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ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS

An Inquiry into the Concept, Change
and the EU's Contribution

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Abstract

This paper examines how the EU as an international actor contributed to the creation and sustenance of order in world politics since the end of the Cold War. To this end, it advances an operationalization of order that takes the worldview of states and international organizations, which are regarded as key actors, as its starting point. Their ideas and beliefs on how the world works outlines the range of orders that is meaningfully possible. On the basis of this assumption order is operationalized via seven variables. Three describe the basic outlook of actors on politics, economics and governance. Four characterize the modalities of international interaction. Order during the Cold War and during the post-Cold War is analyzed using this operationalization. Main elements of continuity appear to be the continuing significance of liberal political systems with democratic governance structures that use a form of regulated capitalism to generate wealth. Main ruptures occurred with regard to the great power structure of the international system and the quality of international interaction. It is shown that the EU mainly contributes to current order in world politics by strengthening most of its currently dominant values in a non-violent and fairly consensual manner. Yet, it carries some seeds of change in order. As a region it stimulates interregional cooperation which eventually could add a category of relevant actors to world politics. In addition, the path of integration it has followed so far offers a different perspective on the notions of sovereignty, democracy, authority and power.

1. Introduction

Questions related to order in world politics are relevant for academics, politicians, diplomats and citizens alike because of the linkage that exists between order and the goals it may serve - like security, prosperity or justice. Such goals represent key conditions for a good life. These goals guide the formulation of policies, means and actions. Order is the enabling context that provides the stability and predictability necessary for the realization of such goals. The analysis of order in world politics is therefore relevant for three reasons. To discuss what it means to speak of order and how it is created enriches our mental mapping (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994, 9-12). This improves judgment and can lead to more effective outcomes. In addition, to understand what order is for, and how it has developed over the last decades, helps to move away from daily headlines. Day-to-day events emphasize the short-term over the long-term. Yet solid assessment requires the combination of what is possible with what is imaginable. Finally, to know how the EU as an actor contributes to current order can improve the degree to which its policies realize desired outcomes.

Over the last decades a growing number of paradoxes may be observed in relation to order in world politics. Firstly, the state has impressively expanded its range of functions and depth of activity since its presumed Westphalian ''conception'' in 1648.[1] However, by itself it seems to be less and less able to guarantee order (domestically or internationally) because of the tension between its territorial limitations and the fact that global problems demand global solutions (Waltz, 1979, 109).[2] Sovereignty is not on its way out, but effective unilateral use of state power seems to carry an increasing price tag.[3] Yet, the system of states as a mechanism to ensure order in world politics is remaining largely unchanged. The question arises to what degree this discrepancy has consequences for the nature and maintenance of order.[4]

Secondly, the Cold War has ended and the nuclear threat receded. The prospects for world peace and prosperity never seemed closer. Fukuyama announced the end of history in 1992. Yet the number of conflicts seems to be growing and the risk, or necessity, of involvement and spill-over looms ever larger (USA, NSS, 2006; European Council, ESS, 2003).

Finally, the creation of a 'global village', the growing volume of international transactions, the increased linkages of global commerce and the fast paced advance of modern technology are bringing new prosperity, a higher standard of living and more chances for personal development. Yet increased interdependence also carries with it all potential ingredients for destabilization, disorder and conflict (EC, 2001a). A forteriori, globalization seems to improve as much as to deteriorate order in world politics.

In the midst of these paradoxes the European Union (EU) is regarded by many as a unique international actor combining characteristics of states with those of international organizations in a novel form of governance in world politics, traditionally dominated by the ''state paradigm'' (Kuhn, 1996, 43-51; Wiener and Diez, 2004, 8-9; Nugent 2003, 465-474). Its distinctive element lies in its unprecedented degree of institutionalized international policy cooperation with consequences for state competences and prerogatives, policy processes and output (for example: Moravcsik, 1993, 473). The EU is said to be a soft power with a focus on norms and the rule of law, which presumably bring with them beneficial consequences for global order and peace (Laïdi, 2005, 12-14). It is easy to contrast this

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[1] Usually articles LXIV and LXV of the Westphalian peace treaty are taken as evidence hereof. For a counterview: Osiander (2001)

[2] Milward et al. argue that only selected domestic problems require international solutions (Milward et al, 1993, 5, 12, 186). Following this line of thought global problems are not necessarily global because of their nature, but because a large number of states are faced with similar or related domestic problems for which an international framework is required.

[3] For a detailed treatment of sovereignty: Krasner (2001)

[4] Kant (1988, sections 1-2) already recognized some of the implications of the state system for order in 1795

image with today's more unilateral, hegemonic policy style of the United States and draw the conclusion that the EU is a force for good (like for instance Chomsky, 2004, 11).

Although this might seem compelling logic, it also appears too simple and lacking nuance. Therefore this paper takes up the question how the EU contributes to order in world politics. It answers the question *''how has the EU as an international actor contributed to the creation and sustenance of order in world politics since the end of the Cold War?''* This can be divided into three parts: 1) How can the concept of order in world politics be understood in general terms; 2) What order characterizes world politics since 1991; 3) How does the EU as an international actor contribute to this order?

On the basis of the research of Easton and Dahl, world politics can be defined as the processes of interaction between states and international organizations as political systems. In other words, it denotes the processes through which representative agents of legitimized actors interact with the aim of advancing their interests (Easton, 1965, 57; Dahl, 1991, 4).

Using key insights in International Relations (IR) theory, section 2 of this paper takes up the first part of the question. It starts with discussing the definition and meaning of order against Bull's landmark treatment of the concept in: *''The Anarchical Society''.* Two departures from Bull are highlighted, mainly to take account of the differences between the present-day and the Cold War during which he wrote.[5] The first relates to the relevant actors involved in the creation of order in world politics. Instead of limiting these to states, like Bull does, a case is made to also view international organizations as relevant actors. The second departure concerns the goal(s) of order. Instead of being primary, elementary or universal in character, as Bull suggests, the formulation of such goals is argued to represent what is at stake in world politics. They are socially constructed for a given time and space. Next, three conditions required for the existence of order are analyzed. Subsequently, the possibility to formulate shared positive goals under the anarchical conditions of world politics is discussed. Finally, order is operationalized by introducing a set of seven variables that characterize and organize it. This operationalization is used as analytical grid to define and discuss units of order in later sections.

Section 3 discusses the second part of the question. Firstly, it analyzes changes in the goals of, threats to and actors involved in Cold War and post Cold War order. Secondly, changes from Cold War to post Cold War order are discussed and characterized using the operationalization of order of section 2. By looking at the values of order in world politics for

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[5] There is, for example, little in Bull's work that relates the increasing salience of political economy, globalization and the resulting interdependence to world order (Hurrell, in: Bull, 2002, xv; xxi).

both periods, recent changes of order in world politics will become clear. The analysis is carried out on the basis of academic literature, key policy documents (mainly from the United Nations (UN) and World Trade Organization (WTO) and some quantitative indicators that follow from the operationalization of order (see section 2.4 and annex I).

Finally, section 4 answers the third part of the question. The general nature of the EU as actor and its preference for certain values of order are linked to the set of dominant values that characterize post Cold War order. Moreover, the contribution of three particular characteristics of the EU (Europeanization, interregionalism and desecuritization) to specific values of current order is highlighted. Academic literature, the EC/EU treaties and key EC/EU policy documents provide the sources for this analysis.

The EU largely reinforces a particular subset of the dominant values that characterize current order. The EU not only does so internally but also seeks to actively export its preferred values of order, albeit in a non-violent and fairly consensual manner. Because of its unique nature, the EU carries with it some minor seeds of change compared to current order in world politics, particularly through its preference for regionalism and pluralistic democracy.

2. The meaning of order in world politics

Section 2.1 defines order. It discusses the key actors involved in the creation of order and the purpose of order. Section 2.2 analyses the conditions required for order to exist. One of these conditions is the presence of positive goals that are shared by the actors involved in order. Section 2.3 discusses how much scope exists for actors to express such goals in the international context. Section 2.4 operationalizes order in world politics using seven variables, each with 4-5 values.[6] This outlines the range of possible kinds of orders.

2.1 The concept, actors and what's the purpose?

Order refers to a state of affairs that is based on some underlying organizing principle(s) or variable(s). Such variables can take a number of different values. Each value refers to a particular kind of order. For example, the variable describing order between books on a shelf could be ''sequence''. Its values could be: ''alphabetically'', ''ascending by height'' and ''cover

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[6] Values are characteristics or qualities that describe an object. Variables are logical groupings of values (Babbie, 1995, 31-32; King, Keohane and Verba, 1994, 51-52)

colour''.[7] Because a particular order is organized by specific values, it has a degree of stability and predictability. If the value(s) that organize order can change easily, its stability and predictability are relatively low. If such values change with difficulty, stability is relatively high. Neither variables nor values create order. An actor and purpose are also necessary. However, variables and values are essential to describe it. In politics, order logically is a relational concept and can be defined as:

> ''a state of affairs in which the relationship(s) between two or more entities can be described by a number of variables and values that provide a degree of stability and predictability.''

Bull already pointed out that this creates the possibility of order in which the relationships between entities can be organized on the basis of the variable ''war''. However stable and predictable such order would be, it would not resonate with any existing conception of order but with one of disorder (Bull, 2002, 3-4). To resolve this question, Bull suggested that: ''by international order is meant a pattern or disposition of international activity that sustains those goals of the society of states that are elementary, primary or universal.'' Bull advanced three such goals: 1) the preservation of the system and the society of states; 2) the maintenance of the independence or external sovereignty of individual states; 3) the maintenance of peace through the absence of war as a normal condition between states and 4) the common goals of all social life (Ibid, 16-18).

Two problems exist with Bull's position. The first is that he limits the entities between which order can exists in world politics to states.[8] This restriction sidelines a number of theoretical IR approaches to what key entities in world politics are. As their conclusive falsification has yet to be offered, it is necessary to keep an open mind towards their claims (Popper, 2004, 18; Leurdijk, 2001, 28). Moreover, the Cold War in particular, during which Bull wrote, was dominated by a state-centered worldview.

To identify key entities in world politics the concept of territoriality must be considered in relation to the political organization of output. The world in which mankind lives, is a material world. Both the resources that are needed for substance and the factors of production are physically located. Therefore, the primary conceptualization of existence is geographical. Political entities that govern output through regulative inputs have predominantly been

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[7] The fact that books are placed in a row is not seen as providing order. This situation would be no different from a pile of books on the floor (Bull, 2002, 3-4). The purpose of order in this example is to speed up the process of finding the relevant book.

[8] This is in line with realist theory; see e.g. Waltz (1979) or Guzzini (2002). There is wide agreement in IR literature that states are important actors on the world scene – but not the only ones.

organized on the principle of territory for reasons of geographical control (Hix, 2005, 4-5; Wallerstein, 1997, 10; Ruggie, 1998, 159-161, 178-180). For centuries such entities could deal with the issues they faced through simple and unilateral actions within their territorial confines. Physical control over surface represented the dominant source and ''legitimation'' of political power. This control needed not be total but required a link between control as claimed and control as exercised. The state represents the modern version of such political entities. This makes it a key actor in world politics.

But this territorial, state-centric image of the political organization of output needs to be nuanced (Ruggie, 1998, ch. 7). After the Cold War it is increasingly asserted that a growing number of issues that states must address to provide effective policy output are becoming cross-border (for example: Knutsen, 1999, 262-272). The main cause hereof is generally said to be ''globalization'' - referring to the wider spatial dispersal and easier repositioning of production facilities, advanced telecommunications, the growing ease of travel, the output interdependence of modern economies and the thickening of trade flow volumes (Chomsky, 2004). States are becoming more interdependent with regard to their capability to generate prosperity and security for their citizens (Keohane and Nye, 2001, xv-xvi; ch. 10).[9] The question of who exercises territorial control is complemented by the question of what the quality of the relation with the controller is. Interdependence cannot be reduced by empire or conquest anymore but needs to be relationally managed. When the density and regularity of interstate interaction rises and dissatisfaction with existing output increases, international organizations become an attractive and necessary method to improve the quality of policy output (Wendt, 1992, 424; Wessels, 1997, 69-72; Milward, 1993, 20-21). To quote Keohane and Nye (2001, 30): ''…in a world of multiple issues imperfectly linked, in which coalitions are formed transnationally and transgovernmentally, the potential role of international institutions in political bargaining is greatly increased''. In short, because of their role in the management of such interdependence, international organizations are relevant actors in world politics (as for instance illustrated by: Cooper, 1996, 22-26).

Regardless of the increase or decrease of interdependence, international organizations can also be argued to be relevant entities because their ''forum function'' creates new dynamics between states, partially fed by a non-state actor. The neo-realist position that international organizations are subject to state preferences and that states therefore remain supreme may be true in a strict legal sense, but ignores the fact that through membership of an

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[9] This observation does not assume a gradual and smooth development towards a harmonious world order. Although interdependence increases, states can still chose to what extent they ''participate'' in it. Such choices, however, have consequences for national prosperity and ultimately for political legitimacy. See for example: Milward (1992, 10-12). For a historic perspective on changing demands on the state: Bayly (2004, 217-273)

international organization a state becomes exposed to a flow of ideas, a body of rules and an interaction frequency that it was not part of before (for the neorealist viewpoint: Waltz, 1979, 93-94). This co-shapes a state's interest, its room for maneuver and its relations. To divide the sum of this process by its constituent members and reduce it to single state interests in support of the position that international organizations do not matter introduces artificial simplicity (Wendt, 1992, 399; Moravcsik, 1993, 507-516; Hall, 1996, 18).[10]

The second problem with Bull's position lies in the goals he advances as the elementary, primary or universal goals of order. Some difficulties arising from his claim are highlighted below and an alternative approach is suggested.

The first goal Bull identified is the preservation of the system and society of states. If states are regarded as organizations that provide goods and services for a group of constituents, there is no reason why they would want to preserve themselves ad infinitum should requirements or circumstances change (for instance: Carr, 2001, 226-231). Historical reflection learns that the current system of states evolved out of feudalist structures. The Thirty Year's war can be seen as the climax of the governance problems that beset these structures and which they proved unable to handle. Although 1648 is taken as the birth *moment* of the modern state, it is properly seen as a phase of a *process* of a longer duration starting around the thirteenth century (Cooper, 1996, 7; Ruggie, 1998, 181-189; Kennedy, 1987, 70-72). This process was not one in which the political entities of that day were passive bystanders. It was partially their actions that changed the political system of their time. The current system of states has been the dominant form of political organization for around three centuries. The state's predecessors amalgamated and transformed into different political organizations voluntarily many times over before becoming today's states (Bayly, 2004, 38-41). European integration as a way to increase prosperity or to avoid conflict is merely a variation on the marriages between ruling elites in the Middle Ages.

The second goal of order Bull identified as elementary, primary or universal is the maintenance of the independence or external sovereignty of states.[11] However, from Bull's account it is not unequivocal what is meant by the maintenance of external sovereignty. Is formal territorial preservation the criterion, or a capacity to act independently? Can, for example, Somalia still be considered an independent and externally sovereign state in the face of its internal chaos? Would a voluntary and peaceful break-up of Belgium or Spain

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[10] This does not mean that the state is on its return or being superseded. It is sufficient to accept that states increasingly need to cooperate with other states via international organizations to maintain effective levels of political output. See also: Leurdijk (2001, 593-597); Wallace, Wallace and Pollack (2005, 101-102)

[11] From a realist perspective, the maintenance of sovereignty can regulate relations in an anarchical world as long as convenient but in the quest for security it cannot be a goal.

invalidate the goal? Factual events do not necessarily invalidate goals; they may merely show policy failures. Nevertheless, they illustrate how difficult it is to have the preservation of states as a goal if it is unclear what this means. If sovereignty is, as Krasner (2001, 19) suggests, ''organized hypocrisy'' because norms regarding sovereignty consistently diverge from actions, its status as goal seems rather empty.

Thirdly, to suggest that the absence of war as the normal condition for the relationship between states is a universal, primary or elementary goal seems historically incorrect (Bull, 2002, 17). The discrepancy between this goal and (military) history makes this position difficult – even as a goal that states have failed to meet. For example Kennedy's (1987) classic account of economic and military developments between 1500 and 2000 demonstrates a frequency of warfare that does not support any image of states in this period desiring peace in the sense meant by Bull (see also: Knutsen, 1999; Tuchman, 1989).

Finally, Bull suggested the common goals of social life (the preservation of life, truth and property) as the fourth goal of order. It can be assumed in general that states need to fulfill these goals, if only to be perceived as legitimate. However, they mainly do so internally within the boundaries of their political and territorial authority. As a result it is more plausible that this goal is a goal of order in domestic politics and not a goal of order in world politics. Before accepting it as a goal of order in world politics, the link between the interest of citizens and the interests of the state in terms of their interaction and relative priority seems necessary.[12]

Instead of the goals of order advanced by Bull, this paper suggests to consider such goals as social constructs, contextually dependent on time and space. Order, as Bull suggests, needs to serve positive goals. It requires purpose. But instead of being universal, elementary or primary, the definition of 'positive' and 'purpose' is exactly what is at stake in world politics. Order is a context, a state of affairs against which certain ends can be achieved. But these ends do not exist independently. Instead they are vague, diffuse and contested; they are continuously created, refined, discarded and reinvented. The actors involved in order continuously engage in their formulation. As a result, the initial definition of order needs some refinement. The following definition is proposed:

> ''Order is a state of affairs, conducive to the realization of shared positive goals,
> in which the relationship(s) between two or more entities can be described by a

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[12] Carr observed that: ''the obligation of the state cannot be identified with the obligation of any individual…; and it is the obligation of states which are the subject of international morality'' (Carr, 2001, 151-161)

number of variables and values that provide a degree of stability and predictability.''

2.2 The creation of order: three conditions

This definition of order shows that at least three conditions must be met before order can exist in world politics: 1) a sufficient number of all existing political entities must be part of it; 2) frequent and dense interaction between these entities must be possible; and 3) such entities must have expressed shared positive goals.

The first condition is closely related to the second. More frequent and denser interaction enables, and forces, more political entities to take part in the creation of order. Order in general needs two or more entities to exist. Order in world politics requires the possibility for states that want to participate, to participate, as well as the active involvement of the great and super powers. This is what is meant by sufficiency.

The possibility to participate depends on the possibility to interact. It may be assumed that possibility is positively correlated with necessity. The possibility to interact dates back at least to the Silk Road, which, as early as 1200 B.C., provided for the global exchange of information and goods. But it cannot be said that the resulting interaction was adequately dense or regular to enable the relationships to exist that are required for order. Arguably, the age of discovery and colonialization represented the first period in which interconnectedness rose to levels that made it possible for order to be created in world politics. This suggestion is in line with the periods for which Kennedy and Knutsen discuss world order. According to Keohane and Nye this possibility vastly increased after World War II (WWII) when globalization (the process that thickens globalism) started to make real impact on interaction density and regularity (Keohane and Nye, 2001, 7-8, 233-235; Held and McGrew, 1998, 221-235). Interconnectedness became increasingly complemented by interdependence. Interconnectedness refers to the degree and ease with which political entities can interact. The declining costs of communications since the 1980s are an example of the increase in interconnectedness. Interdependence refers to the (perceived) cost of its disruption (Keohane and Nye, 2001, 236). The increase of energy imports/exports, global debt financing and trade volumes are examples of increasing interdependence (IMF, 2005).

This increase in interconnectedness and interdependence has had three consequences for order in world politics. Firstly, increasing interconnectedness has enlarged the scale of world politics. The number of actors that can participate in world politics has increased. This makes any particular order in world politics more relevant because a larger number of political entities is engaged in its formation and affected by its existence. It has also made the

creation of order more difficult as the need for coordination and the building of shared perception and interests increased in parallel.

Secondly, increasing interdependence has enlarged the scope of world politics. States need to be thoughtful about their mutual relations on a growing range of topics. Most states have limited options to manage their interdependence. They can pursue a hegemonic course of action to ''conquer'' increased interdependence. But generally states do not have the resources to pursue such a course of action meaningfully. It may confer great power status on them, which would provide enhanced influence. Paradoxically, however, becoming a great power means to have a larger stake in the system. Greater influence is thus likely to come with greater interdependence. States can also create and participate in international regimes and organizations to jointly control their interdependence (Keohane, 1982). Moreover, they can attempt to reduce it. The risks of reduction are decreasing prosperity and legitimacy. Finally, states can try to (ab)use interdependence by leveraging ownership of key resources or assets (like OPEC or Gazprom have done). All options with the exception of the third are likely to result in demands for more order in world politics.

Thirdly, because interconnectedness and interdependence grow unevenly throughout the world, interests in and demands for order diverge increasingly. States that are highly connected and interdependent have more interest in creating and maintaining order. It is evident that such states, mainly industrialized Western states, will attempt to push for an order resembling a global management system that is tailored to their particular situation. Less ''globalized'' states may more feasibly seek to reduce or (ab)use interconnection or interdependence.

The active involvement of the great and super powers in order is a necessary condition for the reason that if states are key actors in world politics, the most powerful states must logically matter most. Waltz (1979, 97) already observed that state functions may be identical, but state capabilities differ. The special and critical function and role of the great powers in world politics is widely acknowledged in IR theory and literature. Not just by realists, but also by constructivists, liberals and scholars belonging to the English school (Bull, 2002, ch. 9; Wendt, 1992 and 2000; Keohane and Nye, 2001). Logically, if great powers have a special role in world politics, they also have a special role in the creation of order in world politics. The term superpower is a tailor-made modification of the term to cater for the post Cold War situation. A number of great powers exists today, but the power difference between the United States of America (USA) and other great powers is so large (mainly militarily), that to refer to them as if they belong to a single category would obscure the different leagues in which they seem to play. The concept of great and super powers is

used in this paper without further elaboration. Existing literature provides adequate definition and detail (Bull, 2002, ch.9; Waltz, 1979, ch.6; Leurdijk, 2001, ch.6).

The final condition required for order in world politics is the presence of positive goals that are shared by the key actors involved in order. Bull deducts such goals from human nature, from the nature of states and from the system in which they operate. Some problems with this approach were highlighted above. These are mainly related to the fact that actors and systems can change and must be capable of change. To derive fixed goals from the way a system operates, risks creating a closed circle that renders change impossible.

Another method to establish the existence of shared positive goals is to postulate an apriori normative set of goals. These would not necessarily have to be substantive but might also be procedural. For example Kant's categorical imperative could be such a goal - what is seen as a desirable general law for all by one actor will be seen as such by all actors.[13] The problem with this approach is that goals usually represent beliefs of particular actors at a particular time. They only obtain their meaning in social reality and context which change continuously (Winch, 1999, part III, 86-91). It is not unlikely that substantive agreement on normative goals, universally valid in time and space, cannot be found. This would make it impossible to speak of order in world politics.

Instead, this paper suggests that the formulation of shared positive goals is the end result of the process of politics in world politics. If goals represent a time-bound output of particular political interaction at world level, they cannot be established upfront (Wendt, 1992, 394-395, 399-403). As a result, the presence of their expression needs to be judged for a specific moment in time. Naturally, the diversity and range of key actors on the world scene makes the formulation of shared positive goals a laborious process (illustrative is Huntington, 1997). As a result, a minimal variant and a more ambitious variant of shared positive goals can be imagined. The minimal expression of shared positive goals is the absence of negative goals. If actors recognize that they stand a better chance of reaching their goals when most of these do not conflict fundamentally, order can be realized. In this scenario order becomes the enabling context against which the individual goals of a number of actors can be realized in parallel. A more ambitious expression of shared positive goals is the presence of goals which improve a quality of life and that require joint action of some sort to be realized.

It seems that today all conditions for the existence of order are met. The best evidence hereof appears the charter of the United Nations. It expresses a number of positive goals that require joint action of states and international organizations. Moreover, nearly all states,

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[13] "Handle nur nach derjenigen Maxime, durch die du zugleich wollen kannst, dass die ein allgemeines Gesetzt werde." (Kant, 1984, 52)

including the great and super power(s), participate extensively and frequently in its operations (UN, 1945, preamble, articles 1-2).

2.3. International anarchy: on the possibility of shared positive purpose

Section 2.2 examined what it means to require the presence of shared positive goals as a condition for the existence of order. Order was said to provide the enabling context for action that seeks to realize such goals. This section examines in more detail how much scope exists in world politics for actors to jointly express positive goals. It argues that a mix of realism, liberal interdependence theory and constructivism is necessary to understand the systemic conditions of world politics and the nature of its actors.

The starting point of most theoretical IR discussions remains neo-realism. Three realist assumptions are particularly relevant in relation to the actors and nature of order in world politics. The first is a structural system assumption, the other two are behavioral. Firstly, the systemic condition of anarchy requires states to be self-reliant. Secondly, states have a competitive and hostile worldview. Thirdly, states value survival above all else.[14]

These assumptions make the realist world a conflict-prone world in which states are considered the only relevant actors. The structure of the international system is a critical starting point for realist predictions. In this system there is no supreme authority because it is characterized by the structural condition of anarchy. The root cause for the condition of anarchy is the concept of sovereignty. States established ultimate and exclusive domestic authority, free of external interference. They all agree with the merits of this principle and adhere to its continuation. As a result, a formal hierarchy among them cannot exist (Waltz, 1979, 88-110; Dunne, 1995, 369). Hence, the international system lacks a central authority (Bull, 2002, 44; Mearsheimer, 2001, introduction). States are therefore self-reliant. There is no actor that can authoritatively help or intervene in case of need. Combining this systemic condition with the behavioral assumptions that states view each other as 'enemies-rather-than-friends', and value their survival above all else, means that only states themselves can guarantee their survival. The condition of anarchy alone is insufficient to support this assertion. The behavioral assumptions are necessary complements as otherwise there would be no reason for states to consider their survival as being threatened (Guzzini, 1998, 188). Taken together, this set of assumptions predicts states to follow strategies that ensure their survival. Realists argue that security is the best strategy to this end because being

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[14] A single form of realism does not exist. The discussion uses generally shared premises of the different strands of realism. Waltz is often taken as the theory's leading author. For offensive realism: Mearsheimer (2001), structural realism: Buzan (1993), neo-realism: Waltz (1979)

secure indicates the absence of threats. Security is thought to be best achieved by power maximization.[15] Logically, states will seek to enhance their power relative to their contending rivals. This leads them to pursue competitive, conflict-prone strategies resulting in a mostly zero-sum quest for power in which the most successful state prevails (Waltz, 1979, ch.6). The distribution of power among states becomes the key variable to study. Large states have more capabilities than small states and therefore potentially the greatest impact on the functioning of the system (Ibid, ch.5 – section III-3). This worldview has three important consequences for order as understood in this paper: 1) power distribution is its key variable; 2) the expression of shared, positive goals, or at least the absence of zero-sum games about relative power, becomes difficult as this requires (tacit) cooperation; 3) great powers are critical actors in shaping order insofar as it can exist. Order almost becomes an empty concept. However, before drawing such a conclusion, three caveats need to be made that provide essential nuance.

First, the absence of a central authority due to the systemic condition of anarchy cannot be equaled to the absence of order. Realists use only part of the domestic analogy to demonstrate the absence of all hierarchy in the international system. Like a state's government is not the only source of domestic authority or order, neither is a central agent hierarchically located above states the only possible authority or source of order in world politics (Guzzini, 1998, 155; Bull, 2002, 46). It would therefore be rash to view the realist position and the possibility for order to exist as black and white.

Second, Wendt argues that although anarchy prevails internationally as a systemic condition, its effects are not exogenous but depend on how the actors that are confronted with it perceive their world. Under identical conditions of anarchy, he suggests, actors in world politics engage in 'self' and 'other' identification on the basis of knowledge, culture, ideas and interaction. This process creates distinctive ''cultures of anarchy'' that have different implications for order in world politics. Wendt differentiates the Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian cultures (Wendt, 2000, 246-259; Dunne, 1995, 384). In the Hobbesian variant, states construct each other as enemies if at least one of them fundamentally denies the other's right to exist and seeks to revise its ''life and liberty''. Such ''deep revisionism'' logically emphasizes military power, a high degree of risk averseness, the possibility of limitless use of violence in the form of total war and excludes negotiation. If state A constructs state B in this way, state B is forced to replicate A's image construction if it wants to survive. This creates a vicious, self-fulfilling circle. Realist logic seems to apply in this culture of anarchy. It

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[15] For a critical treatment of the realist concept of power: Guzzini (1998, 135-138)

is hard to imagine any order at all. In the Lockean variant, states construct each other as rivals. Rivals recognize each other's right to exist but contest specific attributes or behavior of the other. This results in limited warfare, balancing of power and the possibility of neutrality. In such a culture order exists to regulate state behavior. Agreement on positive goals that need to be collectively realized is possible as long as the goals are positive-sum and satisfy the self-interests of the parties involved. As a result, international organizations can fulfill limited functions in this setting. Finally, in the Kantian variant states constitute each other as friends and renounce violence as a dispute settlement mechanism. Instead, they may promise to aid in the face of external security threats based on their mutual trust (Wendt, 2000, 259-308). This opens the door to extensive cooperation and a more substantial order. NATO and the EU represent good current examples (Deutsch, 1969; Nugent, 2003).

If Wendt's position on anarchy is connected with the realist view, some subtle insights in relation to order can be gained. To start with, power is not the only key variable of order anymore. In fact, power as material force is used on the basis of perceptions and interests. These are formed, not given. In Wendt's account anarchy does not automatically preclude order as suggested by realism and shared positive goals stand a chance of being expressed. His observation that a-priori, cooperation is as likely as conflict, is echoed in many neo-liberal critiques of realism (Guzzini, 1998, 188). In addition, if different cultures of anarchy can exist with different possibilities for cooperation and distinctive effects on order, units are not necessarily forced to become functionally alike the way Waltz advocates (Waltz, 1979, 104-107). Guzzini and Wendt both note that the possibility of functional specification opens up the way towards a further measure of hierarchy in the international system (Wendt, 2000, 258; Guzzini, 1998, 225). Arguably, so far mainly international organizations have been created to meet specialization needs.[16] When interconnectedness and interdepence increase, as was argued above, it is likely that specialization also increases.[17] This seems part of the explanation of the post WWII creation of many present-day international organizations. Their growth in combination with their forum function and constitutive effects is likely to facilitate the expression and realization of positive goals. As Keohane and Nye argue, international organizations bring officials together, help to activate potential coalitions in world politics, provide a forum in which weak states can share their view and permit linkage strategies. In general, international regimes and organizations provide information, improve coordination, allow burden sharing and introduce stability (Keohane and Nye, 2001, 31, 291-292; Keohane

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[16] It can be demonstrated that states specialize, not just economically but also in terms of their expertise and involvement in the international system. This is not done here but the question is how this may provide additional hierarchy in world politics.
[17] For the relation between complex interdependence and international organizations see: Keohane and Nye (2001, 21), Keohane (1982), Keohane (1984, ch. 5)

1984, 8; Lake, 1996). Complex interdependence, triggered by the ''thickening'' of globalism, changes the realist ''enemies-rather-than-friends'' assumption of state behavior because its effects change states' interests. In fact, states may come to recognize that cooperation is necessary to create security and ensure survival. The instruments that facilitate cooperation, regimes and international organizations, in their turn mitigate the effects of anarchy and are conducive to the creation of order.

Keohane and Nye also argue that in international organizations the power of large states is embedded in a newly created context in which capabilities other than ''raw'' power bring influence (like coalition building ability and network elite control) and is subject to organizational rules (such as procedures and voting power) (Keohane and Nye, 2001, 47-49). Although powerful states remain influential and are critical for the creation of international organizations, their role becomes more predictable and rule bound. This provides space for smaller states to use linkage strategies and agenda setting to further their interests. Preference intensity and perception formation complement the influence of material power. In relation to order the great and super powers remain its most influential actors. However, in the process of goal definition and the creation of order, they enter into a logic that also creates space for less powerful actors and that limits their own direct influence.[18] To some degree this is the equalizing influence of interdependence. Even small states have great disruptive potential. Or, to put it positively, they can contribute more meaningfully than before to the realization of positive goals and the creation of order.

The third caveat with regard to the realist position is the fact that states, or groups/systems of states, can move from one culture of anarchy into another (Wendt, 2000, 264). The transformation from the 18th century European balance of power system into the North Atlantic security community springs to mind. As a consequence, ''tipping points'' must exist. By passing some sort of threshold, groups of actors involved (at least two) can change their views, logics and ways of interacting. Changes of ideas and beliefs cause changes in interests and perception because their content is socially constituted. They are not cast in stone (Wendt, 1992).[19] The key question is how such transformation takes place. This question is not taken up here but clearly social theories, theories of preference formation and domestic political theories must play a critical role in opening up the realist image of the state as a black box (Guzzini, 1998, 138-140; Moravcsik, 1993). As state interests, ideas and identity change slowly over time, it is likely that their change will have an incremental impact on whatever order exists. But this also provides a degree of stability to order.

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[18] USA criticism on the role and functioning of the UN after 9/11 could be conceptualized from this point of view.
[19] For a discussion on EU Member States interest formation: Moravcsik (1993)

In summary, the scope for the joint expression of positive goals is not as minimal as the realist zero-sum image of state behavior might lead one to believe at first glance. Such scope not only seems dependent on material resources but also on the way actors construct the world. The involvement of great and super powers is a necessary condition for the expression and realization of joint positive goals and hence for the creation of order. This seems uncontested in realists, neo-liberal and constructivist readings. Their preponderance of material resources, the range of their preferences and the weight and relevance of the way they express their ideas and beliefs lends more impact to their actions. Nevertheless, in addition to Bull's institutions of international society, their behavior is also constrained by a blend of institutional dynamics and the constitutive formation of interests and worldview (Bull, 2002, 95-222). As a result, order does not only obey the imperatives of power politics. It is also open to dialectics.

2.4 Operationalizing order: basic outlook and interaction

This section proposes a new operationalization of order in world politics that is based on two premises. The first leans into the preceding discussion on the various logics and possibilities of interaction under the condition of anarchy. It was argued that ideas and beliefs are socially constituted. States and international organizations (inter)act on the basis of them. Therefore, such ideas and beliefs on how the world works and interaction takes place are the cornerstones of order. Table 1 captures today's main ideas and beliefs with seven variables in the areas of politics, economics, governance and international interaction. These variables and their values together outline the spectrum on which actors can make constitutive identity and perception choices. Some variables measure such choices directly, others more indirectly.

The second premise is the definition of order discussed in section 2.1. It presented order as a relational concept that is actor-based. Actors chose values on the existing bandwidth of choice. Their choices can make them look alike or may differentiate them from each other. Because this paper analyzes order in world politics, it is concerned with the aggregated value choices that actors make in terms of their ideas and perceptions. As a result, it seeks to identify the *dominant* values of order. It is not suggested values are mutually exclusive. In fact, on most variables no single dominant value will emerge because world politics is too diverse for this kind of uniformity.

The remainder of this section addresses three other methodological issues. First, I clarify the degree to which the operationalization can be generalized and its causal claims. Next, the

construct validity of the variables and values is discussed (annex I analyzes their content validity and lists indicators).[20] Finally, table 1 depicts the operationalization scheme by enumerating variables and values. The table is used in section 3 to compare Cold War and post Cold War order and in section 4 to assess selected elements of the EU's contribution to post Cold War order.

To start with generalization and causality, the operationalization of order in world politics (table 1) does not aim at making descriptive or causal inferences. It is used to analyze two units of order: that of order in world politics *during* the Cold War and that of order in world politics *after* the Cold War - as well as the EU's contribution to the latter.[21] The usefulness of the operationalization is tested in parallel by means of conducting the analysis it is designed for. Evidently, it is not value free. In social science the phenomenon observed influences the observer and vice versa because meaning is socially constituted. As a result, the operationalization is based both on theoretical possibility and on the real experiences of the last decades (Hume, in: Winch, 1999, 7; Wendt, 2000, 374-375). In general this is not problematic but invites an open, critical approach and awareness of bias (King, Keohane and Verba, 168-176).

Two points support the construct validity of the operationalization. The first relates to its variables and the second to its values. The combination of the social construction of reality with the realist use of the domestic analogy, which illustrated the ease of creating order at home in contrast with the difficulty of creating it internationally, generates the question how a society constructs or expresses its preferences for order domestically. A basic way through which this is done is by means of a constitution. A constitution generally expresses three kinds of choices: 1) it contains a choice for a set of values out of a possible range of values 2) similarly, it contains a choice for a decision-making process, and: 3) a choice for a number of symbols. Together, these choices create order. Not directly, but they provide the basis for it. Although constitutions do not exist internationally, the idea of the basic choices they express can be used to operationalize order in world politics. The value dimension of domestic constitutions appears in the operationalization as the ''basic outlook'' grouping, containing three variables. The decision-making process dimension shows up as the ''interaction'' grouping, containing four variables. This is because internationally an

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[20] Face validity assesses whether the operationalization makes sense at first glance. Construct validity assesses whether the variables as operationalized are logically related. Content validity assesses whether the full range of meanings of a concept is covered by the way it is operationalized (Babbie, 1995, 127-128)

[21] Units are the entities, beings or objects that are observed. An observation is the noted occurrence of a value for a given unit (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994, 51 - slightly adapted)

authoritative source of binding decision-making is absent. As a result, it is internationally more appropriate to consider decision-making as a function of the process of interaction instead of as a function of authority. Symbols in the sense as set forth by constitutions seem irrelevant for order in world politics (like flags, decorations and national anthems).

Secondly, the 4-5 values per variable have been chosen on the basis of the academic discourse. With the above reasoning and variables in mind, a wide range of academic literature has been consulted to identify key terms that are generally used when authors speak of order. Key terms are, for example: interdependence (Keohane and Nye, Hoffman), great powers (Waltz, Bull, Keohane and Nye, Wendt), nationalism (Hoffman, Bull), democracy (Deutsch, Wendt), sovereignty (Krasner, Bull), wealth and economic advancement (Hall, Keohane). Bull's common rules that ''regulate'' the international society are another example of keywords (those of coexistence, for keeping to agreements and limiting the use of violence) (Bull, 2002, 40).

Table 1: Operationalization of order in world politics 1945-2005

	Variable	Value 1	Value 2	Value 3	Value 4	Value 5
Basic outlook	Political ideology (worldview)	Nationalism	Political Liberalism	Communism	Political Islam	Socialism
	Method of wealth generation	Communism	''Market'' Communism	Protectionism	Regulated capitalism	Capitalism
	Domestic governance structure	Totalitarian	Autocratic	Sovereign democracy	Pluralistic democracy	Integrative democracy
Interaction	Great power structure	No great powers	Many great powers	Few great powers	Two great powers	One super power
	Nature of international interaction	Coexistence	Cooperation	Governance	Integration	
	Nature of violent conflict	Interstate enmity	Intrastate enmity	Interstate rivalistic	Intrastate rivalistic	Violent conflict renounced
	Method to resolve violent conflict	Contracting	Intervention	Coercion	Imposition	

Finally, table 1 depicts the operationalization scheme in detail. Three final points regarding the values it lists will enhance a good understanding. First, it is intentional that several values of a single variable can occur simultaneously. In fact, all values can probably be observed at the same time for both units of order. The analysis does not intend to suggest single values per variable for either unit of order but (a) dominant value(s). This is possible because order in world politics is seen as an aggregate concept of the relations between all actors involved. Methodologically it is not correct that several values of the same variable can be observed

simultaneously (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994, 51-53). The solution would have been to create composite values. Given the exploratory character of this paper I felt such a move would have introduced needless complexity. Second, some values constrain the choice of values on other variables. For example: ''communism'' as value on the variable ''political ideology'' can only have ''communism'' or ''market communism'' as values on the variable ''methods of wealth generation''. This is because communism is an ideology with strong political *and* economic dimensions. Again, this is methodologically not very elegant. In my view it reflects the complexity of order rather than a shoddy operationalization. It is of course in particular critical that no value *determines* another value, as this would make one of them superfluous (Ibid, 182-184). This is nowhere the case. Third, in this paper a change *in* order occurs when an observed value changes over units of order. A change *of* order is a change in the variables that are necessary to describe order meaningfully. Annex I discusses the content validity of variables and values. It also suggests some quantitative indicators to measure the proposed values.

3. Order in world politics during and after the Cold War

Section 3 highlights similarities and differences between order in world politics during and after the Cold War (1947-1989 versus 1990-2006). Section 3.1 analyzes changes in goals of, threats to and actors involved in order. Section 3.2 discusses the changes in order that occurred from the one unit to the other, using the operationalization of order in world politics proposed in section 2.3.

   The choice to take 1947-1989 and 1990-2006 as the two ''units'' of order for analysis is based on commonsense. The fall of the Berlin wall seemed a fundamental change in the world political system. 9/11 is regarded as a change in the threats to order, not as a change of order.

3.1 Changes related to order: goals, threats and actors

Section 2 argued that the goals of order in world politics are contextually constructed and need to be shared as well as positive to resonate with the commonsense notion of order. Articles 1 and 2 of the UN charter contain such goals. All UN members seek to: 1) maintain international peace and security; 2) develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples; 3) solve international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character through

international cooperation and promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and 4) let the UN be the centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these ends (UN, 1945, article 1). The UN was founded in 1945 between 51 states. Today it has 191 members (UN, 2000).[22] This 370% increase in membership can be taken as an indicator of success. The UN also includes all great and super powers. As a result, shared and positive goals can be argued to exist in world politics.

It may be objected that the UN is a product of Cold War dynamics in which security issues dominated the agenda with the result that non-security goals were subordinated to the maintenance of peace and security and have not found their expression in its charter. It must be recalled, however, that the UN was founded before the Cold War started to have its full impact on international politics (Painter, 1999, 12-23; Kennedy, 1987, 371). Furthermore, if this indeed would have been the case, pressure for substantive changes to these goals via a charter revision should have built up after 1989. There is clear pressure for reform of the role of the Security Council (UNSC) and for administrative reform within the UN, but none for changing its goals (UN, 2006a, 2006b). Instead, the UN recently strengthened its capability to realize the goals expressed in its charter by creating the Peace Building Commission (December 2005) and Human Rights Council (March 2006) (UNGA, 2005).

Two other key documents that express shared and positive goals merit a brief review to establish a ''second opinion'', namely the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of 1990. The Helsinki Final Act sets out ten principles that, for the purpose of this paper, can be considered as goals of order (CSCE, 1975, 4-9). Unsurprisingly, they are nearly identical to those expressed in articles 1 and 2 of the UN charter. The Charter of Paris for a new Europe echoes similar aspirations on the humanitarian, economic and security dimensions that are in line with the UN charter and the Helsinki Final Act (CSCE, 1990). The Cold War and post-Cold War periods are thus characterized by a high degree of continuity insofar as the goals of order are concerned.

Threats to order must logically be threats to the realization of the shared and positive goals expressed in the UN charter. These goals can be divided into three categories: humanitarian goals, economic goals and security goals. The existentiality and immediacy of threats to security goals makes such threats imperative. For this reason the analysis below is limited to three key dimensions of change in security threats: their clarity, existentiality and nature.[23]

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[22] Large waves of ''UN enlargement'' occurred in parallel with the period of decolonization (1945-1975), the break-up of the Soviet-ring of satellites, the USSR itself and Yugoslavia. Yet, these new states all decided to *become* UN members.
[23] Security threats in their narrowest form are military threats to (state) survival. From a wider perspective, security is as much about creating the conditions through which violent conflict can be

Security in the Cold War was mainly about military security. After the solidification of the USA-USSR great power conflict in the Korean War, the subsequent arms race and the Cuban missile crisis showed the dominating logic of force parity and deterrence (Painter, 1999, 33; Allison and Zelikow, 1999, 380-395). The enemy image seemed clear-cut, the power distribution and core areas of ''imperial'' dominance were fairly well defined and the stakes straightforward (Gaddis, 1997, 284-292; Kennedy, 1987, 395-412; Wallerstein, 1997, 50-51). The dominant threat was direct confrontation between the USA and the USSR that could lead to nuclear war. After the Cold War, the clarity of threat became more diffused as a result of the increase in the number of actors and dimensions of security. The disappearance of overlay is said to have ''unfrozen'' existing conflicts that were subsumed in the main conflict to avoid escalation (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1998, 14). In addition, the reduction of the risk of direct, existential and global military confrontation enabled the emergence of other threats to security that have a lower degree of existentiality. A cursory comparison of the security threats expressed in the security strategies of today's great and super power(s) with this paradigmatic image of the Cold War confirms diversification of the threat spectrum.[24] If such strategies are seen as securitization attempts, they are clear indicators of perceived dominant threats (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1998, 21; 26). From this perspective, the terrorist attack of 9/11/2001 has led to instant re-securitization of the threat of terrorism, most strongly by the USA. It seems to have become a defining moment for USA ''character planning'' with profound consequences for order (Wendt, 1992, 419-422). For example, the USA administration seems to consider coercion as an acceptable method for the resolution of violent conflict much more than before. Detailed analysis hereof is left for further research.

A change in threat spectrum necessitates a change in the capabilities to manage them. This represents another change in relation to threats to order in world politics. Examples are the expansion of EU activity in the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), the retooling of military capabilities in many European states and the transformation of American National Security institutions (USA, NSS, 2006, 43-46; Thompson, 2005, 9-13).

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avoided and peace can be sustained, as it is about managing such conflict after it has erupted (Hyde-Price, in: Gärtner et al., 2001, 28)

[24] The European Security Strategy (2003), the national security strategy of the United States of America (2006), China's position paper on the new national security concept (2003) and the Russian National Security Concept (2000) all list terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, organized crime and state failure as security threats, albeit to varying degrees. China's position paper is not as clear-cut a national security document as the other three. I have therefore interpreted this document to deduct these threats.

With regard to relevant actors during the Cold War and post Cold War three changes stand out. To start with, a single dominant actor remains. This view, expressed by Krauthammer in 1991, is widely shared. The claim is that the USA is ''dominant by every measure: military, economic, technological, diplomatic, cultural, even linguistic…'' (Krauthammer, 1991 and 2002-2003, 7; Dunne, 1995, 172-173).[25] At first glance it seems that the USA, as a result, today faces fewer restraints on the scope of its action. But simultaneously a more complex global situation emerged post-1989. Responsibility and capability became more diffused. More, but subtler restraints might in fact have been created. Nevertheless, because *direct* constraints on the USA diminished, it appears more at liberty to shape order in world politics in a unilateral fashion without facing negative responses immediately.

In addition, the number of actors on the world scene increased post-1989: the break-up of the USSR for example created fourteen new states. This does not set the post-Cold War apart from the Cold War period. During the Cold War decolonization created dozens of new states (Kennedy, 1987, 391-394). But it does show that the scope for divergent views on the desirable goals of order in world politics has continued to increase.

Finally, the room for independent maneuver of state and non-state actors increased after the Cold War. During the Cold War interests different from those of the USA could relatively easily be subjugated to Cold War securitization logic that justified the abrogation of divergent views. Moreover, the USA's hegemonic position was seen by the West as serving its best interests for similar reasons of security. These views have changed post-1989. Naturally, the fact that political liberalism is the dominant ideology in the USA plays a large role in determining the available room of maneuver it leaves for other states. But this orientation has been constant since the early 18th century.

In sum, the range of threats to an unchanged series of goals of order increased post-1989. The actors involved in dealing with these threats multiplied and gained scope for action.

3.2 Ruptures and continuity in order, not of order

Table 2 suggests the dominant value(s) of order during and after the Cold War. A brief ''likely'' case is established for each changed value. All changes are argued to be changes *in* rather than *of* order.

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[25] Illustrative are military data, for example current American force posture (IFRI, 2005, 200-201) and selected economic data (IMF, 2005, 18-24)

To start with the variable ''ideology'', I advance that after the Cold War, ''political Islam'' and ''nationalism'' have taken the place of ''communism'' as the dominant values of order. ''Political liberalism'' remained a dominant value.

To suggest that communism has ceased to be perceived as a valid ideology is probably least disputed. As Wallerstein puts it: ''the seizure of state power by a party claiming to incarnate the popular will, and using state power to ''develop'' the country … has proven unworkable'' (Wallerstein, 1997, 84, 96; Kissinger, 1994, 786). Although it remains the official ideology of China, this represents an isolated case (admittedly a big one with ~1,3 out of 6,4 billion humans) that has no ideological appeal. Privatization in China has been ongoing for some three decades now (Hoffman, 1998, 115).

Table 2: The dominant values of order in world politics during and after the Cold War

		Order during the Cold War			Order after the Cold War		
	Variable	Value 1	Value 2	Value 3	Value 1	Value 2	Value 3
Basic outlook	Political ideology (worldview)	Communism	Political liberalism		Political liberalism	Political Islam	Nationalism
	Method of wealth generation	Communism	Protectionism	Regulated capitalism	''Market'' Communism	Regulated capitalism	
	Domestic governance structure	Totalitarian	Autocratic	Sovereign democracy	Autocratic	Sovereign democracy	
Interaction	Great power structure	Two great powers			One super power		
	Nature of international interaction	Coexistence	Cooperation		Cooperation	Governance	
	Nature of violent conflict	Interstate enmity	Violent conflict renounced		Intrastate enmity	Interstate and intrastate rivalistic	Violent conflict renounced
	Method to resolve violent conflict	Contracting	Coercion	Imposition	Contracting	Coercion	Intervention

The continuity of political liberalism as a dominant ideological value seems equally uncontroversial. Since the end of the Cold War the number of states run on the basis of political liberal systems has increased whilst few states that used such systems have changed their outlook. Based on a Hegelian understanding of history Fukuyama even pronounced the victory of liberal political systems in 1992 (Fukuyama, 1992, 199-205, 337-339).

A driver of nationalism is the fact that nations and states do not coincide whilst states have become the dominant form of political organization.[26] As a result, every nation that is not a state seeks to become one as this represents the highest political status attainable. During the Cold War two empire-states existed that each contained several nation-states. As a result, the disappearance of USSR dominance made, as Hall puts it, ''the emergence of nationalism in Eastern Europe inevitable'' (Hall, 1996, 184). The end of existential great power conflict also provided a new leash to life for nationalism where it already existed. The post-1989 ''outburst'' of nationalism as counterweight to decades of external oppression may be said to have run its course already. However, the number of nationalist struggles that exist today is still significant and less limited by the constraints of the Cold War (Hoffman, 1998, 214-216).

The post-1989 appearance of political Islam as an ideology is not so much based on its increasing appeal as political ideology but rather on increased awareness of its relevance and existence. Defining moments are, again, the end of overlay that created more scope, but surely also 9/11. This event drew attention in the Western world to the capability of political Islam to ''produce'' Islamic fundamentalists with unambiguous implications for order. However, a direct causal link does not exist.[27] The situation is more complex in at least four ways. First, a single political Islam does not exist. Second, Islamic fundamentalism has little to do with traditional Muslim society. Third, many states with a large Muslim population have autocratic regimes that seem to cover up domestic shortcomings by agitating, using Islamic trappings, against outsiders that are alleged to threaten traditional ways of life. Lastly, Turkey, Lebanon and Iraq are states with strong Islamic elements that are also oriented towards the ideology of political liberalism. Thus, to speak of a quasi-intercivilizational war between the West and Muslims since 1979 and to associate the use of violence by states that have a large proportion of Muslim citizens with Muslim religion is somewhat simplistic (Huntington, 1997, 216-217, 258; Hall, 1996, 178; Dunne, 1995, 175).

The case for the dominant values of the variable ''method of wealth generation'' can be made succinctly. The downfall of communism as a political ideology is inextricably linked to its discrediting as an economic system because it is a political-economic worldview. The

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[26] For state dominance, its development and possible future see: Herz (1957, 474, 492-493)

[27] The 2002 US security strategy almost assumes a link by stating to aim ''to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by: [inter alia, EvV] supporting moderate and modern government, especially in the Muslim world, to ensure that the conditions and ideologies that promote terrorism do not find fertile ground in any nation.'' (p. 6). The 2006 US security strategy mollified this by suggesting that the terrorist groups it targets exploit the proud religion of Islam and its faithful followers (pp. 9, 11). See also: Andréani (2004-2005, 49). The existence of political theological concepts like Dar al-Islam, Dar al-Harb and offensive jihad that are used by popular Islamic movements such as Ikwan ul Muslemeen and Jamaat e Islami facilitates Western mental imagery.

ongoing process of controlled privatization in China confirms this perspective (IFRI, 2004, 233; China became a member of the WTO in 2001).

Capitalism today is the world's most viable economic system (Fukuyama, 1992, 90-91). Yet 'pure' capitalism in its original form has long since been transformed into regulated capitalism. Initially, capitalism represented a new way of economic thinking, characterized by harmony of interest of producers and merchants. Adam Smith outlined it against the economic structure of the 18th century when specialization, large capital investment and distributive problems were largely absent (Carr, 2001, 44-45). However, 19th century industrial capitalism proved a different beast with its logic of expansion and dominance. The endless accumulation of capital requires maximum appropriation of surplus-value through market expansion, increased labor efficiency and polarization (Wallerstein1997, 164-165). The ensuing realization that unbridled capitalism clashes with other social values stood at the basis of its regulation.

Protectionism disappears as a value due to the development of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) / WTO system, in particular the Uruguay round (1986-1994). This round reduced global tariffs on trade in goods with ~40%. It also launched a number of ambitious initiatives to open up a wide range of economic areas, like public procurement (Agreement on Government Procurement, 1994), textile and clothing (Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, 1995), services (General Agreement on Trade in Services, 1994) and intellectual property (Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights and Trade Related Investment Measures) (WTO, 1994b; Artis and Nixson, 2004, 279-284). Protectionism continues to exist (as Mittal's recent bid for the takeover of Accor shows) but policies based on its premises are the exception rather than the rule.

The main change on the variable ''domestic governance structure'' is the disappearance of totalitarianism as a dominant value. With the USSR, the largest totalitarian regime imploded, discredited in the eyes of a large part of the world. Similar regimes remain but on a much smaller scale and with correspondingly low levels of dominance and attractiveness.

Moreover, the number of democracies increased sharply post-1989, illustrating the continuing dominance of ''sovereign democracy'' as a value of order. The 2005 UN Human development report for example shows that in 1990, 39% of all states were democratic, 22% intermediate and 39% autocratic against 55%, 27% and 18% in 2003 (UNDP, 2005, 20). Freedom House shows an increase in the number of electoral democracies for the period 1987-1996 from 66 (40% of all states) to 118 (62% of all states) with the peak increase in 1990-1991 (Freedom House, 2006). Finally, Fukuyama demonstrated that if democracy means the ''right to choose their own government through periodic, secret-ballot, multi-party elections, on the basis of universal and equal adult suffrage'', the number of democracies

rose from 30 in 1975 to 61 in 1990 (Fukuyama, 1992, 43, 49-50). Two nuances are necessary. Firstly, as Diamond notes: ''There are dozens of struggling and recently established democracies in the world that have yet to achieve the deep and enduring levels of public and elite legitimacy that signal consolidation'' (Diamond, 2000). A difference exists between liberal, deep-rooted and relatively new democracies. Secondly, the number of states also increased in the period 1989-2005. Yet, 'new' states that turned to democracy *chose* to do so. Unstable institutions do not invalidate that basic choice. ''Pluralistic democracy'' has not been suggested as a dominant value of order because this value is limited to the EU and seems unsupported elsewhere in world politics.

On the variable ''great power structure'', the value ''two great powers'' has clearly changed into the value ''one super power''. During the Cold War the USA and USSR were by far the most powerful states. Their power was predominantly judged in military terms because of the existential nature of the conflict. As a result of their preponderance, the implosion of one of them by definition left a single great power post-Cold War. The use of the term ''one super power'' denotes the difference between American great power status and the ''remaining'' great powers. This difference springs from unrivalled American military power in combination with its economic and social power, which is at least equal to that of the EU, its potential challenger in the economic and social dimensions. The value ''one super power'' does not mean there are no other great powers. For assessing values on the ''great power structure'' variable, the exact conceptualization of power is immaterial. Great powers are those states that are perceived to play a dominant role on all the dimensions of power (Bull, 2002, 94-98).

On the variable ''nature of international interaction'', it is argued that ''coexistence'' as a value has been replaced by ''governance''. ''Cooperation'' has continued. Coexistence during the Cold War was partially a function of the enmity nature of the conflict. Its disappearance did not necessitate closer international interaction but enabled it.

Two post-Cold War observations tentatively suggest ''governance'' as a value indicating closer international interaction. First, the EU as a regional organization is characterized by several supranational elements, in particular after 1992. The possibility of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) for example increased significantly with the Single European Act (1986) and the Maastricht Treaty (1992) (Nugent, 2003, 59, 65). In addition, the Maastricht treaty, fast-tracked by the end of the Cold War, transformed the scope of EU activities. Second, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism was created during the Uruguay round that ended in 1994 (WTO, 1994a).

The continuation and strengthening of ''cooperation'' can illustrated by four examples. To start with, the increase in membership and scope of the activities of many international

organizations after 1989 has been remarkable.[28] In addition, the role of the UN, IMF and Worldbank has deepened significantly. Backlash against the '"Washington consensus'', it should be noted, has not led to calls for a less active role of these institutions but to calls for their reform. The World Health Organization's (WHO) recent active role in coordinating efforts to control avian influenza makes a third example. Finally, the number and scope of regional and interregional cooperation arrangements grew significantly after the Cold War (Fawcett, in: Farrell, Hettne and Van Langenhove, 2005, 29-33).

It is not unrealistic to suggest a trend of international crises (the collapse of Bretton-Woods (1971); first/second oil crises (1973/1979); East Asian financial crisis (1997); Russian ruble crisis (1998) and Argentine debt crisis (1999)), partially the result of increased interdependence, that has helped alter state perception regarding the necessity of cooperative behavior. Facilitated by the end of the Cold War, this has occasionally led to the emergence of global governance in embryonic form.

On the ''nature of conflict'' variable ''interstate enmity'' conflict disappeared with the end of the Cold War as dominant value. ''Inter- and intrastate rivalistic'' and ''intrastate enmity'' values have (re)-made their appearance. ''Violent conflict renounced'' continued to be a dominant value over both periods, largely within 'the West'.

During the Cold War at least one of the preponderant powers sought to eradicate the other and achieve global dominance. As a result, ''interstate enmity conflict'' disappeared as value in 1989 (also: Gaddis, 1997, 286-291). The interstate and intrastate wars fought during the Cold War can largely be seen as limited local manifestations of the underlying main conflict. Many rivalistic conflicts were suppressed to avoid creating a pretext that could escalate into global conflict.

Conflict data for the post-Cold War show numerous intrastate enmity, intrastate and interstate rivalistic conflicts, but no interstate enmity conflict (Hoffman, 1998, 116-118). The 2005 Conflictbarometer of the Heidelberger Institut für Internationale Konfliktforschung (HIIK) for example lists twenty-four violent conflicts. None of these are interstate enmity conflicts, but quite a few are intrastate that seem enmity driven. This pattern is similar for many of the post-Cold War years: 1998 featured thirty-one violent conflicts that were all intrastate (save Eritrea-Ethiopia, which was interstate rivalistic), 1995 featured exclusively intrastate violent conflicts (HIIK, 1995, 1998 and 2005).

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[28] The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (part of the later Worldbank): 45 members in 1944, 184 members in 2006, similar figures for the IMF (1944); the GATT/WTO: 23 members in 1948, 149 members in 2006 including China; the IAEA: 81 members in 1957, 139 in 2006. Articles 1 of the IMF and IBRD articles of agreement express clear recognition of financial, resource and trade interdependence. See also: Fretter (in: Bercovitch, 2002, 99)

The main difference on the ''methods to resolve violent conflict'' variable is the replacement of ''imposition'' as a dominant value by ''intervention''.

Imposition still occurs, but no more as a dominant value for three reasons. First, the disappearance of global existential conflict decreased the necessity to impose solutions in the name of security. Second, the renewed empowerment of global fora like the UN has tightened international scrutiny. This resulted in a declining acceptability of forceful imposition to many states.[29] Finally, the increase in the number of democracies increased the number of actors that discuss and negotiate conflict rather than impose themselves forcefully.

International intervention in violent conflicts increased after 1989. Three quantitative trends support this claim. First, the number of UN peacekeeping operations (60 as of 1948) grew significantly: 1948 (2); 1950's (2), 1960's (6), 1970's (3), 1980's (5), 1990's (35) and 2000's (6). The low number of operations for the 2000's can be explained by reflection on the problematic operations in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina (UN Peacekeeping, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp, 17/03/2006). Second, the frequency of UN mediation attempts increased: 1945-1955:72; 1956-1965: 75; 1966-1975: 132; 1976-1985:135 and 1986-1995: 201 (Fretter, in: Bercovitch, 2002, 103). Third, the post-Cold War period saw the unprecedented establishment of a number of tribunals/courts with international jurisdiction, mainly the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda (1993 and 1994) and the International Criminal Court (2002).

By way of summary, it is worth comparing the findings above with the following quote of Hall:

> ''the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union was not followed by any general
> peace treaty, thereby creating a legacy in which current rules curiously
> combine old institutions with new realities'' (Hall, 1996, 164).

It is tempting to draw the conclusion that the values of ''political liberalism'', ''regulated capitalism'' and ''sovereign democracy'' have come to characterize order as the basic outlook of most states. If accepted, this conclusion would seem to represent a continuing trend rather than a Cold War-post Cold War rupture. In fact, clear rupture has occurred on only two of seven variables (''great power structure'' and '' nature of violent conflict'').

Yet alternative political ideologies have gained prominence with the decline of communism, ''nationalism'' and ''political Islam'' are less amenable to superposition in the post-Cold War environment. Super power dominance also creates resistance. In addition, despite the

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[29] I advance that the USA-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 confirms this perspective. In particular pre-invasion USA coalition-building efforts and post-invasion attempts to draw in the UN and other states demonstrate that international disagreement with the invasion was not without effect.

strengthening of ''cooperation'' and ''intervention'' as values for international behavior, the number of violent conflicts seems larger than ever before. In short, the assessment of current and Cold War order on the basis of table 1 appears to resonate with Hall's observation.

4. The EU's contribution to current order

Section 2 operationalized order. Section 3 identified the values of order for two of its units. This section analyzes four ways through which the EU as international actor contributes to post-Cold War order in world politics.[30] Section 4.1 examines the general contribution of the EU as actor. Sections 4.2-4.4 analyze how three EU actor characteristics contributed to order after 1989. Section 4.2 discusses the impact of Europeanization on order. Section 4.3 examines the effect of the EU as a regional entity on order. Section 4.4 studies the impact of the EU's propensity for desecuritization.

4.1 The EU as international actor: ever closer order

To discuss the EU's contribution to order, its actorness needs to be established. Next, the relation between its general values as actor and current order in world politics must be investigated. Section 2.1 established that international organizations can be relevant actors. In their 1999 publication, Bretherton and Vogler (38, 248-258) suggested that the EU is a global actor of some significance. For the purpose of this paper their observation that the EU has different degrees of actorness in different contexts is important. EU actorness, they suggest, is largely a function of the degree to which Member States have conferred the capability to act on the EU. Sjöstedt (112-114) already proposed in 1977 to regard the EC as some sort of half-developed international actor. Therefore, with a view to EC/EU developments between 1977 and 1999, it seems that the question whether the EU *is* an international actor can be answered in the affirmative.[31] The relevant nuance is that it represents a connected series of actors with different degrees of actorness in different contexts rather than a unitary actor with full de jure competence on all dimensions. A logical consequence is that the EU's contribution to order in world politics must be uneven. More precisely, it can be expected that such contribution is largest when the degree of EU

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[30] The EU and EC are technically different entities (e.g. the EC has legal personality) with different competences. When this section refers to the EU as actor, it refers to both entities.
[31] Article 2 TEU lists external actorness as a *goal* of the Union.

actorness is high. Ginsberg's empirical study (2001, 278) illustrates the considerable but uneven impact of EU foreign policy.[32]

Annex II suggests the degrees of EU actorness in its main external policy areas as a function of its procedural capability. On the basis of annex II, the EU's contribution to order can roughly be estimated as follows. First, the EU is likely to contribute significantly to the variables ''method of wealth generation'' (due to high actorness on the trade/commerce policy dimension) and ''domestic governance structure'' (due to high actorness on the enlargement and development policy dimensions). Second, the EU is likely to contribute to the variables ''nature of international interaction'' (high actorness on trade/commerce but low-medium on foreign policy), ''political ideology'' (high on enlargement, medium on development but low on foreign policy) and ''nature of conflict'' (high on trade/commerce and enlargement, low-medium on foreign and security policy). Third, the EU is likely to contribute only modestly to the variable ''method to resolve violent conflict'' (low actorness on security policy).

This variation in EU actorness suggests that three of its organizational characteristics influence its general contribution to order in world politics in particular: uniqueness, flux and complexity.

The EU's uniqueness as international actor does not result from any of its constituent building blocks. Considered in isolation its separate elements are hardly new. They belong to the existing stock of concepts and language. Its uniqueness arises from the configuration of these elements in a single political entity (for instance: Nugent, 2003, 464-474). As a result, references like superstate (Andreatta), superpower (Galtung), multi-perspectival polity (Ruggie), multi-level governance system (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch) or federation (Auer, Trechsel) are all valid but incomplete descriptions, depending on which feature of the EU configuration is highlighted.[33]

For an assessment of the EU's contribution to order in world politics its blend of state and international organization characteristics and capabilities is important. Like a state, the EU's can lay down binding and enforceable rules in some fields. Like an international organization, it can increase its membership. Combined, these features enable a wide range of modes of organizational expansion that differ in reach, decision-making procedures and their degree of power coordination/centralization. To speak meaningfully about the EU as international actor and as contributor to order requires this mixture of the images of state and international

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[32] A latent indicator of EU policy impact is its global diplomatic representation. In 2005 the Commission employed 4,855 staff in its unified external service, representing the EU in 163 states (out of 193) and in 7 international organizations (EC, 2005, annex 1). For the related discussion on presence and actorness: Ginsberg (2001, 45-48); Smith (2003, 17-21); Bretherton and Vogel (1999, 32-34)
[33] For a comprehensive introduction to EU theorizing: Wiener and Diez (2004)

organization plus a strong dose of uniqueness (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999, 44, 258; Ginsberg, 2001, 12-13).

The developing nature of the EU becomes clear when the treaties of Rome and Nice are compared. Purpose, membership, institutional organization, policy scope and policy tools have all increased. A close look at the non-treaty reality would surely highlight many additional developments (Nugent, 2003, 57-108). EU external actorness is generally understood to have broadened from the policy fields of commerce and trade to foreign and security policy with enlargement as a constant at the background (Ginsberg, 2001; Tonra and Christiansen, 2004; Bretherton and Vogler, 1999). Its degree of actorness and level of activity within each of these policy fields has grown significantly overtime but continues to vary between them (see annex II) (Smith, 2003, 24-51; EC, 1997-2005). As a result, a growing EU contribution to order in world politics may be expected if the past is any guide to the future. This unsettled finality of EU actorness also creates an element of instability and uncertainty in relation to order (Hill, in: Ginsberg, 2001, 33).

The different degrees of EU actorness make it a complex actor. Its uniqueness and constant flux increase this complexity. This has at least two consequences for order in world politics. Firstly, it puts a premium on internal coordination and alignment if formulated preferences are to be effectively translated into policy outcomes. Secondly, it is difficult for the EU's interlocutors to properly understand the EU's capacities and incapacities. This can lead to miscomprehension and over- or underestimation of its relevance.

The EU's normative values are mainly outlined in article 6 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for fundamental and human rights and the rule of law. In addition, the 1993 conclusions of the presidency after the European Council in Copenhagen laid down the criteria for accession and by doing so defined much of the normative essence of the EU. These criteria are the presence of democracy and fundamental rights, a functioning market economy, the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and the real ability to take on the obligations of membership. Also relevant is the Union's capacity to absorb new members (European Council, 1993, 10-15). Article 11 TEU relates these normative values to the non-EU part of the world by stating that one of the goals of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is to safeguard its common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity. Another goal of external action is the maintenance of peace and the reinforcement of international security. Both article 11 goals are sought to be realized in accordance with the UN charter (European Council, 2003, 9).

This basic EU disposition as reflected in articles 6 and 11 TEU can be related to six variables of order. Firstly, TEU emphasis on respect for fundamental and human rights, civil

liberties and the rule of law shows the political liberal orientation of the EU's political ideology. Secondly, the Copenhagen criteria combined with progress in the Single European Market (SEM) clearly suggest ''regulated capitalism'' as its preferred method of wealth generation. Thirdly, its ''domestic'' governance structure is democratic (both on EU and on Member State level). Because they are EU members, the Member States are pluralistic democracies. Fourthly, the mix of intergovernmental and supranational elements show the EU's contribution to both cooperation and governance as values of the ''nature of international interaction'' variable. Its expressed preference for the international rule of law also supports this. The governance dimension has clearly increased in scope in the EU's history. Wessels (1997) suggests this is a result of the relative failure of cooperation to deliver effective cross-border solutions because it leaves the constraints of state sovereignty in place. Fifthly, all violent conflict has been eliminated between EU Member States. Interstate conflicts have been solved through friendly, non-violent means without exception. A very low degree of violent intrastate rivalistic conflict remains (e.g. in Spain and Ireland). Violent conflicts between the EU and the rest of the world have not yet taken place. Potentially they could take the value ''interstate rivalistic'' if based on UNSC authorization of intervention. Sixthly, the EU's adherence to the UN charter with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security points to its preference for the values ''contracting'' and ''intervention'' on the ''methods to resolve violent conflict'' variable. These values represent either peaceful conflict resolution methods or authorized international use of force. Finally, the EU's relation with the variable ''great power structure'' is unclear. The European Security Strategy (ESS) states the EU to be a ''global player'' by definition. This conclusion is textually based on latent great power indicators (European Council, 2003, 1). But their enumeration illustrates EU presence and interests. Not its global player status and even less its great power status. Even the tempting observation that the EU has the latent potential to become a great power is not self-evident as the nature of the EU might make it apriori impossible for it to become a great power in the way this concept is understood today.

The EU's contribution to order through the linkages highlighted above takes place in two different settings. The EU dialogues simultaneously with two ''audiences'': its Member States and the non-EU world. This creates different logics and different capabilities to contribute to order. Internally, a growing number of Member States is becoming evermore integrated into the particular values of order that the EU prefers. Externally, the EU increasingly seeks to project its internal order (Andreatta, in: Hill and Smith, 2000, 33). But the *impact* of the EU's contribution as an international actor to order in world politics is more subtle than the black/white image of creating a strong normative order internally whilst contributing more loosely to order externally. Even an image of concentric circles that reflects a diminishing EU

impact on order as the geographical distance from the source increases (see e.g. the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) is too simple. Rather, the way in which the EU contributes to order in world politics resembles more a patchwork of uneven density (even within the EU)[34] whereby density is influenced by the willingness of states to engage with the EU and by the degree of EU actorness.

In sum, the linkages that can be constructed on the basis of EU actorness between its normative disposition and order in world politics suggest that it contributes to the strengthening of a subset of the dominant values of current order. This is hardly a surprise. The following investigation examines the linkage between some specific EU characteristics and order in world politics in more detail.

4.2 Europeanization as the philosopher's stone: from disorder to order?

Europeanization refers to three distinct but related theoretical concepts that enable different EU contributions to order in world politics. Firstly, it denotes an ongoing and mutually constitutive process of chance between the EU and its Member States that links national and European policy and decision-making methods (Major, 2005, 177). With the passage of time its dialectics increasingly clarify which values of order the EU prefers. In addition, the process ensures internal EU convergence towards and adherence to these values.

Secondly, Europeanization refers to the EU-ization of Europe via enlargement. Within the period of the research question, the EU grew from 12 (1989) to 25 Member States (a 208% increase). Another five entrants are foreseen (another 20% increase). Eventually the EU will represent 16% of the world's states. Thus, the number of states sharing more or less the same values of order grows continuously. The high actorness of the EU in the enlargement policy field indeed has resulted in a large contribution to order. Gavin (in: Farrell, Hettne and Van Langenhove, 2005, 233) even qualified the 2004 enlargement as the biggest foreign policy success of the EU.[35] Naturally, the possibility to enlarge is a general characteristic of any international organization. However, if the first two meanings of Europeanization are combined with the EU's sui generis nature, the upshot is a unique contribution to order because of the resulting scope *and* depth.

Thirdly, Europeanization is used to refer to the process of closer association (short of full integration) of the non-EU part of Europe with the EU. The remainder of the section focuses

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[34] Illustrative of uneven EU impact on its Member States are benchmark tables of cases of non-compliance or infringements by EU Member State brought before the ECJ (Hix, 2005, 131, 242)
[35] For a discussion of enlargement as foreign policy: Sjursen and Smith (in: Tonra and Christiansen 2004, 130-140)

on this third meaning.[36] The geographic limits of Europeanization in this sense logically lie at the border regions of the EU: the southern Mediterranean, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Balkans. More precisely, this section defines Europeanization as: ''a process, activated and encouraged by the EU, that links conditional interaction with a degree of integration of the parties involved into European structures that stops short of membership'' (Coppetiers et al., 2004, 22-23 – adapted). This process allows the EU to make three further contributions to order in world politics.

Firstly, due to its weight the EU can make it attractive for neighboring states to share its preferred values of order. Where EU actorness is high it can offer numerous tempting carrots. Examples are association agreements or participation in some of its institutions. Because of its high actorness in the trade/commerce policy field this logic would mainly enable the EU to export its preference for ''regulated capitalism''. But the economic dimension has seldom featured alone in EU contacts with its periphery after 1989.

The early Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) with the CIS, supported by TACIS, already included clauses on political dialogue. The Europe agreements went well beyond any trade-plus formula in their function as staging posts to accession. Only the early Euro-Mediterranean agreements, supported by Mediterranean Aid (MEDA), were mainly economic in character. By 1995 however, these agreements were upgraded to include political elements and put in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership kicked off by the Barcelona process (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999, 143-145, 156-159).

The subsequent ''common strategies'' (available in the CFSP area after the Amsterdam treaty) all explicitly intended to promote EU values. Academic labels that indicate their success in spreading EU values vary between 'inconsistency', 'immaturity' and 'limited impact' (Haukkala and Medvedev, 2001, 7; Kelley, 2006, 45-47). Since 2004 the ENP advances a comprehensive framework for political, economic and security dialogues and for cooperation on the basis of values shared between the EU and the third country. The ENP also seeks to uphold all of the Union's own values (EC, 2004, 3, 12). The stability pact for South-Eastern Europe has a similar purpose. Its three working tables (democracy, economy and security) explicitly intend to export values such as the rule of law, human rights and good governance.

As a consequence, the export of EU preferred values of order to its border regions goes beyond ''regulated capitalism''. Despite its low-medium actorness in foreign and security policy fields, it includes ''political liberalism'' and ''cooperation/governance'', in particular since the end of the Cold War.

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[36] Further introductory references regarding the first two meanings can be found in Major (2005)

Secondly, by introducing conditionality as sine qua non for granting benefits that result from association, the EU gains the leverage of pressure to spread its preferred values of order. The power of conditionality depends on the EU's capacity to use it consistently and on how critical the benefits it offers are to their potential recipients (important is not so much their added value, but rather the loss that occurs if they are withheld).

Conditionality is clearly most effective when a country seeks EU membership. Nevertheless, the EU seems to use it more and more in its external relations in general. An example is the current discussion on sanctions against Belarus in response to its manipulated elections. Another example is the € 30 million reduction in food aid and € 90 million reduction in the ''Technical Assistance to the CIS'' (TACIS) funding scheme, imposed on Russia in response to the way it conducted the second Chechen war in 2000 (Haukkala and Medvedev, 2001, 57). Yet another is the fact that in contrast with the ENP, the common strategies did not contain explicit conditionality clauses. However, the ENP states that: ''The level of the EU's ambition in developing links with each partner through the ENP will take into account the extent to which common values are effectively shared'' (EC, 2004, 13). As Kelley (2006, 30) observes, more conformity with EU values equals closer cooperation.

The application of conditionality seems inconsistent in the Mediterranean region where economic cooperation has increased despite the continuation of questionable political and human rights conditions (Ibid, 45). Notwithstanding, the leverage of conditionality is likely to increase due to growing EU economic influence. A more profound question related to the southern Mediterranean is whether the region might represent a different value system (for example characterized by ''political Islam'' on the ''political ideology'' variable). In particular it is relevant to consider whether the export of values through conditionality will lead to polarization or to slow and peaceful adaptation to such values.

In summary, if the carrots in the form of benefits of association are insufficient, conditionality provides a stick that is used inconsistently to spread EU preferred values of order. Its effectiveness is likely to be positively related with the prospect of membership and negatively related with the distinctiveness of the value systems it seeks to condition.

Thirdly, by complementing the leverage of its economic preponderance with establishing itself as a credible foreign policy actor (commanding military force if necessary), the EU could unofficially police its border regions. This would enable a contribution to its values ''violent conflict renounced'', ''intervention'' and ''cooperation/governance''.

The evidence of real EU contribution to order along these lines is rather mixed. On paper, an impressive increase of civilian and military capabilities has been realized in the context of the ESDP (Wallace, Wallace and Pollack, 2005, 446-447). In practice, the EU struggles to

find replacements for 17 military and police monitors in Darfur (European Voice, March 13-17 2006). In addition, the general perception of the way the EU handled the Yugoslav crisis might not be as nuanced as Ginsberg's and hence impede the effectiveness of future EU ''crisis handling'' significantly.[37]

In their study of the influence of Europeanization on secessionist conflicts in the EU's periphery, Coppetiers et al. reach conclusions that demonstrate not only the slowness of EU action and lack of leadership at critical conflict junctures, but that also highlight the inherent difficulties of complex conflict management in general (Coppetiers et al, 2004, ch.6). The consensual and process oriented nature of the EU might make it rather unsuitable to manage crises characterized by the threat of violent conflict. The low to medium actorness of the EU in the foreign and security policy fields is likely to make any EU contribution in this area modest in nature.

4.3 The EU-regionalization of order

''Regionalism is a policy or project whereby states and non-state actors cooperate and coordinate strategy within a region. A region is a zone based on states, groups or territories whose members share some identifiable traits (Fawcett, in: Farrell, Hettne and Van Langenhoven, 2005, 24).'' Regionalism is usually regarded as a response to deal with the pressures of globalization and interdependence by bundling the capacity of its constituent units (Hettne, 2002, 329). Interregionalism refers to cooperative contacts between regions to address issues of mutual concern in the face of these phenomena. In relation to the EU it refers to region-to-region contacts in which the EU participates (Söderbaum and Van Langenhoven, 2005, 256).

EU ''regionness'' allows it to engage with other regional organizations on equal footing and on the basis of a similar logic. But it has a much higher degree of actorness than other regional organizations, like for example ASEAN or Mercosur.[38] As a result, EU ''regionness'' may cause it to act as a region-state in its contacts with other regions. Indicators would be the use of its preponderance and ''superstate'' behavior. The EU as a region contributes to order in world politics in at least three ways.

Firstly, the EU as a region could stimulate regionalism around the globe. Regionalism potentially changes the actor composition of the international system. It could add regions as

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[37] He suggests both that the EU had a ''remarkably robust political impact'' on the combatants in the Yugoslav conflict and that it got ''badly burned''. A mixed judgment, it appears (Ginsberg, 2001, 83-85, 278)

[38] For a more comprehensive treatment of these claims: Farrell, Hettne and Van Langenhoven (2005, in particular 29-33, 269)

a category of actors to the current categories of states and international organizations. This would make to EU contribute to the value ''few great powers'' as in such a scenario ultimately some regions might become great powers. This value is the first on which EU preference differs from current order. In addition, stimulating regionalism contributes to the values ''cooperation'' and ''governance'' by virtue of the process of regional integration.

Fundamental transformation of the Westphalian state system into a new global regional system as a result of EU-led regionalism is unlikely because the audiences of regions are states. ''The European rescue of the nation state'' not only highlights enduring state relevance but also a complex state-region relation that can both be enabling and disabling (Milward, 1992, ch.1). It is more likely that EU-led regionalism could create a complementary, unevenly developed layer of regions that helps states tackle global policy problems. Some regions could eventually become great powers in their own right. A key determinant in such a scheme seems the propensity of states to engage in regionalism. Security concerns are likely to be a prime determinant. As shown, the EU only has low actorness in the security policy field and low-medium actorness in foreign policy (annex II). Fawcett, however, suggests three conditions for regionalism that are more open to EU influence: 1) the availability of resources; 2) tolerable or absent local or regional rivalries and competition; 3) the presence of stable and capable key states in regions (Fawcett, in: Farrell, Hettne and Van Langenhoven, 2005, 34).

The EU's high actorness in the trade/commerce and its medium actorness in the development policy fields enable it to provide necessary resources through all sorts of regional agreements and cooperation schemes. Its vast institutional toolkit and technical expertise can work towards the same goal. Moreover, the EU's demonstrational value of the range of potential benefits that can result from integration should not be underestimated. Naturally, the EU is no recipe for automatic global imitation. But the fact is that it is there and exemplifies how regional rivalry can be structurally contained and overcome is a powerful sign in itself of the merits of regionalism. Nevertheless, real EU capabilities in the fields of structural conflict prevention and state building need to be developed in addition and used to help address local regional rivalries and to build stable key states (EC, 2001a).

What does the record suggest the EU is doing? Current activity shows it to focus on strengthening regionalism in two regions: Mercosur and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (EC, 1997, 41).[39] The academic discourse classifies both as intermediate regions in terms of their degree of regionalism (only the EU is considered advanced) (Hettne, in: Farrell, Hettne and Van Langenhoven, 2005, 277). The relevant strategy papers and

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[39] The Euro-Mediterranean partnership that was launched with the 1995 Barcelona process is left out of account as the Mediterranean only represents a region from an EU security perspective. It is not a self-constituted region.

framework agreements for cooperation with Mercosur and ASEAN contain both clauses for resource provision and for the opening up of political dialogue (Interregional framework agreement, 1995; EC, 2002, sections 4-5, EC, 2001b, sections 4-5; EC, 2005c, section 5). The EU is thus actively nurturing regionalism by creating an environment in which Fawcett's three conditions can be more easily met.

Regionalism is likely to lead to clashes with powerful states that are least in need of such ''economy-of-scope'' solutions if such states perceive regionalism to undermine their own position (Wallerstein, 1997, 140-141). An example might be the American preference for bilateral agreements over EU-NAFTA arrangements. Weak institutional ties between these two regional blocks have been the result (Hettne, in: Farrell, Hettne and Van Langenhoven, 2005, 280). The Russian Federation also indicated its wish for a separate strategy rather being part of the ENP (EC, 2004, 4). Therefore, strengthening the values ''cooperation'' and ''governance'' via regionalism could have the paradoxical consequence of simultaneously weakening them if powerful states would feel forced to counteract to uphold their own position and interests. Such a zero-sum game need not emerge but it draws attention to the role of perception and the need for a dual track approach.

Secondly, the EU could globally leverage its weight as a region and seek to increase international security by sharing its economic prosperity. Its high actorness in trade and its medium actorness in development enable the EU to contribute indirectly to order by strengthening the values of ''regulated capitalism'' and ''violent conflict renounced''. Naturally, the spread of economic prosperity in itself is merely a necessary and not a sufficient condition for generating security. Relevant frameworks, for example good governance, must also be established. But the post Cold War environment provides more scope for an economic approach to security because overlay, interstate enmity conflict and the constant threat of violent large-scale conflict have disappeared (Hettne, 2002, 326). It is clearly a long term game.

As a region, the EU could also stimulate more extensive use of chapter VIII of the UN charter and engage strongly in the recently opened discussion on an enlarged role for regional security organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security (Fawcett, in: Farrell, Hettne and Van Langenhoven, 2005, 21).

Evidence for the creation of security through prosperity by the EU is plentiful but ambiguous. The EU strongly supports the WTO regime and has conducted countless bilateral regional and country trade agreements that, in line with WTO standards, seek to combine open and fair trade with preferential market access (articles XXIV of GATT and V of

GATS).[40] But it is not clear that this strategy is based on considerations other than maximizing the prosperity of the Union itself. For example the EU's agricultural policy has widely been criticized as very protectionist (Colman, in: Artis and Nixon, 2004, 103-107; Nugent, 2003, 408-409; Bretherton and Vogler, 1999, 53-54, 250). In fact, this policy hinders wealth generation through the export of agricultural surplus by third states, which is one of the strategies that allow developing countries to industrialize. Of course, agriculture is only part of EU trading policy and exceptions to its high tariffs exist (e.g. for tropical produce and Least Developed Countries). Nevertheless, EU agricultural policy combined with its apparent lack of intent to trade prosperity for security makes the case for this potential EU contribution to order somewhat unlikely.

Thirdly, EU encouragement of regionalism can be seen as a long-term strategy that consists of two phases. The first step would be to help create other regions and to gain credibility and leverage in the process. This was discussed at the beginning of section 4.3. The second step would be to use this leverage to shape other regions in the EU's image via the export of all its preferred values of order. Region-to-region contacts allow wider and faster impact compared with a bilateral country approach.

Because the EU currently focuses on Mercosur and ASEAN, it makes sense to start with a brief examination of these agreements for relevant evidence. The Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement with Mercosur promotes cooperation and integration in the economic and trade spheres. Specifically, it mentions respect for democratic principles and human rights as the basis for cooperation (article 1). Moreover, the attached joint declaration reaffirms adherence to democracy, the rule of law and the UN charter. As a result it can be said that the EU and Mercosur contribute to order by strengthening the values ''political liberalism'', ''regulated capitalism'', ''intervention'' and ''sovereign democracy''.

EU-ASEAN relations are not laid down in any formal interregional agreement. The chairman's statement of the fifth Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) meeting in 2004 mainly highlights that ASEM (the EU and ASEAN) consider the UN charter as cornerstone for the maintenance of international peace and security. With regard to cooperation, multilateralism and economic cooperation, the WTO context is mentioned (ASEM, 2004a and 2004b). References to shared liberal political ideology are conspicuously absent. In ASEM the EU primarily seems to contribute to order through the values ''regulated capitalism'', ''cooperation'', and ''intervention''.

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[40] For an overview: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/index_en.htm (12 April 2006)

In accordance with the expectation expressed in section 4.1, the EU contributes unevenly to order in world politics through its 'regionness'. On the one hand because it engages selectively with two regions, on the other hand because it influences some values of order more than others. Most notably it contributes to ''regulated capitalism'', ''intervention'' and ''cooperation''.

4.4 Desecuritization is the name of the game

To securitize an issue means that an issue is presented as an existential threat that requires emergency measures. Such measures in turn justify actions which can be taken outside regular political procedure. The issue is taken out of the normal political discourse available for problem-solving and moved into a fast-track variant in which certain actors have special powers and are less accountable (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1998, 23-24). To desecuritize an issue is to move it back into normal politics or to prevent a securitizing move from being made. Securitization is seen as negative because it represents failure to deal with issues as normal politics (Ibid, 29). This section demonstrates the EU's lower propensity to securitize issues compared to state actors and analyzes the impact hereof on order. Three distinctive contributions are highlighted.

Firstly, the EU is likely to engage in a more nuanced and varied process of threat construction than states because of its multinational composition. The EU is an institution continuously engaged in a search for compromise and win-win solutions between twenty-five distinctive sets of identities and interests to arrive at outcomes. As a consequence, its constituent actors operate in a working mode that takes account of different perceptions, that creates space for constructive dialogue, that allows for compromise and that pays due attention to outcome *and* process. It is unlikely that such a deliberative process results in securitization. It is rather probably that this diversity of perception leads to a more subtle construction of what is going on. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that this logic and working mode is exported by the EU in its dealings and dialoguing with third parties, which provides more space for the joint construction of events and for exploring win-win solutions. The real impact of such logic critically depends on the willingness of the other party to engage in meaningful dialogue that departs from similar premises. A counter argument to the presumed export of this working mode is that EU positions once taken, are difficult to amend due to the imperatives of internal consensus. Such an argument assumes a linear path of decision-making in which the EU's position is only shared with third parties after it has been agreed on internally. The point, however, is that the logic already is at work when the third party engages with the EU during the process of internal position formulation.

On the basis of the above, the EU can be argued to contribute to order via the values ''cooperation'' and ''violent conflict renounced''. A cursory discourse analysis of how the current situation in Iran with regard to the enrichment of uranium is constructed, confirms this view. The conclusions of the General Affairs and External Relations (GAER) Council consistently refrain from labeling developments a threat to international peace and call for diplomatic efforts to find a solution instead (European Council, 2006a, 2006b and 2005, 13-14).

Clearly, more in-depth research is required to nuance and substantiate this argument. For example, failure to securitize a real threat can create significant costs of inaction (Ginsberg, 2001, 41-42). It is also likely that if the EU successfully securitizes an issue, its logic of diversity will hinder consistent implementation of protective measures towards the referent object from which the threat is thought to emerge (Smith, 2003, 198-199).

Secondly, the EU is a highly institutionalized and legalized entity. It therefore seeks to embed its relations with third parties in a web of regulation, rules of law and legal principles similar to its own (see also: Farrell, Hettne and Van Langenhoven, 2005, 11-13). As a result the EU prefers, as Laïdi suggests, norm over force; it has a normative preference (Laïdi, 2005, ch.2). It seeks to regulate international interaction via norms, international regimes and international law. Such regulation reinforces the conflict resolution capacity of normal political structures and decreases the need to securitize.[41] This EU way of doing business impacts order in world politics by strengthening the value ''contracting''. This does not necessarily make the EU a benevolent actor. Rules are still someone's rules and power politics continue unabated in the process of their creation (Carr, 2001, 86-88, 176, 201-207). A process of rule creation can be dominated by a single party. Nevertheless, both domestically and internationally under the condition of anarchy it needs to be a *joint* process to some degree to be effective. In addition, rules increase transparency because they are binding guidelines for international conduct. This limits the scope of behavior and action. Because consistent rule violation requires systematic explanation, random justification of power politics does not suffice anymore. Both effects create a different impact on order than the use of conflict-solving methods that go without any dialogue.

Thirdly, the EU is often said to be a ''soft power'' (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999, ch.7). Because soft power capabilities (e.g. aid and trade) are of limited use when an issue is successfully securitized, it seems plausible to suggest that the EU is less likely to engage in the process to start with. It would seem that not only the EU's composition, but also its

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[41] For a comparative overview of signed and ratified treaties by the EU, US, Japan, China, India, Brazil and Russia that provide some evidence of the EU's normative preference: Laïdi (2005, 110-115)

capabilities strengthen its preference for ''cooperation'' and ''violent conflict renounced'' as values of order. However, if it is recalled that hard power, as originally coined by Nye, does not refer to capabilities (i.e. military) but to behavior (i.e. coercion); the EU does have hard power at its disposal (Nye, 2004, 8). For example sanctions are a coercive instrument and the EU's economic weight is likely to make them felt. Conditionality is another form of hard power. It is therefore more precise to say that the EU disposes of few hard power capabilities that can be used to coerce *directly*. In combination with the EU's normative preference this remains likely to moderate securitization on the part of the EU. It rather exercises a form of soft imperialism whereby indirect coercion is limited by its stated intent and the legal provisions of the relevant agreement. The EU has voluntarily made its application of direct coercion dependent on wider international approval and an UNSC mandate (idea adapted from: Hettne, in: Farrell, Hettne and Van Langenhoven, 2005, 282). The real proof hereof can obviously only be obtained when the EU disposes of direct coercive instruments.

5. Conclusion

This paper started by asking how the EU as an actor has contributed to the creation and sustenance of order in world politics since the end of the Cold War. In summary it can be concluded that the EU's contribution to order in world politics is sixfold.

Firstly, the EU itself brings a clear set of preferred values of order to world politics (reference table 3). Secondly, the values preferred by the EU largely strengthen a subset of the dominant values of post Cold War order. This is mainly the case with regard to the values ''political liberalism'', ''regulated capitalism'', ''cooperation/governance'' and ''contracting/intervention''. Thirdly, the EU espouses some values that have the potential to change elements of the post Cold War order. This concerns mainly the values ''pluralistic democracy'', ''few great powers'' and ''violent conflict renounced''. Yet for the foreseeable future it is likely that these values will chiefly gain strength within the EU. Fourthly, the EU has been shown to actively export its values in a non-violent and relatively consensual manner. It does so selectively and unevenly. Fifthly, the high degree of correspondence between EU preferred and currently dominant values of order in combination with the non-violent and consensual way in which the EU spreads its preferences increases the stability and predictability of order.[42] Sixthly, if the past is any guide to the future, these five EU contributions to order in world politics will continue to grow.

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[42] For extensive historical treatment of the ''made in the West'' label of order: Knutsen (1999, in particular ch. 5)

In short, the EU exercises a profound influence on order in world politics because of its clear preferences for specific values of order, its size, its attraction and the way in which it exports its preferences.

More detailed conclusions necessitate a brief look into the three parts of the main question. These were: 1) How can the concept of order in world politics be understood in general terms; 2) What order characterizes world politics since 1991; 3) How does the EU as an international actor contribute to this order?

Regarding the first question this paper suggested that states and international organizations interact and build relations in world politics with purpose. Such purpose may simply be to manage their coexistence or it may be to jointly define and realize more ambitious positive goals. Only when shared positive purpose is present can order be spoken of. The process through which relations are built and shared goals are formulated is interactive and in constant flux. Although history, experience, values and beliefs provide inputs, they do not predetermine outcomes.

To analyze order in world politics it has proven useful to define order as those characteristics of a relation that provide it with stability and predictability. In addition to the flexibility required to deal with daily events, relations in world politics also need a degree of stability and predictability that enables such responses to be constructed. Order in this sense forms the texture of world politics on the basis of which interactions occur, relationships are built and goals can be achieved. By its very nature, order has organizing characteristics; it can be described in terms of a certain logic and structure. This paper offered a new way to think of order through operationalizing it with the use of seven variables. Three variables reflected the basic outlook of the actors engaged in world politics. Four indicated the main orientations for interaction between these actors.

This operationalization was subsequently used to analyze order during and after the Cold War. By contrasting the Cold War and post-Cold War as units of order, ruptures in and continuity of values of order in world politics were defined. This provided a mental map against which much of the ongoing debate on order and change can be understood more profoundly, away from daily events. Three conclusions stand out:

Firstly, the values of order changed, fully or partially, on all variables. Within the remit of this study this in itself is a clear indication that the Cold War and post-Cold War should be seen as distinctive units of order. This is no surprise.

Secondly, clear ruptures occurred on the variables ''great power structure'' and ''nature of violent conflict''. On the first of these variables one of two super powers remained. On the

second, interstate enmity conflict disappeared to be replaced with intrastate enmity and inter-/intrastate rivalistic conflict. This rupture highlights both the qualitative improvement of order as well as its fragmentation. Qualitative improvement results from the disappearance of enmity conflict between states, in particular between the most powerful. If their involvement is required to make order work, antagonism between them reduces order's capacity to serve as an enabling context for the realization of joint goals to a minimum. Fragmentation is caused by the increase in the sorts of conflict that can emerge.

Thirdly, a mixture of rupture and continuity can be observed on the variables that describe the basic outlook of actors on the dimensions of politics, economics and governance. Two variables that describe international interaction, namely the nature of international interaction and the methods used for the resolution of violent conflict, are also characterized by rupture and continuity.

Table 3 below provides a detailed conclusion with regard to the third part of the question that asked how the EU contributes to order in world politics.

Table 3: The EU's actor contribution to order in world politics

	Variable	Order after the Cold War			The EU's contribution to order		
		Dominant value 1	Dominant value 2	Dominant value 3	General EU preference & contribution		Specific contribution
Basic outlook	Political ideology	Political liberalism	Political Islam	Nationalism	**Political liberalism**	Europeanization	- Political liberalism - Regulated capitalism - Cooperation - Governance - Violent conflict renounced - Intervention
	Method of wealth generation	''Market'' Communism	Regulated capitalism		**Regulated capitalism**		
	Domestic governance structure	Autocratic	Sovereign democracy		**Pluralistic democracy**		
Interaction	Great power structure	One great power			**---**	Interregionalism	- Political liberalism - Regulated capitalism - Sovereign democracy - **Few great powers** - Cooperation - Violent conflict renounced - Contracting/ Intervention
	Nature of international interaction	Cooperation	Governance		**Cooperation / governance**		
	Nature of violent conflict	Intrastate enmity	Interstate and intrastate rivalistic	Violent conflict renounced	**Violent conflict renounced**	Desecuritization	- Cooperation - Violent conflict renounced - Contracting
	Method to resolve violent conflict	Contracting	Intervention	Coercion	**Contracting / Intervention**		

What stands out are the EU preferences for ''few great powers'' and ''pluralistic democracy'' because these values differ from the dominant values of current order. The preference for the ''few great power'' value stems from EU encouragement of regionalism. In the long run this might help more and more groups of states to act jointly on the basis of a certain level of cooperation or governance. For the moment it sounds like a faraway scenario, which in addition would necessitate a redefinition of the great power concept. Nevertheless it represents a possible change in order. The preference for the ''pluralistic democracy'' value stems from the process of regional integration in Europe. This has occurred via both cooperation and governance. It changes the understanding of the notions of democracy, authority and sovereignty. The traditional European nation-state becomes embedded in a region-state, characterized by a blended and more diverse governance structure. In the longer run this could transform the nature of statehood.

Finally, some conclusions should be drawn on the limitations of this paper. The operationalization of order has proven useful. It provided a framework to conceptualize order other than in the more usual terms of institutions or day-to-day politics. In addition, it has allowed conceptual separation of goals of, actors involved in and characteristics of order, which provided better focus in the discussion of such a broad term. However, the operationalization has also proven rather rough. In particular the ''nature of international interaction'' and ''nature of conflict'' variables would benefit from more nuance to serve as useful analytical lenses. Probably the variables ''political ideology'' and ''domestic governance structure'' should be merged to some degree. In addition, the values of ''violent conflict renounced'' seem to be too much part of each other. Coercion can for example contain elements of contracting.

Moreover, the EU's contribution to order has only been assessed superficially. A significant omission has been not to consider how the EU deals with the values of current order that it does not prefer. In addition, the EU's contribution to order has mainly been assessed by analyzing linkages between its nature as international actor and order. The actual polices of the EU, their intent and impact, has hardly been considered. This is a missing element, which is required for a full assessment of how the EU contributes to order. Finally, even within the discussion on the nature of the EU, only some of its characteristics were discussed. A more complete inventory of its attributes should be undertaken to gain a deeper understanding of its specific contributions to order in world politics.

Annex I: The variables and values of order in detail

Section 2.3 outlined the construct validity of the proposed operationalization of order in world politics. This annex discusses the validity of the operationalization in more detail. Tables 4-11 define variables and values of order to ensure their content validity. After each table the relation between the variable and order in world politics is outlined to further substantiate its construct validity. Finally, relevant indicators are listed where appropriate. These quantitative indicators are used in addition to the more qualitative indicators provided by the academic discourse.

1. Basic outlook

''Political ideology'', ''method of wealth generation'' and ''domestic governance structure'' are critical descriptors of how actors perceive the world and therefore, on the basis of what and how they will engage with others. Goals, means, strategies and interaction methods are formed against and take their meaning from such perception.[43]

Table 4: Variable ''Political ideology''

Variable	Political ideology	A system of political ideas and ideals forming the basis of a worldview.
Value 1	Nationalism	The conscious assertion of the nation in terms differing from patriotism, usually against other national identities. Irredentist nationalism arises when an ethnic group that achieved statehood wishes to incorporate other members of the group left outside its borders.
Value 2	Political liberalism	A set of beliefs that has freedom in all its dimensions as its key tenet. Humans should enjoy freedom from government interference with regard to certain inalienable individual rights on the basis of a doctrine of natural rights. Religious tolerance, the rule of law and skeptical inquiry (leading to rationalism) stand out as additional defining principles (see also: Fukuyama, 1992, 42-48).
Value 3	Communism	A set of beliefs aspiring to create a classless society in which everyone owns a share of the means of production. In such a society there would be no need for representation, no possibilities for exploitation and no need for the state. The dictatorship of the proletariat was foreseen as an interim stage on the way to the complete overthrow of the capitalist class.
Value 4	Political Islam	The elements of Islam as religion that express preferences regarding the organization of political life. Mainly those that seek to ground both private and public life in the premises of the Koran. As a result there is no real separation between state and religion: the clergy dominates or strongly influences politics and the minds of the laity. More fundamentalist Islam seeks to establish a society on the basis of the Shari'a - classic Islamic law.
Value 5	Socialism	The belief that public ownership is a better and fairer form of ownership than private ownership and that the welfare state should reallocate wealth by using redistributive measures, taking from the rich and giving to the needy. Alternatively, it is also seen as a stage on the way to communism whilst operating within the remit of democratic society.

Relation of ''Political ideology'' to order in world politics

A political ideology determines the basic political outlook of a state on the world. Within a state there are usually a number of groups adhering to different ideologies that compete for power. Nevertheless, most states have a fundamental political outlook that remains relatively stable and unchanged overtime. The political ideology of a state strongly influences the goals

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[43] For the definitions of the variables ''political ideology'' and ''method of wealth generation'' and their values, Bealy (1999) has been extensively used.

it considers relevant. It also defines or outlines the range of permissible means to achieve such goals. Thus, a political ideology provides a stable framework of reference for the state that espouses it and for states dealing with that state.

Indicators:

- The development of the number of states overtime that have Islam as dominant religion and that do not explicitly seek to prevent religion from influencing the state.
- The number of conflicts caused by nationalism.

Table 5: Variable ''Method of wealth generation''

Variable	Method of wealth generation	An economic system that generates prosperity and physical wealth.
Value 1	Communism	A set of beliefs advocating to run the national economy on the basis of the public ownership of the means of production and detailed forward looking central planning.
Value 2	''Market'' communism	The combination of the political ideology of communism as the way to organize the relevant state politically with capitalism as the method of wealth generation, whereby the political ideology dominates the economic system.
Value 3	Protectionism	The protection of home industry against competitive imports from abroad to prevent its demise. It represents an abrogation of the right to trade freely irrespective of national frontiers. The modern form consists for example of the creation of national champions through e.g. tax advantages and subsidies.
Value 4	Regulated capitalism	Capitalism that is subject to constraints that reflect other values than maximum wealth generation. For example social and distributive justice. The main tenets of capitalism as listed below are recognized, but they do not exist in unrestrained form.
Value 5	Capitalism	A method of industrial production that represents a set of ideas on economic organization: 1) the ownership of production is in the hands of numerous shareholders while control is in the hands of management 2) free competition and free markets ensure maximum wealth generation 3) as little state intervention as possible should occur (mainly to ensure security of property and sanctity of contracts) 4) everyone is free to become an entrepreneur 5) consumers are sovereign.

Relation of ''Method of wealth generation' to order in world politics

A method of wealth generation represents a state's basic economic outlook on the world. It is often closely linked to a political ideology but differs from it in the sense that it focuses on the creation of prosperity and not on the structural organization of the political system. Political systems are based on territory. Economic systems need territory but are not based on it. Positive goals need resources to be realized. Economic systems generate such resources. At the same time, economic preferences influence the definition of relevant goals and value certain means over others.

Table 6: Variable ''Domestic governance structure''

Variable	Domestic governance structure	The organizational nature of the political system on the basis of which a state is governed.
Value 1	Totalitarian	A centralized, dictatorial system of government that demands complete subservience to the state.
Value 2	Autocratic	A system of government in which the ruler has absolute power.
Value 3	Sovereign democracy	A system of government, based on the universal right of all citizens to have a share of political power, which acts as an independent entity on the basis of the several dimensions of its sovereignty.
Value 4	Pluralistic democracy	A system of government, based on the universal right of all citizens to have a share of political power, which forms part of a larger political organization that has some supranational elements. It retains, however, its legal independence and is not merged into the larger political organization.
Value 5	Integrative democracy	A system of government, based on the universal right of all citizens to have a share of political power, which merges with like systems into a community that constitutes a unified system of government.

Sources: the definition of democracy is taken from Fukuyama (1992, 43). The notions of ''pluralistic'' and ''integrative'' democracy have been derived from the notions ''pluralistic and amalgamated security community'' as originally coined by Deutsch et al. (1969, 6)

Relation of '' Domestic governance structure'' to order in world politics

The domestic governance structure of a state influences its behavior under the condition of anarchy. The assumption is that democracies are less prone and totalitarian/autocratic structures more prone to ''realist'' effects of anarchy. Domestic governance structure as a unit variable (states are the units) mitigates anarchy as a system variable (the international system is the system). It has been pointed out that democracies often behave as ''nasty'' and ''brutish'' towards non-democratic states as the latter are said to behave towards each other (Cooper, 1996, 39-42). Nevertheless, recourse to violent behavior is subject to more constraints in democracies than in non-democracies.

Indicators:

- The development overtime of the number and percentage of democratic and non-democratic states as part of the total number of states.
- The development overtime of the number and percentage of autocratic states as part of the total number of states.
- The development overtime of the number and percentage of states that are member of an international organization with supranational elements.

2. Interaction

''Great power structure'', ''nature of international interaction'' and ''nature of violent conflict'' are key variables of order because they describe the nature and strength of the potential relation between entities. In addition, the variable ''method to resolve violent conflict'' indicates how disruptions to these relations are dealt with. It indirectly also highlights what consequences such disruptions might have.

Table 7: Variable ''Great power structure''

Variable	Great power structure	The number of states in the international system that are perceived to command significantly larger resources than other states.
Value 1	No great powers	No state outranks other states in the combination of its population size, territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength (in particular), political stability and competence. Nor is any state recognized as such by other states. This represents a situation of perfect competition.
Value 2	One super power	A single state is preponderant in the combination of its population size, territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength (in particular), political stability and competence and is recognized as such by other states. This represents a situation of monopoly, a hegemon is present.
Value 3	Two great powers	Two states are preponderant in the combination of their population size, territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength (in particular), political stability and competence and are recognized as such by other states.
Value 4	Few great powers	A limited number of states is preponderant in the combination of their population size, territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength (in particular), political stability and competence and are recognized as such by other states. This represents a situation of oligopoly in which realists would say the balance of power is a key instrument.
Value 5	Many great powers	Many states are preponderant in the combination of their population size, territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength (in particular), political stability and competence and are recognized as such by other states. This represents a situation of monopolistic competition and the concept of great power starts losing its analytical value.

Source: for the operationalization of this value extensive use has been made of: Waltz (1979, 130-131) and Bull (2002, 194-199)

Relation of '' Great power structure'' to order in world politics

Two methodological notes are relevant to start with. First, the conventional understanding of the term great powers is that of the 19th century in the context of the balance of power. Here, it is used slightly different (as defined above). Second, the value ''one super power'' does not mean great powers are absent but indicates the presence of a state so powerful that it stands apart from any other existing great powers.

   The number of great powers matters because the larger resource potential of great powers endows them with greater leverage and influence on order in world politics. Even when resources are only used for action on the basis of interests and perceptions that are socially constituted, the capability with which great powers can pursue their policy preferences increases the impact of their behavior on order. The notion of polarity (uni, bi or multi) is avoided because by being opposites, the term 'poles' suggests adversary. Unipolarity does not seem to make sense at all as a pole is necessarily defined against another pole.

Table 8: Variable ''Nature of international interaction''

Variable	Nature of international interaction	The principle according to which states relate with each other in the international system, the degree of intensity that follows from it and the perceived degree of interdependence it testifies of.
Value 1	International coexistence	States command their full Vattelian, domestic, international legal and interdependence sovereignty. Interaction between states and international organizations is limited to a minimum.
Value 2	International cooperation	States work together internationally in appreciation of limitations to their interdependence sovereignty but on the basis of recognition of their Vattelian, domestic and international legal sovereignty.
Value 3	International governance	States work together internationally in ways that legally bind them in specific and limited areas but which leave their domestic and international legal sovereignty mostly intact.
Value 4	International integration	States work together internationally so that they come to form part of a larger governing entity that lays down the law for their territory whilst their domestic sovereignty remains intact to ensure execution and maintenance of such laws.

Source: the various notions of sovereignty are taken from Krasner (2001)

Relation of ''Nature of international interaction'' to order in world politics

The ''nature of international interaction'' variable indicates to what degree states consider it possible and necessary to cooperate. Possibility is shaped by past experience and the absence or presence of conflict. Necessity is based on perceived interdependence. The more interdependent relationships are perceived, the more states are likely to want to manage them in ways that safeguard their benefits. A high degree of perceived interdependence (in terms of the perceived cost of disruption of the link between a state's prosperity / governing capability and its relations with other states) does not necessarily translate into more or deeper international interaction. It may also result in coercion, imposition or conquest. However, more or deeper international interaction is partially the result of a high degree of perceived interdependence.

Indicators:

- The development overtime of the number and percentage of states that are members of international organizations created to manage interdependence such as the IMF, Worldbank and WTO
- The development overtime of regional cooperation and integration arrangements

Table 9: Variable ''Nature of violent conflict''

Variable	Nature of violent conflict	The kind and intensity of violence that is used in a dispute and the nature of actors involved in it.
Value 1	Interstate enmity	Disputes between states in which the use of violence is potentially unrestrained (if it is used) because one state does not recognize the other state's right to exist autonomously. As a result, one state seeks to revise the life or liberty of the other state.
Value 2	Intrastate enmity	Disputes between groups within a state in which the use of violence is potentially unrestrained (if it is used) because one group does not recognize the other group's right to exist autonomously. As a result, one group seeks to revise the life or liberty of the other group.
Value 3	Interstate rivalistic	Disputes between states in which violence can be used but in which its application is only considered legitimate under a limited set of circumstances. Violence (if used) is self limiting because the states in conflict recognize each others right to exist but seek to revise a property or the behavior of the other.
Value 4	Intrastate rivalistic	Disputes between groups within a state in which violence can be used but in which its application is only considered legitimate under a limited set of circumstances. Violence (if used) is self limiting because the groups in conflict recognize each others right to exist but seek to revise a property or the behavior of the other.
Value 5	Violent conflict renounced	Disagreements in which the use of violence is renounced as a conflict resolution mechanism.

Source: The notions of enmity and rivalry are derived from Wendt (2000, 260-261).

Relation of ''Nature of conflict' to order in world politics

Even if jointly defined positive goals are present and order enables their realization, conflict still arises. It might be over the goals themselves when circumstances change; it might be over the means necessary to realize them. Order does not mean the exclusion of conflict, but the provision of a framework to deal with it. The critical issue for order is what kind of conflicts dominates the relation between entities. The more enmity is characteristic for the typical kind of conflict that occurs, the less order is likely to exist because enmity severely limits the formulation of joint positive goals.

Indicators:

- The development overtime of the number of violent conflicts and their causes.
- The perception of the nature of conflict as expressed in the security strategies of the great and super powers (United States, European Union, Russian Federation and China).

Table 10: Variable ''Method to resolve violent conflict''

Variable	Method to resolve violent conflict	Ways to end a dispute after it has arisen and turned violent. A dispute turns violent when an explicit and credible threat to resort to violence is expressed by at least one of the contending parties. Actual violent action is not required.
Value 1	Contracting	The violent conflict is ended by the contending parties via a joint agreement in the expectation of mutual gains. The agreement is negotiated and enacted on the recognition of approximately equal status of the contending parties. Both sides need to honor the agreement to effectuate it.
Value 2	Intervention	The violent conflict is ended by international interference, regardless of the request for or willingness of the contending parties to submit their dispute to such interference. Interfering into conflict takes place by the system of states through the UN on the basis of an agreed rule with a predefined goal. It can for example take the form of mediation, peace keeping or peace enforcement.
Value 3	Coercion	The violent conflict is ended by the establishment of dominance by one of the contending parties after a significant struggle. This enables the dominating party to force the other party to accept its solution of the conflict. A significant struggle means that the execution of credible threats or unilateral (violent) action has critically undermined the bargaining position of the other party. Examples are war or sanctions.
Value 4	Imposition	The violent conflict is ended before it really emerges because one of the contending parties is overwhelmed by the other (or by a third party that is involved). Overwhelmed means the party is rendered incapable of meaningful counteraction to support its preferred outcome of the conflict. As a result, the weaker party has no option but to comply with the preferences of the stronger. This may occur when large power disparities exist.

Source: the concepts contracting, coercion and imposition are taken from Krasner (2001, 18)

Relation of 'Method to resolve violent conflict'' to order in world politics

Within order, conflict continues to occur. This variable outlines how it is likely to be managed. It indicates indirectly what consequences the outbreak of conflict might have for relations between international actors. The variable contains two values that represent peaceful ways to resolve a violent conflict (contracting and intervention). It also features three values that represent violent ways to resolve a violent conflict (intervention, coercion and imposition).

   On the scale of violent-peaceful, imposition is the most problematic value to place as it can resolve conflict with and without resorting to violence. Yet for imposition to solve a conflict it is likely that a credible threat of disproportionate use of violence needs to be made. This in itself may be seen as an act of violence.

Indicators:

- The development overtime of the number of UN peacekeeping operations with UNSC mandate.
- The development overtime of the number of UN mediation efforts.
- The development overtime of the number of courts with international jurisdiction.

Annex II: EU actorness in its external policy fields

Table 11: The degree of EU actorness in its five main external policy fields

The assessment in bold in the last row is based on the capacity conferred on the EU to act:
- Exclusive competence = high degree of actorness; shared competence = medium, intergovernmental competence = low
- QMV = high; unanimity = low

The external dimensions of internal policies are excluded.

	Trade / commerce	Development cooperation	Enlargement	Foreign policy (CFSP/EFSP)	Security policy (ESDP)
Is the policy field's treaty base in TEC or TEU?	TEC (art. 133, 310)	TEC (art. 177-181A)	TEU (art. 49)	TEU (title V)	TEU (title V)
What is the nature of EU policy competence?	Exclusive EU competence (CCP)	Shared EU-MS competence	Exclusive EU competence	Intergovernmental coordination through EU of MS competence	Intergovernmental coordination through EU of MS competence
What procedures are available in this policy field?	Negotiations with 3rd states (trade, cooperation & development cooperation agreements, association agreements)	Development agreements with 3rd states Economic, financial and technical agreements with 3rd states	Negotiations with states previously granted candidate-status	CFSP decision making procedures (common strategies, joint actions, common positions)	CFSP decision making procedures (common strategies, joint actions, common positions)
Who ultimately decides in this policy field?	EC leads negotiations, Council decides predominantly by QMV. Art. 133 committee 'controls' EC. EP assent for association agreements	EC leads, Council decides by QMV. EP co-decision EC proposes, Council QMV, EP consulted	EC leads negotiations and Council decides by unanimity. Assent EP	Council decides by unanimity (constructive abstention). QMV if implementing common strategies (but: national interest brake)	Council decides by unanimity QMV not possible for military matters
Assessment of the degree of EU actorness	**High**	**Medium**	**High**	**Low-medium**	**Low**

Sources: Woolcock and Sedelmeider, in: Wallace, Wallace and Pollack (2005) and Smith (2003)

If the EU is exclusively competent in a policy field, this means that the Member States have decided to take all decisions related to that policy field jointly at the EU level. In terms of EU actorness this enables the EU to take a common position vis-à-vis the outside world.

The conferred capacity to act demonstrates potential EU actorness rather than its real impact as an international actor. To assess impact, additional assessment of policy goals, available tools and policy outcomes is required. This is beyond the scope of this paper.

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