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The EU's Preferences for Multilateralism; A SWOT Analysis of EU/UN Relations

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Introduction

This paper aims to present an overview of the EU-UN relations and map the actual and possible EU-UN relationships and their implications for global governance. First, a general overview is presented of how the EU and the UN interact (empirical evidence). Secondly, a more detailed overview is given in one field of interaction: peace and security. Thirdly, a SWOT analysis is presented that highlights the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats that will influence how EU/UN relations will develop in the future.

Finally, some ideas will be presented on how EU/UN relations can develop in the future. It will be argued that, all along the last decades, there has been a gradual convergence of aims and policies between these two actors. Even though EU's foreign policy still lacks of character and of a clear institutional asset; even though the UN is often perceived as a weak and overburden actor, the truth is that their cooperation is growing in efficacy and dimension. Peace and security is proving to be the field in which the declarations of intent coming from the EU and UN are developing into concrete actions.

The new security concept adopted by the UN, encompassing development, human rights and security in a triangular relationship, is converging with EU's security approach and places the organisation as a preferred partner for the UN in this most visible area of cooperation.

The paper stresses out that despite their structural deficiencies/weaknesses, the threats provided by national interests and competitions, the opportunities and the strengths of such cooperation will prove to be stronger in the future.

1. The Evolution of EU-UN Relations

Both the UN and the EU have gone through an evolution themselves. In the next paragraph it will be briefly described the evolution of their interaction as it was framed in the two development stories of the institutions.

1.1. Evolution of the UN

The Treaty establishing the United Nations (1947) vividly reflects the distribution of power that emerged in the post World War international community. Nevertheless, despite its Westphalian approach, the Charter acknowledges the existent potential of

regional realities. As a matter of fact article 23 of the Charter stipulates that non permanent Members of the Security Council are elected "*due regard being specially paid ….. also to equitable geographical distribution*". Chapter VIII on "Regional Arrangements" foresees a substantial role for regional organisations in promoting peace and security. In particular, art. 52 states that the Security Council shall encourage the creation of pacific settlements through regional agencies or agreements. Furthermore, article 53 grants the Security Council the possibility to *"utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority*".

During the Cold War period, the United Nations froze under the sword of a bloc to bloc contraposition and Chapter VIII laid unused. To some extent, it was in the economic field that the UN proved to give a special role to regional arrangements in the world (Ténier, 2005); five regional commissions were created: the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), and the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA). Some commissions proved to have prominent roles in enhancing first generation of regional cooperation[1] and fostering development, especially CEPALC and CEA. On the other hand, the Economic Commission for Europe had the advantage of offering a global vision of a (then) divided Europe (Ténier, 2005).

With the collapse of the soviet bloc and the consequent end of the US/USSR duopoly, the United Nations went through a new phase. The world faced new realities as intra-states/ small scale conflicts replaced the 'classic' concept of inter-state wars. The vacuum left by the dissolved balance of powers set ancient ethnic rivalries and unsolved situations free to explode. Thus, the UN faced a new period of growing interventions, mainly in the field of peacekeeping.

Rising in the heart of Europe and from the ashes of a collapsed communist regime, the conflicts in the Ex Yugoslavia showed the weakness of existing mechanisms for conflict management and highlighted the potential role that regional organisations could play in promoting/enforcing peace in partnership with the UN. As a consequence, the UN acknowledged the importance of cooperating with regional agencies such as the OSCE, NATO, and the EU. In 1992 the Secretary General Butrus Butrus Gali drafted the "Agenda for Peace" in which he pointed out the strategic interest of having a 'division of labour' between the UN and the various regional actors.[2] (Gali.1992).

The atrocity committed in Rwanda in 1994, showed furthermore the urgency of involving regional organisations or regional agreements within each continent in partnership with the UN. The supplement to the "Agenda for Peace", issued in 1995, outlined the form of cooperation to foresee between the UN and Regional Organisations: consultation, diplomatic support, operational support, co-deployment and joint operations. Acting in the recognition of the potential for greater involvement

[1] See par 1.2

[2] '…and should the Security Council choose specifically to authorize a regional arrangement or organisation to take the lead in addressing a crisis within its region, it could serve to lend the weight of the United Nations to the validity of the regional effort." (A/47/277-S/24111, paras 63-65). Agenda for Peace, 1992

of regional agencies in the pursuit of international security, the UN has held a series of meetings since the mid-1990s designed to develop a strategic partnership between the UN and regional agencies. This has taken two forms: a series of high-level meetings of the UN Secretary-General and UN specialised agencies with regional organisations, and three general meetings between the Security Council and regional organisations[3].

These six High-level Meetings (HLM) convened by the UN Secretary-General have resulted in a series of broad guidelines for operational measures in conflict prevention and peace-building. In recent years, the work surrounding the 5th HLM (July 2003) and 6th HLM (July 2005) has intensified. The latest meeting in July 2005 introduced procedural innovations of potentially far-reaching significance, as the Secretary-General called for a 'common vision of a global architecture of peace and security with interlocking capacities based on the comparative advantages of the global and regional institutions'[4].

Furthermore, the Security Council has undertaken initiatives in strengthening the partnership in the past few years. It has now held three meetings with regional and other organisations (April 2003; July 2004; October 2005), the most recent of which adopted a Council resolution on the UN- regional organisation (UN-RO) relationship for the first time. The Council expressed its determination to take appropriate steps to further the development of cooperation with regional and sub-regional organisations in maintaining international peace and security consistent with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. It stressed the importance for the UN of developing the ability of regional and sub-regional organisations in pacific settlement and also their ability to deploy peacekeeping forces in support of UN operations or other Security Council-mandated operations. In addition the Council invited the Secretary-General to submit a report on the opportunities and challenges facing the cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations in maintaining international peace and security[5].

This new focus on a UN-RO partnership has been given some prominence by the high-level process leading up to the World Summit of September 2005. The 2004 UN High-Level Panel noted the important role that regional organisations had to play in the area of international peace and security and called for more formalized agreements between them and the UN. In his report 'In Larger Freedom' of March 2005, the Secretary-General declared his intention to conclude a series of memoranda of understanding with partner organisations. These developments were noted and endorsed by the World Summit.

This year, and reflecting the developments of the 6th High-level Meeting, the 7th of these meetings is being held back-to-back with a 4th Security Council Meeting, where the Secretary-General is presenting his report "A Regional-Global Security

[3] For more information on the development of the high-level meetings' process, see Graham and Felício, Regional Security and Global Governance: A Study of Interaction between Regional Agencies and the UN Security Council with a Proposal for a Regional-Global Security Mechanism, VUB Press, 2006.
[4] For the full document please see A/60/341-S/2005/567, 2005.
[5] For the full resolution, please see S/RES/1631 (2005), 17 October 2005.

Partnership: Challenges and Opportunities" pursuant to Resolution 1631[6], advancing eight recommendations for the development of the partnership, which include clarification of roles, agreement on guidelines for UN-regional cooperation and formalisation of the partnerships with the UN through conclusion of formal agreements and a general statement of principles.

Another significant development is that the 2006 annual report of the UN Secretary-General for the first time has a section on 'cooperating with regional organisations. Already in the introduction to that report, the Secretary-General notes that 'Nation-States are no longer the role players in international relations' (p. 2). In the section on regional organisations it is emphasised that a new vision of global security is needed that "draws upon the resources and legitimacy of effective regional and global institutions that are both flexible and responsive to the complex challenges of today's world" (p. 39).

These latest developments are a reflection of a truly growing partnership developing between the UN and regional and other intergovernmental organisations. At the same time, the European Union has been going through its own developments, towards multilateralism and the reinforcement of the partnership with the UN, enhancing its capacity for action in security.

1.2. The EU Regional Integration - its Evolutions - From First to Third Generation Regional Integration

On the path towards building a coherent classification of the complex phenomenon comprised under the name of 'regionalism', the academic literature has paid attention to two dimensions: the chronological one and the qualitative one. From a purely chronological perspective, part of the academic literature Schultz, Söderbaum and Öjendal (2001) distinguishes two waves of regionalism, taking into account only the regional agreements developed world-wide after the end of WWII, while other authors Telò (2001) see three distinct periods of regionalism, by including also in their calculations the experiments carried out between the two World Wars. In 2005, Van Langenhove and Costea pointed out that in order to better grasp the complexity of regionalism one could speak of 'generations' rather than 'waves' This helps underlining the coexistence of several kinds of regional agreements different in quality/content, while meanwhile also acknowledging that some forms of regionalism build upon previous ones. As such, it is possible to summarize the evolution of the EU's foreign policy identity in three 'generations' of regional integration development, showing how the processes of regional integration and foreign policy identity construction are mutually influential and how the latest evolution of EU integration can explain the new role the EU is willing to play within the UN.

The 'first generation' of regionalism is based upon the idea of a linear process of economic integration involving the combination of separate (national) economies into larger economic regions. This process begins with a free trade area and moves through successive stages of integration (customs union, common market) until it reaches the point of an economic union (Viner 1950, Swan 2000).The classical

[6] For the full report, please see A/61/204-S/2006/590.

example of this linear evolution of economic integration is offered by the evolution of Western Europe after WWII: the creation of the European Economic Community with the Treaty of Rome in 1957 removing the tariffs and quotas on intra-EEC trade, the achievement of a Customs Union in 1968 with the establishment of a common external tariff (CET), the creation of a Single European Market in the mid-1980s eliminating the barriers still existing to trade and the establishment of the 'four freedoms' of circulation (persons, goods, services and capital).

The development of the political dimension of integration is the main characteristic of 'second generation' regionalism, which coincides with what is generally referred to as 'new regionalism': 'New Regionalism' is based on the idea that one cannot isolate trade and economy from the rest of society: integration can also imply *non-economic matters* such as justice, security, culture. The emergence of the 'New Regionalism' can be historically related to a series of transformations of the world such as the end of the bipolarity, the relative decline of American hegemony, the affirmation of globalization and the changed attitudes towards (neo-liberal) economic development and political systems in developing countries as well as in the post-communist countries"(Schultz, Söderbaum and Öjendal, 2001). Second generation regionalism is more *extroverted* than the first generation. Due to globalisation, the border between purely internal and external policies is getting extremely blurred The EU is considered as the most developed example of second generation regionalism. The development of distinctive characteristics of EC/EU's foreign policy identity has considerably evolved in the context of new regionalism. Building on the European Political Cooperation launched at the end of the 1970s, the EC created with the Treaty of Maastricht a political union comprising a Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar which aspires to give the Union a strong voice in world affairs, which has been gradually consolidated by the following treaties[7]. In parallel with this institution-building, the EU developed ambitions that its foreign policy identity would be acknowledged around the concept of 'global actor' (Breherton and Vogler, 1999). The EU's external policies cover a wide array of non-military areas: economy, development aid, regional cooperation, allowing Piening (1997) to speak of a '*global Europe*' while referring to "the EU's external role as 'partner, trader, competitor, benefactor, investor and paradigm for countries and emerging regional groupings throughout the world" First, trade has developed from the inception of the European Communities as their main instrument of external actorness. Second, the EU is perceived as an important global actor in the fields of development cooperation and humanitarian aid. Third, another important feature of EU foreign policy identity stems from its actions as a '*democracy promoter'* and the use of political conditionality as a foreign policy 'weapon' for stabilizing and securing the near abroad.

At present, thinking of a 'third generation' regional integration is more of a foresight exercise, a possible scenario of the next step regional integration might take in time considering the current indications. Third generation regional integration could have at least three main characteristics, which would distinguish it from the previous generations. First, in third generation integration, the institutional environment for

[7] For a history of European foreign policy co-operation see Regelsberger, E. et al., *Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond*, London: Lynne Rienner, 1997; Nuttall, S., *European Foreign policy*, Oxford, Oxford UP, 2000.

dealing with 'out of area' consequences of regional policies would become fully consolidated. Secondly, regions would become more proactive engaging in inter-regional arrangements and agreements going beyond purely trade issues, with a multidimensional character, and having the potential to affect more relations at the global level. Finally, in 3° generation regional integration, regions would become more actively engaged at the U.N In other words, while first generation regional integration was of an 'introverted' and protectionist nature, exclusively focusing on the creation of economic benefits for its members, second generation brought in a more extroverted form of regionalism, opening integration to new domains although the focus is still mainly on the consolidation of internal political integration, and, finally, third generation would produce the most extroverted level of regionalism, with a clear focus on *external projection of the region* and *inter-regionalism*. The emphasis is rather on the promotion of the region's identity in *global governance* and *in countries and geographical regions outside its own continent*. Although 'third generation' regionalism is still a largely normative idea, the European Union could be considered as a prototype presenting some of the characteristics of a future 'third generation' regionalism that is gradually taking shape along some dimensions having an important impact on the EU foreign policy identity. Among them of high relevance would be the role of regions as global actors at the U.N.

1.3. EU/UN Interactions

1.3.1 Institutional Aspects

Since the beginning of the European integration process multilateralism has been acknowledged as one defining character of European institutions and Member states. In the preamble to the Treaty of Rome (1957), the commitment to the UN Charter and international multilateralism is clearly affirmed[8]. The development of the European Community (EC) through the different generations of integration has influenced the impact of this new actor in the international arena. The intricacy of the present institutional set up has often made evident the difficulty of having a coherent foreign policy.

On the one hand, in areas in which the European Community has the exclusive competency such as Trade and Agriculture policies, the European Commission has been the legitimate voice speaking in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). On the other hand, since the beginning of political cooperation in areas other than trade and agriculture, the nature of the representation of the EC in the international institutions has proven to be more complex. In a joint declaration in December 1973, the European foreign ministers mentioned the need for a common stand of the EC in international institutions and such declaration became a binding rule within the Single European Act in 1987 (Ojanen, 2006).

[8]" …Intending to confirm the solidarity which binds Europe and the overseas countries and desiring to ensure the development of their prosperity, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations"

As far as the United Nations are concerned, while all EU Member States are members of the UN in their own right, in 1974 the European Community was granted observer status in the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC); since then it is represented by the European Commission. With the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, and the creation of a Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) the obligation to cooperate for common stands was reinforced through article 19 (ex art J.9)[9]. The Treaty of Maastricht doesn't appoint one institution to represent the EU in the UN; therefore the Union is represented by the State holding the six months European Presidency and Member States have to coordinate their positions beforehand.

The division of roles between the European Commission- representing the European Community in areas of exclusive competency - and the European Presidency - speaking for the European Union in matters related to the CFSP - has often created confusion as to "who is speaking for Europe". The situation is even more complex in the Security Council, where convincing the two Security Council permanent Members (UK, and France) to inform the other Member states and agree on common position, was very hard until the beginning of the 1990's (Farrell, 2006).

In recent years, some studies shave been carried out on the EU coherence within the UN Institutions. Paul Luiff (2003) reported that in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) there has been a convergence in voting among the Members States[10] and that before the 2004 enlargement, candidate countries started aligning themselves to the other Members states position. Jorgensen & Laatikainen (2004) add that, despite the 2003 European split related to the Iraq war, the trend of convergence in voting has continued. It seems that the EU has become an actor within the UNGA.

1.3.2. The EU Support to the UN

The EU's commitment to the United Nations has been emphasised repeatedly in recent years; now more than ever the European leaders are promoting valuable

[9] "Member States shall coordinate their action in international organisations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such fora.
In international organisations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the common positions. 2) Without prejudice to paragraph 1 and Article 14(3), Member States represented in international organisations or international conferences where not all the Member States participate shall keep the latter informed of any matter of common interest. Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter. "

[10] 85% convergence in 1999 (See Luiff 2003)

partnership with the UN and supporting its mandate. In this respect, the year 2003 could be seen as turning point for the UN and the EU's CFSP.

The military intervention in Iraq weakened the UN Security Council in its role as legitimate leader for peace and security in the world. Furthermore, the attacks against UN civilian personnel in Iraq shocked the UN Secretariat and brought into question its image as 'neutral actor'. On the EU' side, the split over the Iraq war called for a deep re-thinking over of the CFSP and the capability of the EU to prove itself as strong international actor. Both organisations faced a crisis that could be generally inserted into a broader crisis of multilateralism as such. Consequently, the EU's new emphasis in supporting the UN could be explained as a double attempt to revitalise both multilateralism and its own actorness. (Jorgensen & Laatikainen, 2004)

In September 2003 the European Commission drafted the 'CFSP manifesto': "*The European Union and the Untied Nations: The choice of multilateralism*". Starting with the affirmation: "*The European Union's commitment to multilateralism is a defining principle of its external policy*", the document provides an overview on the EU current interactions within the UN and the future steps that should be taken in order to reinforce the UN and its role as a universal institution. The document underlines two facts of the EU's contribution to the effectiveness of multilateral legal instruments. First, the EU's is seen as a "*front-runner*" in developing and implementing multilateral instruments and commitments. Second, the EU can support the capacity of other countries to implement their multilateral commitments effectively"[11]. Moreover the communication affirms the necessity to develop the partnership between the EU and the UN on areas other than development, in order to enhance co-operation in peace and security.

Few months after, the EU published its very first European Security Strategy: "*A Secure Europe in a better world*". The Strategy highlights the current threats challenging the international community and presents the cooperation with the UN as a defining principle of the EU foreign policy in responding to them.

On the UN side, UN Secretary General Koffi Annan, strongly called for a reform of the UN, its institutions and its administration. The High-Level Panel report to the Secretary-General '*A more effective United Nations for the twenty-first century*'[12], comprising a several sets of proposals, has been discussed at the September 2005 World Summit. The Summit has proved to be an important occasion for confrontation and debate. Some important reforms have been approved -among them the creation of a Peace Keeping Commission and the set up of a new Human Rights Council- while other steps such as the reform of the Security Council and of the Secretariat proved to be highly controversial. Moreover, the Summit took up the idea of a stronger relationship between the UN and regional and subregional organisations pursuant to Chapter VIII of the Charter**.**

[11], European Commission, "Communication from the Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament. The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism", COM(2003) 526 final, (Brussels, 9th of September 2003):5.

[12] Presented in December 2005

The EU supported strongly the UN attempt to reform, and pushed passionately for the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission. Nevertheless, the EU suffered a paralysis over the modification of the Security Council and proved to be unable to solve the enigma of how to enhance its efficiency (Smith & Laitikainen, 2006). This internal opposition to an enlarged Security Council (more permanent members or a single EU seat) deprived de facto every attempt to find a compromise.

2. EU/UN Cooperation in the Field of Peace and Security

As the EU and the UN grow closer, security seems to be the most visible dimension of their cooperation and should be analysed further, the EU having proved its special nature in this context. Indeed, the European Union has become to resemble the UN while it has partly distinguished itself above its member states as an international actor, more influential than many nations (Ojanen, 2006).

The EU's *sui generis* nature and the 'special partnership' with the UN require for a different analysis of its role in the cooperation process.

First, we will analyse to what extent the EU is different from other UN partners. Furthermore, we will consider its nature and role in the UN - regional organisations' cooperation process, using an organic approach based on the UN Charter. Additionally, we will balance this formal approach with a functional analysis of the institutional and operational 'special partnership', in order to find its strengths and opportunities.

2.1. The Nature of the EU in the UN-RO Partnership: an Organic Approach

As the UN's relationship with regional organisations develops, the complexities inherent to this partnership become clearer, with the organizations growing in number and expanding in nature and becoming more and more disconnected from the principles of the process itself, deriving from Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (see part 1.1). According to Graham and Felício, regional organisations are those that 'have operational focus on a region and whose membership equates totally or near-totally with the region, with no external membership' (Graham and Felício, 2006, p.85-88).

However, the organizations participating in this partnership for peace and security are much more heterogeneous in nature, ranging from almost universal organisations (such as the Organization for Islamic Conference or the Commonwealth – who have memberships from every region in the world) to sub-regional organisations, smaller in their membership and geographical scope.

The growing complexities of the membership have demanded for greater clarity, and the Secretary-General itself has already suggested in his Report "*A Regional-Global Security Partnership: Challenges and Opportunities*"[13] that partner organisations identify themselves either as regional organisations acting under Chapter VIII or as

[13] For the full report, please see A/61/204-S/2006/590.

other intergovernmental organisations acting under other provisions of the Charter. The question now is to see where the EU fits in this mapping of UN partners and what consequences this can bring.

Graham and Felício (2006) argue that the EU is indeed not a regional agency or organisation according to Chapter VIII of the Charter, considering that its membership is smaller than the region of Europe and that it does not focus its activities solely in its region, acting mostly 'out-of-area'. The EU is developing its role, namely in security, outside of its regional borders and it aims to become a global actor. For its combined diplomatic skills and 'soft power' the EU is already generally welcomed around the world as potentially global in its actions. Declaring itself to be a Chapter VIII organisation would indeed limit EU's actions to its region and to this chapter. And indeed, EU might act in peacekeeping under chapter VI, enforcement under chapter VII (that being the case of Operation Artemis) and peace building under chapter IX. Furthermore, EU officials have stated, although not in official documents, that the EU is not and does not wish to be considered as a Chapter VIII regional agency[14].

The EU is not an organisation aimed at cooperation but at deeper integration, remaining as the most high profile model of supra-national integration of the contemporary age, a sui-generis actor operating above the state level but not yet as a single supranational entity (Graham and Felício, 2006). This N=1 nature of the EU and its aimed global actorness place the organisation in a different level of cooperation, parallel from the one of the regional organisations.

If we take it further, the EU is not even an international organisation. The EU is an integration process aimed at supranationality while international organisations are built for cooperation. Furthermore, in the absence of a founding constitutive document that accords it legal competence under public international law, the EU cannot, in legal terms be considered as an international organisation (Graham, Tavares and Felício, 2006).. The EU as such would have to wait for its Constitution to be accepted and enter into force, if ever.

At present, without the clarification of the roles of the organisations in the UN-regional organisations partnership, the distinction between being a regional agency under chapter VIII of the UN Charter or another type of grouping still carries little significance (Graham, 2004). The EU itself, as many other organizations, still favours a "pragmatic and flexible approach", putting the emphasis on the functional cooperation, and preferring to 'muddle through', and adapt to each situation.

Bringing clarity to the process would however lead to a division of the roles of the partners between actual Chapter VIII agencies, and other intergovernmental organisations. Ideally, while the regional organisations would have the responsibility to monitor their regions and report to the Security Council, the others, such as the EU, NATO or the OSCE would be called as advisers and requested to respond to crises in cases where the regional organisations would be constrained - by their limited capacities or lack of will or even danger of partiality (Graham and Felício, 2006, p.288-90).

[14] Statements by EC Officials in Brussels and Bruges-based seminars.

Although the EU is not formally a regional arrangement, in the sense of chapter VIII, it is the regional organisation that has gone the furthest in its relationship with the UN, and it is also the one that offers the most promising perspectives of cooperation at both the military and civilian levels. Its role is not to be diminished by formal constraints but to be clarified and better perceived.

2.2. Functional Approach: Operational Cooperation

The EU's own military crisis management capability and the desire to deploy it globally has been the most significant change in its international role in the recent years (Ojanen, 2006). The rapid increase in the number of EU's operations shows its desire to become a global independent actor in peace and security but also a partner for the UN.

In the past five years, the EU has begun to develop its operational capability, not only in Europe's region but also in 'out-of-area' operations. Accordingly, the UN has recognized the far-reaching potential of relying on a more active, capable and coherent EU as an operational partner committed to effective multilateralism (Graham and Felício, 2005).

Besides the formal cooperation declarations on conflict prevention and crisis management, de facto operational cooperation is growing. Contact between the two Secretariats on peacekeeping commenced with UN-Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) officials in May 2001, the EU Military Staff having identified this department as its UN partner while the EU Policy Unit identified UN-Department of Political Affairs (DPA). Joint task forces have been established to coordinate interaction over police and military missions, and foster training. Furthermore, the UN Secretary-General remains in constant contact with the EU High Representative for CFSP.

In 2003 the first ESDP operations were created, all linked to the UN, either by mandate or actual deployment. The first ESDP mission was the EU Police Mission in Bosnia, testing EU-UN relationship, through EU's take-over of the UN International Police Task Force, information-sharing and double-hatting of officials.

Later on in 2003, the EU undertook Operation *Artemis* in DRC Congo, its first autonomous military operation in DRC Congo, at the request of the UN, with a UN mandate (under Chapter VII of the Charter) and to be taken over by a UN reinforced operation. EU and UN activities were therefore intimately linked from the outset. In this case, the re-hatting of the EU operation into a UN operation was dismissed by the Europeans, reluctant to leave their troops and assets under a UN operation. Europeans showed that they were ready to support UN peace efforts through separate operations but not within a UN operation, keen to keep their independence of action. Finally, there were no European troops in the reinforced MONUC Operation. Instead of supporting directly through the deployment of it's assets, the EU choose to support MONUC indirectly through a series of initiatives related to civilian crisis

management, a financial programme of strategic support (€205m) and the creation of a Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL KINSHASA)[15].

Even if showing this drawback, the Artemis mission was a good opportunity for the EU and the UN to work together and develop their relationship, leading to the elaboration by the EU of the 'battle groups' concept – which may become one of the most visible expression of EU-UN cooperation. This was also an opportunity to bring the institutionalisation of the cooperation one step further with the signature in 24 September 2003 of the EU-UN Joint Cooperation in Crisis Management. The text took note of the recent developments in the ground and identifies four areas for further cooperation: planning, training, communication and best practices. A Steering Committee was established as a joint-consultative mechanism to enhance coordination in these four areas. Since then, the Steering Committee has met regularly, work has been conducted on planning standards and modules, EU personnel has participated in EU training courses, and continued dialogue on planning EU-UN operational cooperation has been taking place (Tardy, 2005).

These events show how the EU is developing crisis management capacities that precisely the UN is lacking, playing an important role now that the UN is overstretched and looking for partners to share its peacekeeping burden. The UN is facing shortages in troops, but above all in rapid reaction capacity and in what it calls 'enabling assets' such as movement control, intelligence, medical units or logistics, which are less available than infantry battalions. The UN Secretariat currently called on the EU to provide such resources and welcomed any EU initiative that strengthens the UN capacity directly or indirectly.

The Lebanon crisis is providing a new test for the EU to show it has the capabilities that the UN lacks and it can commit to a strong partnership in security with the world organisation. However, the EU has already been criticized for showing 'reluctance' and taking too long to act. After weeks of diplomatic struggle, the EU member states agreed finally to send half of the requested troops by the UN.

This unwillingness of the EU member states to commit troops to UN operations is not new. Indeed, if at the financial level, the EU states' shares of the UN regular and peacekeeping budgets are very high, with 37.75 and 39%, and EU states are major contributors in troops to UN-mandated operations, they contribute little to UN-led operations. For well-known reasons with origins in the UN peacekeeping records of the 90s, Western states in general have over the last ten years become reluctant to participate in UN-led operations, and have started favouring regional organisations or coalitions of states for their crisis management activities.

Even if fearing reluctance from the EU, the UN naturally looked at the EU to provide the backbone of the extended mission in Lebanon and the EU member states were already the largest contingent of the mission. If not more, this most recent case shows that the UN does trust the EU to give the international response and the EU can work as a clearing house mechanism to commit assets and troops to UN-led operations. In the process of building up support for strengthening the UNIFIL mission, the UN

[15] For further information on this mission see Tierry Tardy, "EU-UN Cooperation in Peacekeeping: A promising relationship in a constrained environment", Chaillot Paper N.57, June 2005; and Hanna Ojanen, "The EU and the UN: A Shared Future", FIIA Report 13, 2006.

Secretary-General met the EU Foreign Ministers, who committed an overall number of 6,000 troops to the mission. This coordination enables a faster commitment and avoids bilateral meetings between the UN SG and the different EU countries.

Furthermore, the EU is also supporting the UN in other peace related areas – from the broad field of conflict prevention to its multifaceted involvement in peace building efforts. In this context it is important to look at EU's role in strengthening the peace capacities of other regional organisations to cooperate with the UN, namely in Africa. Through the ESDP Action Plan, the EU created the Peace Facility for Africa, gives political and technical support to the AU and ECOWAS, and participates in joint fact-finding missions (with the UN).

Indeed, in Africa the UN and the EU may think of a strategic partnership - going towards UN Secretary-General's call for an "interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities", taking into account regional capacities and comparative advantages. The EU's holistic approach, combining a wide variety of instruments is in this sense a unique comparative advantage.

2.3 - The Future of the Operational Cooperation in Security

The cooperation between the UN and the EU has been developing faster than with any other regional organisation and may be seen as a model for others to follow. Looking at the future of the cooperation in the field, and according to Tierry Tardy (2005), three components seem to determine it, these being the nature of the crisis management (civilian or military), the sequence of EU and UN deployments and the degree of EU's assets' deployment within a UN operation.

Although falling short in the contributions made directly to UN operations, the EU envisages a role in the coordination of its members' national contributions to UN operations – a mechanism that can be very useful and has been used very recently in the Lebanon crisis.The EU also envisages conducting operations on its own, under UN mandate, at the UN request or under its own independent initiative. The operations in the Balkans initiated in the last 3 years are good examples. The objective is not only to take over UN operations but to continue developing the model of the Artemis operation in DRC – with the rapid deployment of an operation at the request of the UN and the objective of providing the organisation with time to mount a new operation or reinforce an existing one. Again, in this manner the EU offers a model for cooperation - in which regional organisations respond first to a crisis situation for a limited period, while the UN prepares to take-over for a longer period for peacekeeping and peace-building.

Tardy also suggests that the EU should find a cooperative model which includes not immediate re-hatting, but co-existence of the two operations – a first EU rapid deployment and the following UN long term operation, in order to assure the success of the remaining UN operation. This could include a so-called modular approach, in which the EU provides one module of an UN operation working side by side in the same crisis (Tardy, 2005).

The UN Secretary-General has put forward a two-fold solution for the problem of UN's overstretched peacekeeping capacities, suggesting both a more comprehensive approach to crises (especially through peace building) and a system that combines the different peacekeeping resources of relevant regional organisations. The EU is well-positioned to support the UN in both aims. First of all the EU is an active contributor in the newly-created Peacebuilding Commission, using here its far-reaching capacities for conflict prevention and peace-building. Secondly, through the creation of national battle-groups (to be deployed at the request of the UN for small-scale stand-alone operations) the EU can be an important partner in making peacekeeping resources available. Furthermore, the EU is supporting other UN-partners, namely in Africa, to develop their own peacekeeping capacities, therefore contributing to the overall regional-global security partnership.

The EU is therefore well positioned to become UN's preferred and most effective partner for peacekeeping. But there are also challenges and obstacles to face. What follows is an analysis of the obstacles to overcome and the strengths to build on in order to make this a successful and effective partnership.

3. EU/UN relations; a SWOT Analysis

The relationship between the EU and the UN as partners is characterized by far-reaching potential yet also by formidable challenges. An analysis of these potential and challenges is put forward, looking at strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats.

Strengths

The EU certainly is a major actor within the UN. This is reflected in the fact that EU member states are together the largest financial contributor to the UN system. And also, the EU is the world largest provider of Official Development Assistance. On top of this, the EU-25 has more than 1/8 of the votes in the UN General Assembly and the EU and candidates account for 1/3 of the Security Council membership; all of this being backed by a commitment to multilateralism.

The EU is supporting the overall multilateral system for security and the UN, through its support to other regional organisations, namely in ECOWAS and AU and through its overall encouragement for regional building in other parts of the world. 'Post-Westphalian' regional clusters – encouraged by the EU model – may indeed become the major trend for security, as an important intermediate level between intermediate states and global multilateral institutions.

A UN/EU partnership therefore has great strengths as both players share the same values. To some extent one can say that the UN needs the EU, both intellectually and financially. And on the other hand, the EU needs the UN because it is mainly through the UN that the EU can manifestate itself as world-player.

Weaknesses

Looking in more detail to the existing relations between the UN and the EU, one can however detect some structural weaknesses in that relationship.

First, the institutional framework of the EU is still confusing. Although the EC has observer membership, the EU as whole does not have juridical personality and a seat at the UN institutions as a whole. Instead, its institutions hold multiple seats at multiple tables. One example is the High-level Meetings process, where the EU holds three seats (European Commission, Council of the EU and Presidency of the Council of the EU). This multiplicity of voices does not help develop EU's role as a supporter for multilateralism, showing inability to direct its voice to one single actor. It also creates confusion among partners at the international forums.

Secondly, looking at EU's actorness in the UN Security Council, the main question is whether the EU Member States view their seats as instruments of EU foreign policy rather than expressions of national interest, and themselves as Europeans, rather than national agents. In the UN General Assembly European states have seemed to move progressively towards speaking with one voice. Yet the same cannot be said for international security issues. Notwithstanding the fact that the EU has been increasingly visible in the UNSC, the degree to which it is present to actual decision-making depends on degree to which Member States allow for this. Indeed, when Spain and Germany offered their seat to the EU in 2003-2004, France and the UK blocked their intension. There appears to be substantive consensus between the EU Member States on the long term strategy of conflict prevention and stabilisation, but in crisis situations, national interests tend to dominate the agenda, and the degree of Europeanization looses its value. (Biscop in Smith & Laitikainen, 2006).)

The internal *effectiveness* of the EU in the UN is increasing (Smith & Laitikainen, 2006). Nevertheless, is the EU a truly important actor and an identifiable bloc inside the UN? The fact that two of the EU members have permanent seats at the Security Council has shown that they still prefer to use their power to defend their national interests than to search for a common policy for the EU. In the speech delivered by Tony Blair at the September 2005 UN summit, the EU was not even mentioned once. Moreover, the tensions arisen among EU Member states during the negotiations for the Peacebuilding Commission and the Human Rights Council didn't give an image of a unified regional actor. The EU remained divided on other crucial aspects of the UN reform, namely in what the Security Council reform was concerned.

Thirdly, while the UN wants to involve the EU as much as possible, and aims at a formalized / institutionalized partnership that involves a sub-contracting model of some kind; the EU favours a more flexible, case-by-case approach, were its autonomy for decision and actions prevail – with no guarantee that UN needs will be met.

And finally, Europeans are ready to support UN-mandate peace efforts through separate operations but reluctant to offer their troops and assets to UN-led operations.

Threats

On top of the structural weaknesses, the UN/EU relations can be negatively affected by a number of external issues related to how the EU and the UN will each further develop.

On the one hand, the EU is going through a phase of stagnation with problems such as the lack of popular support for an EU Constitution, different opinions of member states on enlargement and on world politics. The proliferation of Euro scepticism all over the European continent seems to undermine a further integration and represents a threat to a more coherent institutional asset for the CFSP.

On the other hand, the UN faces its own problems and is going through a difficult phase of reform and needs to increase its legitimacy. Dealing with non-state actors such as the EU might only complicate matters. After all, the EU remains a *sui generis casus* in the architecture of international relations. One that cannot be easily fitted into the UN system because there are always conflicts possible between the EU and its member states.

Opportunities

The UN reform also opens possibilities for the strengthening of UN-EU relations. The new concept of security (encompassing development and human rights) provides a window of opportunities to manifestate the EU as a civilian power (Telò, 2005). The new security thinking developed in the UN reform process - practical implementation of multilateralism and such instruments of crisis management that are generally regarded as legitimate - may help the EU in increasing its legitimacy and hence, authority in international relations.

Additionally, there seems to be a growing awareness within the UN that new security architecture is needed that combines a global with a regional approach (Graham and Felício, 2006). Strengthening partnerships between the UN and regional organisations in general and involving regional organisations in building regional security complexes, opens many opportunities for the EU. But it also poses the issue of the nature of the EU.

4. The Future(s) of UN-EU Relationships

Thinking about the future of UN-RO relationships can be done along two lines: the minimalist and the maximalist approach. In the maximalist approach, the starting point is that regions and regional organisations are becoming key players in international relations, as important or perhaps even more important as states. Consequently, an organisation that aims to deal with global governance should not restrict its memberships to states; it should open up to regions. In such a 'united regions' approach, the whole functioning of the UN needs to be rethought. Some have argued that the Security Council for instance could be composed out of regional organisations. Fantastic and unrealistic as they seem, it is important to realize that

such ideas float around in policy-making and academic circles. In his bestselling book, "Why Europe will run the 21st century", Mark Leonard argues that the future global order "will be centred around neither the United States nor the United Nations, but will be a community of interdependent regional hubs". In this sense, one of EU's greatest successes has been to prove the viability of regional integration and demonstrate the non-viability of national sovereignty.

In contrast, proponents of the minimalist approach will point to the remaining importance of national sovereignty and argue that regional integration is always intergovernmental and hence individual states remain in control. On top of it, they will also argue that the way regional integration is spread around is simply too diverse to allow for some kind of global structure where regions are the members. Hence, all that can be done is make sure that the regions find their optimal place in the theatre of international relations.

In between the minimalist and the maximalist approaches are a number of positions possible that give regions a more prominent place in global governance without however radically changing the basic ontology of the world order. Overall, the EU has good perspectives of becoming a preferred partner of the UN in peace and security, namely through the development of its crisis management capabilities and its decision-making capability. In what security is concerned, the major trend to look at is UN's intertwined concepts of security, development and human rights, going hand and hand with EU's integrative approach to security.

The UN reform has started with a reform of concepts, arguing that present day threats go further beyond war and conflict and acknowledging that security, development and human rights are intertwined. Incorporating the politico-military dimension in such a global integrated network, Kofi Annan's view meshed perfectly with the integrative approach to security, which the EU has been following for years (Biscop and Arnould, 2004). Although it is difficult to say how much EU's support to multilateralism actually contributed to these concept reforms, it is clear that they do help bringing EU's 'civilian power' nature into the agenda and provide the terrain for enhanced EU global actorness. The changing concept of security and UN's adoption of the security triangle (security, development and human rights) place the EU as a preferred partner to respond to today's security threats, giving the EU an excellent opportunity to further position itself as a foreign policy actor and consolidate the internal consensus on collective and comprehensive security.

One of the core issues in the EU-UN relations is that the UN works with regional groupings (also in determining the non-permanent members of the Security Council). Seen from that perspective the EU is not Europe. As pointed out by Graham and Felício (2005), the Council for Europe would have a more adequate geographical coverage of Europe. However, it cannot be denied that only the EU has enough power and resources to 'represent' Europe in the UN. What is needed therefore is the establishment of a broad European group around the EU, including non-EU members and members of the Council of Europe, the OSCE and perhaps even the Community of Independent States. This could be the beginning of a 'regional representation' much in line with what Kofi Annan proposes in his September 2006 report. This would mean that the EU declares itself a Chapter VIII regional organisation but in association with other relevant states and regional organisations. This should,

however, not imply a scaling-down of the EU's present status and position in UN bodies. The EU should be given guarantees that it can continue its *sui generic* position that that would be a major step in rationalising the EU's activity in the UN.

Or, as Ortega (2005, p. 7) states: "*By formally declaring its willingness to act according to Chapter VIII, the EU would be upgrading and codifying the current practice of EU-UN collaboration*". This would in turn lead to further development of UN-regional organisations relations and this in turn could be a major contribution to the UN reform.

The EU needs the UN - as its main arena for fostering global governance and multilateralism – gaining visibility as a global actor; and the UN needs the EU - for its assets, contributions and developing military capabilities, and for EU's full array of tools – ranging from development aid to diplomatic negotiation or peacemaking – for conflict prevention. But only when its political issues are finally settled and an agreement is reached on how much sovereignty to give away for the common purpose of a single voice in CFSP, will the EU be able to emerge as a resolute international actor with a single voice that speaks for Europe and with the ability to be UN's strongest partner for effective multilateralism.

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