




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Security Governance in a Comparative Regional Perspective

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Abstract

This article aims to explore the relationship between domestic economic and political conditions and the performance of 14 regional organisations over a range of security provisions. It argues that the willingness of member states to increase the range of security provisions of a regional organisation is influenced by the combination of high levels of economic and political development and low levels of dispersion among the members of a regional organisation. In order to evaluate this assumption, two aspects of regional organisations will be explored. The first is to examine the existing scope of security provisions of 14 regional organisations together with the associated autonomy of empowerment arrangements (coordination, management enforcement instruments) of those organisations. The second is to analyse how six economic and political variables influence the range of security provisions and the degree of empowerment of regional organisations.

Introduction¹

As the number and scope of regional organisations have spread since the end of the Cold War, the way regional organisations conceptualise security and practice their collective duties has become a focus of attention of scholars. The prolific literature on the governance of regional organisations has shed some light on their institutional mechanisms and autonomy (Acharya and Johnston 2007, Tavares 2009, Laursen 2010), the variety of security governance policies (Kirchner and Sperling 2007a, Kirchner and Sperling 2007b, Kirchner and Dominguez 2011), the conditions to become significant actors (Kirchner and Dorussen 2012) and the capacity of member states to enable regional organisations to produce collective security goods, particularly in the case of NATO (Olsen and Zeckhauser 1966, Sandler and Hartley 2001, Shizumu and Sandler 2002) and the EU (Dorussen, Kirchner and Sperling 2009). While the research agenda of the security governance of regional organisations has produced significant contributions, some scholars (Christou, Croft, Ceccorully and Lucarelli 2012) rightly argue that it is still necessary to advance systematic comparisons and strengthen the methodological foundations of the security research in the analysis of security governance.

This article is based on the literature of regional organisations (Breslin and Croft 2012, Tavares 2009, van der Vleuten and Ribeiro Hoffmann 2010, and Kirchner and Dominguez 2011) and explores the extent to which domestic political and economic conditions of member states affect the range of security provisions and hence the levels of security governance of regional organisations. To this end, the article develops a comparative study of 14 regional organisations in Africa (African Union-AU, Economic Community of West African States-ECOWAS, and South African Development Community-SADC), Asia (Association of Southeast Asian Nations-Regional Forum-ARF, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation-SCO, Collective Security Treaty Organisation-CSTO), Europe (European Union-EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation-NATO, Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe-OSCE), and Latin America and the Caribbean (Organisation of American States-OAS, South American Union of Nations- UNASUR, Union Andean Community of Nations-CAN, Southern Common Market-MERCOSUR, Caribbean Community-CARICOM). The benefits of such a comparative and empirical study are that they will allow the identification of the variety of conceptions and practices of regional organisations and help to shed further clarity on the concept of security governance.

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The key argument advanced in this investigation is that regional organisations develop different levels of security governance as a response to their particular milieu, such as the levels of political (corruption, rule of law and political rights) and economic development (human development index, economic freedom and government effectiveness). Previous scholarly works have paid attention to the domestic characteristics of members states of regional organisations in the policy making of regional security governance (Goltermann, et. al., 2012). In order to evaluate this assumption, two aspects of regional organisations will be explored. The first is to examine the existing scope of security provisions of 14 regional organisations and to assess the autonomy or empowerment (coordination, management and enforcement instruments) of those regional organisations. The second is to analyse how six economic and political variables influence the level of security governance system, as measured by the scope of security provisions performed and the degree of autonomy delegated to regional organisations.

Levels of Regional Security Governance

The chosen framework for the analysis of this article is the concept of security governance, which alerts us to the multiple actors and levels of security engagement and assumes that norms, rules and ideas are, besides interests, also influential in the shaping of security policies (Webber *et al.* 2004; Coates 2010). The strength of this framework lies in conceptualising the coordination, management and regulation (including forms of institutionalisation and routinisation) of regional security (Kirchner 2006, p.965). In order to evaluate the similarities and differences of the security governance of these 14 regional organisations, it is necessary to examine the domestic conditions of member states of regional organisations, as they affect their performance in the provision of security policy. The main assumption is that regional organisations reflect the security governance consensus of the member states by choosing some security policies over others (for instance assurance policy over compellence policy) and by selecting from a range of policy instruments, such as coordination, management and enforcement mechanisms. The choice of which security dimensions is favoured and which empowerment mechanism is selected helps to determine which system of security governance (e.g., balance of power, security community or collective defence) is in operation in a given regional organisation. In line with this consideration the intersection of two main elements will be at the heart of the investigation in this article,

namely, security governance policies and organisational autonomy; each of which is described briefly in the following.

Security Governance Policies: The security governance framework is based on four dimensions of security policy –namely, policies of assurance, prevention, protection and compellence. Policies of assurance relate to measures taken in post-conflict situations. Policies of prevention deal primarily with root causes of conflict and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Policies of protection aim at protecting society from external threats, e.g., transnational terrorist organisations, organised crime and corruption. Policies of compellence involve peace-making and peace enforcement interventions (Kirchner 2006, Kirchner and Sperling 2007a, Dorussen *et al.* 2009).

Level of Autonomy or Empowerment of Regional Organisations: While the four security governance policies are helpful for comprehensively understanding the activity of regional organisations, the level of autonomy or empowerment complements the explanation with regard to the willingness of member states to deepen security cooperation. Most of regional organisations have expanded their agendas to respond to the increasing complexity of security threats, particularly in declarations and statements. Nonetheless, member states act more cautiously about empowering regional organisations with instruments for managing, monitoring or enforcing rules and norms because such empowerment often entails a commitment to collective goals and hence to self-restrain the use of unilateral actions. As a result, regional organisations experience a variance in the performance. While some research has been conducted in describing the variance of empowerment of regional organisations, this article advances a more precise typology based on the following sequence of four main instruments, which move from rhetorical security commitments, on one side of the spectrum, to actual provision of enforcement instruments, on the other.

- The first is the form setting stage or the stipulation of general goals and principles of regional organisations, which entails either treaty provisions or strategic statements with regard to security governance
- The second stage involves the provision of coordination actions. This instrument allows regional organisation to play a role of agenda setter, consensus maker and lead actor.
- The third stage provides regional organisations with instruments at the implementation of common policies. This can involve the monitoring of policies, the administration of

funds, and the management of personnel such as in peacemaking or peace keeping missions. Lack of implementation or management instruments, together with insufficient resources and manpower are likely to inhibit the role of regional organisations.

- Enforcement and solidarity provisions represent the highest level of regional organisational empowerment and constitute the fourth stage of the analysis. They involve the oversight of central institutional courts and bodies or the use of solidarity and collective defence commitments via treaties. While most states are still reluctant to accept this kind of provisions, because it signals the erosion of sovereignty, some are willing to suspend membership within an organisation (e.g., the OAS, the AU, SADC and ECOWAS) or enact sanctions (e.g., the EU). The use of force to restore or keep peace is only practiced by a few regional organisations, such as NATO, the AU and ECOWAS

An overview of how the 14 regional organisations either cover the full spectrum of security provisions, or engage in the third and fourth stage of empowerment instruments or institutional autonomy, is provided in Table 1. To illustrate those characteristics in some quantitative fashion the following ordinal codification will be used. Each one of four policies of security governance will be assigned a value of 0.25 per each one of the levels of empowerment of regional organisations and to lead to a sum of four points as the maximum score: $4 - \text{very high}$; $3 \leq \text{Total} < 4$, high; $2 \leq \text{Total} < 3$, then, medium; $1 \leq \text{Total} < 2$, low; and $\text{Total} < 1$, very low.

The general trend, as shown in Table 1, is that regional organisations are inclined to enshrine goals of all four security governance policies in their organisational treaties, but the willingness to develop further empowerment instruments progressively decreases in the areas of management and enforcement. This broad tendency, however, manifests remarkable differences not only among regional organisations, but also from region to region. As indicated in table 1, the EU is the only organisation that fulfills the matrix of the four dimensions of security governance policies and the four stages of levels of autonomy. The EU's high level of security governance is based on, *inter alia*, the initial impulse aimed at making war not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible supported by a steady institutional development and delegation of policies for more than five decades (Kirchner and Sperling 2002). It also has made steady improvements in the allocation of resources. For example, the EU, sometimes in parallel with member states or when held exclusive competences, has implemented significant policies, such as in development aid, totaling 53.8 billion Euro in 2010, or in dispatching 25 civilian and military operations in countries of three continents since 2002.

NATO covers nearly the full-spectrum of security provisions and ranks high in terms of the scale of empowerment instruments, and therefore reaches a high level of security governance, but slightly below that of the EU. NATO has experienced significant transformations since the end of the Cold War by including policies beyond the strictly scope of a military alliance as it was conceived in the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, particularly in its Article 5. NATO enlargement from 12 to 28 members has served as an effective instrument of prevention through the adaptation of norms of new members and, since its first major peace-support operation in the Balkans in the early 1990s, NATO operations have increased in order to cover the full spectrum of crisis management operations – from combat and peacekeeping, to training and logistics support, to surveillance and humanitarian relief (NATO 2012) in Afghanistan, Kosovo, the Mediterranean, off the Horn of Africa and in Somalia. The only area where NATO scores low is on assurance policy. NATO is less involved with civilian peace building exercises (police training, or rule of law missions) and more with military ones in the fields of peacemaking or peace keeping. The lack of emphasis on assurance policy corresponds to insufficiently existing management and enforcement instruments in this policy. Unlike NATO, the AU, since the creation of its predecessor the Organisation of the African Unity, seeks to emulate the EU institutional model and to encompass the full-spectrum of security policies, and hence a high level of security governance, but below that of NATO and the EU. While in the transatlantic area most of the origins of threats are external, the AU faces a variety of sources of political and security instability coming from its member states, which produces a two-fold effect. On the one hand, the environment of instability requires member states to respond collectively to threats in the areas of assurance and especially compellence (e.g., the Peace and Security Council, the peacekeeping operations in Burundi, Sudan and Somalia, and in the suspension of Mauritania). On the other hand, policies of prevention and protection experience less development due to the lack of resources and the weaknesses of the member states. For instance, the EU has allocated 243 million Euro for its CSDP operations for the 2007-13 period (Gya 2009). In comparison, the AU allocated 38 million Euro toward its Peace Fund between June 1999 to July 2003 (Williams 2009, p.618); it is overwhelmingly funded by external support from the EU, USA, Canada and others (Hardt 2009, p.393).

Three organisations practice a limited range of security policies together with a mixture of empowerment instruments. These are the OSCE, the OAS and UNASUR. While the three organisations were conceived under three different historical contexts, all of them share a common denominator, proclaim extensive coverage of all four policies of security governance in their charters and in the coordination of provisions, but are cautious and selective in the deployment of empowerment instruments, especially with regard to management and enforcement aspects. The transformation of the OSCE since the end of the Cold War has made it a significant contributor in the processes of monitoring democracy and post-conflict situations (assurance and prevention), which has resulted in the development of empowerment instruments, such as the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, and the Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media. To a lesser extent, the OSCE has also served as a forum of negotiation for agreements on protection (terrorism or human trafficking). Even less so have been its engagements in compellence policies, where the OSCE has no mandate to engage in military operations, and where it has only exercised the suspension of membership. The OAS, has obtained coordination mechanisms and management instruments for policies of, assurance (mediation in conflicts) and prevention (election monitoring missions). With regard to policies of protection, it has coordination instruments, such as the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission. In the field of compellence policy, it has provisions for mutual assistance in the case of an attack on a member state (Inter-American Treaty on Reciprocal Assistance), carries out annual allied military exercises, and uses the suspension of member states in cases of abrupt disruption of political stability (Honduras 2009-2011). However, in light of the history of US military interventions in Latin America and the still tense relations between the United States and several Latin American countries such as Venezuela or Bolivia, there is some reluctance to engage into further cooperations within the OAS. Emulating the OAS, but without the participation of the United States, UNASUR was created in 2008 as a South American project to undertake a comprehensive security agenda and institutions ranging from health, energy and development to drugs and defence. While the broad agenda of UNASUR is still in its initial stages, some progress has taken place in the coordination and management of security policies and in some cases of enforcement, such as the suspension of Paraguay in 2012. Overall, UNASUR is similar to the OAS in terms of the scope of security policy provisions and of the empowerment instruments.

Eight out of 14 RSOs analyzed in this article were ranked with low levels of security governance; all reaching less than half (below 2.00) of the EU score. In Asia, the three organisations under study fall within this category of low governance. The CSTO is an organisation focused on developing a military alliance, dominated by Russia, and hence on policies of protection and compellence, neglecting the areas of assurance and prevention. As a result, yearly military command exercises or the implementation of the collective reaction force play a relevant role in the agenda, followed by plans on cooperation to collectively counter illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and their precursors. While its member states are reluctant to allow the CSTO to interfere in domestic affairs, the inability of the CSTO to act in the 2010 crisis in Kyrgyzstan has opened a debate with regard to the CSTO's role in crises situations. With regard to the military cooperation, some fissures exist among its members. For example, Uzbekistan voluntarily suspended its membership in 2012 as a result of the possibility of hosting a US base on its territory after US troops withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. Such an agreement would be contrary to the CSTO agreements, which states that a member state would have to consult with the other members before hosting the armed forces of a non-CSTO country. Different from the CSTO, the SCO includes two regional powers (China and Russia) and does not aim at developing a military alliance. While the SCO does not express any statements with regard to policies in post-conflict situations or assurance, most of its instruments are focused on the policies of protection and to a lesser extent on compellence. With regard to protection, the SCO is primarily concerned with the "three evils" or main threats which the region confronts: terrorism, separatism and extremism. Particularly in the area of terrorism, the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) plays a significant role in the SCO's agenda. With regard to compellence, military exercises are carried out regularly with the participations of its member states since 2003. The ARF, on the other hand, has focused on fostering dialogue and consultation, and promote confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the region and does not include any instruments of compellence. It has no management and enforcement instruments in either of the four security policies and coordination mechanisms in only policies of assurance, prevention and protection (Acharya 2003).

In Africa, ECOWAS and SADC are two subregions where member states have developed a comprehensive agenda ranging from monetary union to peacekeeping forces and from economic integration to election monitoring. Similar to other organisations analyzed in this article, the empowerment of both regional organisations dissipates as the principles and goals are not supported by management and enforcement provisions due to their lack of institutional capacity

and resources. Nonetheless, both organisations have implemented actions to enforce norms. Strongly influenced by Nigeria, ECOWAS has advanced the implementation of compellence policies and contributed significantly to peacekeeping, helping to settle conflicts in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire under the aegis of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Likewise, ECOWAS has also sponsored mutual defence and non-aggression agreement among its members. In the case of SADC, Madagascar was suspended from the bloc for an unconstitutional change of government. Overall, the two organisations practice mostly policies of prevention and compellence, and do little, if at all, on policies of assurance and protection. This emphasis is also reflected in the degree of empowerment instruments.

In the Western Hemisphere, MERCOSUR was created in a context of transitions from military to civilian regimes and has fulfilled the function of promoting and enhancing economic cooperation as a means to strengthen democracy. Hence, it has focused on policies that promote the free transit of produced goods, services and factors among the member states, providing a common external tariff and coordinating positions in regional and international commercial and economic meetings when it is possible. Hence, as far as security policies are involved, they relate to prevention and assurance. Besides having coordination mechanisms in those two policy areas, it also has made use of an enforcement instrument, in the case of policies of assurance, by enforcing the democracy clause in June 2012, when Paraguay was suspended, as UNASUR did. While the CAN has engaged in policies of assurance, prevention and protection, it has developed empowerment instruments only to the level of coordination mechanisms, particularly emphasising policies of protection in the case of drug trafficking and prevention through economic integration. In the case of CARICOM, which aims at promoting economic integration, all security provisions are in place, except policies of compellence. However, the empowerment instruments go only up to the level of coordination, particularly in the multilateral initiative of the Regional Security System (RSS).

Economic and Political Development and RSOs

The preceding section explained the classification of regional organisations based on the combination of security governance policies and levels of autonomy. In order to advance the analysis related to the conditions in which the levels of security governance are produced, this section looks at the correlations between six independent domestic variables (human development index, economic freedom and government effectiveness, corruption, rule of law and political rights) and one dependent variable (level of security governance, as it was defined in the previous section). All the independent variables were determined by retrieving information from a variety of databases, which will be explained below, and then the scores of the member states of each regional organisation were averaged. Unless indicated otherwise, the year of analysis was 2010. The dependent variable was determined by the scores of the matrix of four security governance policies and four levels of autonomy (see table 1). Due to the limited sample size, a non-parametric Spearmen's correlation coefficient was used to identify the strength of the relationship between the six independent variables and levels of security governance, as measured by the scope of security policy provisions and the scale of empowerment instruments of regional organisations. By using the Statistical Analysis System (SAS) programme, the Spearmen Coefficient Correlation test was run and the interpretation of the coefficients considered .41 and higher as strong correlation, .31 to .40 moderate and .21 to .30 weak.

The results are the following:

Independent Variables	Spearsman Coefficient Correlation
<i>Economic Variables</i>	
Economic Freedom	0.40
HDI	0.40
Government Effectiveness	0.30
<i>Political Variables</i>	
Corruption	0.41
Rule of Law	0.39
Political Rights	-0.44

Economic Variables

The argument of economic integration as a mechanism to set conditions for functional cooperation and the eventual reduction of violence among member states has been explored elsewhere (Nye 1971). The objective here is to evaluate the correlations of three economic variables on the levels of security governance: Economic Freedom, Human Development Index and Government Effectiveness. As indicated in the Spearsman Coefficient above, Economic Freedom and HDI present a moderate positive correlation with security governance, while Government Effectiveness has a weak positive correlation.

The Economic Freedom Index, compiled by the Heritage Foundation, measures ten components of economic freedom, assigning a grade in each using a scale from 0 to 100, where 100 represents the maximum freedom. Most of the organisations respond to the trend of correlation between economic freedom and security governance. Two of the 14 organisations do not correspond to this trend. The AU has reached an important level of

security governance, but its average of economic freedom is the lowest of the 14 organisations under study. The explanation for this occurrence lies most likely in the low level of economic development in most of the African states, which inhibits economic freedom, and the high level of internal threats and political instability in these states, which necessitates security governance cooperation. CARICOM is the opposite case with a relatively high degree of economic freedom and low level of security governance. While also plagued by low levels of economic development, CARICOM countries engage to a much higher degree than African ones in international trade. In addition, the level of intra-state conflicts is less than in the African example, and the penetration of outside actors (USA, and European countries) in the affairs of CARICOM countries helps to explain the exception to the expected moderately positive correlation between high levels of economic freedom and high levels of security governance. The Human Development Index is a composite statistic of life expectancy, education, and income indices developed by the UNDP. Two organisations have opposite correlation scores to the expected; they rank high on the human development index and score low on the level of security governance. These organisations are MERCOSUR (0.76) and CARICOM (0.71). The anomaly with the MERCOSUR correlation reflects the emphasis this organisation gives to economic cooperation and the low levels of intra-state conflicts experienced in the area. With regard to CARICOM a similar explanation applies here as provided for by the economic freedom factor. Similar to the economic freedom variable and explanation provided there for the lack of positive correlation, the AU registered low levels of human development and high security governance. The third economic variable is Government Effectiveness, which captures perceptions of the quality of public services, civil service, policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. This variable is based on the scores of the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators and ranked the performance of the countries within the range -2.5 (worst) to 2.5 (best). Two organisations scored a medium score of government effectiveness and also low level of security governance: ARF (0.13) and CSTO (0.21). With regard to MERCOSUR, the lack of a positive correlation can largely be explained by the fact that the ARF consists of a variety of states, some, such as

the USA and European members, have high scores of government effectiveness. On the other hand, the ARF pursues the principles of low level of institutional ties (the Asia way of relying on consensus building and minimum interference in state sovereignty). CSTO also has some members with high scores of government effectiveness, but like the ARF pursues low levels of institutional cooperation. Overall, the moderate positive correlation of economic, human development and government effectiveness with high levels of security governance holds for the 14 regional organisations with few exceptions. The outliers are the AU and CARICOM (each twice) , MERCOSUR, the ARF and CSTO.

Political Variables

The relationship between political factors such as democracy and regional organisations has been explained by several scholars (Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik 2009; Pevehouse and Russett 2006). In this article, three political variables were considered for this analysis: Corruption, Rule of Law and Political Rights. As indicated in the Spearman Coefficient, corruption presents a strong positive correlation with security governance, while the correlations of rule of law and political rights are moderate positive and strong negative, respectively.

Corruption is the only variable with a strong and positive correlation with security governance. The variable was determined by the average of the score of the member states of each regional organisation based on the Corruption Perception Index (2010) produced by Transparency International, which ranges from 0 (worst) to 10 (best). The EU, NATO and the OSCE reached the highest scores (6.37, 6.10 and 5.27, respectively) and ECOWAS, SCO and CSTO the lowest (2.89, 2.35 and 2.37, respectively). An interesting case is the AU because while it has produced a level of security governance similar to NATO and OSCE, it is afflicted by widespread corruption (2.88). It reflects, as noted above with regard to some of the economic variables, the relatively low level of economic and political development of most of the African states.

The variable of rule of law is based on the scores of the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators and ranked the performance of the countries within the range -2.5 (worst) to 2.5 (best). The rule of law indicator “captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the

quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (World Bank 2011). In this indicator, it is interesting to note that the CSTO (-0.88) and SCO (-0.91) were ranked with the lowest indicators, even below that of the African organisations, which have higher levels of security governance than Asian organisations.

Political Rights has a strong negative correlation, which is explained by the fact that the index, based on Freedom House, is a numerical rating on a scale of 1 (highest degree of freedom) to 7 (lowest degree of freedom). In other words, the literal interpretation of coefficient is that the higher the score of political rights (number 7 indicating lowest political rights), the less the level of security governance. In this regard, SCO and CSTO (6.17 and 6.00, respectively) are the organisations with the lowest records on political rights, while the EU and NATO (1.11 and 1.25, respectively). The outlying case is CARICOM experiencing low governance and a political right score similar to European organisations. The lack of a positive correlation is reflected, as noted above, in the low level of intra-state conflicts, and the penetration of outside actors (USA, and European countries) in the affairs of CARICOM countries.

Overall, the expected correlations between levels of corruption, rule of law and political rights with high levels of security governance is reasonably strong for the 14 regional organisations, with only two outliers: the AU and CARICOM. The exercise of correlating domestic economic and political actors with the scope of security policy dimensions and the scale of empowerment instruments demonstrates positive outcomes, though more so with political than economic variables.

Regional Security Governance Arrangements

Regional organisations play a significant role in stimulating and reproducing regional governance orders. Some organisations such as the EU aim at transforming norms and practices of security governance, while others such as the CSTO or the SCO focused on preserving the status quo of regional security arrangements. There has been an ample debate on the regional security orders

and most of them have resulted in three different models. The first is the perspective of the English School, in which Barry Buzan (2012) suggests four characteristics of regional security orders: Power-Political, Coexistence, Cooperative and Convergence. The second model is offered by Paul (2012) who identifies regions comprising forms of Pluralistic Security Community, Enduring Rivalry, Stability and Limited Conflict, and Partial Security Community. The third model is suggested by Sperling (2009) who categorises four different systems of security governance: Collective Defence, Collective Security, Westphalian Security Community and post-Westphalian Security Community. From the perspective of this article, the comparative empirical assessment of the 14 regional organisations leads to the identification of three main groupings of regional security arrangements based on their intra-organisation cohesion (Kirchner and Dominguez 2011) and their dealing with the traditional security dilemma and the issue of sovereignty (Dorussen, Kirchner and Sperling 2010; Ross 2009; Webber 2007). However, at the same time it is important to remember the limitations of such generalisations because as Adler and Greve (2009) argue, regional mechanisms of security governance (such as balance of power and security communities) often coexist and overlap in political discourse and practice, and as a result all categorisations are approximations to capture the variety of institutional arrangements.

The first group consists of organisations which favour a traditional balance of power approach. Characterised by regional contexts in which internal sources of threats are both many and prioritised, the empowerment scale generally goes up to the level of coordination mechanisms and in a few rare cases involves management and enforcement instruments. Due to the low economic and political development of member states, the security dilemma is barely attenuated because the emergence of violent conflict is feasible and potential. The AU, ARF, ECOWAS, SCO, CSTO and SADC embody this trend. Nonetheless, nuance should be kept in mind. While AU and ECOWAS have been able to sporadically implement some enforcement provisions due to the instability prevailing in Africa and the urgency to act to manage the outbreak of violence in the region, the AU has actually developed a variety of instruments to consider it as a regional organisation with a high level of security governance. However, the AU often fails to deliver tangible collective goods due to the weaknesses of its member states. Table 3 presents the dispersion of cohesion of regional organisations, which is the standard deviation of each one of the six economic and political independent variables. One of the interpretations of table 3 is that low levels of dispersion will produce conditions for security cooperation because the member states are closer in their levels of economic and political development. However, such levels among the member states of one organisation can reach high or low scores. For instance, as

indicated in table 3, the EU registered low levels of dispersion as well as high scores of economic and political development, while ECOWAS and SCO also present low levels of dispersion as well as low scores of economic and political development. In other words, in the case of SCO and ECOWAS, their respective member states seek to avoid dealing with intrusive collective security policies.

The second group of organisations is characterised by a less intense level of internal threat and for whom consequently the security dilemma is ameliorated despite a pervasive logic of balance of power within the group. As a result, the regional entity is empowered with some management provisions, and its member states experience medium and high political and economic developments, which contributes to enhance cooperation. These are the cases of the OAS, UNASUR, CARICOM, OSCE, and, to some extent, MERCOSUR, which, however, lacks management instruments altogether. While MERCOSUR and CARICOM experience moderate levels of dispersion, both organisations have prioritised economic regionalism. In the cases of OAS, UNASUR and OSCE the high levels of dispersion and the dominant role of the United States, Brazil and Russia/United States, respectively, may inhibit reaching common denominators for increasing cooperation and security governance.

NATO and the EU epitomise the third trend. Both organisations have transcended the security dilemma within the group and the main source of threats is mostly external. Likewise, NATO and EU register high levels of economic and political development as well as low levels of dispersion, as noted in table 3. However, while the EU is both a full-spectrum security policy provider embracing the full panoply of empowerment instruments in all four policy areas, NATO's strength lies in three of the security policies, together with the appropriate empowerment instruments, and less so in policies of assurance. Moreover, while NATO remains an intergovernmental alliance, the EU uses both the supranational and inter-governmental methods as a security governance actor. Overall, the levels of economic and political development are high and the dispersion of cohesion is low in both organisations, which facilitates similar views and the development of common objectives and effective implementation of collective security policies.

Conclusion

The comparative analysis of 14 regional organisations in this article reveals three different tendencies for regional security governance. First, while there are some global referents in the conceptualisation of the security of regional organisations, their practices are unique, defined regionally, and hardly replicable, particularly those of the EU. Second, while the economic and political cohesion and capacity of the states creates a setting conducive for increasing regional cooperation and security governance, states take into consideration variables such as the dominance of regional powers or the dimension of the security threats when they calculate whether or not to empower regional organisations. Third, the security practices of regional organisations have developed different systems of governance reflecting various degrees of collective commitment to deal with threats, in which the EU, NATO and AU are the organisations with the highest levels of security governance.

This article shows that these three propositions are intertwined and their analysis explains only partially the organisations' performance. Instead, the main challenge regional organisations face is how to deal effectively and collectively with security threats and how to overcome the reluctance of member states to cooperate and surpass the boundaries set by the principles of the Westphalian state (Lake 2010; Krasner 1999). Overcoming these boundaries appears particularly difficult with the organisations outside Europe. Although the contemporary sources of insecurity as perceived by African, Asian and Latin American organisations are similar, the operationalisation of normative concerns and security conceptualisation is very different. Hence, while the organisations of these regions have a declared emphasis on collective defence, the principles of non-intervention and self-determination, shaped by historical legacies, impede progress on this aspect. This is somewhat surprising in the case of Latin America, which, although it has a long history of regionalism, lacks both the normative and substantive commitments for achieving, let alone sustaining, a regional modality for governance. There is hence a gap between rhetoric and operationalisation/implementation. CARICOM is a somewhat special case, due to the fact that security there has always been transnational (ties with US and some European states) rather than purely inter-state (Hurrell 1995).

A 'broadened' understanding of security, as advocated by the proponents of security governance, is clearly evident in the regional security discourse in all of the organisations examined. This signifies, on the one hand, an expansion, particularly over the past ten years, from non-military to military concerns, as for the EU, the four Western Hemispheric organisations and the ARF, and

on the other hand, from military to non-military ones, as in the case of NATO. An example is the OAS adoption in 2002 of a multidimensional concept of security in which threats are viewed as diverse and multidimensional. The concept of security governance helps to explore the way in which security issues and discourses have been the subject of a variety of forms of institutionalisation in the 14 organisations. For most of the 14 organisations, the key functions of security governance lie in the emphasis on conflict prevention and protection. This signifies a preference toward negotiated peace and security, but exposes the limitations to pursue tasks of conflict resolution (policies of compellence) areas where, with the exception of NATO and, to some extent, the EU and the AU, organisations lack both the political will to engage as well as the capabilities to do so.

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Table 1. Levels of Security Governance

	<i>Form Setting Provisions</i>				<i>Coordination Provisions</i>				<i>Management Provisions</i>				<i>Enforcement</i>				<i>Score</i>	
	A	Pr	Pt	C	A	Pr	Pt	C	A	Pr	Pt	C	A	Pr	Pt	C		
<i>Europe</i>																		
EU	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	4
NATO	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25		0.25	0.25	0.25		0.25	0.25	0.25	3.5
OSCE	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25		0.25	0.25				0.25				2.5
<i>Western Hemisphere</i>																		
OAS	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25							0.25	2.75
UNASUR	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25			0.25		0.25				2.75
CAN	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25											1.75
CARICOM	0.25		0.25			0.25	0.25	0.25		0.25								1.5
MERCOSUR	0.25	0.25			0.25	0.25							0.25					1.25
<i>Africa</i>																		
AU	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25		0.25	0.25				0.25	3.25
ECOWAS	0.25	0.25				0.25		0.25		0.25							0.25	1.5
SADC	0.25	0.25	0.25			0.25				0.25				0.25				1.5

<i>Asia</i>											
ARF	0.25	0.25	0.25		0.25	0.25	0.25			1.5	
CSTO			0.25	0.25		0.25	0.25		0.25	1.25	
SCO		0.25	0.25	0.25		0.25	0.25		0.25	0.25	1.75

Sources: Kirchner and Dominguez 2011; European Union 2012; NATO 2012; OSCE 2012; OAS 2012; UNASUR 2012; CAN 2012; CARICOM 2012; MERCOSUR 2012; AU 2012; ECOWAS 2012; SADC 2012; ARF 2012; CSTO 2012; SCO 2012.

Table 2

Economic and Political Variables of Regional Security Organisations (2010)

	1	2	3	4	5	6
EU	69.6	0.85	1.16	6.37	1.15	1.11
NATO	68.7	0.84	1.04	6.10	1.00	1.25
OSCE	67.6	0.82	0.83	5.27	0.69	2.27
OAS	62.2	0.71	0.11	4.03	0.11	2.12
CARICOM	61.9	0.71	0.29		0.20	1.64
MERCOSUR	59.5	0.76	-0.10	3.93	-0.17	2.25
ARF	58.5	0.69	0.13	4.30	0.25	3.92
UNASUR	58.4	0.71	-0.14	3.63	-0.42	2.42
CAN	58.0	0.70	-0.30	3.08	-0.79	2.75
CSTO	58.1	0.71	0.21	2.37	-0.88	6.00
SCO	55.9	0.70	-0.48	2.35	-0.91	6.17
SADC	55.1	0.50	-0.43	3.49	-0.40	3.87
ECOWAS	53.5	0.40	-0.83	2.89	-0.71	3.67
AU	52.0	0.45	-0.78	2.88	-0.71	4.62

1 Economic Freedom-Heritage Foundation (index ranges from 0 to 100)

2 Human Development Index-UN (index between 0 and 1)

3 Government Effectiveness-World Bank (index ranges from -2.5-weak- to and 2.5-strong)

4 Corruption Perception Index by TI (index between 0 and 10)

5 Rule of Law (index ranges from -2.5-weak- to 2.5 strong)

6 Political Rights-Freedom House (Index between 1 and 7)

Sources: Heritage Foundation 2010; UNDP 2010; World Bank 2010; Transparency International 2010; Freedom 2010.

Table 3

Dispersion of Cohesion of Regional Organisations

	1	2	3	4	5	6
EU	5.1	0.04	0.60	1.80	0.56	0.31
ECOWAS	5.1	0.07	0.42	0.79	0.50	1.66
SCO	5.2	0.05	0.34	0.65	0.35	0.68
NATO	5.6	0.06	0.62	1.88	0.65	0.57
MERCOSUR	7.0	0.05	0.56	1.79	0.60	0.82
CSTO	7.2	0.06	1.10	0.32	0.27	0.57
CARICOM	7.3	0.19	0.68	n.a.	0.65	0.95
CAN	8.6	0.02	0.30	0.43	0.33	0.43
AU	8.7	0.12	0.61	0.99	0.63	1.85
OAS	9.5	0.09	0.77	2.30	1.56	1.15
UNASUR	10.8	0.05	0.59	1.90	0.77	1.03
OSCE	12.5	0.20	0.98	2.47	1.00	1.94
SADC	12.5	0.13	0.69	1.17	0.72	1.78
ARF	17.3	0.20	1.14	2.66	1.81	2.34

1 Economic Freedom-Heritage Foundation (index ranges from 0 to 100)

2 Human Development Index-UN (index between 0 and 1)

3 Government Effectiveness-World Bank (index ranges from -2.5-weak- to and 2.5-strong)

4 Corruption Perception Index by TI (index between 0 and 10)

5 Rule of Law (index ranges from -2.5-weak- to 2.5 strong)

6 Political Rights-Freedom House (Index between 1 and 7)

Sources: Heritage Foundation 2010; UNDP 2010; World Bank 2010; Transparency International 2010; Freedom 2010.

