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The Role of Regional Integration in the Promotion of Peace and Security

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Working Paper¹

Introduction: Linking Peace, Security and Regional Integration

This paper explores the relationships between peace, security and regional integration, presents current global developments and challenges on regional and global approaches to peace and security, and recommends concrete measures to facilitate peace and human security that can be taken within the ACP – EU cooperation framework.

Human Security: The link between development and security

In the 21st century African, Caribbean and Pacific countries continue to be challenged by a variety of complex socio-economic, political and development problems and security threats. The most devastating of these include intra-state wars and armed conflicts, with considerable regional consequences due to the regionalisation of domestic civil wars. ACP countries still lack the critical mass of sustained expertise and capacity for conflict prevention, management and resolution and peace-building. Thus, differences in opinion continue to ignite violence, destabilising regions and preventing investment, productivity and growth. Violent civil wars and multiple security threats in ACP countries have seriously undermined the attainment of economic integration, development and democratic consolidation objectives. This is recognised by the European Commission in its proposed ‘EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa’s development’, which emphasizes that peace and security are ‘first essential prerequisites for sustainable development’ and to achieving the MDGs. The Commission urges that,

*The EU should step up its efforts to promote peace and security
at all stages of the conflict cycle, from conflict prevention, via*

¹ This working paper was prepared for and presented to the Political Affairs Committee of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly meeting, in Edinburgh 15 – 24 November 2005.

conflict management to conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction' (p. 3).

Recognition of the close link between development and security has led to the embracing of the 'human security' concept. In contrast to the more traditional 'hard' security concept that focused on military reaction to (perceived) threats, the human security concept is a more holistic, human rights-based approach that holds sacred the security of the individual, rather than (only) geopolitical borders. The provision of human security, rather than only state security, is also inherently a preventive approach to social conflict.

Regional integration and cooperation: more than trade

What is (regional) integration?²

In the most general sense, integration refers to the unification of a number of hitherto independent units into a larger whole. A region can be defined as a territorially based subsystem of the international system. Thus, regional integration denotes the process whereby territorial based subsystems increase their level of cooperation. Cooperation can be in the area(s) of trade, economic & monetary policies or peace and security as well as in political, social and cultural aspects of governance. Within the present context, the degree of integration is very much related to the willingness of independent sovereign states to share their sovereignty. A clear example of integration is the formation of a state, the merging of previously independent units into a recognisable political entity, capable of independent action. International organisations (United Nations, EU, ACP, etc.) and international regimes (such as the international environmental regimes) also represent forms of integration, but their achieved degree of "unity" or coherence is as yet not as high as the degree of unity in states.

² For more information on regional integration, refer to the online education module accessible at www.cris.unu.edu.

Linking Regional Integration with Peace, Security and Development

Peace, security and development are also inextricably interlinked with regional integration and cooperation. While regional integration can contribute to economic development, regional cooperation is prerequisite to the attainment of, as well as dependent upon, peace and security. As neither the causes nor the consequences of violent conflict are bound by national borders, there is broad consensus that a regional approach is essential to effectively ensure global security.

Regionalism in Europe was initiated in the aftermath of World War II as an effort to prevent in future the kinds of conflicts that had ceaselessly ravaged the continent until then. Formal cooperation began in 1951 the area of trade with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Only in 1993, with the signing of the Treaty on European Union in Maastricht (widely known as the Maastricht Treaty), was a fledgling Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) established. A number of important changes were introduced in the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, and there have been numerous developments since, such as an agreement to embark on a common security and defence policy (CESDP) within the overall framework of the CFSP.

Because peace and security are indispensable to the realisation of the cooperation, integration and development objectives in ACP member states, there is an emerging imperative to incorporate peace and security components into regional integration programmes in a systemic and sustainable manner, and an increasing number of regional organisations have included peace and security into their mandates. For example, while COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) was originally established merely as a common market, as implied in its name, it has expanded its vision and strategy to include peace and security issues:

Beyond economic co-operation, the internal co-operation strategy focuses [on] issues of peace and security with emphasis on prevention and post-conflict reconstruction, strengthening of democratic infrastructure, and development of a vibrant culture.³

³ <http://www.comesa.int>

The potential positive role that regional organisations can play in responding to contemporary problems and in particular to the challenges of ensuring peace and security has been underscored by the African Union, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the ACP, the European Union, the UN Secretary General and the Millennium Declaration, and UNESCO and the Institute for Security Studies in their report on *Peace, Human Security and Conflict Prevention in Africa* and the Report of the United Nations Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*.

In practice as well, regional integration organisations have proven their potential as foundations for durable peace, long-term stability, economic growth, sustainable development and democratic consolidation. Regional early warning and early response mechanisms have been established, such as the ECOWAS Early Warning Mechanism and the IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Mechanism, CEWARN. Furthermore, regional organisations have been emerging as legitimate conflict managers, in part as a result of somewhat successful interventions such as the West African peacekeeping and intervention force, ECOMOG, and the SADC peacekeeping deployment in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Similarly, the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was successful in the Pacific region (Sutherland, 2004), while CARICOM and the OAS actively intervened in the Haiti crisis.

Despite these successes, these initiatives have all been based on ad hoc improvisations, rather than long-term policy prescription, commitment and coordination on the part of regional organisations and other levels (national, local) of governance. An important symptom of this is a dearth in the capacity of regional organisations to systematically address peace and security issues. The MDG Report⁴ (Sachs, 2005) calls for increased international support for and investment in regional public goods, including specifically 'political cooperation mechanisms for regional dialogue and consensus building'. The authors underscore the need for adequate direct funding and staff for dedicated regional institutions to enable them to provide regional public goods and improve coordination among member countries.

⁴ See chapter 15.

Building Capacity for Peace

While a human security approach is gaining ground and many regional organizations' have emphasized the urgency of addressing peace and security issues from an expressly regional approach, most of the regional organisations lack the institutional capacity to adequately fulfil their broadened mandates. They make training in this area a priority, as reflected in their regional strategy papers (RSPs) and regional indicative programmes (RIPs), and numerous other documents (see Goucha and Cilliers, 2001; Wachira, 2003). For example, the SADC regional strategic paper (RSP), states that

The region continues to experience pockets of instability, which prevents it from allocating all its resources and focusing all its attention on securing sustainable social and economic growth. Support in the area of conflict prevention and resolution is essential because a stable political, economic and social environment is a basic requirement for human development. Capacity building is of particular importance in order to enable SADC to efficiently identify, appraise and implement projects under this RSP (p.28).⁵

Correspondingly, the RSP for SADC lists “capacity building for conflict prevention and management” as its first project/programme under the non-focal sectors category of its intervention framework.

Various workshops have been conducted to identify the capacity development priorities of regional organizations, and to explore how they can collaborate with each other and with civil society organisations in order to fulfil their peace and security mandates.⁶ Capacity building needs encompass not only ‘hard security’ elements, but also measures to improve human security and prevent violent conflicts, such as research and training in culture, identity and communications, which will be

⁵ The SADC RSP and RIP for 2002 – 2007 can be found at:

http://www.delbwa.cec.eu.int/en/eu_and_sadc/rsp.htm

⁶ *Linking Peace, Security and Regional Integration in Africa*: _____. Workshop organized by UNU-CRIS, COMESA and the University for Peace. Lusaka, Zambia, 20 – 23 September 2004.

^{3rd} *High-Level Meeting between the UN Secretary-General and the Regional Organizations* (1998). See report Annex II: Modalities for Cooperation between the UN and Regional Organizations in the Field of Conflict Prevention.

High-level expert meeting organised by UNESCO & Institute for Security Studies, South Africa. 23 – 24 July 2001.

elaborated below, and training in methods of participatory governance. Manifold declarations encouraging the engagement of non-state actors and emerged from the ACP and EU (see Annex I), as well as academics (see Sutherland, 2004). However, the capacity of regional organisations to engage non-state actors needs to be developed. While various participatory methods are already available as tools for engagement (see Slocum-Bradley, 2003), support for trainings is required.

At the global level, in accordance with the conviction of the need to work with regional organisations on peace and security issues, as well as to build their capacity to do so, the UN Secretary General and UN Security Council have taken various concrete steps to facilitate collaboration and a more structured relationship between the UN and regional and other intergovernmental organisations. These developments, as well as the implications for the ACP-EU cooperation, will be further elucidated below. At the third high-level meeting between the regional organisations and the UN, participants emphasized in particular the need for conflict prevention strategies. They criticised the tendency to merely react after violence erupts, rather than implementing preventive measures. The delegates identified various modalities for cooperation between the UN and regional organisations in the field of conflict prevention. However, the actual *content* of conflict prevention strategies needs to be developed.

Conflict prevention: Addressing the root causes

The Cotonou Agreement, previous reports issued by the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly's Committee on Political Affairs, regional organisations and the UN Secretary General have all underscored the importance of addressing the root causes of conflict in order to prevent violence⁷. Successful strategies for preventing conflict can save a great number of lives as well as resources. Nonetheless, very little has been done to identify and address root causes in order to prevent violent conflicts. Identifying root causes, as well as generating support for funding conflict prevention programmes, requires more long-term and less simplistic thinking on the part of policy makers, funding providers and researchers.

⁷ See Annex I for excerpts from the Cotonou Agreement and JPA reports.

What are true root causes of conflict?

In order to identify the root causes of conflict, one first must identify the type of conflict one is addressing. In general, when policy makers and researchers attempt to address conflict and plan conflict prevention strategies, they are not addressing a conflict over differences of perspective or opinion being freely expressed by political campaigns or interest groups. Such ‘conflict’ can be considered ‘healthy’ for a democratic society as it does not involve violence and no individual or group is suppressed from expressing a point of view. Rather, when considering conflict prevention, the kinds of conflicts being addressed are those characterized by one or both of the following characteristics:

1. The presence of violence and/or
2. The targeted victims are targets because of their (attributed) social identity.

Here, (attributed) social identity refers to the characterization of a person as a member of a social group, such as a religious or ethnic group (see Slocum-Bradley and Van Langenhove, 2005). A bank robbery entails threatened violence and may be considered a ‘conflict’, but the victims are targeted because they own or work in the bank, not because of their social identity. In contrast, conflicts in which the aim is to oppress or inflict harm upon (an) individual(s) because of his (attributed) status as a member of a particular social (ethnic, religious, gender, sexual preference) group may or may not be accompanied by violence. Genocide is an example of a conflict characterized by violence and whose victims are targets because of their social identity.

While poverty and income disparity are often important reasons for turning to violence, they cannot (independently) explain conflicts in which victims are targeted as a result of their social identity. In order to explain why people turn to massacring members of a religious or ethnic group – and to *prevent* this, one needs to understand:

- A) how people come to perceive an entire group of people as legitimate targets (whereby the individuals included in the group membership are often diverse and the majority innocuous);

- B) how the same people come to see violence as a justified solution despite social norms prohibiting it; and
- C) how masses of average people are mobilised to commit violent acts that they would otherwise deem unthinkable.

To understand these processes, social-psychological factors need to be considered, such as the ways in which meaning systems embedded with social identity stereotypes are constructed, as well as how these are propagated through the media and other communicators.

Meaning Systems and the Role of Communication

Trials at the international criminal court have publicly exposed the role that media and communications commonly play in inciting violence. Fledgling research (see Slocum-Bradley, N. 2001, Slocum-Bradley and Van Langenhove, 2004 and 2005) has revealed how such communications incite hatred and violence by constructing certain social identities and meanings systems. This is sometimes done intentionally to manipulate, as exemplified in the radio broadcastings used to incite hatred and violence in the Rwanda genocide⁸. However communicators also sometimes unintentionally reinforce paradigms that maintain social conflict. One example of this is the use of the metaphor ‘ethnic cleansing’, which implies that there is something (or rather someone) dirty to be ‘cleansed’ and thus can implicitly entrench this derogatory view. This research is also examining how communications can facilitate peace and social harmony. See Annex II for examples of communications that can contribute to social harmony or conflict. Such research should be expanded, and training programmes should be developed to educate public communicators (and eventually the general public) on these processes and concomitant consequences. Research and training in this area are essential mechanisms ‘for bridging dividing lines among different segments of society’ (Cotonou Agreement) in order to build a ‘partnership of civilisations’, which has been set as a key priority in the Cotonou Agreement and by regional organisations and the UN in their high-level meetings.

⁸ See Annex II for examples.

The Growing Regional-Global Security Mechanism: Cooperation between the UN and International Organisations in Security

The UN is seeking to develop a 'regional-global security mechanism' for the 21st century. The structural relationship between the UN and the regional organisations is fundamental to the success of this mechanism, and comprises three phases: shaping the relationship (through the UN Charter); building the institutional framework (through the development of the regional organisations) and developing a framework for cooperation. Two phenomena in particular characterise to date the experience in strategic planning: increased interest from the regional organisations themselves and the development of a normative framework of co-operation between them and the UN.

The fundamental relationship between universalism and regionalism in security doctrine is addressed in the UN Charter. The Charter allows for regional security arrangements for the maintenance of peace and security as a support to the primary role exercised by the Security Council, but there is no pre-fabricated mechanism. At the time of its drafting, the notion of regionalism was still in its infancy, which is very likely one of the reasons for a weak treatment of the regional level in the UN Charter. However the 50s witnessed a burst of unparalleled creativity in regional institutional building in Europe, spreading to Africa and Asia in the 60s and the Caribbean and Pacific in the 70s, and supplemented by 'late-comers' and a wave of 'new regionalism' in the 80s and 90s, when a global network of regional agencies was in place.

In the 90s, the UN began to act in the recognition of the potential for greater involvement of the regional agencies in a cooperative relationship with the UN in pursuing international security. In January 1993 the Security Council invited regional organisations to study ways of strengthening their functions in peace and security and, within this context, to improve coordination with the UN. In the course of the year the Secretary-General signalled his intention to develop a 'set of guidelines' governing such co-operation, which was welcomed by the General Assembly (A/RES/48/42: par.63, 1993). A series of meetings have since then been held between the global body and the regional agencies, first with the Secretary General and later

with the Security Council, focusing on the range of peace and security challenges: counter-terrorism, conflict prevention and management, and peace-building.

Meetings between regional organisations and the UN Secretary General

Six high-level meetings have been held between the UN Secretariat and regional agency heads. The first four meetings (held between 1994 and early 2001) focused on preventing armed conflict and strengthening the ‘fabric of peace’ through global-regional co-operation. Subsequent to September 2001, the fifth high-level meeting with the UN Secretary-General (held in July 2003) reflected the changed security environment, focusing this time on terrorism.

These first five meetings allowed for the development of a ‘framework for co-operation’, comprising modalities for conflict prevention and principles for peace building. Furthermore, some overall principles for cooperation were laid down, such as UN primacy in all crises, a flexible and pragmatic approach in responding to crises, a clear division of labour between the global and the regional bodies, and regular consultations between the organisations. However, these were still just principles, and no structure had yet been laid down for a permanent cooperation framework.

The latest meeting in July 2005 introduced procedural innovations of potentially far-reaching significance, as the Secretary-General called for a ‘common vision of a global architecture of peace and security with interlocking capacities based on the comparative advantages of the global and regional institutions’ (UN A/60/341-S/2005/567, 2005). The preparations for the Sixth High-Level Meeting were more thorough than before and encompassed six working groups (focusing on particular areas such as ‘Dialogue among Civilizations’, Civilian Protection, Terrorism and Human Rights, and ‘Lessons Learned from Field Experience’ in Peacekeeping, Disarmament and UN Reform). The working groups produced specific recommendations for action to strengthen the regional-global mechanism, which were adopted in their totality. The participants agreed to hold annual meetings, adjacent to their meetings with the Security Council, thus demonstrating their commitment to make the cooperation more permanent. Even more importantly, the regional leaders agreed to establish a Standing Committee to the UN, whereby one person from each

regional organisation will be designated as a permanent representative to the UN. The Committee will meet between high-level meetings in order to oversee the continuation of the working groups and streamline the process of strengthening the operational partnership (UN A/60/341-S/2005/567, 2005).

Meetings between regional organisations and the UN Security Council

In addition to the high-level meetings between the Secretary General and the regional and other intergovernmental organizations, three meetings have been held between heads of regional organizations and the Security Council (the third one was held in October 2005). In April 2003 the Security Council, under Mexican presidency, met for the first time with regional agencies, with the objective to engender an 'interactive dialogue' between the Council and regional organizations. This marked a 'new stage' in international relations, since the situation then prevailing obliged the Council to identify courses of action that would strengthen international security. Under the theme 'The Security Council and Regional Organizations: Facing New Challenges to International Peace and Security', six organizations (AU, ECOWAS, EU, LAS, OSCE and OAS) attended.

A second meeting took place in July 2004 under Romanian presidency, this time with the aim of identifying new methods of co-operation between the UN and regional organizations and developing innovative approaches to conflict resolution and stabilization processes. This meeting was attended by seven international organizations (AU, CIS, EU, LAS, NATO, OSCE and ECOWAS) and a Presidential Statement was produced. The Council concluded that regular dialogue on specific issues between it and regional organizations would bring 'significant added value' to UN-regional cooperation for peace and security, based on 'complementarity and comparative advantage'

The most recent meeting took place in October 2005, again under Romanian presidency. It endorsed a strengthened UN cooperation with regional organizations, supported the conclusions of the last Sixth Level Meeting between the UN Secretary-General and the Regional and Other Intergovernmental Organizations, and it emerged

with a Security Council Resolution on this issue, requesting further cooperation between the UN and regional organizations, consistent with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The adopted resolution also asked for the strengthening of regional organizations' capacity, especially in Africa.

ACP and EU Representation in the UN-ROs cooperation

The purpose of this section is to examine and analyse the current and potential roles and representation of the ACP and the EU in collaborating with the UN to develop a global-regional security mechanism. It must be acknowledged that each of these agencies is dynamic and in the process of (re-)defining its roles and divisions of labour within the global changing global context. It is our hope that the current analysis may prove useful in reflecting upon the current and future mandates and divisions of labour of these organisations.

In the development of a global-regional security mechanism, the EU is already an active partner with the UN and is currently represented by 3 persons: one each on behalf of the European Commission, the European Council, and the Presidency of the EU. To date, the ACP Group as such is not currently participating, nor has it been formally considered for partnership within the framework of collaboration in peace and security between the UN and regional organisations. However, within the domain of the ACP Group's geographical coverage, other organisations are attending the meetings. The participating regional organisations include the African Union (AU), SADC, ECOWAS, IGAD, ECCAS, Pacific Island Forum (PIF), CARICOM and OAS, while some participating trans-national organisations include ACP member states, such as the Commonwealth Secretariat, OIC (Organisation of Islamic Conference), IOF (Francophonie), and CPLP (community of Portuguese-speaking Countries).

From the perspective of the UN, the basis of its formal cooperation with regional organisations in peace and security is Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which puts forward the link between regions and security, stating:

Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

The UN has frequently acknowledged chapter VIII in its documents relating to UN cooperation with regional and other intergovernmental organisations (in the High-Level Panel Report⁹, in the SG's Report, *In Larger Freedom*¹⁰, in the High-Level Meetings, in the World Summit of last September¹¹ and in the Security Council Meetings¹²). While Chapter VIII condones collaboration with 'regional arrangements', the UN Charter does not define 'region', its framers having refrained from using any concept that might prove too self-restrictive. The conceptual notion of 'regional arrangement' advanced in San Francisco for Chapter VIII purposes was of,

organisations of a permanent nature, a grouping in a given geographical area several countries which, by reason of their proximity, community of interests or cultural, linguistic, historical or spiritual affinities make themselves jointly responsible for the peaceful settlement of any disputes which may arise.

In practice, when initiating the process of forming a regional-global security mechanism, the UN SG has simply extended invitations to those organisations with which the UN had previously experienced close operational relationships in the area of peace and security and accepted any regional agency that expressed interest in cooperating. As interest grew, space and other constraints made it necessary for the UN to restrict participation. Thus, the question arose as to which criteria should be applied in deciding which organisations should be accepted into the cooperation (and thus allowed to attend the annual meetings).

⁹ The ability of the Security Council to become more proactive in preventing and responding to threats will be strengthened by making fuller and more productive use of the Chapter VIII provisions of the Charter of the United Nations than has hitherto been the case. *A More Secure World: Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, A/59/565, 29 November 2004, para 270

¹⁰ *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*, Report of the Secretary-General, 21 March 2005, A/60/2005, paras. 21, 112.

¹¹ *2005 World Summit Outcome*, A/RES/60/1, 20 September 2005, paras. 93, 170.

¹² The Security Council, at its third meeting with regional and other intergovernmental organizations in October 2005 expressed its determination "to take appropriate steps to the further development of cooperation between the regional and sub-regional organizations in maintaining international peace and security consistent with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter", S/RES/1631, 17 October 2009, operative para. 1.

One attempt to restrict potential partners was the legal manoeuvre of seeking a formal definition for the term ‘regional arrangement or agency’ used in Chapter VIII. In the absence of any such clear formal definition in the Charter, Bruno Simma drew upon the conceptual definition put forth in San Francisco to propose a formal definition. He proposes that a regional arrangement or agency, for the purpose of Chapter VIII, is:

A union of states or an international organisation, based upon a collective treaty or a constitution and consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, whose primary task is the maintenance of peace and security under the control and within the framework of the United Nations.

However, this definition, when applied in practice, has also been successfully contested.¹³ In practice, any formal acceptance of each one for the purposes of Chapter VIII requires a specific decision by the UN. The only explicit criterion the General Assembly gives for granting observer status is that the applicant be an intergovernmental organisation¹⁴, though there are many exceptions to this. In examining its current array of partners, a range of factors can be discerned as relevant to the admittance of an organisation to the High-Level meetings: General Assembly permanent observer status, Secretariat invitations, Security Council appellation and self-proclamation. However, none of these has proven to be a necessary or sufficient condition.

Permanent observers to the UN have access to all open meetings of the UN organs, including the SC. There are, at present, 49 organisations with such observer status (See Annex I), of which the ACP Group is one. Sixteen of these are regional or sub-regional, but not all have security functions. However, as stated earlier, this is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for acceptance by the UN as a regional organisation.

¹³ The CPLP in 2003 claimed its right to an invitation to the 5th HLM, and this trans-national organisation was henceforth invited.

¹⁴ The many exceptions to this rule include: Palestine, Inter Parliamentary Union, Latin American Parliament and Red Cross/Crescent Federation, amongst others.

The Security Council has built its own history of dealings with regional agencies and other organisations. It has referred to organisations explicitly as ‘regional agencies’ under Chapter VIII; it has referred to specified agencies for a peace and security partnership or for enforcement under Chapter VII; and it has invited a number of organisations to attend its open meetings. Finally, two organisations (OAS and OSCE) have proclaimed themselves to be a ‘regional agency’ or ‘regional arrangement’ for the purposes of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, while a third (LAS) declared that it is operating under Chapter VIII.

In discerning potential *new* partners in this process, the Secretariat takes into account the following factors:

- A) Mandate: The new organisation should have a mandate and the proper mechanisms to act in the area of peace and security;
- B) De facto Cooperation: the new organisation is already cooperating with the UN in peace and security or showing the will to do so directly.
- C) Geographical representation: When deciding if a new organisation should be invited to join the high-level meetings, one must recognize that the new organisation can better represent its states than the ones who are already partners. This can happen, for example, when there is a gap in a region (lacking a proper structure to represent it) or when not all states are represented by organizations attending.

These are informal criteria that remain politically contentious. In the next section, each of the above factors will be examined with regard to the ACP Group and the EU.

According to the definition used in this paper, the ACP Group clearly exemplifies a process of formalized cooperation/integration between states. (Similarly, the Cotonou Agreement formalizes cooperation/integration between the ACP and EU member states.) The mandate of the ACP Group was first set out in 1975 by the Georgetown Agreement, the founding document of the ACP Group which defines the membership, institutions and functions of the ACP Group. Amongst the 15 objectives established by the Georgetown Agreement, two are in the area of peace and security:

- d) *Consolidate, strengthen and maintain peace and stability as a precondition for improving the well being of ACP peoples in a democratic and free environment;*
- n) *Contribute to strengthening regional mechanisms for the prevention, management and peaceful settlement of conflicts and by pursuing and developing cooperation between the ACP States and third States.*¹⁵

Thus, the ACP Group has a clear mandate in the area of peace and security, and the proposed mechanisms for execution appear to be ‘regional’. This could be interpreted as suggesting that the ACP Group is meant to be the political arm and the regional organisations to play the executive role. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the ACP Group has also been charged with ‘pursuing cooperation’ with parties other than the EU. Furthermore, the call for developing relations with other international groups, as well as improving its visibility and empowering its institutions, has been a constant theme at the ACP Summits of Heads of State since the ACP’s inception in 1975 and was repeated at the Heads of State Meeting in Mozambique in 2004.

This brings us to the criterion of the ‘*de facto*’ cooperation and the will of the organisation in question to engage in cooperation with the UN in peace and security matters. To date, the ACP Group has various cooperation agreements with a handful of international organisations, including various bodies of the UN, as displayed in Table 1.

TABLE 1: ACP GROUP RELATIONS WITH EU & NON-EU STATES / ORGANISATIONS / GROUPS¹⁶

Country/Organization/Group	Nature of Relationship
UNO	Observer status since 1981
UN Human Settlements Programme (UN Habitat)	Reciprocal Observer Status: 25 October 2004
UN Conference on Trade & Development (UNCTAD)	MoU.
UN Development Programme (UNDP)	MoU
UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)	MoU.
Secretariat: UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)	Cooperation Agreement.

¹⁵ The Georgetown Agreement, Brussels, 28 November 2003.

¹⁶ Adapted from Bradley, A. (2004)

Secretariat of the ECOWAS	Framework Agreement for Cooperation.
International Organisation for Migration	Reciprocal observer status
Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery	MoU.
World Customs Union (WCO)	Technical cooperation.
Organization for Economic Cooperation Development (OECD)	Technical cooperation.
World Bank	Technical cooperation.
WTO	Ad hoc observer status
G-90 Group	Alliance (not formalised).
Canada	Technical assistance for the organization of the 1 st Meeting of ACP Ministers of Culture.
France	Technical assistance in the field of culture.
ACP Regional Integration Organisations	Observer status
World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO)	Observer status 7 Aug 2003
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) International Labour Organisation (ILO) African Development Bank (ADB)	Requested the signing of a MoU – decision pending.

Despite these agreements, the main thrust of the ACP Group's activities currently lies in the operation of the Secretariat and the Committee of Ambassadors and their interface in the day-to-day operation of the ACP Group and its negotiations with the European Commission in its various forms (Bradley, 2004). Given the calls for expansion of its relations and activities with non-EU partners, as well as its permanent observer status at the UN, it would seem that the Group has an interest in developing an active partnership with the UN in the pursuit of its peace and security mandate.

Regarding geographical coverage, the ACP Group is not considered a traditional 'regional' organisation, since its membership encompasses more than one geographically continuous region. This is not *a priori* a limitation to be a partner for the UN in the unfolding cooperation with regional organisations, as reflected by the fact that organisations such as the CPLP, the Commonwealth and NATO, also trans-national in nature, have been invited and are attending the high-level meetings with the UN Secretary General. There is an overlap in coverage with organisations already attending, but that is already the case: Overlap exists between the AU and the other African regional organisations, between the OAS and CARICOM, as well as with the Commonwealth and CPLP, for example. Furthermore, this is also the case with EU representation, as there are three representatives (Council, Commission, Presidency) for the same geographical space.

If one considers potential efficacy as a criterion, both political weight and the possibility for practical implementation should be taken into consideration. It should be reflected here that the biggest political success for developing countries occurred when the ACP countries held together for negotiations in Doha. Furthermore, in political enforcement, the weight of the voice of the ACP Group, which represents 79 countries, is necessarily louder than that of any given smaller grouping, such as SADC or CARICOM. However, the ability to exercise this voice is dependent upon individual countries' recognition of this political benefit and would be greatly facilitated by a subsequent accord of mandate and executive powers to the ACP Group. As is largely current practice, it is rational for execution of the activities to be determined according to the activity and be implemented by the regional organisations or at country level, with the ACP Secretariat playing a coordinating role and facilitating collaboration in all-ACP projects.

In the case of the EU, as mentioned above, three organisations are participating that represent an identical geographical space: Council of the EU, Commission, Presidency of the EU. Ironically, EU officials have informally declared that the EU does not consider itself a Chapter VIII regional organisation. While it seems that parliamentarians would be best placed to liaise with and represent members of civil society, the European Parliament is not represented at the High Level meetings, in spite of the many calls for closer collaboration with civil society on peace and security issues, and on conflict prevention in particular. Therefore, possibilities for integration these voices in the process should be explored. Graham and Felicio (2005a and b) have argued that the Council of Europe, which comprises a larger geographical representation, considers itself a regional organisation, and has dispute settlement mechanisms, could be a more rational partner for the UN in this endeavour. However, the EU has demanded representation due to its desire to play an active political role in the area of peace and security.

Rather than putting the UN Secretariat in the position of having to sort out which organisations should participate and how they should be represented, it would seem most prudent for the regional and trans-national organisations to clarify amongst themselves a division of labour and system of representation that would be most

effective in insuring peace and security. Therefore, the task at hand would appear to be to make decisions regarding the division of labour between these organisations and, consequently, which roles they will assume in partnerships with the UN.

Conclusion

Recommendations for consideration by the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly

The Cotonou Agreement declares that:

Dialogue and cooperation strategies will address peace-building policies and conflict prevention. The partnership will focus in particular on regional initiatives and the strengthening of local capacities. (Cotonou Agreement)

In accordance with this mandate, parliamentarians can:

Through the provision of funding:

1. Promote capacity development of regional organisations to fulfil their mandates in peace and security and to collaborate with parliamentarians and non-state actors.
2. Promote research and training in preventing conflict through addressing the root causes of conflict, and building (cultures of) peace and a 'partnership of civilizations' by promoting mechanisms 'for bridging dividing lines among different segments of society' (Cotonou Agreement).

Through active participation:

3. Participate in trainings for conflict prevention, such as on communication strategies to foster peace and security.
4. Contribute to building a 'partnership of civilizations involving all stakeholders – governments, intergovernmental organizations and civil society – to foster diversity and overcome divisiveness'
5. Engage non-state actors and facilitate their participation in conflict-prevention activities.

Through political dialogue:

6. Support and ensure the inclusion of programs to promote conflict prevention and human security in the RIPs and NIPs.
7. Discuss (actual and potential) ACP and EU participation in the global-regional security mechanism, as well as possibilities for collaboration.

8. Promote awareness and facilitate coordination and consultation between national governments, NSAs, ROs (including ACP), the UN and parliamentarians.

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ANNEX I: Linking Peace, Security and Regional Cooperation within the ACP-EU Cooperation

A. Cotonou Agreement

Part I: General Provisions / Chapter 1: Objectives and Principles / Article 1: Objectives of the partnership:

The Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the ACP States, of the other part, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties" hereby conclude this Agreement in order to promote and expedite the economic, cultural and social development of the ACP States, *with a view to contributing to peace and security* and to promoting a stable and democratic political environment.

Title II: The Political Dimension

Article 8: Political Dialogue

2. The objective of this dialogue shall be to exchange information, to foster mutual understanding, and to facilitate the establishment of agreed priorities and shared agendas, in particular by recognising existing links between the different aspects of the relations between the Parties and the various areas of cooperation as laid down in this Agreement. The dialogue shall facilitate consultations between the Parties *within international fora*. The objectives of the dialogue shall also include preventing situations arising in which one Party might deem it necessary to have recourse to the non-execution clause.

3. The dialogue shall cover all the aims and objectives laid down in this Agreement as well as all questions of common, general, *regional or sub-regional interest*. Through dialogue, the Parties shall *contribute to peace, security and stability and promote a stable and democratic political environment*. It shall encompass cooperation strategies as well as global and sectoral policies, including environment, gender, migration and questions related to the cultural heritage.

5. Broadly based policies to *promote peace and to prevent, manage and resolve violent conflicts* shall play a prominent role in this dialogue, as shall the need to take full account of the objective of peace and democratic stability in the definition of priority areas of cooperation.

6. The dialogue shall be conducted in a flexible manner. Dialogue shall be formal or informal according to the need, and conducted within and outside the institutional framework, in the appropriate format, and at the appropriate level including *regional, sub-regional* or national level.

7. *Regional and sub-regional organisations* as well as representatives of civil society organisations shall be associated with this dialogue.

Article 11: Peace-building policies, conflict prevention and resolution

1. The Parties shall pursue an *active, comprehensive and integrated policy of peace-building and conflict prevention and resolution* within the framework of the

Partnership. This policy shall be based on the principle of ownership. It shall in particular focus on *building regional, sub-regional and national capacities, and on preventing violent conflicts at an early stage by addressing their root-causes* in a targeted manner, and with an adequate combination of all available instruments.

2. The activities in the field of *peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution* shall in particular include support for balancing political, economic, social and cultural opportunities among all segments of society, for strengthening the democratic legitimacy and effectiveness of governance, *for establishing effective mechanisms for the peaceful conciliation of group interests, for bridging dividing lines among different segments of society as well as support for an active and organised civil society.*

Part 3: Cooperation Strategies / Title I: Development Strategies / Chapter 2: Areas of Support / Section 3: Regional Cooperation and Integration / Article 30: Regional Cooperation

3. Cooperation shall help promote and develop a *regional* political dialogue in areas of *conflict prevention and resolution*; human rights and democratisation; exchange, networking, and promotion of *mobility between the different actors of development*, in particular in *civil society*.

B. ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly: Committee on Political Affairs

Report on Post-conflict rehabilitation in ACP countries [ACP-EU 3754/B/05/déf. 02.03.2005] Explanatory Statement Section IV: Political reconstruction and national reconciliation

‘Special attention should be given to *education for a culture of peace*, including a nation-wide awareness-raising campaign to *help the various groups in the population to live together again in peace; training* for political and administrative leaders and economic agents in the peaceful settlement of disputes and the introduction of the notions of democracy, human rights and education for peace in school curricula.’

Report on conflict prevention and resolution and the establishment of a lasting peace [ACP-EU 3601/04/fin]

In the Motion for a Resolution:

...

I. whereas it is *preferable to prevent* the outbreak of conflict, rather than to intervene once it has broken out, by addressing its deep-rooted causes, but whereas the EU has not yet put in place a genuine prevention policy which *addresses the root causes* of the conflicts before they break out,

...

T. having regard to the importance and the role of *regional African organisations* in the prevention and resolution of conflicts,

...

1. [The ACP-EU JPA] calls for *conflict prevention* and structural stability to constitute key objectives of EU development policy and takes the view that the

EU's conflict prevention policy must *address the structural causes of conflicts* connected with poverty, including the unequal distribution of wealth, social injustice, human rights violations, the oppression of minorities and religions discrimination;

...

2. Is convinced of the essential role of both *international* (AU, EU, UN) and *regional cooperation in conflict prevention and resolution and peacekeeping* and expresses its concern at the continuous reduction in the EU's development cooperation budget;

...

13. Calls on the European Commission and on the Member States to create a *budget for peace and conflict prevention* in Africa which must not be charged to the European Development Fund; takes the view that this budget could be managed in conjunction with the African Union and *regional organisations in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific*, and that its scope should include peacekeeping operations;

...

26. Hopes that a genuine *culture of peace and democracy* may be developed through the institutions supported by the EU and the ACP States;

...

ANNEX II: Examples of Communicators promoting violent conflict or peace

A. Radio journalists in Rwanda (Conflict)

‘One hundred thousand young men must be recruited rapidly. They should all stand up so that we kill the Inkotanyi and exterminate them, all the easier that...the reason will exterminate them is that they belong to one ethnic group. Look at the person’s height and his physical appearance. Just look at his small nose and then break it.’
From RTLM Tape No. 0134 / Broadcast dates: 4 – 5/6/94

‘Unfortunately the Inyenzi-Inkotanyi do not want life to continue, they want everything in this country to come to a standstill, schools, health centers, hospitals, everything. In fact, as my colleague GAHIGI was saying, they are people called nihilists, they are very bad people. They are a species [a race, an ethnic group?] of bad people, I do not know how God will help us exterminate them. This is why we should stand up ourselves and exterminate those bad people, this species [a race, an ethnic group?] of bad people, the species [race?] called Inkotanyi. There is...I do not want people to misunderstand this and say that I mean Tutsis. No, I am talking about a species [a race?] called Inkotanyi; they are bad people. These people should perish because there is no alternative.’ *From RTLM K7 Tape no. 0215 / Broadcast date: 2/7/94.*

‘...What is even more distressing is that... I have already told you this, we have often said so ...the methods of execution used by the Inyenzi-Inkotanyi ...they kill in a cruel manner ...they mutilate the body ...and remove certain organs such as the heart, the liver and the stomach. This is what I was telling you yesterday, that the Inyenzi-Inkotanyi could be eating human flesh ...no, there is no doubt about that anyway, since ...what do they do with all the organs they remove from the bodies? They do eat human flesh ...the Inyenzi-Inkotanyi eat human beings ... so much so that we have little hope of finding any remains ...’ (*Valérie Bemeriki, RTLM, 14 June 1994*)

‘So, where did all the Inkotanyi who used to telephone me go, eh? They must have been exterminated.... Let us sing: “Come, let us rejoice: the Inkotanyi have been exterminate! Come dear friends, let us rejoice, the Good Lord is just”. The Good Lord is really just, these evil doers, these terrorists, these people with suicidal tendencies will end up being exterminated. When I remember the number of corpses that I saw lying around in Nyamirambo yesterday alone; they had come to defend their Major who had just been killed. Some Inkotanyi also went to lock themselves up in the house of Mathias. They stayed there and could not find a way to get out, and now they are dying of hunger and some have been burnt. However, Inkotanyi are so wicked that even after one of them has been burnt and looks like a charred body, he will still try to take position behind his gun and shoot in all directions and afterwards he will treat himself, I don’t know with what medicine. Many of them had been burnt, but they still managed to pull on the trigger with their feet and shoot. I do not know how they are created. I do not know. When you look at them, you wonder what kind of people they are. In any case, let us simply stand firm and exterminate them, so that our children and grandchildren do not hear that word “Inkotanyi” ever again.’
(Kantano Habimana, RTLM, 2 July 1994)

B. Parliamentarian in Brussels (Conflict)

Use of the concept 'ethnic cleansing' in a speech at a commemoration for victims of the Srebrenica genocide (spring 2005)

C. International Community in Brussels (Peace)

An exchange between 2 gentlemen at a cocktail party in Brussels (spring 2005):

Mr. XY: But you are European?

Mr. AB: No, indeed like you, I am African.

Mr. XY: (*looking surprised*) Where are you from?

Mr. AB: (*smiling*) Guess!

Mr. XY: (*pause*) South Africa?

Mr. AB: Yes, I am South African.

Mr. XY: Oh, there have been many problems between you white South Africans and us.

Mr. AB: I think it is very important that we learn from, and never forget, the mistakes that were made in the past. However, I see myself first and foremost as a South African, not a white South African.