



United Nations
University

CRIS

Comparative Regional Integration Studies

UNU-CRIS Working Papers

W-2007/2

Problematizing Regional Integration in Latin America: Regional Identity and the Enmeshed State- The Central American Case

José Caballero

Department of Politics and International Studies

University of Warwick

j.caballero@warwick.ac.uk

Problematizing Regional Integration in Latin America: Regional Identity and the Enmeshed State—the Central American Case

José Caballero

Introduction¹

Studies of Latin American² regional integration³ follow two strands of thought. The first, which I refer to as the ‘classic,’⁴ interprets regionalism as a logical process: a continuum in which economic cooperation would lead to economic union and eventually to political union. The process is seen mainly as intergovernmental.⁵ The second current, the new regionalism studies, conceptualises the process as a constructed multilayered space in which different regionalising actors struggle to impose their discourse on the regional agenda. An examination of the latter strand’s literature reveals that some important aspects for the study of Latin America have been barely incorporated into its analytical framework. Despite the persistence of integration as the background of the region’s politics (Bierck, 1990, p. 9: 9), and evidence of a common identity, the relation between these factors and the complex, patchy, and sometimes, *ad hoc* nature of integration has gone virtually unexplored. In addition, new regionalism’s multidimensionality becomes problematic. No doubt Latin America has achieved some democratic successes; yet, finding effective multilevel governance and participation in a region historically

¹ This paper is based on and contains sections of the author’s PhD thesis.

² I argue that the common identity among countries leads to the persistence and complexity of regionalism; and that shared colonial institutions have determined the state’s nature and its participation in the process. For this reason, in this paper Latin America refers to the Spanish-speaking countries of the region as they share those characteristics. When indicated the term also refers to Brazil.

³ I understand regional integration as the predisposition to delegate policy making power to a regional centre. I used the term integration interchangeably with regionalism.

⁴ What I consider “classic” regionalism is equivalent to what is labelled “old.” I disagree with the term as it implies outdated and thus not applicable anymore. Considering the regained importance of certain theories developed within the classic regionalism, the division itself seems to be outdated. For an example of the relevance of classic regionalism, specifically of Neo-functionalism, see Rosamond (2005). For proposals to “abolish” this old/new division see Rosamond and Warleigh (2006) and Hettne (2005).

⁵ This paper does not rehearse a review or critique of the classic regionalism; the focus here is on new regionalism. For the classic view on Latin America see Bulmer-Thomas (2001) and Gauhar (1985).

characterised by oligarchic control is considerably difficult.⁶ Although, there is awareness about the close relationship of the state and certain social elites,⁷ the issue remains under theorised.

This analytical void leads to the search for alternative explanatory elements which direct the observer to factors typically proposed by the classic school. For instance, new regionalism proponents give the US, as the regional hegemon, a predominant role as a catalyst if not the main agent of integration in the region. In short, similarly to the classic school, new regionalism builds our understanding of integration around political-economy factors by retaining its focus on free trade, security, and development issues. While such studies give us valuable in-sight on integration's nature, however, their analytical scope seems narrow. Analytical narrowness leads new regionalism studies to somewhat preordained conclusions shared by the classic school from which, ironically, since its inception has striven to distant itself. Thus, just as the "academic and political" spheres in Latin American have not "accepted" new regionalism's discourse (De Lombaerde & Garay, 2006: 33), it seems that new regionalism is "trapped" in the classic discourse in which Latin American integration is merely an intergovernmental process and its engine a structure of cooperative hegemony.

Such studies fail to problematise historically the Latin American integration process. To understand the puzzling nature of regionalism, I suggest, we need to deconstruct integration beyond the political-economy sphere. I argue that a binary identity⁸ (i.e., national/regional) exists in the region which has allowed the integration idea to survive and evolve in different forms. Yet, two factors, an "enmeshed" state and the lack of social will—defined as the predisposition of social elites to construct, deconstruct or reconstruct

⁶ Oligarchy is "a system of real power whose essential dimension is economic" and in which the state "swayed by family loyalties and clan alliances, and subject to the manipulation of *clientelae*," is instrumentalised by the controlling elites (Mercier Vega, 1969: 5).

⁷ I adopt Etzioni's (1965: 26) definition of elites as a social group that "devotes a comparatively high proportion of its assets to guiding a process and leading other units to support it." For Keller (1963) Elites are "socially significant [groups] responsible for the realization of major social goals and for the continuity of the social order" (quoted in Kadushin, 1968: 688).

⁸ Understood here as "role-specific understandings and expectations about self" that emerge from collective understandings (Wendt, 1992: 397). Such meanings can be elaborated on common ethnic background and language, and/or on the collective myths, symbols, values, and feelings of belonging shared within a community or groups of individuals.

the region in order to bring integration out of its characteristic stagnation phases—have shaped the integrationist discourse, in some cases outstripping it of any significant power. I conclude that integration has become a struggle between the political and a superimposing “social;” that is, the political discourse is devoid by an enmeshing social discourse which restrains the process from advancing beyond certain thresholds.

The paper proceeds as follows. The first section reviews the main new regionalism arguments in Latin America and their implications for the region. The focus is on what are considered the catalytic factors for the process and where the Latin America states stand in the process. The second traces the existence of a binary Latin American identity. It highlights the link between that binary identity and the persistence and patchy nature of integration in the region. The third section studies the emergence of the Latin American state and the social elites who captured the *de facto* political power in the process. It argues that this phenomenon led to the construction of a socially “enmeshed” state in the region. The fourth analyzes the existence of political and social will within regionalism. The emphasis is on the imposing role that social will plays in the process of region construction. The fifth section concludes.

New Regionalism and the Study of Latin American Integration

New regionalism emerged in an attempt to understand regionalism through a variety of dimensions. While the classic school was euro-centric, new regionalism was the product of two realizations. The first understanding was that “all regions are socially constructed and hence politically contested” (Hurrell, 1995b: 38-39). This recognition led to the second realization, the understanding of the process as highly complex: fluid, multidimensional, multiactor, and multilevel (Soderbaum, 2003: 1). In this sense, new regionalism was a reaction to the classic’s “original sin,” that is, “state-centrism” (Hettne, 2003: 22). While the classic focused on integration as a process related to sovereignty, the new concentrated on regionalism as “regional project” which implied the organisation of the world as regions; and conceptualised the region construction process through interactions as “regionalisation” (Hettne, 2005: 545).

Whereas classic regionalism, by understanding integration “as a planned merger of national economies through cooperation” neglected the global structure (Hettne, 2005: 547), the new emerged as the study of regionalisms within globalization (Hettne, 2005: 543). In addition, new regionalism incorporated in its paradigm “security, social and cultural” matters (Hettne, 2003: 27). From this multidimensional conceptualisation, according to De Lombaerde (2003), new regionalism has four meanings. First, it indicates the quantitative increase of regional schemes during the 1980s and 1990s. Second, new regionalism refers to the qualitative differences that characterized those schemes; for example, their greater focus on non-trade matters. Third, it alludes to the elaboration of new theories; for instance, theories concerning the regionalism and globalization links. New regionalism also denotes methodological developments such as the re-emergence of comparative studies. It is important to note that most studies on Latin American integration focus on the quantitative and qualitative understandings.

New regionalism as the proliferation of schemes, produces a highly confusing picture in which Latin American integration is seen as a web of schemes with 17 intraregional free-trade/custom union agreements completed during 1991-2002 and another six agreements in process during the same period (Devlin & Estevadeordal, 2002: 25-26). There are also instances in which members of a scheme negotiated bilateral agreements. For example, El Salvador and Panama reached a bilateral agreement in 2002 while both being members of the System of Central American Integration. According to Van Klaveren (2000: 153), in Latin America the process follows a “meandering course” which leads to a “blurred subregional design” (Van Klaveren, 2000: 140). Consequently, there emerges a “loose and open” subregionalism “with blurred edges, overlaying agreements, and varying commitments;” to which the orderly and uni-linearity of economic integration theory is not applicable (Van Klaveren, 2000: 140). Such overlapping web of bilateral and interregional agreements has been conceptualized as an “alphabet soup” (Hurrell, 1995a: 280), and a “spaghetti bowl” (De Lombaerde & Garay, 2006: 10). This conceptualization overlooks the existence in Latin America of a “binary identity:” a national and regional identity in which the latter is activated once national problems cannot be dealt with domestically. A common regional identity may have direct effects on the patchy nature of integration. Continuing with the spaghetti analogy, by adopting a quantitative approach

the analyst is able to see the embroiling spaghetti but neglects to see the bowl holding the embroiled spaghetti in place.

New regionalism's second meaning, that of the qualitative differences between regionalisms, distinguishes the new from the classic in terms of generational processes, or occurring in "waves" (Soderbaum, 2003: 3). For Van Langenhove, Torta, and Costea (2006: 3-5), the first generation "is based upon the idea of a linear process of economic integration" among states. In this sense, it is roughly equivalent to classic regionalism. Although this generation is mainly concerned with the economic process, its original intentions could have been political. This political dimension engenders the second generation or new regionalism, which proposes that trade and economy cannot be separated from society. The process thus incorporates non economic issues (i.e., justice and security). This generation is a limited phenomenon of which the EU is the best example.⁹ The generational view concludes that the classic regionalism in Latin America was imported from the European experience (Soderbaum, 2003: 4); and the new wave originated in the US attitudinal change toward the region (Gamble & Payne, 2003: 54). Analysing Latin American integration through "generations" delimits or confines our understanding of the process because it does not accommodate the historical lens so important for the analysis. Failing to do so, for example, does not allow us to assess the pre-1940s (i.e., pre-classic regionalism) integration record in the region; nor does it allow us to make sense of the recurrent integrationist efforts in Central America and the repeated efforts by all Latin American countries to reach certain type of integration.

To be sure, I am not denying the importance of or the hegemonic role of the US, but assigning almost complete credit to it for the regionalist experience in Latin America seems short-sighted. While the importance of identity and historical interactions among the region's countries have been stressed by new regionalism scholars,¹⁰ the depth with which these factors are treated analytically seems inadequate. Regionalism is seen

⁹ Van Langenhove, Torta, and Costea (2006: 3-5) argue that there is a third generation of which the EU shows some characteristics. First, in it "the institutional environment for dealing with 'out of area' consequences of regional policies are more present;" this trend is illustrated by the European Constitution. Second, the region becomes "proactive engaging in interregional arrangements and agreements." Third regions "actively engaged at the UN level."

¹⁰ See for example Sunkel (2000).

overwhelmingly in economic terms within these studies. Hence, analysis is limited to economic variables that overpower other dimensions such as regional identity. For example, it is assumed that integration in Latin America starts from a point of “low economic interdependence,” a condition that is worsened by the region’s countries different levels of development and geographical and infrastructure elements (Van Klaveren, 2000: 141). These initial assumptions effectively bracket out the intersubjective dimensions that underpin the regional process.

Another delimiting aspect of the new regionalism literature is the “dual perspective” that it implies. According to Hettne (2003: 23), new regionalism was originally seen as a “voluntary process” internal to the region, one that emerged from the “urge to merge” experienced by the actors (be it states or other actors) in order to face global challenges; however, he indicates that too much emphasis was given to globalisation’s role (Hettne, 2003: 26). For this reason, Hettne (2003: 26) argues that regionalism must be approached from a dual perspective. First, the “exogenous” perspective sees regionalism and globalisation as “intertwined articulations, contradictory as well as complementarity, of global transformation.” The second perspective, the “endogenous,” is characterised by its assessment of regionalism as a process shaped by a multitude of actors.

The exogenous view directs the analysis of Latin American integration first, to incorporate an economic rationale; and second, to the role of the US as the main regionalising engine. For example, Grugle (2004b: 605) argues that new regionalism “is best understood as a state strategy designed to minimise risks in the uncertain conditions of economic globalization.” In this context, the re-emergence of Latin American integration is the result of the US strategic planning which “sought economic re-engagement” with the hemisphere in order to deal with “the tensions generated by global liberalization... [and] new security issues” (Grugel, 2004b: 605-606). Similarly, for Grugel & Payne (2000: 199) the current regionalism is taking place within the US sphere of influence and is qualitatively different in that it is open-market oriented and private sector led. Regionalism in the hemisphere is best described by the concept of “political co-operation” through which the US attempts to “reposition itself globally,” this requires “the strategic calculations and policy decisions of states” involved in the process (Grugel

& Payne, 2000: 200). Drivers of regionalism are, therefore, the US hegemony and its responses to globalization, and the “changing notions of development within South America...,” and the latter’s need to insert itself in the global economy (Grugel, 2004b: 606). Thus, the US is considered as the main trigger of integration and other countries become mere reactionary units.

Ironically, this perspective has reached conclusions that borderline the classic view’s “original sin.” For the sake of comparison, let us review some of the arguments that scholars from the more “classic” school propose. For Pendersen (2002: 677), regionalism is best analysed through a “theory of co-operative hegemony” based on the interests and strategy of the region’s hegemon. This theory argues that integration is a “grand strategy and, to the extent that it is successful, a type of regional order” (Pendersen, 2002: 683). In this context, integration has failed in instances in which “a hegemon has normally been lacking” (Pendersen, 2002: 678). This is a similar argument to that of Mattli (1999: 146-150): in the 1960s, integration failed in some Latin American subregions (i.e., Andean Pact and LAFTA) because they lacked a “regional leader.” More importantly, where successful (as in Central America) it was due to the US willingness to act as “adopted regional leader” by “easing distributional problems and assisting policy coordination.” A successful regional scheme thus requires a hegemon willing to cost the integration process.

This argument, however, does not help us understand why the US was able to rally the Central American subregion behind the process and, at the same time, failed to do so elsewhere. This was so despite the fact that, at the time, the US within the Alliance for Progress¹¹ was willing to “supply financial and technical cooperation in order to achieve...” the acceleration of “the integration of Latin America so as to stimulate the economic and social development of the continent” (OAS, 1961b). It was recognized that “economic integration implies a need for additional investment in various fields of economic activity and funds provided under the Alliance for Progress should cover these

¹¹ The Alliance was designed to reinforce the hemispheric Food for Peace program, and technical training programs. Militarily, it sought to protect the region’s countries from threats, specifically, from communist revolutions. For a comprehensive review of the Alliance see Levinson and Onis (1972).

needs...”(OAS, 1961a). This is evidence that the US was willing to act as a regional leader and bear the economic and political costs of Latin American integration in general but was successful only in Central America. The easy answer to this puzzle is to argue, as Hurrell (1995a: 280) indicates, that in the latter subregion, the US “interests are most directly engaged.” Nevertheless, this argument neglects internal factors that facilitate the adoption of regional norms. Although hegemonic cooperation is important for the process there must be certain conditions that enable the hegemon to persuade the region’s states to enter a given scheme.

It is necessary to indicate that the exogenous approach leads to the conclusion that the states’ rational strategic behaviour, in this case the hegemon, is the most appropriate level of analysis. By doing so, this perspective delimits our understanding of integration in Latin America; or as Gamble and Payne (2003: 50) argue in the context of globalisation, “the strategic calculations of states is only one level of analysis... If it is made the only level of analysis then it becomes narrow and one-sided.” The “original sin” is a sin since it erroneously reduces our understanding of regionalism to the states’ rational behaviour. Representative of such misleading conclusions is that of Fawcett’s (2004: 444): “All regional activity in the Americas, whether bandwagoning in NAFTA or balancing in Mercosur, is predicated on the dominant role of the United States. The Monroe Doctrine has long legitimized and conditioned the US special sphere of interest on the American continent.” This conclusion overlooks, for example, the idea of union in Latin America which pre-dates the Monroe Doctrine, and the fact that while President Monroe was developing his doctrine Central America was already struggling to maintain the unity it enjoyed under the Spanish Empire. By underplaying the intersubjective elements involved in the process, the exogenous perspective leads the analysts to attribute the successes as well as the failures of integration in Latin America solely to the US role.

Conversely, the endogenous perspective directs the analysis towards the search for multilevel societal processes in which several actors, besides the state, interact in order to construct the region. Yet, in a region historically characterized by oligarchic control, such search becomes a spiral that leads the observer directly to a state-centric understanding of the process. This perspective thus leaves the observer searching for an effective

multilevel participation in Latin American regionalism that is not to be found. Limited multilevel participation in the process is recognised by some new regionalism studies such as that of De Lombaerde and Garay (2006: 18-19) and Gamble and Payne (2003: 52). However, it is Bull (1999: 957) who succinctly asserts that “the dynamism and pluralism” implied by new regionalism “are hard to detect.”

It is worthwhile, however, to look at how endogenous studies deal with the absence of a multilevel dimension; and in the case of Bull, despite her awareness of the troublesome multidimensionality. According to Bull and Bøås (2003: 258), the construction of a region “is a political act committed by regionalising actors who seek to promote their vision and approach on to the regional agenda.” In this process, the many visions simultaneously “move” the region in several directions; and “they are best viewed as different layers superimposed on top of each other.” This approach “reveals other aspects and dimensions of regional practices and discourses than approaches which only see these as state-led processes implanted on objective units delimited in space and time by geography, culture and history.” Bull and Bøås conclude that theirs is an approach that “makes it easier to give voice to the multitude of actors involved in the practice and discourse of regionalism.”

The issue here is that the power relations implied in the process of superimposing visions (or discourses) is not problematised. Discursive practices are “social power” spaces in which “power relations” make and sustain some discourses as dominant; the latter, brings the “power to define and thus constitute the world”(Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson, & Duvall, 1999:17-18). In the context of integration, then, some regionalising actors have greater powers than others. To obtain a deeper understanding of regional integration in Latin America it is thus essential to historically deconstruct the process through which the current Latin American states emerged. For example, it is necessary to study whose interests reflected the process of identity territorialisation that the then new states adopted; also, how colonial institutions were used by the elites to embed the new state structure; a structure that they, the elites, came to quickly dominate.

Elsewhere, Bulls (2002) hints at the state/elite relationship in the region. She indicates that it is important to provide a “realist approach to regionalisation with a theory of the state.” In such theory, the Latin American states are seen as interlocutors that can encourage different “integrated business projects,” but they are “not well suited for being an interlocutor between the different political projects” constructing the region. This is so because since the 1990s, the Latin American states have undergone a “privatization of politics” (Bull, 2002: 2). This privatization takes place as “political elites are increasingly recruited from the business elites” and the “private sector has been drawn more closely into the policy making process,” which has modified the nature of links binding “the private sector and the state together” (Bull, 2002: 4-5) . Bull goes on to indicate that “The states in question here may resemble most closely the post-colonial state” which is “controlled by a narrow elite exploiting it for the benefit of its own interest.” Also, the “elites that later came to form the core of the Latin American oligarchies, derived their *power over the state* from the control over production” (2002: 4, emphasis added).

Despite identifying the elites/state issue, Bull remains focused on the free trade, security, development and anti-development agendas converging in integration and attempts to find their “voices.” By doing so, Bull never problematises the state/elites binding links and how these links led to the privatization of politics; such link remains under theorised. Bull’s analysis remains just a hint into the issue: her focus on the different agendas forces her to lump those agendas into voices superimposed on each other within a socially constructed space in which the state is unable to act as a dynamic interlocutor. The endogenous perspective of new regionalism thus finds itself in a never-ending search because of the hard-to-find multilevel participation. This perspective leaves the analyst with the state as the only adequate explanation for the nature of the Latin American integration: the state is an inadequate interlocutor for the many voices struggling within the process. However, the existence or discursive power of those voices is scarcely questioned;¹² rendering an analysis in want of deeper theorisation.

¹² See for example Grugel (2004a).

Perhaps, it is the very binding links that Bull mentions which render the states an unsuited regional interlocutor. This is so, I argue, because the privatisation of the state is not new. The Latin American states have never been privatised; they were “enmeshed” by design. As the Latin American states emerged, the region’s elites captured what Mann (1992: 7) refers to as the “substantive sources of social power.”¹³ Consequently, these elites were able to “enmesh” the state in such a manner that the latter reflects the normative power¹⁴ of the former. This historical process has further enabled the elites to construct, deconstruct and reconstruct the region when their identity, interests and/or ideology are threatened by regionalism.

In the Mercosur context, Duina’s work has moved in this “historically problematising” direction. In his comparative analysis of the EU, Mercosur and NAFTA, building on Historical Institutionalism, Duina emphasises the constraining role played by institutions on the choices of regional actors. His primordial focus is on the region’s “pre-existing legal and political arrangements” (Duina, 2004: 362). Specifically, for Duina, different legal traditions lead to different approaches or “cognitive strategies” to integration.¹⁵ Common markets are social construction or “at the very least they are embedded in social relations and structures” (Duina, 2004: 380). As such, regional markets require “shared definitions of the world as is and as it should be” (Duina & Breznau, 2002:585). From this market conceptualisation the legal system emerges as the systemic articulation of the ontological and normative notions. Ontological notions express the “essence of objects, activities and actors in society;” their normative counterparts establish the “desirability of certain situations” (Duina & Breznau, 2002:575). For example, the common law systems (based on case precedent) lead to a “minimalist approach” or one that avoids the “cognitive articulation of the world.” Instead of defining and codifying into law “the essential characteristics of objects, activities and agents” (i.e., ontological notions),

¹³ That is, economic, ideological, political and military resources.

¹⁴ Understood here as the ability to generate social heterogeneity through the construction of discourses despite the presence of otherwise homogenizing meanings and understandings. On normative power, see Adler (2005: 178-179), Guzzini (2005), and Manners (2002) and (2006).

¹⁵ Duina’s work is part of the broader literature that traces the determinant role of the legal structure on economic outcomes. See for example, Botero, Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004); and Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003); and La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998).

regions with common law traditions “refer to existing standards set by industry associations and other trade organizations” (Duina, 2004: 360-361). On the other hand, the civil law tradition (based on procedural codes) leads to a more “proactive” if not “interventionist” approach: “the articulation of complex webs of secondary laws rich with ontological and normative notions applicable to a large variety of subject matters” (Duina, 2004: 361); that is, a complex standardisation of the world (Duina, 2005: 5).

Apparently, thus, a shared legal tradition among the members of a given region may facilitate a successful integration process. If so, in regions such as Latin America where civil law tradition is prevalent, the legal structure should expedite, or at the very least, simplify the process; yet, considering the integrationist record, that has not been the case. In addition, Duina does not fully address the question of how countries with different legal traditions manage to articulate the power structures of their respective societies. For instance, within NAFTA, Canada and the US share a common law tradition while Mexico has a civil legal heritage. To deal with this issue, Duina (2004: 375) focuses on the commonality of the member countries’ political system, as the three are federations and thus function as common markets “in which trade occurs across very different legislative units.” Elsewhere, Duina (2005: 6) redefines his position and argues that in cases of divergent traditions the regional scheme “matches those that are most prevalent in the member states.” Yet, this proposition is problematic. For example, it does not seem realistic to assume that the US would adopt civil law principles within the free trade area of the Americas just because that legal tradition is the most prevalent among participating countries (i.e., Latin American countries). Another interesting question that emerges out of this analysis is, in the case of NAFTA, what effect did the adoption of common law at the regional level have in Mexico’s national civil law system? Although this question is beyond the scope of this paper, it seems to point to the fact that there must be domestic factors that enables such an abrupt legal adoption. Indeed, Duina (2005: 6) indicates that “the choice of market officials receive the crucial support of key powerful actors (leading economic groups, civil society associations, and so on) that have flourished in those dominant regulatory environments.”

It is not clear, however, how powerful those “powerful” actors are in regards to their influence on the legal system. This is so because despite an in-depth analysis of the market nature, the only state aspect Duina considers is the legal structure, and the latter, is seen as a supporting structure in the process of market construction (Duina, 2005: 10). Thus, it seems that the market remains above all other aspects of society. This position does not allow for the incorporation of the state nature and its impact on market construction into the analytical framework. For example, in a pluralist state the impact of civil society in the law making process is greater than in a statist system. Therefore, it is unclear the extent to which social groups influence the legal system. It seems that at the national level Duina’s stance ranges from one in which societal groups merely “adjust to their legal environment” (Duina, 2006: 248), to another in which they “influence and adjust” to the legal structure (Duina, 2004: 362). Regionally, Duina indicates that societal groups’ “influence ultimately determines, within the boundaries of the permissible, the final character of any given regional law” (Duina, 2005: 7). The regional legal structure thus reflects “the will of powerful actors in the member states” (Duina, 2006: 249). Considering Duina’s proposition that common law systems depend on the standards set by industry and trade organizations, it seems that societal groups have greater influence on the legal structure in common law countries. This argument, however, does not account for the fact that, in the EU (mostly a civil law region), pressure groups impact greatly the process. Consequently, Duina looks for the multilevel governance dimension, and argues that different civil society associations and business groups greatly influence the regional market construction. This position effectively leads Duina to situate his analysis within the new regionalism’s endogenous perspective. In the cases of the EU and NAFTA (that is, in the US and Canada within the latter region) such perspective may not be problematic because of the pluralist nature of their societies. However, as we have seen, in the case of Latin America the implicit multilevel dimension in the perspective is deficient at most.

A final issue in Duina’s analysis is that the preference formation of the powerful social actors so important for his analysis goes under scrutinised. The legal structure is believed to prepare domestic organizations to expand regionally and to encourage actors to “develop regional capacity to lobby and guide the direction of such law” (Duina, 2005:

7). Seemingly, thus, it is the legal system that produces and/or changes the actors' preferences. However, to the extent that actors influence the legal structure, there must be other factors that construct their preferences. For example, as identity and ideas form the foundation of interests they impact an actor's preferences. In the sections that follow, I will attempt to address these issues by tackling the nature of the Latin American state and the interplay of the actors' interests, ideas and identity within the regional process.

The Latin American Identity and Regional Integration

In the preceding section I argued that new regionalism studies in Latin American remain somewhat short-sighted because they give limited importance to domestic intersubjective spaces which may contribute greatly to the process. In this section, I propose that one of those spaces, the existence of a binary identity, may help us understand further the complexity and persistence of integration in the region.

The post-independence atomisation of the American Spanish Empire has been largely attributed to political inexperience, the adoption of unsuitable political ideals, and deficient interconnectedness among the colonies. There were, however, other more subtle factors that led to the fragmentation of the region. Regional unity threatened the fabric of the region's highly traditional societies and cultures accustomed to a given way of life. The threat came from the liberal ideology behind independence which attempted to fundamentally reform¹⁶ the Catholic, Hispanic and indigenous traditions. Reforms threatened not only the elites' interest, identities and ideology whose power rested on the Catholic/Hispanic tradition, but also represented the same threat to the region's mass population. To achieve regional unity it was necessary, therefore, to find a rallying point for elites and masses to territorialise an identity. Yet, that rallying point, the symbol of unity around which a Latin American identity could be constructed was precisely that which the region was rebelling against: the Spanish Crown. Independence meant a rupture with that entity that allowed the region to imagine their unified identity. How

¹⁶ For example, the reduction of the Church's participation in state matters. For an excellent discussion on the struggles that ensued due to such reforms see Woodward (1996).

could the independence leaders solve such a riddle? Finding solutions to collective action problems, as Wendt (1994) argues, “depends in part on whether actors’ social identities generate self-interests or collective interests.” Identity is a positive-negative spectrum from which the Other emerges as “anathema” or “extension” to the self. The self boundaries are established by the nature of identity which “varies by issue and other” (Wendt, 1994: 385-386). This variation produced a binary identity in Latin America; one that enables us to understand the persistence of regionalism in the area and throws some light on the patchy nature of the process.

In identity construction processes, elites struggle to disseminate and institutionalize their choice of alternative identities (Waisman, 1998: 148). The task is carried within two socially constructed spaces: first, internal ties or attributes that are shared by all member of the community; and second, the attributes that differentiate that community from others (Waisman, 1998: 150). In the case of Latin America at the moment of independence, however, elites were aware that the internal unifying links were not sustainable because that meant to uphold the ideational and cultural elements of the Crown. It was thus essential to identify the space through which the “otherness” was to be embedded. Ironically, because of the very Spanish nature of the concept, the answer lied in a constructed space of loyalty: *patria*.

Prior to independence, *patria* and *nacion* (nation) were used interchangeably and denoted local character; they expressed local relations within the town for example (Andres-Gallego, 1992: 282). At that time, due to ethnic diversity in Latin America, concepts that denoted unity were avoided (Andres-Gallego, 1992: 291). For example, *criollos*¹⁷ never called themselves Americans, although they had been born there. The national was the indigenous; *patria/nacion* were employed to designate the indigenous population (Quijada, 2003: 292). Thus, *patria/nacion* became the *patria chica* that Centeno (2002: 69) defines as, “pockets of territorial loyalties often associated with indigenous groups.” *Patria chica* denoted loyalty to one’s birth-place and thus it was easily “located and territorialised;” *patria* was not “imagined” but was “immediate and realisable,” and for

¹⁷ *Criollos* or creoles refer to Spaniards’ descendents born in America.

this reason, in a breaking point such as the independence period, *patria* was easily “instrumentalised” to further particular interests (Quijada, 2003: 291). Arguments for self-determination led to the instrumentalisation of *patria* which became associated with liberty, and at the same time, the word *Americano* as synonym of collective (regional) identity emerged (Andres-Gallego, 1992: 281). The idea of *patria* was thus reconstructed to encompass the whole continent. In the name of *patria americana*, the region began to advance the rupture with the Crown (Quijada, 2003: 292) .

Once the process was finalised, the links that united the region were shattered and Latin American fragmentation became imminent (Guerra, 1999: 44-45). As the division among the different political units grew, the meaning of *patria americana* swung back to that of *patria chica*. Self-determination meant the construction of a “differential unity” (Andres-Gallego, 1992: 294); an identity that could be instrumentalised to assert the national. Thus, a nationalism based on *Criollo* identity emerged as the dominant paradigm for independence. Interestingly, that identity was constructed based on the “*glorification of the Indian* [sic] past, civic eulogy, denunciation of peninsular immigrants, and religious cult” (Brading, 1998: 20; emphasis added). *Patria chica* facilitated the expression of that identity and provided the ideational structure to assert the national self and to justify the emerging states’ construction (Andres-Gallego, 1992: 285-286). The latter came about through a singularisation process in which identity found its “historical memory.” The selection, elaboration and construction of the latter gave the new political units a degree of legitimacy (Quijada, 2003: 304). For the emerging states, historical memories asserted the present, provided a shared past and thus, a common destiny. More importantly, they brought a superimposing “singularity” that delimited the “[Latin] American identity” (Quijada, 2003: 304).

As Quijada (2003: 305-306) notes, through the historical memory the dominant discourse appropriated an “idealised image” of each territory’s indigenous peoples, their cultures and values. This reinforced the emerging collective (national) identity and legitimated independence because it re-established what had been “stolen” by the conquest, the indigenous identity. In addition, it provided a “symbolic bridge” between the *criollo* elite

and the indigenous society; that is, a “contact zone”¹⁸ through the retrieval of a common past. Moreover, it enabled the elite to find “continuity in the rupture;” to break away from the Crown and, simultaneously, continue as the dominant social force in the colonies. The myths and symbols required for state/nation building were embedded in pre-colonial elements, the elites “redefined, channelled, and more importantly, ‘essentialised’” those myths and symbols in order to construct the collective (national) identity (Quijada, 2003: 289). As Brading (1998: 18) argues in the case of Mexico and Peru, the elites “rehearsed as never before the sheer grandeur of the pre-Hispanic civilization[s],” as the tensions between *peninsulares*¹⁹ and *criollos* increased, the latter “identified with the indigenous foundation of their countries.” Such an imagined identity enabled the elites to construct “their *patrias* as heirs” of the indigenous civilizations (Brading, 1998: 18). The indigenous, however, soon became excluded from the societies whose construction they had facilitated. As Martí (1891) noted, the Latin American *patrias* were constructed on the “mute indigenous masses.”

The indigenous served as territorialising elements from which the new states emerged. Territorialisation implies that the collective memories become “national” by attaching them to “definite territories” and by doing so the latter becomes “the historic homeland” (A. D. Smith, 1996: 453). This process is evident in a 1815 New Granada national anthem²⁰ in which the *patria* is freed by becoming the “lord,” the enslaved (i.e., dominated by Spanish rule) identity is superseded by the greatness of a beloved *patria*; one that is “reviving” the *patrias* of the Incas, the Aztecs and the Zipas (i.e., Peru, Mexico and Colombia). Yet, as territorialisation took place vestiges of the *patria americana* used to legitimise independence remained embedded in the ideational structure of the new states becoming an all encompassing identity. This phenomenon was possible because collective identities, as Waisman (1998: 149) argues, “accumulate, identities that were prevalent in the past may either remain on the surface... as the

¹⁸ The concept is Pratt’s (1999) and it is defined as a discursive ground in which different cultures intersubjectively converge.

¹⁹ *Peninsulares* were Spaniards living in the American colonies.

²⁰ The original text is in Spanish; it reads: “Desde el día que en este hemisferio, de la aurora la gloria brillo, vivir libre juro nuestro pueblo, convertido de esclavo en señor... Ya revive la patria querida, de los Incas, los hijos del sol, el imperio del gran Montezuma, de los Zipas la antigua nación” Quoted in Lomne (2003: 488-490).

patrimony of specific groups, or buried in the collective consciousness... they [may be] forgotten but not gone.” More importantly for our understanding of the Latin American identity, when dominant identities lose legitimacy the “buried identities” are combined with new elements and thus “resurrected.” Evidence for this “buried” identity is found in the Venezuelan national anthem (written in 1811) in which Latin America is united by ties that the heavens formed, and in that union under God, Latin America exists as a nation.²¹ This embedded identity has resulted in a binary identity, one that “swings,” depending on the interests on hand, from one side of the identity spectrum to the other and that enables us to see the region as “diversity within a general unity.”²²

The inclusion of a Latin American binary identity into our analytical framework brings in, and concomitantly, helps us understand the persistence of regionalism in the area. In addition, it illuminates the complexity and patchy nature of the process. For instance, the inability of a country to find solutions to an issue at the national level may trigger the regional identity and thus lead it to search for answers at the subregional or regional level. If there is complementarity of ideas and interests between two or more countries, a regional agreement (economic, security, political, social, etc) is reached. Thus country A may have a regional agreement with countries B and C; but country B may have a completely different agreement with country C and D but not with A. Yet, A, B, C and D could be members of scheme Z. In this complex context, regionalism seems *ad hoc* but pervasive nevertheless.

Social Elites and the Enmeshed State in Latin America

The Latin American binary identity provides the ideational mechanism from which integration is often activated to construct and reconstruct the region. The process’ economic focus leads inevitably to its politicisation in which the benefits of integration are evaluated vis-à-vis negative effects on national sovereignty (Middlebrook, 1978: 66). During this process the states internalise regionalism as they become concerned about its domestic effects. In this internalisation the participation of social elites becomes a

²¹ The Spanish text reads: “Unida con lazos, Que el cielo formo, La América toda, Existe en Nación.”

²² The expression is Blake and Smith’s (1976: 569-572).

determinant role in the region's construction. This is so because, as I previously argued, their role in state construction was crucial: they guided the process, and at the same time, were able to superimpose their interests, ideas and identity within the structure of the emergent countries. The elites thus rose triumphantly over the state. Therefore, it is fundamental to analyse this relationship between the social elites and the state; specifically, how the former came to "enmesh" the latter.

Before proceeding it is important to specify what I mean by the state. The state is the framework through which social relations are articulated (Oszlak, 1981: 6). It is not "structurally and exogenously given;" it is a construction which emerges through "historically contingent interactions" (Wendt, 1994: 385). Thus, the state refers to two interconnected concepts. First, "a pact of domination or rule;" and second, "a series of physical, material sites and institutions" which function as a resolution mechanism of "conflicts over power" which are "hierarchically reordered" (Mallon, 1995; , 2002: 10; 2002, 1, fn. 1). The state is an intersubjective structure in which first, the "domination pact" is socially constructed, and second, socio-political power is advanced in the form of domination rules. The second structure, as a conflict resolution mechanism includes the executive, legislative, public sector bureaucracies and the armed forces. I refer to the first dimension as the constructed structure of the state, and to the second, as its formal or legal framework.

The events leading to the wars of independence in Latin America revealed the "hidden chaotic" nature of the colonial order (Halperin Donghi, 1985: 188): an unstable political environment in which power was greatly diffused and disseminated. The Spanish Crown was never able to create a strong central state in its colonies. On the contrary, the state became a patrimonial authority "operating a network of favours, guaranteeing some legitimacy and serving as the policeman of last resort for elite squabbles" (Centeno, 2002: 65). As the independence process began, the *criollo* elite demanded "political power, economic freedom [and a new] social order" (Lynch, 2001: 104). However, the wars of independence were not revolutions to achieve a radical reconstruction of the colonial society; their aim was to shatter the Crown's colonial authority (Griffin, 1966: 1) represented by the *peninsulares*. The *criollos'* objective was to redistribute power within

the colonial system: a reconfiguration of the colonies by outstripping socio-political power from the *peninsular* elite, but retaining their own power and influence.

The independence struggle's uncertainty offered the elites a grim picture: a complicated web of racial tensions whereby they needed to assimilate powerful *peninsulares* elements, and simultaneously curbed demands from below. The fear of anarchy made essential the adoption of a republican institutional system through which to ensure public order (Stuven, 1998: 1). It was, thus, imperative to "enmesh" the state in order to construct a new order which would protect and sustain the elites' interest and power. The economic dimension of the latter was primordial. In the new order, the political was to be secondary, while military power remained outside state control, subordinated to powerful private interests (Centeno, 2002: 61, 66 and 75).

As the Latin American states emerged, the elites thus captured what Mann (1992: 7) terms the "substantive sources of social power:" economic, ideological, political and military resources. From the independence's anarchic conditions emerged a powerful elite that indeed "press and guide the state" to promote and adopt policies that "safeguarded their particular domestic interests" (Peloso & Tenenbaum, 1996: 6). The socio-political reconfiguration of the region "sandwiched new, socially ambitious groups into an 'aristocracy;'" the latter, increasingly wielded "broad and visible political power" in order to fulfil it's needs (Peloso & Tenenbaum, 1996: 7). The state emerged as an "image" of the Latin American elites' interests (Casaus, 1994: 47). In consequence, the states became characterised not for high concentrations of power but for the weakness of their institutions which did not enable them to "outlast the founding elites" (Centeno, 2002: 55-56). The resulting state became enmeshed by the power structure constructed by the Latin American elites. This was possible due to the elites' "diffused power;"²³ or as Mann (1992: 6) defines it, the subtle power found in "ideological and economic organisations" and which spreads unconsciously and spontaneously at the same time that

²³ As oppose to authoritative power or that which "comprises willed commands by an actor (usually a collectivity) and conscious obedience by subordinates. [This type of power] is found most typically in military and political power organizations" (Mann, 1992: 6).

it constrains individuals or groups of individuals to follow certain courses of action. In time, however, this diffused power evolved into a *de facto* political power.

In this study, “political power means *state* power” (Mann, 1992: 9; emphasis in original). State power, as Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) assert, has two dimensions. First, there is the *de jure* power, or the power that derives institutionally, through elections for example. Second, there is the *de facto* power that “is not allocated by institutions (such as elections), but rather is possessed by [social] groups as a result of their wealth, weapons” or other resources. The *de facto* power results from the possession and sustainability of social power’s substantive sources. While *de jure* political power is distributed through the state’s formal framework, the *de facto* power is projected by the social elites through the state’s socially constructed structure. In this manner, when changes “in some important dimension of political institutions [occur] which may [be] costly for the elites,” the elites neutralises them by exercising their *de facto* power (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006: 50-51, 57). This exercise is achieved by any combination of first, what we can label electoral re-engineering: outright “electoral fraud, the blocking of entry of new parties” or complete domination of the political party system; and second, the control of key governmental offices, lobbying, bribes and violent means. In short, when social elites are threaten to be, or are deprived of their *de jure* political power they strive to offset this trend by “investing” in their *de facto* power (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006: 56).

There are two trends that point to the elite persistence in the region (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006: 57). First, we find the endurance of the economic system. Despite changes in the Latin American political structure (e.g., democratisation) the underlying economic structure persists.²⁴ This is so because the region’s economic system is greatly influenced by groups or individuals who possess disproportioned *de facto* power, and therefore are able to offset any political reform. The second trend is elite identity. Although changes occur in the latter through the incorporation of new elite members, newcomers adopt the policies and practices of their predecessors resulting in the sustainability of the socio-political and economic structures.

²⁴ For example, the Labour market’s organisation around “repressed” wages, that is, below competitive levels (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006: 4-5).

The key to understanding this trend lies in the family ties existent in the region: kinships that originated within the colonial society have enabled the region's elites to accumulate both *de jure* and *de facto* powers.²⁵ Family ties evolved into "family networks," groups that function as a "survival" mechanism for elite persistence, and are interconnected through five dimensions: marriage alliances; business alliances; geographical proximity and socio-racial matters; membership in political, religious, and socio-cultural associations; and the "making" (*formación*) of their own "organic intellectuals" who provide the ideational structure to rationalise and sustain the elites' power (Casaus, 1994: 41-43). More importantly, through family networks the elites efficiently exercise and sustain their *de facto* political power.

The embryonic family networks are found in two colonial institutions: the *encomienda* and the *cabildos*. *Encomiendas* were grants given by the Crown to the conquistadors. They were "to be held in perpetuity" and consisted of the conquered land and the labour of its inhabitants; from these grants emerged the region's grand estates in which "the writ of the landowner was absolute... these estates became self-contained fiefdoms in which moral, religious, political, economic, and social power were fused" (Wiarda, 2001: 57 and 98-99). During the early colonial period, these *encomenderos* (originally *peninsulares*) controlled the *cabildos*, or town councils, becoming "the effective heads of society," and transforming the councils into "family possessions, [and] the main resource of a numerous clan" (Lockhart, 1985: 57). As the colonial society grew the old elites were challenged by newcomers (i.e., *criollos*). Therefore, the *cabildos* became centres to protect the family's interests and "privileges based a supposed lineal descent from the original" conquerors (Wortman, 1982: 65). Eventually, however, newcomers were inevitably accommodated into the councils. Nevertheless, a council's position remained a symbol of power, of "authority rooted in tradition," one that it was to be "handed down from generation to generation" (Wortman, 1982: 65-66). As the composition of society continuously shifted, this traditionalist view found it necessary to incorporate other classes. Spanish merchants and other government officials obtained their power share in

²⁵ On the fundamental role of the family as an institution in Latin America see Carlos and Sellar (1972)

the councils through marriage “into the Creole elite” (Wortman, 1982: 66).²⁶ This institutional evolution signals the emergence of the family networks that were to be so influential for modern Latin American society.

The incorporation of newcomers into the network had a significant effect. Paige (1997: 15) indicates that in Central America the descendants of the “aristocratic” colonial families who largely control land ownership in the region, incorporated into their network offspring of more recent Europeans immigrants who provided a much needed technical knowledge (i.e., commercial and financial abilities). Such merger transformed the family networks into the nucleus of powerful business blocs. As these business blocs expanded, the family network acquired a share in almost all dimensions of the economy: financial sector, commerce, agro-exports, industrial, etc. Business blocs thus developed into a “family-centered version of a multinational corporation” (Brown, 1997: 102). Consequently, business groups embedded in the family networks accumulated political, social, and of course economic power becoming what an observer calls “hegemonic business blocs” (“Editorial: El Bloque Hegemonico”, 2002: 595).²⁷

With this in mind, let us analyse the nature of the state and its relation to family networks. Costa Rica is considered as an exceptional democratic case in Latin America. Intuitively, one is hesitant about the applicability of the “enmeshed” state argument to the country. Yet, the evidence suggests that Costa Rica is not an exception; family networks have been closely intertwined with the state, not only within the country but throughout Central America. The evidence substantiates the existence of a “great ruling class or

²⁶ This phenomenon, of course, is more easily observed in some subregions or countries than in others. Perhaps, this is so because of the size of the elites and/or the more traditional nature of, the societies. For example, in Central America the functioning of family networks and their use of *de facto* power are more detectable. The evidence suggests that the same trend occurs elsewhere (although with variant degrees) in the region. Furtado (1965: 151), has discussed the emergence of the Brazilian state as a oligarchic system in which the political was to protect and advance the interests of the “grands seigneurus.” Similarly, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006: 51-52), discuss the interconnectedness of the political and family networks in Colombia. Skidmore and Smith (2005: 460-470), describe the functioning of elite networks (political and social coalitions) in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, among others; they conclude that in the region “political outcomes...derive largely from the social class structure...” (Skidmore & Smith, 2005: 462). For a discussion on Chile see Zeitlin and Ratcliff (1988), and for Mexico see Smith (1979).

²⁷ Central America opens a clear “window” into this phenomenon. For example, Paniagua (2002), studies in detail 23 family groups in El Salvador. He demonstrates that family networks are the foundation of the hegemonic business blocs that control the country’s financial system and have a considerable presence in other sectors.

Central American ‘family’”(Stone, 1990: 4). Here it is worthwhile to quote at length from Stone’s (1990) groundbreaking study:

“A Costa Rican social class formed by conquistadors and their descendants has provided most of the important office holders there since the conquest. One conquistador, Cristobal de Alfaro, is forefather of all the presidents (with a single exception) since Independence... His family tree frequently crosses with that of another conquistador, Juan Vasquez de Coronado, who has generated over half the presidents and over a quarter of the members of congress, and was married to a cousin of Pedro Arias de Avila (Pedrarias), conquistador and governor of Panama. Vaquez’s family tree crosses with that of Jorge de Alvarado, conquistador of El Salvador and Guatemala, who is forefather of a tenth of the members of congress (some one hundred forty) in Costa Rica and was a brother of Pedro de Alvarado, conquistador of Guatemala” (Stone, 1990: 6-7).

According to Stone, in Central America, many of its presidents, “even today, are descended directly from noble colonial families;” many rulers “have been and continue to be related to their counterparts” in other countries of the region (Stone, 1990: 3). The networks “cannot be controlled by the majority even through democratic means” due to the elites’ “power, organization, political skill, and personal ability of its members” (Stone, 1990: 5). The elites’ power emerges from their “capacity to establish the terms of admission to its ranks, such as conformity with criteria of interests (wealth) and ideology (social origin, education, religion)” (Stone, 1990: 5). In this sense, the region’s states have been enmeshed by design; they have not been recently privatised as others argue. More importantly, Stone’s study shows how family networks act as a key factor in delimiting the state’s nature and powers. This is not to argue, however, that what we observe in the region is a unified elite. There are several parallel networks; and in this sense, the elites are hard to define. Yet, if need be it, they can present a harmonised regional position.

Political and Social Will within Regional Integration

The enmeshment of the Latin American state has important consequences for regionalism. The process as a norm must be socialised: it must be transmitted throughout society and, via learning, internalised.²⁸ In this way, integration gains salience within society.²⁹ Norms constrain behaviour and depend on the power distribution that underpins society. Norms need to be empowered; that is, “the prescriptions embodied in a norm become, through changes in discourse or behaviour, a focus of domestic political attention or debate,” a process that involves elites as “gatekeepers who ultimately control the political agenda” (Checkel, 1999b: 87-88).

According to Checkel (1999b: 88-90) there are four diffusion mechanisms through which norms are socialised depending on the domestic structure. First, the “liberal structure” in which political elites are highly restrained by the pressure exercised by domestic individuals or groups within the policy-making process. Within this configuration, “it is irrelevant whether [political] elites learn from norms.” Second, the state-above-society structure in which the state is free from domestic pressures and at the same time “exercises considerable control over society.” In this arrangement political elite learning is required if norms are to be empowered. Third, the corporatist structure in which political elites enjoy a “greater role in bringing about normative change than in the liberal case; however, this does not mean they impose their preferences” on society. This structure is characterised by “the policy networks connecting state and society; with the latter still accorded an important role in decision making.” Empowerment in the corporatist mechanism functions in a two-step process: first “societal pressure,” and second, political elite learning. Finally, Checkel presents the “statist” structure in which political elites’ learning fulfils a “dominant role in the process” of norm diffusion; this is so, because “societal penetration of the state and the organization of social interests are

²⁸ My interpretation of socialisation follows the definition offered by Checkel (1999a: 3).

²⁹ According to Cortell and Davis (2000: 69), norms acquire salience as society develops “a durable set of attitudes toward the norm’s legitimacy in the national arena, such that the norm is presumptively ‘accepted as a guide to conduct...’ when a norm is salient... its invocation by relevant actor legitimates a particular behavior or action, creating a prima facie obligation, and thereby calling into question or delegitimizing alternative choices.”

weaker than in the liberal or corporative” systems. Therefore, in the statist structure the probability that “pressure from below will empower norms is reduced.”

With this in mind and returning to the new regionalism studies on Latin American integration, it seems that the endogenous perspective with its multidimensional and multi-participatory take on the process could fit into the liberal or corporatist structures. The exogenous perspective attributes the state a greater role in socialization; thus it seemingly corresponds to the statist system. Conversely, the enmeshed state argument does not seem to fit quite comfortably in this categorization. The liberal and corporatist structures imply a society in which a multitude of pressure groups (civil society) are highly influential in policy making. On the other hand, the statist and state-above-society systems require an independent strong state. Perhaps, in the context of Latin American integration, it is more appropriate to talk about a variation of a statist structure; one to which I will refer to as “circumscribed-statist.” Within this structure, the state/political elites function as filters of regional norms, not necessarily going through the norm learning process, but searching for approval/support from the normative social elites (that is, the holders of *de facto* power)³⁰ for a given norm. Once approved/supported, the norm is empowered and then diffused and internalised by the rest of society. The norm diffusion mechanisms and the relationship between the state and society within them are summarised in table 1.

³⁰ Or as Manners (2002: 236 & 252) puts it, the “the changers of norm” or those with the ability to define what normal is.

Table 1. Norm Diffusion Mechanisms					
	Checkel's Original Categorisation				<i>Circumscribed-statist</i>
	<i>Liberal</i>	<i>Corporatist</i>	<i>Statist</i>	<i>State-over-Society</i>	
<i>Domestic Mechanisms Empowering Norms</i>	Societal pressure on [political] elites	Societal pressure on [political] elites (primary)	[Political] elite learning (primary)	[Political] elite learning	Political elite filtering
		[Political] elite learning (secondary)	Societal pressure on [political] elites (secondary)		Social elites approval ⇒ norm empowerment
<i>State-Society Links</i>	State constrained by organised society	State less constrained ⇒ Plays greater role in the process	State controls society	State fully controls society	State delimited by social elites with <i>de facto</i> power
	Bottom up ⇒ Individuals and groups play central role in policy-making	Society (policy networks) plays important role in policy-making	Weak societal penetration of the state and weak organisation of social interests	No organised social interests, nor societal state penetration	Great state penetration by a dominant social group and the rest of society is weakly organised

Source: Checkel (1999b) and the author's own elaboration.

The “circumscribed-statist” structure is evident in the Central American region. For example, once it was deemed that the reactivation of regionalism was necessary, political elites strove to find the social elites’ approval/support for the process. In a revealing document (FEDEPRICAP/FECAICA, 1991), organizations that represent the interests of regional social elites developed the basis for “a new model of integration.” In its introduction, the document states that the model has been elaborated “as per the request of the Ministers on Charge of Integration, to be presented at the Meeting of Ministers and Vice-Ministers on Charge of Integration....” In other words, at the moment that regionalism once again became fundamental, political elites look for the disposition of social elites to initiate the process.

The above argument implies that for regionalism to advance there must be a degree of willingness among the dominant social elites. This willingness may be labelled “social will,” or the predisposition of the normative social elites to support the integration process and to pressure the state to advance, or otherwise, the regional process. Social will emerges from the interplay of the elites’ interests, ideas/ideology and identity. Interests are not fixed in the “objective/material” spaces; they are “perceptual and

subjective” (Rosamond, 2002: 157). As individuals assign meaning to ideas,³¹ their interests rank ideas hierarchically by relevance and their identity delimits the scope within which the ideational meaning is shared. This interplay may follow other patterns. For instance, identity provides the basis for interests (Wendt, 1992: 398). As such, an identity modification may result in a shift in interests and new ideational meanings. This is not to argue, however, that regional integration is a monocausal process. Social will is a necessary background condition for the regional process; it is *not* the sole determinant of the process.

It is often argued that regionalism in Latin America has been constrained by political will. For instance, Grugel and Payne (2000: 217) indicate that “national political leaders retain, and jealously guard, the right to chart diplomatic strategy throughout the region.” This implies that regionalism’s stagnation or failure results from the political elite’s lack of willingness to advance integration because, by definition, the process diminishes their political power. Despite this, evidence from Central America suggests that political will regarding integration exist in the region. In a recent study on the political elites’ vision of the process, when asked directly about the existence of political will 15 of 44 (34%) of the participants indicated that such will exist in the area which seemingly corroborates the lack of political will argument. Yet, when analysed discursively how their ideas, interests and identity interplay, their narrative says otherwise: 95% (42 of 44) of the participants exhibit a positive interplay among the three dimensions (Caballero, 2006).³² The same study indicates that members of the political elite depend on certain social economic sectors.³³ This may influence the position that the political elite have in regards to integration. A lack of disposition (low social will) towards regionalism among the

³¹ I adopt Mittelman’s definition of ideas as “the shared meaning embodied in culture...they help to maintain and reproduce a social order, specifically by eliciting consent from both dominant and subordinate groups... [but they also] contain the capacity to create and to invent new ways of life, universalizing values bear the potential to serve as transforming agents” (1999: 35).

³² The original study included 55 members of 23 political parties from countries members of the System of Central American Integration which includes Panama and Dominican Republic. Because in this study I consider Central American as the nations that historically constitute the isthmus (i.e., Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua), I have taken into account the opinion of the political actors from these five countries; that is, 44 members of 20 parties.

³³ This dependency may stem from political financing as García (2005: 26) indicates: “Es indudable que las principales fuentes de financiamiento en Centroamérica proviene de recursos privados elitistas. Es decir, en pequeños círculos de grandes empresarios y volátiles donaciones extranjeras.”

socio-economic groups on which they depend may result in an anti-regional political stance. Thus, neglecting the link between the political and the social leads the observer to conclude that integration's record and nature results from the limited political will. In short, the Central American case indicates that there is a significant degree of political will toward integration in the region. Yet, if this is the case, why is it that the process in the area seems to be in a permanent state of stagnation? A potential answer lies in the social elites' role in the process.

The problem is that while studies of integration emphasise the degree of political will existent in a region, its social counterpart is not recognized as a separate analytical concept. In addition, it seems naive and misleading to believe that the mere existence of political will is sufficient to advance regionalism. Such context would be characteristic of a totalitarian state (one no stranger to Latin America); and yet, even in the latter state there are social groups whose support is needed by the controlling elite in order to pursue certain course of action. We must remember that processes, such as regionalism, are social constructions that emerge from interactions among social agents. Interactions occur through communicative links that spawn meaning systems which lead to commonly shared ideas. From this emerge structural frameworks that determine the actors' understanding of key issues and by doing so affect the agent's preferences. Social constructions are constantly reconstituted through interactions among different social groups (e.g., social and political elites, the media, academia, among others).

According to Searle (1996: 19), social constructions are elaborated on meaning that arise from functions distributed following a particular set of "interests of users and observers." Consequently, the impact that each societal group may have in the process differs greatly. In the social construction process, there are individuals and groups of individuals who possess "social authority" or the ability to determine a given social situation and what individuals must do (Collin, 1997: 227-228). From this context, I argue, processes such as integration arise and are sustained; institutions are (borrowing Collin's expression) "socially induced and socially endorsed." Actors within an integration process define the region discursively and in this sense they constantly exercise their normative power. In the absence of "overt coercion" normative elites enter a social interactive process based

on “argumentative persuasion” aiming at changing society’s attitudes and preferences about regional integration through “argument and principled debate” (Checkel, 2003: 212). In the Latin American context when considering the *de facto* power layer within regionalism’s understanding as a social construction, then it is clear that integration is underpinned by the predisposition of certain social elites to support the delegation of political power from the national to the regional. This is not to say that other social groups cannot articulate their particular conceptualisation of the region. Of course other discourses participate in the region’s construction, but their power to influence policy development is questionable.

Regionalism is a process that affects multiple dimensions and interests (political, economic, social, etc); as such it will inevitably become politicised. Politicisation leads to a stagnation phase in which political elites perform their internalisation-socialisation functions by looking for approval/support for new regional norms from the “normative” elites. The latter, based on the interplay of their interests, ideas and identity are predisposed (or not) to buttress further integration. In other words, integration’s advancement requires a degree of social will. This willingness is social because it emerges intersubjectively as meaning is assigned to the region. So far, our understanding has been that the stagnant nature of regionalism results from the lack of political will. If we bring the social will concept into the framework, then, arguably the lack of social will in the Latin American context has delimited the political will leading to the stagnant nature of the process.

To analyse this complex process one needs to identify the normative social elites that could exercise such prerogative over regionalism. In light of the family networks’ control of the *de facto* power, their close relationship with the business sector, and the economic focus of the process, it seems that the role of the latter group is fundamental for the assessment of social will. To be sure, Neo-functionalist and cooperative hegemonic, as well as some exogenously focused new regionalism studies, have asserted the business groups’ fundamental role in integration.³⁴ Grugel and Payne (2000: 205) argue that

³⁴ See Haas (1958) and Mattli (1999), for example.

business groups play an essential role, in Costa Rica for example, they have developed a strategy of “interpenetration with the governments” through which they influence regional policies and even “use the state” to advance their interests. This “interpenetration” argument is parallel to that of the recent politics’ privatization offered by Bull (2002: 2); and similarly, comes short of theorising the link, between the social and the political. More importantly, this shortcoming leads Grugel and Payne to assign the state a predominant role in the process. They argue that despite being an “energetic pressure group on all aspects,” the business elites “are not powerful enough to impose” a regional agenda upon the states (Grugel & Payne, 2000: 217).

Indeed, preliminary results point to the functioning and fundamental role of social will in the Central American region. After the decline of the Central American Common Market (CACM), efforts at reenergising the scheme during the 1970s were unsuccessful. There is evidence that regional business organisations (RBOs) that represented the interests of the Central American elites such as FECAICA³⁵ were not able to present a definite unified position regarding the restructuring of integration (Mariscal, 1983: 223). This was so because those elites who benefited the most (i.e., Guatemalan and Salvadoran) from CACM were reluctant to support reforms that would endanger their regional benefits.

By the mid-1980s, however, a degree of social will was growing: conditions in El Salvador and Guatemala were evolving positively towards the re-launching of regionalism. For instance, FUSADES³⁶ an influential policy-research organization founded by members of the most prominent Salvadoran family networks (Paige, 1997: 189);³⁷ among them former presidents, Alfredo Cristiani and Armando Calderon Sol, and current president Antonio Saca (FUSADES, 2003), in mid-1980s proposed a new regional economic model. The scheme would develop a diversified and efficient production structure, and generate higher profits through increased exports. It also proposed to increase the region’s import capacity, level of employment, and expand its

³⁵ Federación de Cámaras y Asociaciones Industriales de Centroamérica (Federation of Central American Industrial Chambers and Associations).

³⁶Fundación Salvadoreña Para el Desarrollo Económico y Social (Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development).

³⁷ For a list of the most prominent Salvadoran family networks see and Paniagua (2002: 616-617).

market (FUSADES, 1986: 4). Tellingly, the model required CACM's reactivation. As a FUSADES' official asserted, the interdependence among the Central American states was so that solutions to national issues could not be found independently, they had to be found regionally.³⁸ At this point a shift in the Salvadoran position occurred, and FUSADES' model was echoed by El Salvador's Chamber of Commerce and Industry. In its position to governmental economic measures, the Chamber considered essential to reactivate integration. Central America, according to the Chamber, was El Salvador's "natural market," to which a high percentage of Salvadoran products were destined (CAMARASAL, 1995). At that time, FUSADES also began its attempts at revitalising RBOs (Lungo-Uclès, 1996: 135).

Similar conditions were evolving in Guatemala where the Chamber of Industry established that its essential purpose was to consolidate the regional market and to increase its negotiation leverage in the international market through the region's integrated action. Accomplishing this objective was to allow the Guatemalan industrials to increase their industrial and agro-industrial exports. In turn, such an achievement would produce economic growth for the country (CIG, 1999). According to Jacobo Tefel (1999), Director of the Chamber, the strategy was directed at the attainment of "larger markets for a larger number of industrial and agro-industrial products with a greater local content;" the aimed, was to "strengthen the development of integration process...and the modernization of its instruments."

In the past, the reluctance of the Salvadoran and Guatemalan elites about integration reforms did not allow RBOs to produce a solid position regarding the process. Therefore, the existence of social will in the region should have reversed this condition and enabled those organisations to present such a position. Indeed, two RBOs, FEDEPRICAP³⁹ and FECAICA, in a key document (1991: iv-v) declared that the regional private enterprises organizations are working "in the same direction." Their objectives in this conjoint endeavour are the improvement of regional productivity, export-led development, the

³⁸ Roberto Murray Meza, quoted in Lungo-Uclès (1996: 136).

³⁹ Federación de Entidades Privadas de Centroamérica y Panamá (Federation of Private Enterprises of Central America and Panama).

exploitation of the region's comparative advantage, increased regional competitiveness, and access to larger markets (1991: ii-iv). In addition, FEDEPRICAP (1990: 87-91) establishes that Central America must improve regional efficiency and cooperation to obtain "greater penetration and participation in larger economic blocs." These goals, according to FEDEPRICAP, can be accomplished through the utilisation of regional integration's mechanisms.

Another RBO, FECAMCO⁴⁰ (1990), suggests that to achieve development (economic, political and social) it is necessary to facilitate deeper integration (FECAMCO, 1990: 95). FECAMCO expresses concerns about the levels of efficiency and quality control in the region; and it also advocates industrial modernization and the promotion and diversification of exports (FECAMCO, 1990: 96). Moreover, FECAMCO indicates the need for an adequate level of competitiveness in the region. According to the Federation, these objectives could be accomplished through exports as the foundation for economic growth which would enable the region to better participate in the international economy (FECAMCO, 1990: 97-98). To this end, FECAMCO proposes CACM's reactivation, and it emphasises the benefits of negotiating as a bloc; it concludes that is necessary to advance toward higher integration levels (1990: 98-99). Similarly, FECAICA argues that economic integration must be one of the bases for economic growth. Integration must be based on the increase of exports which would lead to larger markets; thus it is of vital importance that integration foments free trade and that it establishes a common external tariff. Integration's "central objective" must be the Central American development (FECAICA, 1990: 104-106).

From this discussion two points must be highlighted. First, it is significant to note that proposals reviewed here predate (i.e., FUSADES, 1986) or are contemporaries (e.g., FEDEPRICAP and FECAMCO, 1990) of President Busch's Enterprise for the Americas (launched in mid-1990) and NAFTA (1994) both considered as the fundamental catalyst

⁴⁰ Federación de las Cámaras de Comercio del Istmo Centroamericano (Federation of Chambers of Commerce of the Central American Isthmus).

for regionalism's reactivation in the area.⁴¹ Second, the discussion stresses the Salvadoran and Guatemalan elites' convergence, and thus among regional organisations that represent them, around the three dimensions of social will discussed previously: interests, ideas/ideology and identity. Regarding interests, obviously they are underlined by a common economic core: larger markets, increased exports, and economic efficiency; capitalizing these interests would, in turn, produce economic growth for country and region. Ideologically, those interests are articulated through a neo-liberal model; ideationally, these elites assigned an economic meaning to integration: integration is economic development. Finally, the documents examined reveal a high degree of awareness about a Central American "self:" they all perceive that the national and regional are inextricably linked.

The market "logic" that the underlying common interests among the elites implies, it seems, redefines the ideational meaning of the region (e.g., Central America) and, at the same time, overpowers the identity dimension. In other words, because the economic logic points to the search for greater markets, the "region" must be redefined as a greater region (e.g., hemispheric agreements) and several "others" become "self-images" as the regional identity is reconstructed in order to encompass the region's new meaning. In this space, the social interacts with the political but the former imposes its discourse on the latter. As the process occurs, the elites' economic interests become preponderant and the social is articulated in an overarching economic discourse. Thus the political is devoid of its meaning restricting the integration process to a limited economic space. The integrationist discourse is then seen as an "emptied" rational exercise employed to obtain economic benefits. Integration in the region seems a set of "dead words or hollow institutions" (Marques Moreira, 2000: 159). Considering the existence of political will in Central America, and the evidence of the role of social will, it seems that such nature can be best understood by the interplay of the social and the political; a struggle in which the former superimposes itself on the latter.

⁴¹ See for example, Grugel and Payne (2000) and Gamble and Payne (2003). On the Enterprise see Payne (1996).

Conclusion

My intention in this paper was to assess the implications that new regionalism approaches have had for the study of Latin American integration. I have argued that the application of new regionalism's meanings and perspectives to Latin America has led to a somewhat narrow view of the process. While quantitative, qualitative and exogenous studies have concluded that the nature and rhythm of the region's integration are dictated by the US hegemony, the endogenous perspective has been left in want of a hard-to-find effective multilevel participation. The inability to fulfil this analytical void has led those studies to focus on the role of the state. Yet, the nature of the Latin American state is hardly assessed. In this sense, new regionalism studies have arrived at a state-centric view of the process; coming full circle with the classic school's "original sin."

This fairly narrow understanding, I argue, is the result of overlooking and/or under theorising the process's intersubjective spaces. Skimming the existence of a regional identity does not tell us the impact that such identity has in the persistence of integration and in its patchy nature. Similarly, overlooking the region's historically oligarchic character does not enable us to understand why the different regional discourses cannot find an effective interlocutor. The incorporation into regionalism's framework of a binary identity and the ideational interplay between the political and social wills within an enmeshed state illuminates the complexities of the Latin American integration. For instance, looking through a more intersubjectively oriented lens the chaotic spaghetti-bowl-like image of the region's integration becomes "an order to be deciphered."⁴²

To conclude, in the context of Latin American studies, the under-development of new regionalism's theoretical and methodological meanings proposed by De Lombaerde (2003) have resulted in a limited understanding of the region's integration. Most new regionalism studies have remained within the process' quantitative and qualitative dimensions; to break with the analytical circle in which it has fallen, new regionalism studies of Latin America should build up the theoretical and methodological spaces. By

⁴² The expression is Saramago's (2002: 140-141).

doing so, new regionalism would have greater possibilities to overcome the discursive entrapment that it seems to be experiencing.

References

- Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2006). Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions. *NBER Working Paper Series #12108*.
- Adler, E. (2005). Barry Buzan's Use of Constructivism to Reconstruct the English School: "Not All the Way Down". *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 34(1), 171-182.
- Andres-Gallego, J. (1992). *Quince Revoluciones y Algunas Cosas Mas*. Madrid: Editorial MAPFRE.
- Bierck, H. (1990). Simon Bolivar: The Life, the Man. In L. Hanke & J. Rausch (Eds.), *People and Issues in Latin American History: From Independence to the Present - Sources and Interpretations*. New York: Markus Wiener Publishing.
- Blakemore, H., & Smith, C. (1976). Conclusion: Unity and Diversity in Latin America. In H. Blakemore & C. Smith (Eds.), *Latin America: Geographical Perspectives*. London: Methuen & Co.
- Botero, J. C., Djankov, S., La Porta, R., López-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2004). The Regulation of Labor. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119(4), 1339 - 1382.
- Brading, D. (1998). Patriotism and the Nation in Colonial Spanish America. In L. Roniger & M. Sznajder (Eds.), *Constructing Collective Identities and Shaping Public Spheres: Latin American Paths*. Brighton Sussex Academic Press.
- Brown, R. F. (1997). *Juan Fermin de Aycinena: Central American Colonial Entrepreneur 1729-1796*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Bull, B. (1999). 'New Regionalism' in Central America. *Third World Quarterly*, 20(5), 957-970.
- Bull, B. (2002). *New Regionalism-Old Elites: Change and Continuity in the Remaking of Meso America*. Paper presented at the British International Studies Association, 27th Annual Conference.
- Bull, B., & Bøås, M. (2003). Multilateral Development Banks as Regionalising Actors: The Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. *New Political Economy*, 8(2), 245-261.
- Bulmer-Thomas, V. (Ed.). (2001). *Regional Integration in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Political Economy of Open Regionalism*. London: Institute of Latin American Studies University of London.
- Caballero, J. (2006). *Estudio de las Organizaciones Políticas Partidarias Existente en la Región y su Visión del Proceso de Integración Regional*. San Salvador: PAIRCA.

- Camarasal. (1995). Posición de la Cámara de Comercio e Industria de El Salvador Ante el Plan Económico del Gobierno. *Carta Informativa* 228, 1-2.
- Carlos, M. L., & Sellers, L. (1972). Family, Kinship Structure, and Modernization in Latin America. *Latin American Research Review*, 7(2), 1972.
- Casaus, M. E. (1994). La Pervivencia de las Redes Familiares en la Configuración de la Elite de Poder Centroamericana: El Caso de la Familia Diaz Duran. *Anuario de Estudios Centroamericanos*, 20(2), 41-69.
- Centeno, M. A. (2002). The Centre Did Not Hold: War in Latin America and the Monopolisation of Violence. In J. Dunkerley (Ed.), *Studies in the Formation of the Nation-State in Latin America* (pp. 54-76). London: Institute of Latin American Studies.
- Checkel, J. (1999a). International Institutions and Socialization. *ARENA Working Papers* (WP99/5).
- Checkel, J. (1999b). Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe. *International Studies Quarterly*, 43(1), 83-114.
- Checkel, J. (2003). 'Going Native' in Europe? Theorizing Social Interaction in European Institutions. *Comparative Political Studies*, 36(1/2), 209-231.
- CIG. (1999). Las Ponencias del Sector Industrial. *Industria*, 11, 4.
- Collin, F. (1997). *Social Reality*. London: Routledge.
- Cortell, A. P., & Davis, J. W. (2000). Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda. *International Studies Review*, 2, 65-87.
- De Lombaerde, P. (2003). Review: New Regionalism in the Global Political Economy: Theories and Cases. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 41(5), 968-969.
- De Lombaerde, P., & Garay, L. J. (2006). The New Regionalism in Latin America and the Role of the US. *UNU-CRIS Occasional Papers #O-2006/10*.
- Devlin, R., & Estevadeordal, A. (2002). The New Regionalism in Latin America. In IADB (Ed.), *Beyond Borders: the New Regionalism in Latin America*. Washington DC: John Hopkins University Press.
- Djankov, S., La Porta, R., López-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2003). Courts. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 118(2), 453-517.

- Duina, F. (2004). Regional market building as a social process: an analysis of cognitive strategies in NAFTA, the European Union and Mercosur. *Economy and Society*, 33(3), 359-389.
- Duina, F. (2005). *The Social Construction of Free Trade: The European Union, NAFTA and Mercosur*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Duina, F. (2006). Varieties of Regional Integration: The EU, NAFTA and Mercosur. *European Integration*, 28(3), 247-275.
- Duina, F., & Breznau, N. (2002). Constructing Common Cultures: The Ontological and Normative Dimensions of Law in the European Union and Mercosur. *European Law Journal*, 8(4), 574-595.
- Editorial: El Bloque Hegemonico. (2002). *ECA*, LVII, 593-604.
- Etzioni, A. (1965). *Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Fawcett, L. (2004). Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism. *International Affairs*, 80(3), 429-446.
- Fecaica. (1990). Propuesta de las Cámaras y Asociaciones Industriales Centroamericanas. *Revista de la Integración y el Desarrollo de Centroamérica*, 47, 101-107.
- Fecamco. (1990). Propuesta de las Cámaras de Comercio del Istmo Centroamericano. *Revista de la Integración y el Desarrollo de Centroamérica*, 47, 93-99.
- Fedepriac. (1990). Propuesta del Sector Empresarial Organizado a Los Presidentes de los Países del Istmo Centroamericano. *Revista de la Integración y el Desarrollo de Centroamérica*, 47, 87-91.
- Fedepriac/Fecaica. (1991). *Centro América: Hacia un Nuevo Modelo de Integración*. San Jose, Costa Rica: FEDEPRICAP.
- Furtado, C. (1965). Political Obstacles to Economic Growth in Brazil. In C. Veliz (Ed.), *Obstacles to Change in Latin America*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Fusades. (1986). El Mercado Común Centroamericano y el Modelo de Fomento de Exportaciones. *Boletín Económico y Social*, 15, 4-6.
- Fusades. (2003). Miembros Honorarios y Fundadores [Electronic Version]. Available at: www.fusades.com.sv. Retrieved 18 September 2006.
- Gamble, A., & Payne, A. (2003). The World Order Approach. In F. Soderbaum & T. M. Shaw (Eds.), *Theories of New Regionalism: A Palgrave Reader*. New York: Palgrave.

- García, F. (2005). ¿Cómo se Financian los Partidos Políticos en Centroamérica? *Reporte Político: Panorama Centroamericano* (204), 20-29.
- Gauhar, A. (Ed.). (1985). *Regional Integration: The Latin American Experience*. London: Third World Foundation for Social and Economic Studies.
- Griffin, C. C. (1966). Economic and Social Aspects of the Era of Spanish-American Independence. In L. Hanke (Ed.), *Readings in Latin American History: Selected Articles from the Hispanic American Historical Review* (Vol. Volume II: Since 1810). New York: Thomas Crowell.
- Grugel, J. (2004a). *Civil Society and Inclusion in New Regionalism: Can Civil Society Influence a Trade-led Agenda?* Paper presented at the Second Annual Conference of the Euro-Latin Trade Network, Florence.
- Grugel, J. (2004b). New Regionalism and Modes of Governance - Comparing US and EU Strategies in Latin America. *European Journal of International Relations*, 10(4), 603-626.
- Grugel, J., & Payne, A. (2000). Regionalist Responses in the Caribbean Basin. In B. Hettne, A. Inotai & O. Sunkel (Eds.), *National Perspectives on the New Regionalism in the South* Hampshire: Macmillan Press & UNU/WIDER.
- Guerra, F. X. (1999). De lo Uno a lo Multiple: Dimensiones y Logicas de la Independencia. In A. McFarlane & E. Posada-Carbo (Eds.), *Independence and Revolution in Spanish America: Perspectives and Problems*. London: Institute of Latin American Studies.
- Guzzini, S. (2005). The Concept of Power: A Constructivist Analysis. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 33(3), 495-521.
- Haas, E. B. (1958). *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Halperin Donghi, T. (1985). *Reforma y Disolucion de los Imperios Ibericos 1750-1850*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
- Hettne, B. (2003). The New Regionalism Revisited. In F. Soderbaum & T. M. Shaw (Eds.), *Theories of New Regionalism: A Palgrave Reader*. New York: Palgrave.
- Hettne, B. (2005). Beyond the 'New' Regionalism. *New Political Economy*, 10(4), 543-571.
- Hurrell, A. (1995a). Regionalism in the Americas. In L. Fawcett & A. Hurrell (Eds.), *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Hurrell, A. (1995b). Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective. In L. Fawcett & A. Hurrell (Eds.), *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kadushin, C. (1968). Power, Influence and Social Circle: A New Methodology for Studying Opinion Makers. *American Sociological Review*, 33(5), 685-699.
- Keller, S. (1963). *Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society*. New York: Random House.
- La Porta, R., López-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998). Law and Finance. *Journal of Political Economy*, 106 (6), 1113-1155.
- Levinson, J., & Onis, J. d. (1972). *The Alliance That Lost Its Way: A Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress*. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
- Lockhart, J. (1985). Encomienda and Hacienda: The Evolution of the Great Estate in the Spanish Indies. In P. J. Bakewell, J. J. Johnson & M. D. Dodge (Eds.), *Readings in Latin American History: The Formative Centuries* (Vol. I). Durham: Duke University Press.
- Lomne, G. (2003). El "Espejo Roto" de la Colombia Bolivariana (1820-1850). In A. Annino & F. X. Guerra (Eds.), *Inventando la Nación: Iberoamerica Sigo XIX*. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica.
- Lungo-Uclès, M. (1996). *El Salvador in the Eighties: Counterinsurgency and Revolution*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Lynch, J. (2001). *Latin America Between Colony and Nation: Selected Essays*. New York: Palgrave.
- Mallon, F. E. (1995). *Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Mallon, F. E. (2002). Decoding the Parchments of the Latin American Nation-State: Peru, Mexico and Chile in Comparative Perspective In J. Dunkerley (Ed.), *Studies in the Formation of the Nation-State in Latin America*. London: Institute of Latin American Studies.
- Mann, M. (1992). *The Sources of Social Power: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914* (Vol. II). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Manners, I. (2002). Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(2), 235-258.

- Manners, I. (2006). Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13(2), 182-199.
- Mariscal, N. (1983). *Integración Económica y Poder Político en Centroamérica: Intentos de Reestructuración de 1969 a 1981*. San Salvador, El Salvador: UCA Editores.
- Marques Moreira, M. (2000). Globalization versus Regionalism: A Brazilian Point of View. In B. Hettne, A. Inotai & O. Sunkel (Eds.), *National Perspectives on the New Regionalism in the South*. Hampshire Macmillan Press & UNU/WIDER.
- Martí, J. (1891, 10 January). Nuestra América. *La Revista Ilustrada de Nueva York*.
- Mattli, W. (1999). *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mercier Vega, L. (1969). *Roads to Power in Latin America* (R. Rowland, Trans.). London: Pall Mall Press.
- Middlebrook, K. J. (1978). Regional Organizations and Andean Economic Integration, 1969-1975. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, XVII(1), 62-82.
- Mittelman, J. H. (1999). Rethinking the 'New Regionalism' in the Context of Globalization. In B. Hettne, A. Inotai & O. Sunkel (Eds.), *Globalism and the New Regionalism*. Hampshire: Macmillan Press & UNU/WIDER.
- OAS. (1961a). Charter of Punta del Este: Establishing an Alliance for Progress within the Framework of Operation Pan America [Electronic Version]. Available at: <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/intdip/interam/intam16.htm>.
- OAS. (1961b). Declaration to the Peoples of America. In *Alliance for Progress: Special Documents Emanating from the Special Meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council at the Ministerial Level, Held at Punta del Este, Uruguay, from August 5 to 17, 1961, OEA/Ser. H/XII.1, rev.* (pp. 3-16). Washington DC: Pan American Union.
- Oszlak, O. (1981). The Historical Formation of the State in Latin America. *Latin American Research Review*, 16(2), 3-32.
- Paige, J. M. (1997). *Coffee and Power: Revolution and the Rise of Democracy in Central America*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Paniagua, C. R. (2002). El Bloque Empresarial Hegemónico Salvadoreño. *ECA*, LVII, 609-693.
- Payne, A. (1996). The United States and its Enterprise for the Americas. In A. Gamble & A. Payne (Eds.), *Regionalism and World Order*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

- Peloso, V. C., & Tenenbaum, B. A. (1996). Introduction. In V. C. Peloso & B. A. Tenenbaum (Eds.), *Liberals, Politics, and Power: State Formation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Pendersen, T. (2002). Cooperative Hegemony: Power, Ideas and Institutions in Regional Integration. *Review of International Studies*, 28, 677-696.
- Pratt, M. L. (1999). Arts of the Contact Zone. In D. Bartholomae & A. Petrofsky (Eds.), *Ways of Reading*. New York: St. Martin's.
- Quijada, M. (2003). Que Nacion? Dinamicas y Dicotomias de la Nacion en el Imaginario Hispanoamericano. In A. Annino & F. X. Guerra (Eds.), *Inventando la Nacion: Iberoamerica Siglo XIX*. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica.
- Rosamond, B. (2002). Imagining the European Economy: 'Competitiveness' and the Social Construction of 'Europe' as an Economic Space. *New Political Economy*, 7(2), 157-177.
- Rosamond, B. (2005). The Uniting of Europe and the Foundation of EU Studies: Revisiting the Neofunctionalism of Ernst B. Haas. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 12(2), 1-18.
- Rosamond, B., & Warleigh, A. (2006). *Theorising Regional Integration Comparatively: An Introduction*. Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Workshop 10: Comparative Regional Integration - Towards a Research Agenda, Nicosia, Cyprus
- Saramago, J. (2002). *El Hombre Duplicado*. México: Punto de Lectura.
- Searle, J. (1996). *The Construction of Social Reality*. London: Penguin Books.
- Skidmore, T., & Smith, P. (2005). *Modern Latin America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Smith, A. D. (1996). Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism. *International Affairs*, 72(3), 445-458.
- Smith, P. (1979). *Labyrinths of Power: Political Recruitment in Twentieth-Century Mexico*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Soderbaum, F. (2003). Introduction: Theories of New Regionalism. In F. Soderbaum & T. M. Shaw (Eds.), *Theories of New Regionalism: A Palgrave Reader*. New York: Palgrave.
- Stone, S. Z. (1990). *The Heritage of the Conquistadors: Ruling Classes in Central America from the Conquest to the Sandinistas*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

- Stuven, A. M. (1998). Orden y Sociedad: Mentalidad y Cultura Política de las Elites Chilenas, 1830-1850. In E. Posada-Carbo (Ed.), *In Search of a New Order: Essays on the Politics and Society of Nineteenth-Century Latin America*. London: Institute of Latin America Studies.
- Sunkel, O. (2000). Development and Regional Integration in Latin America: Another Chance for an Unfulfilled Promise? In B. Hettne, A. Inotai & O. Sunkel (Eds.), *The New Regionalism and the Future of Security and Development*. Hampshire Macmillan Press & UNU/WIDER.
- Tefel, J. (1999). Mas Mercados Para Productos Industriales. *Industria*, 11, 16-18.
- Van Klaveren, A. (2000). Chile: The Search for Open Regionalism. In B. Hettne, A. Inotai & O. Sunkel (Eds.), *National Perspectives on the New Regionalism in the South*. Hampshire: Macmillan Press & UNU/WIDER.
- Van Langenhove, L., Torta, I., & Costea, A. C. (2006). The Ascent of Regional Integration. *UNU-CRIS Occasional Papers #0-2006/5*.
- Waisman, C. H. (1998). The Dynamics of National Identity Frames: The Case of Argentina in the Twentieth Century In L. Roniger & M. Sznajder (Eds.), *Constructing Collective Identities and Shaping Public Spheres: Latin American Paths*. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press.
- Weldes, J., Laffey, M., Gusterson, H., & Duvall, R. (1999). Introduction: Constructing Insecurity. In J. Weldes, M. Laffey, H. Gusterson & R. Duvall (Eds.), *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and Production of Danger*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is What the States Make of It. *International Organization*, 46, 391-425.
- Wendt, A. (1994). Collective Identity Formation and the International State. *American Political Science Review*, 88(2), 384-396.
- Wiarda, H. (2001). *The Soul of Latin America: The Cultural and Political Tradition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Woodward, R. L. (1996). The Liberal-Conservative Debate in the Central American Federation, 1823-1840. In V. C. Peloso & B. A. Tenenbaum (Eds.), *Liberals, Politics, and Power: State Formation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Wortman, M. L. (1982). *Government and Society in Central America, 1680-1840*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Zeitlin, M., & Ratcliff, R. E. (1988). *Landlords & Capitalists: The Dominant Class of Chile*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.