and the University of the West Indies, as well as leaders of three projects—the Pan Caribbean Partnership Against HIV/AIDS, the Caribbean Renewable Energy Development Project, and the Mainstreaming Adaptation to Climate Change Project.

## **Conclusion**

Globalizing regionalism would benefit regional organizations, their members, and international threat management alike. It would provide for improved and more nuanced information on global threats and their manifestations at the regional level, streamline the use of resources allocated to regional action, and foster international specialization. ROs' growing density, functional globality, and institutional connectivity have forged in a promising infrastructure for globalizing regionalism. The opportunity is precious and needs to be systematically harnessed through hard work and fresh funds. The key is to institutionalize ROs' connectivity with each other and with IOs, and to drive the RO system toward common global threat management work through regular consultations, expert advice, and smartly targeted and designed joint activities.

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