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A Study of State Coherence and Constituent Emancipation

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Abstract

This thesis' objective is to shed light on the interplay between the local, national, and international level. Thereby, it primarily focuses on paradiplomacy, designating the involvement of subnational governments in international relations. As will be shown subsequently, paradiplomacy indicates the state of societal coherence within a state. While it does not need to threaten the label of sovereignty, it can take over tasks like welfare provision and maintaining solidarity both locally and beyond. Generally, this thesis draws on an inquiry into the concepts of sovereignty, welfare and solidarity, assuming that they indicate a certain state of societal coherence, to then relate them to paradiplomacy theoretically and empirically. The empirical material stems from a series of semi-structured interviews with scholars and practitioners. Finally, this discussion leads to a re-imagination of the state and its capacities and tasks by questioning such concepts as "the nation-state" or "national interests". It is meant to add rigor to the understanding of paradiplomacy as well as to add another angle to the criticism of state centrality in Internal Relations.

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I. Introduction

> *"Well, in my view what would ultimately be necessary would be a breakdown of the nation-state system—because I think that's not a viable system. It's not necessarily the natural form of human organization; in fact, it's a European invention pretty much."* (Noam Chomsky, in Understanding Power: The Indispensable Chomsky, 2002, 314)

> *"More than 300 languages are spoken in London. Religions are freely practiced. Rich and poor live on the same street, side by side. We've actually escaped many of the most difficult problems - integration and community cohesion."* (Sadiq Khan, Mayor of London, in the Chicago Tribune, 2016)

Statehood, and questions of state centrality are recurring subjects of debate within International Relations (IR) and political sciences. Consequently, the two quotes displayed above do not necessarily reflect something new or surprising. One could rather hold that state criticism is a fashionable theme in times of increasing interconnectedness, mobility and/or seemingly disappearing borders. Several experts have already proclaimed the sovereign state to be in demise vis-à-vis forces of globalization, in which the "national" seems to be less and less important, or appropriate (*inter alia* de Wilde 1991, Zürn 1992, Hocking 1999, Keating 1999). Statehood has repeatedly been subject to criticism, whether this concerns questions of war- and welfare, (social) security, or integration. Cities and regions, on the other hand, provide the territoriality in which *"people experience lived reality"* (Jones 2014, 110). Recalling Sadiq Khan's statement, one might feel inclined to put less weight on citizenship, and more on identification with the places of social and work life. Despite the fact that Khan's statement should be treated with caution because of the mayor of London certainly having political intentions, it does at least give an idea of how questions of ethnicities and ultimately nationality can play subordinate roles in human settlement and political configurations. At the same time, the sovereign nation-state remains the dominant unit with help of which we structure the globe. This thesis now attempts to shed light on this field of tension by using the lens of paradiplomacy, designating the involvement of subnational governments in IR.

As I hold, and will show throughout the thesis, paradiplomacy signifies a certain state of (in-) coherence within state structures and remains in itself an underexplored field (e.g. Lecours 2008, Dickson 2014). Thereby, the ambiguity in calling it paradiplomacy, constituent diplomacy, or multi-layer diplomacy demonstrates that there is also room for more conceptual inquiry (Cornago 2010b, 94). Nevertheless, it is a means of challenging traditional imageries of statehood and diplomacy in times where internationalized, and thereby communalized problems require collective action and should not allow for a distinction into an "us" versus a "them" anymore (Constantinou & Der Derian 2010, 5). Of course, this is rather a normative argument against empirical evidence of multilateralism under pressure and nation-state egoism.

Henceforth, this work will mainly focus on the interplay between statehood and sub-state authorities, manifested in their external communication. This falls in line with the aforementioned discussion about state centrality in International Relations, as well as the transformation of diplomacy as a formerly established state-to-state practice. That is not to say that we witness the demise of statehood, although there might examples of contestation. Rather, it shows that there are alternative ways of how to understand the international space. Specific attention will be paid to sub-state entities, such as regions, *départements*, *Länder*, provinces, and alike, but it will also include an urban dimension to it. It aims at showing how due to increasing interconnectedness, those actors play a more

and more important role in international politics, as well. As will be demonstrated, state competences shift towards the sub-national level. I will investigate how the latter communicates beyond its jurisdiction, and which consequences this has for statehood.

The main question this thesis tries to answer therefore states: How does paradiplomacy affect (sovereign) statehood, and what does it signify about it, even if it is not employed for rivaling sovereignty claims?

In order to pay attention to the interplay of different levels, as well as the impact of external factors on national structures, three focal sub-questions shall add rigor to the elaboration of the main research question:

1) Not all states are built on a federal structure. Nevertheless, paradiplomacy exists in centralized countries, as well. Has federalism as main variable become less relevant, or have growing patterns of interdependence and interconnectedness installed a quasi-federal system (though, unofficially) upon the globe? Answering this question is conducive to the aim of the thesis against the background of several scholars proclaiming the demise of the nation-state due to eroding borders in light of globalization. Has globalization hence influences on a state's coherence, or even sovereignty?
2) Even if paradiplomacy and statehood work in conjunction, what does it mean for statehood? Has the state become obsolete regarding its provisionary tasks if it needs to employ its constituents for it? How does this, in turn, relate to the notion of national interest?
3) Lastly, is paradiplomacy capable of taking some of those tasks? Thereby, size, legal freedoms, administration, and capacities need to be considered. At the same time, one should bear the difference between welfare/well-being and wealth in mind, especially when considering commercially employed paradiplomatic practices.

At the heart of the following discussions lies the question whether paradiplomacy in its various forms can pose implicit or explicit "threats" to sovereign statehood. As such, it does not necessarily need to abolish or overcome the state. Rather, it could provoke a re-interpretation of statehood, its associated tasks and how to structure the international space due to greater self-reliance and responsibilities of sub-state entities vis-à-vis different political levels.

This inquiry hence contributes to debates on state centrality in International Relations, as much as to themes like globalization and internationalization. It seeks to provide answers with regard to constituent coherence within state frameworks without promoting secessionism or the abolition of statehood. Moreover, it contributes to the rather narrow body of paradiplomacy literature, in which André Lecours observed the following gaps:

> *"The international activity of regional governments, or paradiplomacy as it has been termed, has been the focus of a modest but growing literature that details various cases and seeks to make sense of the phenomenon (...). However, this literature suffers from two major weaknesses: the first, and most important, is the absence of a general theoretical perspective that can explain how regional governments have acquired international agency, and what shapes their foreign policy, international relations, and negotiating behavior; the second is a lack of focus on constructing general analytical frameworks that can guide the study of paradiplomacy."*
>
> (Lecours 2002, 92).

As a first step, the simultaneous existence of both, a state composed international system and the appearance of regions and cities on the international scene, will be discussed. Hence, a communitarian worldview will be juxtaposed with aspects of cosmopolitanism, and paradiplomacy.[1] This is meant to help answering the research questions in two dimensions: First, I will start by displaying approaches to how the international space is structured. Second, I will depict how paradiplomacy is conceptualized, both independently but also regarding statehood and diplomacy theory. Chapter II will thus provide a literature review.

Building on these rather differing systemic approaches, it is fruitful to examine societal elements with binding character: sovereignty, welfare, solidarity. Since this thesis is of an exploratory nature, I will refrain from introducing a guiding theory, but rather present and demarcate different understandings of sovereignty, welfare and solidarity. Inquiring sovereignty is a rather obvious choice, bearing in mind examples of paradiplomacy that are openly rivaling the sovereign state. Providing at least a minimal level of welfare and maintaining solidarity within and between societies, however, can be interpreted as two (idealized) tasks of sovereign statehood, as is notably argued by Hedley Bull (1979, 115; 2012, 68; Wheeler & Dunne 1996, 99).[2] Subsequently, I will show how they nurture into the relationship between paradiplomacy and statehood. If the state holds the prerogative for external communication among sovereigns (diplomacy), how can one make sense of paradiplomacy? Is it threatening sovereignty? Thereby, I will mainly juxtapose Krasner's most influential book (1999) with Werner & de Wilde's understanding of the indivisibility of sovereignty (2001). Moreover, what are paradiplomacy's functions, especially in relation to concepts that signify societal coherence and well-being? At that stage, I will enquire notions of welfare, and notably the welfare state with the help of Stiglitz, to connect it to the appearance and potential of economically motivated paradiplomacy. Subsequently, it is argued that welfare represents a form of solidarity. Drawing on Durkheim's notion of organic solidarity, I intend to demonstrate that paradiplomacy is relatable to some aspects of Neo-Gramscian and English School understandings of solidarity but that it is ultimately Axel Honneth's recognition theory approach that covers both internal and external dimensions of solidarity (thereby aligning with and referring to Weber 2007).

This demonstrates a rather theoretical engagement in which paradiplomacy is connected to larger debates on statehood and society. It will form the basis for a more empirical inquiry: A series of semi-structured interviews has been conducted in order to gain expert insights into paradiplomacy's capacities and its standing *vis-à-vis* the state. I understand this approach to resemble a pilot study since I have been interviewing both scholars and practitioners and I aim at providing a relational approach to paradiplomacy and statehood. Due to the nature of this thesis being an open inquiry, those interviews shall be analyzed with help of Qualitative Content Analysis, to infer theoretical axioms on paradiplomacy, its capacities, and its relationship with statehood. Additionally, making use of Qualitative Content Analysis enables one to relate the empirical section to the aforementioned conceptual inquiry. Ensuing, the interview information has been coded (open/substantial coding) and will be displayed throughout Chapter V. The main objective here will be to draw inferences from the codes and the interview texts produced. At this point, I want to already hint at my understanding of refraining from putting too much emphasis on

[1] Though, without the intention of equating paradiplomacy and cosmopolitanism.

[2] Acknowledging that there are alternative conceptions in which both solidarity and welfare are not a state prerogative, Chapter III will particularly hint at those different understandings and showcase the potential for paradiplomacy to at least partially contribute to solidarity and welfare.

frequential counting of buzzwords but rather paying attention to how and where meaning is generated, and in which instances tension is created.

Lastly, I intend to relate the derived axioms to existent assumptions and theories on statehood, pluralism, and diplomacy. I will furthermore hint at the potential of paradiplomacy regarding globalized challenges, and invoke a re-interpretation of statehood imageries. The aim will be to contribute to discourses on state centrality, the changing nature of diplomacy, and how constituents contribute to pertaining solidarity and welfare. It is especially the latter that also enables to make inferences to the concept of sovereignty, hence reflecting on statehood and its constituents. The starting point of this thesis, however, has to cover the state and the constituent, how diplomacy can be understood and how those aspects have been conceptualized and theorized about. In the following pages, I will therefore initiate the inquiry by displaying the field of tension in which this thesis' topic is situated.

II. A Story of Two Tales: The State & Diplomacy, The Constituent & Paradiplomacy

This chapter shall now serve to juxtapose two narratives. The first narrative is what one might be inclined to term a "traditional" worldview in which states inherit a prominent role in making sense of social and geographic organizations of space. The second narrative, contrastingly, rather places communal configurations and entanglements at its core, in which states play a less dominant role. Both narratives already hint at the relationship between paradiplomacy and statehood. They shall pave the way for the analysis to come and must be seen as points of initiation, in which several views, concepts and theories are explained. This chapter's aim is therefore to depict possibly tension-loaded relationships vis-à-vis the prerogative of international communication and representation within the international space. Hence, adopting a more narrative style, this is a story of two tales.7

II.1 A Society of States

The first narrative should be a rather acquainted one, since it is the predominant way of how polities are perceived to be structured internationally. Humans are organized in states, bound together by such characteristics as ethnicity, culture, or language. In international law, categories to describe this adherence are most importantly influenced by the three-element-doctrine after legal theorist Georg Jellinek, comprising a state territory, a state people, and the state to exert power (*"Staatsgebiet"*, *Staatsvolk"*, *"Staatsgewalt"*, 1914, 394 - 434). Those principles could be interpreted as legal theory's formalization of modern statehood. Often, the founding principles of statehood are associated with the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. This Treaty was the first to detail elements like mutual recognition among sovereigns, a certain territoriality of sovereignty, and the exclusion of external sovereigns from this territory (Krasner 1999, 20; see also Werner & de Wilde 2001, 288).

In a Rawlsian sense of communitarianism, one can then imagine the globe of being composed of several states, co-existing next to each other and claiming people and

territoriality as integer part of their being (Rawls 2001, 61ff.).[3] As such, these states are sovereign in their decision-making. Not only do they have apparatuses to wield power over its constituents, but also to communicate with other states in the form of diplomacy. Needless to say, states do not necessarily co-exist peacefully. Rather, set-backs, disputes, and unfulfilled claims with regard to Jellinek's three elements - people, territory, and power - have often enough led to (armed) conflict. Moreover, statehood in its Westphalian form is a phenomenon that needs to be seen as primarily European. With its successful application in what we call the "West" (North America and Europe), is has consecutively been exported to all over the globe, mostly as a consequence of colonialism. Therefore, while Westphalian statehood has been successful in covering the globe as an organizational unit, it sometimes remains seen as a colonial legacy (Cornago 2014, 127; Oddone & Rodríguez Vázquez 2015, 112) and can be source for further conflict, due to its ruthless and artificial construction, implying to set borders and impose the will of European colonialists on native populations. Consequences of these actions, least of which still happened a hundred years ago, are still visible to this day.

Nonetheless, in theory, the international space can be said to be structured by sovereign states, all of them with the same rights. In its beginnings, International Relations theory in the form of realism or liberalism drew heavily on this imagery. This is not to say that all states are equal. Instead, early IR theories recognized a state of anarchy in the international system, with different rationales for alliances and conflicts (e.g. consider Waltz 1988; Wendt 1992; Kessler 2009). *De jure*, however, all sovereign states had the same rights. They differed in power and interests, though. Hence, intergovernmental international organizations have been established during the course of the 20th century to ensure peaceful and partially issue-specific cooperation. One might think of the United Nations (UN), or the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for instance. Giving those organizations a closer look, one can once again acknowledge differences amongst their member states. The UN Security Council only grants veto power and permanent seats to the five countries that have been considered on the winning side of World War II. While generally, UN member states hold equal power within its various bodies, the Security Council members enjoy special rights, e.g. drafting resolutions for UN-mandates to appease probable conflicts. The Security Council consists of 15 members, yet only the five permanent members are capable to prevent interventions and resolutions. Within the International Monetary Fund, voting power is attributed proportionally to the financial contribution of the respective member state. When deciding upon the fate of a country in debt, it is hence the "West" (and particularly the USA.) that is able to prevent certain favors to be granted, and hence having a bigger say in how to tailor specific borrowing programs.

Generally, this is not meant as a critique of the "West", the UN, or the IMF. The purpose is to show how statehood, and a state composed international system, has developed. Sovereign states are then treated as equal entities (Krasner 1999, 4). In a Rawlsian communitarian worldview, the state as such has intrinsic value as being the frame for justice in a society (Rawls 2005, 211f.; Amstutz 2013, 35). Other states are to be assisted in achieving a state of justice, or at least of decency in which certain basic freedoms are to be enjoyed (Rawls 2001, 62ff.; Amstutz 2013, 35). This is an ideal that is not to be refuted as such. It remains, however, largely blind to power dynamics and state interests. Whether statehood intrinsically offers justice is also questionable.

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[3] Yet, it is important to note that Rawls (2001, 24ff.) speaks of societies and holds the state to be the primary actor in cases where one can assume a democratic government with the society having electoral control. The basic premise for Rawls is hence liberalism and democracy in order to speak of states.

A relatively traditional take on the issue is to say that states act out of national interests. Those interests are formed via the ascription of certain meanings towards specific objects. This ascription happens to take place in a two-folded process, both by domestic and international audiences (Weldes 1996, 280).[4] State representatives are important in using these meanings to create imageries of representations of the world, considering both the "outside" as well as their positioning, including a variety of actors one might need to deal with (ibid., 281). This process can be considered to be an (outside) identity formation, having the purpose to render a certain object (or state, or actor) tangible and relatable (ibid.). These assigned identities, or imageries, are important in order to justify and identify (foreign) policies toward the object, and to surround them with conditions ordering the exchange between e.g. two states (ibid., 282). It is through this rather complicated construction, between inside and outside, that interests towards the "other" are formed, and hence the *modus operandi* for state`s interest pursuit (ibid.).[5] On the one hand, this shows the close relation between identities (even if only ascribed to) and interests. Those rely heavily on a constant construction and re-negotiation of what is considered to be the "in-" and the "outside" (Urrestarazu 2015, 141). On the other hand, it shows how contingent policy processes are, depending on acting officials and the voices heard.

Diplomacy, as the means of external signaling of those interests, then takes place along certain protocolled and well-established roles (Trager 2017, 133f.). For long, diplomacy has been considered a state privilege, with foreign policy being primarily carried out and decided upon by the executive branch (Carlsnaes 1981, 81ff.). Although the roots of modern diplomacy can be traced to Italian city-states (e.g. Milano) in the 14th Century, those city-states could claim to be sovereign entities, coming at least close to sovereign states (Tavares 2016, 10). Diplomacy, from an English School perspective, can also be seen as a way of norm sharing and socialization within an international society of states (Bull 2012, 166). In that light, James Der Derian's theory of diplomacy as a means of mediating estrangement, or alienation, of and between societies can be interpreted as a suiting fit (1987, 93ff.). Despite the emphasis on national interests, which are articulated via diplomacy, diplomacy can then itself be seen as a virtue within the international state system that has been described before (some might go as far as to say that, next to the balance of power, it is the most important institution for the international society of states, see Berridge 2015, 1). Ensuing, diplomacy is a vital part of sovereign statehood by generating and maintaining channels of communication between sovereigns that follow well-established rules, and are carried out by diplomatic agents (ibid., 25). While diplomacy can have several functions, its most important task is to uphold and conduct negotiations, in order to pursue governmental interests, however not ruthlessly, but in a cooperative spirit with other sovereigns (ibid., 3).

This is hence the first tale, comprising a world that is structured in states, and in which those states are sovereign and have the superiority in communicating amongst each other.

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[4] At this point, it is important to add that Jutta Weldes is not necessarily to be related to the "traditional" schools of thought in IR theory. Stakes on the issue that are less concerned with internal dynamics are for instance neo-realism's Waltz (1988, 619f.), stating that national interests are primarily survival- and thus security-focused. Important to note, though, is that Waltz is not too concerned with foreign policy and/or diplomacy processes, but rather uses a systemic approach to the international space. In a European context, Moravscik (1997, 1998) acknowledges a variety of internal stakeholders but treats the state as the primary bargainer within the international space, acting out of national interests.

[5] A relatable approach to Weldes specifically concerning foreign policy construction is proposed by Carlsnaes (1992, 254) in which he postulates an explanatory account consistent of the intentional, the dispositional and the structural dimension (e.g. following this scheme: preferences, perceptions, outside conditions as being driver to foreign policy actions).

Nevertheless, this thesis is written against the background of changing forms of diplomacy. Starting with informal means of state-to-state diplomacy (see Berridge 2015, 227ff.) in cases of lacking bilateral diplomatic institutions, the term of diplomacy is more and more broadened regarding actors and specific issues. For instance, how can one integrate tech diplomacy (consider a Danish Consulate at the Silicon Valley), public diplomacy, corporate diplomacy, cultural diplomacy (e.g. see de-San-Eugenio, Ginesta & Xifra 2017 on the cultural diplomacy of the Barcelona F.C.) and, finally, subnational diplomacy into what has been claimed to be a state prerogative?

II.2 Cosmopolitanism, Regionalism, Paradiplomacy

> *"The state is dead, long live the state."* (Jens Bartelson 2001, 187)

This state-centric view, and the concept of statehood as such, has drawn a lot of criticism. In times of globalization, of deep interconnectedness, partially free mobility, who is to judge between what is considered to be inside and outside? While borders disappear, re-appear, or are shifted elsewhere, is their absolute certainty over which people, or over which territory sovereign power is exerted?

At this point, it seems fruitful to consider Michael Keating in saying that

> *"Globalization and the rise of transnational regimes, especially regional trading areas, have eroded the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs and by the same token have transformed the division of responsibilities between state and subnational governments."* (Keating 1999, 1)

This phenomenon has also been commented upon by James Rosenau, whose neologism of "fragmegration" signifies the shrinking centrality of statehood. It entails a decentralization and pluralization of actors, whilst at the same time formerly distinctive political communities integrate more and more (Rosenau 1992, 281; Rosenau 1997, 38ff.; Rosenau 2003, 11). Thus, it is time for a second tale. This narrative, on the first glance, rather adheres to a cosmopolitan world view. After the implicit criticisms of the first narrative, one could be inclined to hold with Jens Bartelson and to "throw the state out" (2001, 77). Rather than sticking to statehood, let us organize in communities, reduce or abolish borders, and give greater importance to cities and regions. To quote Benjamin Barber:

> *"Let cities, the most networked and interconnected of our political associations, defined above all by collaboration and pragmatism, by creativity and multiculture, do what states cannot. Let mayors rule the world."* (2013, 4).

Whether this is an ideal towards which one should aim is undoubtedly a question of personal taste, and socialization. These assumptions, however, need to be related to the empirical phenomenon of regions and cities increasingly becoming actors on the international stage themselves (Dickson 2014, 689). This is not necessarily new, since both phenomena have already come to the attention of contemporary scholarship. With regard to regions, though, attention was mostly given to those regionalisms taking place at a supranational and (sub-) continental scale, i.e. the EU, ASEAN, the African Union, Mercosur. All of them, though to differing degrees, represent associations of shared interests. With simultaneous processes of integration and dis-integration, sometimes even competing and overlapping forms of supranational regionalisms, it is rare to assume a distinct identity to a specific regional project. This differs when shedding light on the sub-national level: Here,

one finds administrative entities that are sometimes historically grown, sometimes a political project. Despite having differing constitutive backgrounds, they represent a certain layer of authority and comprise local populations. Sub-state regions, city-regions, and cities, also play a role in the international sphere.

Saskia Sassen, in her work on global cities, has laid a foundation to some theoretical insights in urban geopolitics. As such, irrespective of state-borders, cities communicate and network amongst each other (Sassen 1991, 169). They are vital socio-economic hubs and provide the scale of experiencing work and social life (Jones 2014, 110). That being said, Sassen especially draws upon financial aspects, such as the stock market, in saying that cities like New York, Tokyo or London have created inter-municipal links on their own (Sassen 1991, 169, 190). Accordingly, mayorship in such a city comes with certain levels of power, and representative tasks to the "outside", as well (Smith & Timberlake 2016, 119).

In their Index of Regional Authority, created with support of the EU, Hooghe, Marks and Schakel for instance trace the development of sub-state competences in 81 countries for a time span of about 50 years (Hooghe, Marks, Schakel et al. 2016). One result of their research is that the broader trend moves towards greater de-centralization, and hence more authority for sub-state regions. Generally, one can see higher degrees of self-governance in areas such as fiscal, executive, or legislative power.

This second tale is therefore concerned with the interconnectedness of cities and regions[6], their collaboration, and how this can follow very pragmatic routes. Hereby, this can happen in a top-down, or bottom-up way of communication, but also in horizontal means of networking and problem-solving (Joenniemi & Sergunin 2014; Kuznetsov 2015, 103). More specifically, the way and the intentions of how cities and regions communicate shall be at the core of this narrative, and of this thesis. While I still adhere to Der Derian's notion of diplomacy as mediating estrangement, his primary focus is on societies, and not necessarily on states.

The phenomenon of municipal or (sub-state) regional foreign policy has come to be known as *paradiplomacy*. Sometimes, subnational foreign policy has also been subsumed under Multi-level governance (MLG). Despite it describing several layers of policy making, including local actors, I hold with Dickson (2014, 690) in saying that MLG is firstly more descriptive and system-centered, rather than actor- and intent-focused. Therefore, paradiplomacy is at times treated as a side-product of MLG in order to account for its conceptual shortcomings (ibid.). Second, MLG was primarily developed within a European context (Piattoni 2009, 172), whereas paradiplomacy has veritably developed into a global phenomenon and was observable in different spatial dimensions before (as will be elaborated on later).

Paradiplomacy's conceptual origins need to be traced back to the course of the 1980's and are especially intertwined with political scientists Ivo Duchacek and Panayotis Soldatos. While Duchacek has been observing the phenomenon from the 1970's onwards, he was referring to it as "micro diplomacy" first. It was Soldatos who coined the term as an abbreviation for "parallel diplomacy" (Soldatos 1990, 35ff.). In this early form, paradiplomacy was understood as foreign relations of entities being part of federal state structures, adding to the state in its foreign endeavors due to certain degrees of sub-state autonomy (Duchacek 1990, 2). Thus, what Duchacek observed was a fragmentation of

[6] For the sake of simplicity, the term "region" shall further be used to describe sub-state entities, while any other regional configuration will be marked as "supra-national", "macro-regional", or "trans-border".

foreign policy processes, in which some tasks were re-allocated from the state towards the sub-state level (Duchacek 1990, 7f.). The concept of paradiplomacy hence originated when acknowledging a side-product of state competence re-allocation.

However, this does not necessarily mean that paradiplomacy, even in its conceptual beginnings, has only been seen as a sub-state support to state foreign policy. Soldatos distinguishes between cooperative and parallel action: Whereas the former could either be federally coordinated or take place in conjunction with the central state government, the latter can take a route that stands in a harmonious or dis-harmonious relationship with the state government (Soldatos 1990, 38; Hocking 1993, 2). That being said, early paradiplomacy hence intrinsically focused on tensions or conjunction between governments. More than being practice-focused, federalism as the main premise has been engraved into the concept. This can also be understood when looking at how the two authors describe the momentum of re-allocating competences from the national onto the sub-national level:

According to Soldatos, there are objective and perceptual processes of segmentation. Objective segmentation processes are due to external factors, such as geography, economic structures, or cultural particularities. The perceptual side, however, describes attitudes, loyalties, and interests (among others, Soldatos 1990, 36). The interplay of both, external and internal factors would ultimately lead to a fracture of foreign policy competences, and their re-distribution, due to different interests and stakeholders (Soldatos 1990, 37). Hence, one can summarize that paradiplomacy was developed as a tool to take local conditions into account internationally. Thereby, the very process of segmentation already shows that statehood itself, as a centralizing institution (no matter the actual political system), cannot ensure to effectively address every local concern. Rather, what Soldatos describes opposes the very existence of such a thing as a "national" interest, as mentioned in the previous tale. Rather, it appears that local concerns drive paradiplomacy, since an accumulation of those local concerns into a "national interest" does not seem to appropriately address the specific environment of any given sub-national entity both in territorial and in political terms.

Thereby, Soldatos' and Duchacek's description of paradiplomacy remains very government-centered, mirroring Carlsnaes' (1981, 81f.) assumption that foreign policy is mainly an executive prerogative. This is not necessarily something that I want to act against. Rather, it is an observation that fits the before-claimed scheme of federalism as main premise: The work of the two scholars focuses on the relationship between elites of states and sub-states, and their external behavior. This, however, might differ when including different understandings of paradiplomacy, and different forms of it. Categorizations of those sorts have quickly followed Soldatos' and Duchacek's inaugural work.

The ensuing development resulted in research predominantly concerned with regions with strong identity claims, sometimes even building up to tendencies of secessionism. Hence, Québec, Scotland, Catalonia, Flanders, or the Basque Country are the most prominently discussed case studies. Yet, according to more contemporary research, this is but one form of paradiplomacy: Several attempts of classification have been made. For instance, Lecours distinguishes between political issues (such as the above-stated), economic issues, and cooperative collaboration (2008, 4ff.). This distinction, though, seems hardly applicable considering that all three elements, politics, economics, and collaboration are only rarely separable - rather, they are intertwined and appear in conjunction with each other. Tavares, in a more recent attempt, rather takes incentives and direction of paradiplomacy into account. His scheme foresees four possible ways of conducting paradiplomacy:

Ceremonial Paradiplomacy serves mainly image-building or public relations boosting purposes and is most commonly known in the form of twin cities or sister regions (Tavares 2016, 29). Hence, two entities articulate agreements of mutual understanding, although without binding implications (ibid., 33). Notwithstanding, ceremonial paradiplomacy opens channels of communication and cooperation (ibid.).

Single Themed Paradiplomacy, in its stead, is rather concerned with international cooperation due to a pressing need in a specific sector (ibid., 33). Often enough, this sort of cooperation happens in a cross-border or macro-regional[7] manner due to common interests in a specific field. The collaboration is reduced to the project-specific outcome, but can be of further use with regard to widening networks and the exchange of best-practice examples (ibid., 34).

Global Paradiplomacy then designates the projection of local concerns onto the internal stage, thereby being multi-faceted. Especially rich and powerful sub-state actors make use of the international stage to diversify their opportunities rather than relying on the state's administration only (ibid., 36). Dependent on the individual region, the exact intent can vary between the attraction of tourists and foreign direct investment, to political leadership and the creation of networks and international organizations (e.g. consider California's role in mitigating climate change, ibid.).

Lastly, sovereign paradiplomacy (or protodiplomacy), as already hinted at, must be seen as the consequence of aspirations of greater independence. This can vary between sole claims for greater autonomy and actual desires for statehood (ibid., 38; Duchacek 1990, 27ff.; see also the case of Québec, Paquin 2018, 19f.). While national dichotomies lay at the core of this form of paradiplomacy, they are at the same time the most successful cases, due to inner identity urges and their promotion abroad (ibid.). As such, they mirror state-alike diplomacy and organs, as discussed earlier, and make use of a "national interest" on a smaller scale competing with the entire state they are situated in. Tavares, however, clearly separates protodiplomacy as an identity-related product and preparatory establishment of own channels of communication from paradiplomacy as a result of principles of subsidiarity (ibid.).

Following this categorization then renders paradiplomacy a more complex concept. While the boundaries between the categories are far from sharp, it shows that paradiplomacy is conducted to varying degrees and with varying intentions. Tavares has also attempted to cluster those motives and drivers. He enlists the seizure of global (economic) opportunities, the provision of (internationalized) citizen services, the promotion of decentralization, personal interests, electoral opportunism, the address of local claims, cultural distinctiveness and nationalism, cases of diaspora, geographical realities and the goal of being less isolated as possible explicatory accounts (Tavares 2016, 41ff.). I, however, hold that comparable to national foreign policies, accounting for each individual driver seems hardly possible (see also Herborth 2015, 110f.).

Thus, for simplification purposes, I will subsume those drivers under the aim of addressing local concerns internationally. Those concerns themselves can of course incorporate different degrees of internationalization and impact, and might lead to different forms of conducting paradiplomacy. Generally, one can perceive paradiplomacy as a pragmatic way

[7] Macro-region designates a territorial association that exceeds state borders, without necessarily leading up to a continental scale.

of solution-finding for common and internationalized problems that exceed rather narrow national frameworks (Oddone & Rodríguez Vázquez 2015, 114).

What one can draw from it is that paradiplomacy has matured as political practice (Duran 2016, 2). While some examples still adhere to a state-composed globe, and hence use paradiplomacy for claiming sovereign statehood, there are more examples of an alternative, peacefully co-existing inter-regional cooperation and collaboration (Constantinou & Der Derian 2010, 3). With regard to the two tales, it appears that both have some truth to it, and neither can be fully rejected: Statehood and paradiplomacy are empirical realities. The simultaneous existence of both can be interpreted as a sign of pluralization (Neuman 2002, 627).

What remains open and questionable though is their relationship with each other. How do states react once their constituents exceed their jurisdictions? On the other hand, whatever a sub-state entity might seek within the international space, how does this reflect upon statehood? Are those signs of (in-)coherence, or simply expressions of adaptation in times of greater internationalization?

To get a better idea of those questions, I hold that it is vital to first scrutinize the state of society regarding the relationship between constituent and state. In order to do so, I chose three concepts that I hold to be crucial to indicate societal coherence: sovereignty, welfare, and solidarity. The next chapter will hence inquire those three concepts and how they relate to both, statehood and paradiplomacy.

III. Conceptual Investigations: Sovereignty, Welfare, and Solidarity

As I hold, sovereignty, welfare and solidarity delineate a certain state of societal coherence, and hence require elaboration at this point. I come to this conviction due to the following reasons:

First, paradiplomacy openly contradicts the imagery of autarkic and omnipotent sovereigns, in which the state wields a kind of absolute power. While Werner & de Wilde (2001, 287) hold that this imagery is a myth, and never corresponded to reality, I do see the need for further exploration in light of external factors, like globalization, leading some scholars to assume the demise of the nation state (e.g. Zürn 1992; Keating 1999, Chomsky 2002, Guibernaut 2004, 1254). It appears quite suiting here that Werner and de Wilde argue that the whole sovereignty discourse was created by (state) diplomats in the first place (2001, 296). If different forms of diplomacy are not carried out by state agents alone anymore, what does that mean for the concept of sovereignty? How does it relate to the state and the constituent?

Second, as I will show throughout the following pages, the notion of sovereignty also always comes with a sense of welfare provision. This can, but does not need to, align with the welfare state developed after World War II during a time of re-building and reconciliation. Parallel to the predicted demise of the nation state, the welfare state as well was said to be under pressure by international forces. In contrast, paradiplomacy is often treated as being primarily economically oriented. Is paradiplomacy a means of more accumulation, or can it mitigate the state's alleged shortcomings?

Third, should paradiplomacy have any impact on welfare, then it is important to note that welfare can be interpreted as a kind of (reciprocal) solidarity (Fenger & van Paridon 2012, 52). Moreover, solidarity can also be pertained in a manner of providing for the local well-being that is strived for in sharp distinction to the state (Cox 1999, 13). Consequently, inquiring the role of solidarity within the external communication of both states and constituents can be beneficial for this study in order to understand the purpose and implications of paradiplomacy in relation to the state. Notably, this falls in line with treating diplomacy as a virtue of people-to-people interchange, and hence granting recognition to actors, groups and socio-economic positioning and concerns. Is paradiplomacy hence a means of pertaining to solidarity, both locally and internationally, in cases where statehood is not acting or cannot act?

One can thus interpret the three concepts to be interlinked, and therefore requiring common evaluation in distinction to other societal concepts. The basic premise of this inquiry is hence that the state is under pressure (to different extents). Sovereignty, welfare and solidarity are the chosen concepts to understand paradiplomacy's capacities and ensuing, its implications for statehood on a conceptual level. This chapter thus contributes to answering the research questions by looking at what state tasks are, how they are interpreted, and where and in which instances paradiplomacy is used for those tasks. Thereby, transformations going on at the international level cannot be left out. Thus, one could speak of a synthesis of the two tales of how the international space is organized, with sovereignty, welfare and solidarity as key concepts to examining the relationship between and among different political entities.

Specifically, I want to refer to Guibernaut (2004, 1254) in saying that

> *"At this moment in time, we are witnessing the rise of what I call 'nations without States' as potential new political actors able to capture and promote sentiments of loyalty, solidarity and community among individuals who seem to have developed a growing need for identity. Sound political and economic arguments may also be invoked in trying to account for the relevance that nations without states may acquire in the foreseeable future"*.

It is this imagery of maybe not nations, but communities without states that invokes an investigation of sovereignty, welfare and solidarity, and can be beneficial to understand paradiplomacy's capabilities in relation to statehood.

III.1 On Sovereignty

Sovereignty and statehood are closely intertwined. However, as this section will show, there are very different uses and understandings of sovereignty. The aim is to show sovereignty's logics of legitimacy, and how to conceptualize it for further use with regard to the state, its constituents, and their means of external communication. Especially with regard to sovereignty-claiming examples of paradiplomacy, this is a vital investigation. Thereby, it seems fruitful to start with scrutinizing the origins of sovereignty as a concept.

III.1.1 The historical development of sovereignty

James Johnson distinguishes between two temporal understandings of sovereignty. Firstly, the conception that was common during the Middle Ages until the 17th Century entailed

the responsibility for the common good of the people. This also meant to maintain good relations between different communities, in order for the sovereign to fulfill this responsibility (Johnson 2014, 137). This first conception was challenged due to the outbreak of religious wars, and hence different moral assumptions (ibid.), as well as the appearance of a new world. Moreover, I hold that what the "common good" ought to be remained rather vague and contingent on the sovereign's understanding. Clearly, this notion of sovereignty needs to be associated with the dominant structure in Europe at the time being a duality out of the Holy Roman Empire, a highly heterogeneous entity, and the Church (and hence two competing claims to sovereignty).

The Peace of Westphalia in 1648, however, put an end to those religious wars. Johnson bases the rationale for it in a minimal conception of Human Rights as the right to self-defense (ibid.). This led to an understanding of sovereignty as territorial integrity and the inviolability of political communities (ibid.). Ensuing, he employs a Hobbesian view on sovereignty, in which authority is streamlined from the people upwards to a *Leviathan*, or sovereign (ibid.). Johnson himself, though, questions whether this development of conceptualization would not have led to the responsibility to provide for the common good being replaced by the responsibility to defense in case of attack (Johnson 2014, 138). Thus, governments could declare war to preserve territorial integrity. How those governments would treat their subjects, though, was initially not a concern by external actors (ibid.).

In more contemporary terms, this changed with the inauguration of the UN-system, in which the later to be called responsibility to protect became a more and more important doctrine. One can therefore acknowledge a changing conception of sovereignty, yet reinforcing challenges and disparities to the concept. Johnson suggests that the responsibility to protect-doctrine should rather be seen as a re-characterization that is not reducing state authority, but poses as an empowerment of the freedom of people (2014, 144). Admitting, this is more of an ideal-type than actual reality (as Johnson acknowledges himself).

Generally, Johnson's depiction of historical developments surrounding the concept shows that sovereignty as much as its added value has always been and remains debated. Moreover, it seems hardly imaginable to find one single account of what sovereignty is or signifies. Now reconsidering the two tales of the previous chapter, it shows that sovereignty itself touches upon the core of this thesis' inquiry: Is it being eroded due to globalization, or does international recognition reinforce sovereignty? Partially, states are strengthening their authority, whereas in other parts, effective state control is at least questionable. What does that, in turn, mean for subnational entities?

III.1.2 Sovereignty aspects and paradiplomacy's impact

Those are also the controversies that Stephan Krasner uses when introducing his understanding of sovereignty as "organized hypocrisy" (Krasner 1999, 3, 5). He distinguishes between four different aspects of sovereignty which are subsequently used and referred to in order to highlight how paradiplomacy and sovereignty relate to each other, and where fields of tension occur:

First, *Westphalian sovereignty* merely embodies a political community under one single authority, comprising a certain territory without influences of external actors. *International legal sovereignty*, in its stead, only describes practices of mutual recognition. *Domestic sovereignty* is then concerned with the exercise of effective control within a state, and hence the domestic organization of authority. Lastly, *interdependence sovereignty* is rather

concerned with the control and regulation of trans-border flows of goods, information, and people (Krasner 1999, 4). This split of sovereignty into four aspects now enables one to criticize, and re-conceptualize sovereignty and its use with regard to statehood, centralization, and paradiplomacy.

Thereby, Krasner's primary focus is on sovereignty in its Westphalian and international legal type. He observes two logics in the international realm: One of them is the logics of appropriateness, such as processes of international recognition or territorial inviolability. Logics of consequences, however, dominate those of appropriateness, since the international system is in a state of anarchy and the main appropriateness to be referred to, is the one of domestic audiences (Krasner 1999, 6). This leads to a discussion about actors in the field, so that Krasner observes sovereignty to be in a state of contingency upon ruler's decisions (Krasner 1999, 7). The underlying preference, though, is to safeguard the state of sovereignty in staying in power. Therefore, rulers would try to promote security, prosperity and their constituents' values (ibid.). Krasner hence argues differently than Johnson in saying that, even in its Westphalian conception, there is an inherent element in sovereignty that is concerned with the welfare of its sub-parts. This, in turn, leads one to interpret that sovereignty should be concerned with the constituent's interests in order be legitimized. Paradiplomacy, understood as external subnational interest promotion, could now contradict this paradigm by seeing entities emancipating themselves in case that states do not represent their interests sufficiently.

In that light, it is important to add that both international legal sovereignty as well as Westphalian sovereignty are frequently violated. At first, international recognition can be a powerful tool, since it allows for external resources, diplomatic immunity, and is generally not costly. It remains a policy tool by other states, since non-recognition can be employed politically. Sometimes, other entities as states have been recognized in the international realm (Krasner 1999, 8). Especially this latter part is consequential for paradiplomacy and its more identity-focused type. If entities other than states can be recognized - even if this is due to political reasons - then sub-state entities' stance on the international sphere can be increased, or challenge a state's sovereignty with regard to domestic authority. That being said, it reiterates the claim of narrowing the gap between the foreign and the domestic (Keating 1999, 1). Although Krasner distinguishes the four sovereignty aspects according to their spheres of influence and their attributes, both sides seem closely interwoven. International recognition can then have serious influences on the adherence to Westphalian or domestic sovereignty. Hence, this could explain why those entities with more or less secessionist tendencies, or strong identities, are the cases most present and prominent internationally (and in scientific research).

According to Krasner, though, Westphalian sovereignty has been the most violated (Krasner 1999, 8). This can either take place by intervention or invitation. Invitation hereby includes principles of subsidiarity, in which rulers have compromised their authority (ibid.). Recalling Rosenau (1992, 281; 1997, 38ff.; 2003, 11), processes of "fragmegration" thus do have influences on sovereignty, dependent on which aspect to look at. With the original conception of paradiplomacy as an outcome of subsidiarity, one can then draw a first conclusion in saying that Westphalian sovereignty can be compromised by paradiplomacy, especially when focusing on the constraints of external actors within the domestic organization under one single authority (Krasner 1999, 20). Thereby, one needs to admit that Krasner focuses on supranational bodies and institutions, rather than sub-national ones. Yet, supranational bodies (as in regional integration in the EU or Mercosur) have enabled a majority of sub-state actors to conduct foreign relations in the first place (Oddone

& Rodríguez Vázquez 2015, 114). With regard to international legal sovereignty, Krasner then states himself that

> *"There can be federal or unitary structures. The one point at which the organization of domestic authority could affect international legal sovereignty occurs in the case of confederations in which the individual units of the state have some ability to conduct external relations."* (Krasner 1999, 11)

The example he refers to is the state of Bavaria, granted the right to an independent foreign representation during the time of the configuration of the modern German state from 1870 onwards (ibid.). Clearly, nowadays we rather see federated structures than confederations. Nonetheless, a high number of sub-state units conduct foreign relations. Is a state's international legal sovereignty hence compromised, or does it only have implications on domestic authority structures?

Krasner also concludes that non-recognition is not hindering commercial and diplomatic exchange *per se*, but would bring an element of uncertainty into those relationships (ibid.). Uncertainty would hence come from not knowing whether to treat an entity as a *sovereign state* or not. Switching sides, international recognition also makes it more successful to promote, or enforce, a specific (national) identity (Krasner 1999, 18). This, in turn, has consequences on Duchacek's and Soldatos' focus on federalism as explanatory grounds. While federalism, as the domestic organization of authority, allows for a certain layer of power and competences, sub-state nationalism being promoted internationally has consequences on the international legal sovereignty of a state (Lecours & Moreno 2001, 2).

What one can deduce is that sovereignty discourses have specific relevance for those entities seeking statehood on their own and hence communicate so internationally ("protodiplomacy"). How about less identity-driven examples, though? According to Krasner, violations of Westphalian sovereignty by invitation, that is to say by principles of subsidiarity, do not include violating international legal sovereignty. Rather, sometimes staying in power (or gaining access to power) inclines reducing one's own authority in order to promote the constituents' interests, especially with regard to supranational institutions and conventions (Krasner 1999, 24). For the argument of this thesis, this means that the kind of sovereignty that is compromised or questioned is dependent on the form of paradiplomacy at use.

Nonetheless, what becomes apparent is that Krasner still heavily relies on a sharp distinction between the "domestic" and "the foreign" whereas it was argued before that it is especially those two categories that are blurred by globalization and internationalization. By primarily focusing on international legal and Westphalian sovereignty, he largely reduces those aspects back to an "inside" and an "outside", although he admits that no authority structure is free of external influences (Krasner 1999, 23).

III.1.3 The indivisibility of sovereignty

While the separation of sovereignty into domains that are occupied along the axes of control - authority, and domestic - foreign, are quite handy in analyzing when and how sovereignty is contested or compromised, I hold with Werner and de Wilde (2001, 303) that sovereignty as such is an indivisible quality. Among other points, this attempt of categorical distinction shows what de Wilde and Werner have a called a "descriptive fallacy", namely the belief that the concept of sovereignty would have a real-world counterpart it seeks to

describe, or to quantify (2001, 285). To be more precise, the authors argue that holding the totality of sovereign power would be a myth, since there have always been interdependencies and "throne pretenders" (2001, 287f.; 306f). As such, one could be inclined to argue that sovereignty would be a nearly theological belief in authority, inheriting a legacy of absolutism (which does not quite seem to be congruent with contemporary politics anymore, see Weber 2007, 701). Therefore, Werner and de Wilde argue that sovereignty claims are speech acts, all the more occurring in cases where (societal) coherence or (territorial) integrity are called into question (Werner & de Wilde 2001, 305f.). Thus, as the authors put it,

> *"It is precisely the lack of sovereignty that explains much of the centralization efforts, the nationalization projects, and the international attempts to maximize their power."* (Werner & de Wilde 2001, 307).

This means that the reality of sovereignty is not an outside correspondent, but relies on its use and acceptance by constituents (Werner & de Wilde 2001, 304). Wielding power (as in authority and control) is therefore a matter of legitimization, coming close to the Hobbesian *Leviathan*.[8] With regard to the pooling of sovereignty and the re-allocation of competences, an argument I cited several times already, the authors indicate that e.g. the EU has never claimed sovereignty in a state-alike manner (ibid.). Moreover, states would still enjoy different positions and powers within the EU-framework than other (e.g. sub-state) entities (ibid.). Should the latter claim sovereignty, one would again find oneself with the argument that it is rival claims that lead to state sovereignty being fostered and strengthened. Hence, pooling authority and competences does not lead to a state's loss in sovereignty, but one should rather see it as a positive re-allocation of sovereign rights, or as the authors put it *"a freedom to (...) create new identities and new forms of action"* (Werner & de Wilde 2001, 302).

Ergo, dependent on the understanding of sovereignty one has, sovereignty can be compromised by paradiplomacy, but paradiplomacy also fosters a state's claim to sovereignty by calling its functions and/or coherence into question. Recalling the previous chapter, in which both state-composed international space and a borderless, community-based organization of space are juxtaposed without the capability of refuting one option, I opt for Werner & de Wilde's conception of sovereignty due to it capturing the dynamics of negotiated legitimacy, as much as the dynamics of tension that paradiplomacy can create. In turn, this could mean that paradiplomacy as an expression of actor pluralization in the international space can be conducive to ensuring state sovereignty. While following Krasner's conception would mean that paradiplomacy threatens different aspects of sovereignty, Werner and de Wilde's understanding of sovereignty rather describes it as a status that one can hardly lose, but rather re-allocate sovereign rights to different entities. This means that sub-state entities acquire certain competences. However (and different from confederations mentioned by Krasner), although there might be deviances at the micro level, the majority of policies within a state remain compatible (if one looks at sectors such as education) to enhance mutual recognition within a polity (which has implications on societal coherence). Thus, sovereignty is only openly threatened by protodiplomatic acts that rival state sovereignty because

> *"At the core of sovereignty's anxiety is the haunted awareness that the sovereign is not, in the end, alone. At its simplest, vainglorious sovereigns (...) are compelled to live in*

[8] By means of being the outcome of a social contract, and hence negotiated.

a world full of other sovereigns, monads alike, their claims no less unlimited" (Evens, Genovese, Reilly & Wolfe 2013, 5).

Nevertheless, since sovereignty claims as speech acts rely on the acceptance by an audience, what happens if paradiplomacy in the form of taking over state tasks leads to problems of accepting the state in its entirety, favoring the provisionary respective subnational entity? I hold that this is dependent on what it actually is paradiplomacy is seeking to contribute, what its capacities are and how much it can contribute to forming and maintaining distinct societal coherence in the forms of welfare and solidarity within its community.

Summing up the previous inquiry, paradiplomacy can hence endanger state sovereignty without abolishing the state. While one argument centers on open rival claims for sovereignty and authority, the actual wider array of examples lets one situate paradiplomacy as a tool employed for local well-being, or welfare

III.2 On Welfare

Recalling that sovereignty also inherently means to provide for constituents, it is this welfare function that shall be further investigated (see Krasner 1999, 7; Johnson 2014, 137). More specifically, the discourse thus far has been a strongly Eurocentric one. Alternative understandings of sovereignty, though, have own conceptual genealogies that can be related to indigenous societies before Europeans brought the Westphalian sovereignty notion upon them (Evens, Genovese, Reilly & Wolfe 2013, 6f.). Several examples, such as the Maori *rangatiratanga*, describe a certain idea of self-governance, which it shares to large degrees with European sovereignty, but moves beyond to aim for a high standard of leadership for the populace's welfare (Evens, Genovese, Reilly & Wolfe 2013, 8). Hence, this is an attempt of welfare in a bottom-up manner (ibid.). Apparently, a provisionary element is engrained into the concept, although to different extents and sometimes more, sometimes less obvious. Generally, as Hans Rosling (2018) demonstrates, humanity is better-off than it ever used to be. Welfare, in that sense, covers aspects of well-being. Scotland, one of the cases to be discussed later, most prominently changed its economy under the Sturgeon administration towards being wellbeing oriented (BBC, 22/01/2020). How strong the state is supposed to be involved in ensuring the well-being of its populace relates to ideological and political preferences. Thus, for feasibility reasons, this discussion will foremost target the most institutionalized form of ensuring welfare, namely the welfare state. While the welfare state is mostly applicable in Northern and Western Europe, other countries at least ensure a minimal degree of welfare provision, or distributionism (Cerny 1999, 19).

III.2.1 The Western Welfare state

It appears quite natural then that the welfare state became a common political reality, at least in the post-World War II era to different extents in Western Europe (Hirsch 1995, 268; Swank & Betz 2002, 224; Stiglitz 2018, 3f.). Engraved in the welfare state is that

> *"markets are not, in general, efficient; that market failures are pervasive and not easily correctable; and that as a result, government needs to take a more active role. Of course, government should do what it can to ensure that markets work well. (...) The*

demand for the welfare state was driven by hard-to-ignore imperfections in markets that sometimes had a devastating effect on people's lives and well-being." (Stiglitz 2018, 4).

The invention of the welfare state can therefore be seen as an expression of a socio-economic obligation vis-à-vis the dominant capitalist market system, in which one inevitably finds winners (fewer) and losers (more). Thereby, the classical welfare state featured a set of social securities (eg. health and unemployment insurance), associated with mechanisms of re-distribution, and guarantees of certain freedoms and labor rights (Hirsch 1995, 277; Stiglitz 2018, 6). The state was given quite a prominent role in distributing wealth, income and opportunities (Lund 2002, 118f.). Social welfare hence has the potential to be beneficial with regard to human capital (e.g. development and education), the quality of society (concerning crimes, risk reduction, etc.), societal morale and cohesion, the economy (increased consumer spending, taxation effects and reduction of economic costs of social problems), as well as civility and aesthetics (e.g. urban mingling or "keeping the streets clean"-manner, see Dolgoff 1999, 300ff.). Especially the youth, the elderly, and the poor of working age profit, since they are the most vulnerable to volatile (and probably unfair) market mechanisms (Stiglitz 2018, 19ff.).

In practice, though, welfare is often expressed in terms of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The GDP, without rendering this thesis into a critique of methods of quantification, rather describes output than well-being (Aitken 2019, R3). This is but one indication of the neo-liberalization of the welfare state, notably due to the wide-spread of de-regulated capitalism. Especially within the Reagan-Thatcher era of the 1980's, the "West" (most prominently the USA and the United Kingdom) pushed forward a reduction of social functions and accelerated financial de-regulation (Hirsch 1995, 269; Stiglitz 2018, 3; Swank & Beetz 2003, 225).

III.2.2 Global Capitalism, Neo-liberalization and the Welfare State

Several studies have already targeted the connection between globalization (global capitalism) and the reduction of welfare state functions (e.g. Hirsch 1995, Cerny 1999, Fenger & van Paridon 2012). Here, one can assume two lines of argumentation: Some scholars argue that globalization per se has no impact on the welfare state, so that its functions can be maintained. The argument would be that, in order to increase competitiveness, states reduce taxation (which has impacts on the capabilities of re-distribution) to attract big companies. This, however, has been disproven in a majority of studies. Rather, it would be political contingencies (such as ideologies and preferences) that decide upon the degree of the state's involvement and its respective duration (Fenger & van Paridon 2012, 64).

Other scholars, however, criticize exactly this element of political ideology that has been transformed towards neoliberal competition in the first place in a variety of states. Globalization and internationalization, as was argued before, do not necessarily threaten state sovereignty, but they undermine the state's control function (to stick to Krasner, this is a question of control that effects authority, hence impacts what he termed domestic and interdependence sovereignty). One could therefore describe the relationship between the spread of global capitalism and welfare as follows:

> *"The ability of governments equitably to provide welfare and public goods in general becomes less geographically controllable, undermining both the sense of citizenship and the notion of public interest."* (Cerny 1999, 15).

One can now argue that there have always been interdependencies and external vulnerabilities, and that "total" sovereignty has always been a myth. Rather, the Westphalian Peace has been an acknowledgement of interrelatedness of communities that created a set of rules for common exchange, and ended war (Werner & de Wilde 2001, 287f.). The critical scholars remarking upon the neo-liberalization of the welfare state, however, do not say that the state is disappearing but changing its character by reducing state interventions and distribution but increasing privatization incentives (Hirsch 1995, 269). This would lead to a failure of the post-World War II, Keynesian welfare state, or at least to declining efficacy (ibid.).

> *"Minimal welfare states will of course have to be maintained; the absence of any public safety net would lead to social unrest and destabilization. Furthermore, older, more entrenched states still have something of a comparative advantage in providing identity and a sort of* ***ersatz Gemeinschaft*** *(sic!). (...) However, the* ***Gemeinschaft*** *function too is being unevenly eroded by the postmodern fragmentation of national identities."* (Cerny 1999, 19).

In that light, financial aid by the state would less and less be given for welfare purposes, but rather to increase competitiveness which in turn enhances social marginalization (Hirsch 1995, 269). Not only does this imply to give greater attention to economic issues, but also that the state is actively distancing itself from its constituents (ibid., 273f.). Hirsch and Cerny, the two prominently mentioned scholars here, must clearly be contextualized with regard to their works on globalization, democratic shortcomings, and rising populism, which they assume to be consequential regarding of the former. Hence, there might be a tendency of relating global capitalism to processes of fragmentation and the mutual creation of an "inside" and "outside", in which the state fails to act as binding societal element. Maybe this tendency is even too dominant in these cases. What they manage to achieve, though, is to demonstrate neo-liberalism's ideational agency and transformative capacity which has implications all over the globe (and most definitely in Western societies). Moreover, one should clarify that neo-liberalism is not to be equated with capitalism. With growing de-regulation though, starting from the 1980's onwards, there are tendencies of greater neo-liberalization.

One could hence say that it is not necessarily globalization and internationalization that threaten sovereignty and the state's welfare, but rather that there has been an ideological transformation from the acknowledgement of market failures to wide-spread de-regulation, compromising the welfare aspects (transnationally) in its stead. In his account on the welfare state in the 21st century, former chief economist of the World Bank and Nobel Memorial Prize winner in economics, Joseph Stiglitz, writes that

> *"Many critics of the welfare state believed it would bring down the economy, as the weight of social obligations and the security provided by social insurance both eroded incentives. It turned out that none of the major crises have been related to the welfare state but were instead brought on by the excesses of the financial sector. Even after the crisis, some in the financial sector found it difficult not to seize the opportunity to warn against the dangers of the welfare state, even though countries with the strongest welfare states were among those with the strongest recoveries."* (Stiglitz 2018, 31).

Stiglitz concludes in picking up both lines of argumentation cited above: While there is a need for reforming globalization, in a sense of slowing down tax-cutting races and commonly tax multinational corporations, there should also be acknowledgement about the welfare state being conducive to economic performance, and not endangering it (ibid., 31f.). The problems of the welfare state are therefore less sovereignty-driven (as in compromising statehood) but need to be related to globalized problems. Ideational agency plays a major role in this welfare debate, because it is interwoven with how welfare is interpreted and provided. Despite the welfare state being a mostly Western notion, this discussion showcases how state roles can be interpreted within schemes of global economics and how nuances between capitalism and neo-liberalism ultimately impact well-being in societies. Thereby, rather individualist (liberalist) accounts reject stronger welfare notions by emphasizing the role of the individual and the private sector, whilst those at least acknowledging market failures tend to provide more societal back-up. This is clearly a generalization stemming from the above-made argumentation and is first and foremost meant to show global tendencies. Therefore, its applicability does not hold true for every single country. Yet, for example, despite China's economic success, it's re-distributionism is mostly concerned with urban areas: While the average Chinese is wealthier than ever before, there are still significant differences between urban and rural areas in terms of income (Wu 2007, 1). This shows two things: First, capitalism's impact has become a global phenomenon, even if one does not adapt to its neo-liberal form. Second, wealth and welfare are hardly accountable for on national levels, but different areas are also affected differently.

III.2.3 Paradiplomacy & Welfare

How does this connect to paradiplomacy?

Early paradiplomacy literature also describes these forms of external action as a means of increasing welfare. While Duchacek, one of paradiplomacy's first scholars, links it to the provision of welfare and social securities as such, other scholars rather soften the notion to speak about the local population's well-being (Duchacek 1990, 8ff.; Hocking 1993, 1). The general line of argumentation here is that even in highly centralized countries, local authorities have become aware of the need to be connected internationally in order to be part of global value chains, and thus to immediately increase the level of local well-being (Hocking 1993, 1). On the contrary, not having an independent regional or municipal foreign policy can, according to the World Economic Forum, isolate cities and regions from the globalized economy and therefore disfavor its population (World Economic Forum 2014, 13). The aspect of non-mediation is an important element insofar as one can still find significant divides between the realities of people in rural, and people in urban areas. The geo-economic positioning, as much as inner-state modes of re-distribution can lead to an at least perceived socio-economic inequality (Binelli & Loveless 2016, 212). Hereby, the authors Binelli and Loveless argue with the example that rural inhabitants might, irrespective of the actual state of inequality, have the feeling of having been left out with regard to (internationalized) economic growth in urban areas (2016, 228). Thus, different forms of settlement perceive levels of prices and income (and hence, wealth) differently (Nivorozhkin et al. 2010, 1546). Without diving too deep into economic geography, one can well acknowledge paradiplomacy's potential for countering those struggles. Especially cities inherit a prominent place here, since their *"competitiveness increasingly determines the wealth and poverty of nations, regions and the world"* (World Economic Forum 2014, 8).

Some authors therefore emphasize paradiplomacy's developmental aspects (Nganje 2014, 97).

Classical capitalist accounts quantify welfare with regard to GDP (growth), itself composed of indicators such as productivity and income (Aitken 2019, R3). Therefore, large parts of the paradiplomacy literature are dedicated to seeing it as a stimulus to attract tourists, boost foreign direct investment, or facilitate trade (World Economic Forum 2014, 13; Kaminski 2019, 373). Although the actual impact of paradiplomacy on the communal levels of wealth remain insufficiently researched (notably for lacking data with regard to those sub-state levels), a study focusing on urban Sino-Europe relationships already suggests positive correlations between sister city agreements and foreign direct investment (Zhang, Yang & Van Den Bulcke 2013, ix f.). In these specific cases, this can be explained by assuming closer access to local authorities and risk reduction due to specialized incentives (ibid.). Generally, what is already explored is that *"cultural understanding is conducive to trade and investment, and business provides cultural understanding with a reliable and lasting base"* (Ramasamy & Cremer 1998, 450). Paradiplomacy has a major role to play in this regard.

Thus, paradiplomacy can be an effect-mitigating incentive regarding the assumed neo-liberalization of the state, and hence declining distributionism. It can be conducive to subnational entities being more self-reliant in times in which the welfare state is under pressure due to globalized risks and a momentum of de-coupling the financial sector from "real" economics. However, it is not necessarily a form of contestation with regard to the neo-liberal paradigm, because most entities seek to compete on their own, with other sub-state entities or with states as such. This is probably due to neo-liberalization efforts. However, paradiplomacy often enough takes part in actually increasing the number of competing actors, which can in its stead even lead to entities of the same state competing for economic benefits. One can therefore conclude that paradiplomacy represents one way of accumulating wealth in times of global competition and retrenching inner-state mechanisms of providing for its constituents. Whether this is beneficial for the local populace, as was the idealized imagery for paradiplomacy, also depends on the societal and organizational culture, both locally and nationally (for instance, see Nganje 2014 arguing that wealth and welfare are not the same for paradiplomacy of South African entities).

Concluding this sub-chapter, one can say that taking over the inherent provisionary role of state sovereignty is not a threat to sovereignty *per se*. While Werner and de Wilde (2001,303) argue that there is no negative conception of sovereignty (as in giving it up), but only a positive one in re-distributing (partially or sector-specific) sovereignty, the question is then in how far the state itself is still able to provide welfare. Is it a question of task allocation for the sake of efficiency (and hence paying attention to local conditions), or rather a pragmatic response to state failures (e.g. out of need)? What is also important to note is that while this section focused primarily on the welfare state, and the increasing neo-liberalization in light of the wide spread of capitalism, the state's role is also changing because economies are less and less operating in national terms. Rather, wealth creation is more and more reliant on value chains that are based on information and knowledge, which are not necessarily defined in national terms, but rather have either local or global appeal (Cornay 2001, 71ff.).

Consequently, the welfare/well-being function of a state changes and might look differently. I now argue that the provisionary role of the state, incorporating varying understanding of welfare, is *a priori* to be related to the state of social coherence, expressed

as solidarity. The welfare state as such can, for instance, already be interpreted as institutionalized solidarity (Fenger & van Paridon 2012, 52).

III.3 On Solidarity

The relationship between sovereignty and welfare provision has been demonstrated in showing that the two are intertwined but that the extent to which the state interprets its provisionary role is subject to political ideology and culture. Welfare, however, can be related to being a form of solidarity, though institutionalized and for reciprocal purposes (e.g. accepting sovereignty claims). Investigating the notion of solidarity becomes interesting against the background of Guibernaut (2004, 1254) arguing that paradiplomacy is employed for solidarity purposes. Scrutinizing the relationship between solidarity, the state and paradiplomacy is especially vital regarding the aforementioned section in which it was argued that subnational actors compete on their own in order to provide for the local populace. What does that tell us about solidarity as a state task, both in its internal and external dimension? Is paradiplomacy a tool to maintain solidarity?

III.3.1 Durkheim's solidarity notion

Solidarity's basic principles are often related back to sociologist Emile Durkheim. I thereby opt for Durkheim's notion of solidarity since it is meant to relate to the state of society, and not a specific political or ideological preference. Hence, this discourse on solidarity is not reliant on a specific national myth (as in national socialism or fascism), nor is it specifically class preferent (although it does capture socio-economic systems), nor is it dependent on religious beliefs. While the aforementioned have clear links to sovereign statehood, they only appeal to specific (historical) examples. Since this thesis intends to shed light on paradiplomacy in relation to statehood, and not the state as such, this approach now rather places societal dimensions, and not state-exclusive dimensions at its core.

Rather, Durkheim introduced the notion of *mechanical solidarity*, in which solidarity prevailed in traditional communities consistent of members with clearly identifiable identities, perspectives and positioning within this community (Fenger & van Paridon 2012, 50). This is contrasted with the social ties of modern societies, in which *organic solidarity* describes interdependent societal relations due to the large-scale division of labor. Members of those societies would hence be linked indirectly as individual but interdependent *"parts of a large organism"* (Fenger & van Paridon 2012, 51). Durkheim's notion of solidarity hence describes a state of societal organization. Paradiplomacy, in its stead, has early been associated with globalization and the wide spread of capitalism, hence it also makes sense to assume Durkheim's modern societies with their strong linkage to socioeconomic interrelations. What they show, though, is a distancing in social bonds in which solidarity seeks less to describe direct relations between members of a community, but rather the complex social ties of modern societies in which its members do not need to be immediately relatable. One could feel inclined to see paradiplomacy as a bridge between partaking in those globalized schemes of coherence, and the re-localization of social bonds.

III.3.2 External impacts on domestic schemes of solidarity

Hence, distance apparently seems to play a role for social coherence, and hence solidarity. This is why authors Fenger and van Paridon have undertaken an inquiry analyzing globalization's impact on solidarity, assuming that is a force leading to fading state autonomy, as much as the greater integration of economies and wider spread of risks and ideas (2012, 52f.). What is at that point is the conceptualization of solidarity by focusing on by whom it is exercised, individually or collectively (e.g. being institutionalized), and whether it is driven by morality or reciprocity (ibid., 51f.). For instance, the welfare state is treated as an example of reciprocal institutionalized solidarity, whereas development aid is understood as moral institutionalized solidarity (ibid., 50).

For the individual, globalization's sole impact would be to enlarge the notion of community (towards an international or even global community, ibid., 55, 58). Nonetheless, the closest bonds remain those to family and community (ibid., 67). Localities hence play a role for subjective perceptions of and willingness to maintain solidarity. Institutionalized solidarity, however, offers a slightly different stance on the issue: First, the authors differ from critical scholars like the aforementioned Hirsch (1995) in saying that globalization *per se* has no (negative) impact on the modern welfare state, but that it is rather ideologies and political preferences that matter here (ibid., 64). However, with regard to regional blocs like the EU, having a common market and currency (therefore also being transnationally vulnerable to global risks), the authors conclude that

> *"globalisation demands additional forms of transnational institutionalised solidarity without significantly affecting existing forms."* (ibid., 67).

Following this argument and connecting it to the infamous "fragmegration" (Rosenau 1992, 281; Rosenau 1997, 38ff.; Rosenau 2003, 11), one could see paradiplomacy as a way of yet another means of employing solidary action on top of the state and supranational actions, though being closer to the individual's perspective due to the communal level involved. Recalling Durkheim's foundational notion of solidarity, one could even imagine paradiplomacy to bridge both states of societies in moving between relatable identities due to more condensed communities (mechanical solidarity), and connecting it to the more estranged parts of larger structures (organic solidarity). This would leave one, again, with paradiplomacy as complementary or additional tool that takes over state tasks not out of necessity, but out of pluralization and risk resilience. Moreover, it also re-connects to Der Derian's (1987) notion of diplomacy as means of mediating estrangement. Hence, paradiplomacy could be a means of solidarity for local communities in domestic contexts. It has the potential to extend these means towards the "other" within the international space, as has been hinted at and described by several scholars (e.g. Aldecoa & Keating 2013, 80; Duran 2016, 44).

III.3.3 Solidarity within the international space: Two schools of thought

Durkheim's understanding of solidarity though is not postulating that organic solidarity is organized in states alone (Weber 2007, 701). Rather, and picking up the claim of enlarged communities due to internationalization, it makes sense to move beyond the domestic view of solidarity in order to explore what role paradiplomacy can play in it. Two prominent schools of thought describing solidarity within the international space are the English School and Neo-Gramscian accounts of international politics. I will present both

approaches, because I hold that they cover aspects of what paradiplomacy can achieve and which tasks at least used to be carried out by states alone.

With regard to the English School, solidarity is a means of socialization among states to establish order and shared values (including common interests and identity traits, Weber 2007, 697). Here, solidarity is employed on the way towards an international society.[9] Although this conception starkly treats the state as the primary actor, paradiplomacy in its different forms (from ceremonial, to topical cooperation and even identity promotion) might apply those aspects and socialize with other entities that share certain interests. Important to note is that this might especially apply to those entities that identify as being distinct, e.g. in the sense of "nations without states" (Guibernaut 2004, 1254), as a way of state mimicry.

The Neo-Gramscian stance (and here most prominently Robert Cox) takes a different approach, in which it postulates that one would not need to move towards an international society, but rather that the world society is constitutive for IR in the first place (Weber 2007, 697). Thus, the state and state hierarchies are expressions of a naturalization of relations of production and exploitation. In this scenario, solidarity refers to an orientation among the exploited, e.g. in the actual awareness of being exploited and the capacity to organize counter-hegemonic movements (Satgar 2007, 58ff.; Weber 2007, 697). As such, Cox (1999, 13) highlights different instances in which communal societies provide welfare on the local level, acting against states and international economic organizations who are, at least on a perceptual level, not always oriented along the interests of the people. It appears quite natural to connect this argument to paradiplomacy's potential to maintaining solidarity.

One could deduce that this is a question of international or transnational solidarity. Hence, Weber summarizes that solidarity is understood as *"morally inflected forms of collective social agency"* in both theories, though they would *"differ over where such agency is located"* (Weber 2007, 698). While in the English School, solidarity is pertained through states as a condition of order, the Neo-Gramscian lens to solidarity describes it as movement-to-movement relations among the exploited as a condition to criticize and transform the existent order (ibid). With regard to the latter, rather horizontally (e.g. transnationally) organized procedure, paradiplomacy can follow similar routes regarding issue-specific co-operations on for example climate change mitigation efforts (consider the Network of Regional Governments for Sustainable Development - nrg4sd). At the same time, one needs to acknowledge that paradiplomacy is (in most cases) also organized in authority structures. Dependent on the intent, the respective entity is part of a sovereign structure and hence wields agency within a specific organization of competences and powers, or it is rivaling the dominant structure and attempts to claim sovereignty itself. Moreover, although climate change mitigation action can imply a re-thinking of the dominant economic world order, I hold that climate-related paradiplomacy does not necessarily imply systemic critiques of capitalism and its modes of labor and production (in a "revolutionary" sense).[10]

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[9] Hedley Bull distinguishes between pluralism within the society of states, reliant on a minimal consensus of mutual recognition between sovereigns, and solidarism with a stark emphasis on a common interest of states of the enforcement of law (Wheeler & Dunne 1996, 94f.). This showcases both the relationship between sovereignty and solidarity by emphasizing the aspect of norm socialization.

[10] At this point, I want to clarify that paradiplomacy could do so. However, given the link to globalized capitalism, it is necessary to admit that most entities seek to compete in these economic relations, and not to transform them, e.g. see Rioux Ouimet (2015), describing it as "from sub-state nationalism to subnational competition states".

Therefore, both approaches enable one to partially describe international solidarity expressed through paradiplomacy: Either, it can represent a way of norm sharing and socialization (as an independent entity, or as a means of following official state stances) between different territorial configurations in the international space, or it is capable to transnationally organize interests of communities in a counter-hegemonic way (Cox 1999, 27), without necessarily aligning with capitalism-critique. Nevertheless, Weber's criticism, which I share, is that the English School is too state-centric and cannot account for which norms and values are actually shared (calling it an unspecified "moral dignity", 2007, 704; 709), whilst the Neo-Gramscian school relies too starkly on the common experience of capitalist exploitation, not taking the pluralization of actors and experiences into account (Satgar 2007, 58ff.; Weber 2007, 708).

III.3.4 Paradiplomacy, Solidarity, Recognition

An understanding of solidarity that allows to not being reduced to either domestic or international contexts or to the state is Axel Honneth's recognition theory approach. Solidarity, in that light, represents one of three categories for successful inter-subjective identity formation (Weber 2007, 709). Hereby, recognition is used as a core element, both to solve (moral) struggles individually and collectively (ibid., 710). Although Honneth's account offers a micro-, or subjective, view, the element of recognition can be interpreted as being the explanatory solution to phenomena such as transnational regimes, governance beyond the state, and authority without sovereignty (ibid.).

It is argued that the recognition theory approach

> *"is intended to capture the conditions and capacities required for developing stable social identities and the ability to recognise, defend, or challenge mutually binding values and norms"* (Weber 2007, 711).

Recognition can thereby be granted in three ways: emotional support, cognitive respect, or social esteem (ibid.). It is especially this latter social esteem (*"soziale Wertschätzung"*) that is capable to move beyond the inter-personal as such and be up-scaled towards a societal element because it can be expressed in legal rights and community values (Honneth 1994, 179f.). Thus, the sheer fact of belonging to a society (of whatever scale) can bring an element of recognition (both in terms of societal identity, as a process of inter-subjective construction, and personal identity, see Honneth 1994, 180f.). Solidarity, however, constitutes a moral orientation towards others within social integration that predates matters of rights and duties, but is a means to counter the struggle for recognition in the first place (Honneth asks: What if rights are denied?, 1994, 135f.). Deriving from this assumption is the idea that paradiplomacy can work as an act of recognition both internally and externally with regard to the social esteem of a said entity, as well as its constituent populace. Thereby, paradiplomacy does not necessarily capture the rights and duties of the individual in a given area, but rather promotes their interests, values and norms internationally. Rights and duties can then of course be deduced with regard to this form of action and societal consolidation. Subnational actors can cooperate irrespective of official state-to-state stances. We can find examples when looking at sub-national Russia-EU relations (Joenniemi & Sergunin 2014, 19f.). Noé Cornago even provides us with an understanding of diplomatic couples, with the aim of territorial continuity (2014, 126). This aspect is intensified with regard to cross-border cooperation: Local population can benefit from resource and knowledge pooling exceeding state boundaries to tackle common (internationalized) problems (Oddone & Rodríguez Vázquez 2015, 114). All those patterns

of cooperation rely on aspects of recognition of the other, e.g. as an independent actor within the global economy, as a society facing the same problems, or due to shared historical experiences.

Without complete refutation of the schools of thought previously mentioned, I now hold that paradiplomacy can be solidarity-oriented in several ways: If it is conducive to welfare/well-being, then it appeals to a solidarity notion in a domestic context. Within the international space, as I will also show empirically, it can contribute to both, international understanding by norm socialization, and to counter-hegemonic rallying. Recognition, however, covers both domestic and foreign contexts and is applicable in all the three mentioned dimensions. Interestingly, recognition re-appears as a central element. Within the section on sovereignty, it was labeled as "acceptance" or "legitimacy". However, one could claim this to be an act of recognition, as well. Within the section on welfare, recognition appeared as an element of obligation/ duty towards and among society. I interpret it in a way in which any actor claiming to represent an entity and a populace is dependent on processes of recognition with regard to audience (internally and externally), which ultimately has consequences on the forms of action and the discourses, as well. One could now argue that this holds true for both, traditional means of diplomacy and statehood, as well as for paradiplomacy. Recognition hence covers all three aspects of this chapter: sovereignty, welfare, and solidarity and delivers a partial understanding of how paradiplomacy is employed, and how state tasks can also center around those notions. Thus, this discussion has led to both, first answers on paradiplomacy's capacities, but also to detecting a field of potential tension between the state and the constituent evolving around processes of recognition.

III.4 Chapter Conclusion

Concluding this chapter, one can say that (from a conceptual point of view) paradiplomacy only compromises sovereignty, and the state, if one adheres to the "myth" of the (absolute?) Westphalian construct. However, in most cases, it is rather connected to a re-allocation of sovereign rights, and hence is employed for welfare and solidarity purposes as an act of recognition both by the state and the local populace, realizing that local concerns are better addressed by those subnational entities working in conjunction with the state. This is not compromising state sovereignty *per se*, but rather reflects how the sovereign organizes authority. Only with protodiplomacy (so identity-driven, sometimes even secessionist claims of recognition) are there open rival claims that can threaten the sovereign state.

Therefore, sovereign statehood as such is not declining: Rather, this chapter emphasizes the co-existence of both, subnational actors and the state working harmoniously or dis-harmoniously (Soldatos 1990, 38): Paradiplomacy can be seen as a tool that strengthens statehood by either enjoying sovereign rights that have been distributed to it and ensure the state's well-functioning (it is part of the sovereign structure), or by calling it into question in being a rival sovereign structure, so that the state enforces nationalization projects.

However, given that sovereignty relies on acceptance, paradiplomacy that is employed to take over state tasks can well lead to rival claims in the long run. Taking those strong and well-researched, identity-driven cases into consideration (Flanders, Catalonia, Québec), they are also economic power houses, giving them a greater possibility of self-reliance and self-governance in turn. Rival claims could hence appear by a respective audience within the providing constituent entity, or by the (central) state perceiving this entity to be a rival

or seeing its territorial coherence questioned (see Rioux Ouimet 2015, describing commercial paradiplomacy in Québec and Scotland to be an outcome of diverging interests with regard to the national level, with micro-nationalism remaining the main driver). This becomes interesting against the background of identity promotion being substantiated by economic and political forces, in order for an actor to be recognized and relevant (Guibernaut 2004, 1254). What has further been argued is that paradiplomacy is not necessarily a form of contesting a dominant order or structure (other than, at times, the sovereign state). Rather, it aligns with those systemic procedures and only rarely (most often topic-related) works in a contrarian manner.

Those are the core assumption deriving from the conceptual engagement within this chapter. However, can the use of paradiplomacy exceed pure accumulation of wealth? Is it employed to maintain solidarity both at the communal level and internationally, notably by recognizing and providing social esteem? Does this, in turn, lead to own sovereignty claims by being self-reliant? As a next step, these axioms and the corresponding questions must be confronted with empirical material. Therefore, a series of interviews with experts in the field has been conducted. While the next chapter explains the method of choice in this case, the ensuing part will analyze narratives and discourses with regard to paradiplomacy, its provisionary role, and the state.

IV. Methodological Framework

The debates surrounding sovereignty, welfare and solidarity remained largely conceptual ones. How can one now translate them into a methodological framework, and how can one reflect upon them with help of empirics?

IV.1 Problems of Quantification, Advantages of Qualitative Data

First and foremost, translating the conceptual insights into a methodological framework requires awareness of which data to use. The data thus connects to the research questions on paradiplomacy, sovereignty, statehood, and their respective capacities and tasks. One way of going about it would be to work with quantitative means. The problem would then be to choose specific parameters, *inter alia* social policies, GDP growth, or trade data. These choices of indicators suffer from two shortcomings. First, those parameters do not sufficiently cover concepts such as sovereignty, welfare or solidarity. As has been shown before, there might be very different understandings of the terms since they come with blurring boundaries. An operationalization in numerical codes (e.g. accumulated trade data, job and GDP growth) appears somewhat reductionist. It can only partially cover the three conceptual dimensions of this thesis, as well. Second, there are also practical disadvantages. Statistical data of the communal and sub-national levels is not always publicly available. Whilst federal state structures might provide these data, one would reduce this thesis to an exclusive study of federalism. For the European case, the EU provides sub-state regional categorizations regarding the distribution mechanisms of monetary transfers such as the European Cohesion Funds. However, while regions can be said to be social constructs (Hettne & Söderbaum 2000, 460), those EU categorizations (i.e. NUTS I - III) sometimes do not correspond to actual administrative and political sub-state entities. Allowing myself a brief excursion at this point, entities of the first level sub-state division are classified as NUTS-I. Taking the example of Germany, some of the *Länder* are then sub-

divided for the lower NUTS-II classification, whereas others remain indivisible at that stage (see European Commission 2016, 322/7f.; compare Maps 1 & 2 on p. 2). For instance, whereas North Rhine-Westphalia is split into five sub-zones, Saxony-Anhalt, Thüringen, or Brandenburg remain intact. The decisive element here is the sheer number of inhabitants, but not political coherence. With regard to the directions of monetary transfers, this categorization might be fruitful. However, it appears less useful for the study of paradiplomacy.



Map 1: NUTS II classification by the EU, 2016 (European Commission)



Map 2: Germany and its 16 *Länder*

Moreover, introducing these categorical distinctions would necessarily mean to exclude certain actors again. Focusing on the first-level sub-division of states only could for example lead to being blind to vivid and growing examples of urban paradiplomacy.

Being aware of this quantitative fallacy, I opt for an inclusive approach that shall pay attention to experiences, narratives and discourses. In that light, I do not intend to necessarily reiterate the qualitative-quantitative dichotomy. Rather, as shown before, I hold with Kracauer that quantitative analysis entails qualitative pre-selection, as well (1952, 631). Thus, qualitative and quantitative information can be said to have close ties (Strauss and Corbin identify them as being "cousins", 1990, 4). Relying on quantitative data only, however, is not conducive to accounting for paradiplomacy's relationship with statehood. Notably, Kuznetsov questions both the quantifiability of paradiplomatic practices, intentions and directions as well as case selection rationales (Kuznetsov 2015,12f.). I therefore favor working by qualitative means. Yet, this is not a refutation of quantitative information per se, but a personal positionning with regard to the sort of information considered. Regarding claims that suggest qualitative research is only of subjective and exploratory nature (Kohlbacher 2006, 3), this project is explicitly meant as an exploratory journey that tries to shed light on contemporary developments of paradiplomacy. It is especially this data-oriented and experience-sharing dimension which can be an asset to (para-) diplomacy research. After all, especially in the study of diplomacy, it is discourses, wordings, declarations and narratives that matter (e.g. Werner & de Wilde 2001).

IV.2 Semi-Structured Interviews as a Means of Data-Gathering

The next step is then to gain access to the favored qualitative data. Hereby, semi-structured interviews are used as a means of information gathering. The semi-structural aspect must be seen as a reflection of the preliminary information stemming from the body of literature. There are hence pre-existing categories that find their application in the interview questions, whilst new and complementary information shall derive during the interview and in conjunction with said questions (van Peer, Hakemulder & Zyngier 2012, 82). Generally, the aim is to construct a picture with the necessary information grounded in a particular context, rather than to excavate information as such (Mason 2003, 228f.). I hold this to be a promising approach, given that there are possibilities of gaining access to some empirical data, however there is a lack of structural and relational explanations of paradiplomacy. Hence, conducting semi-structured interviews here aims at enquiring the forms of paradiplomacy, but also to embed then in constitutional and political contexts. Ensuing, the interviews questionnaire reflects different theoretical engagements, among them thematic cornerstones such as: [11]

- Definition (e.g. to understand what is considered to be paradiplomacy, assuming that this might be defined differently for representatives of different entities)
- Forms (e.g. how is it conducted, based on the classification of Tavares 2016, presented in Chapter II)
- Impact (e.g. its capacities, based on the more functional distinction by Lecours 2008, presented in Chapter II)
- Case Peculiarities (e.g. What are the context specifics?)
- Systemic influences (e.g. relationship with statehood, regionalism, globalization, based on the body of literature suggesting a link between paradiplomacy and federalism, global economy, regionalism etc., e.g. Duchacek 1990, Soldatos 1990,

[11] The questionnaire is to be found in the annex of the thesis.

Hocking 1993, Keating 1999, Oddone & Rodríguez Vázquez 2015, Tavares 2016, as presented in Chapter II)

Rather obvious is that when asking questions along those lines, the interviewee's responses must be embedded in his/her own respective political environment. Important, though, is to equally be aware of the researcher's own positioning. This has implications on how questions are asked, and which expectations are meant to be met. Consequently, any interview situation cannot be objective, but is rather a mediated inter-subjective creation of yet another latent context. Therefore, I hold that one needs to maintain a reflexive spirit when analyzing those interviews.

In the next step, interview participants must be selected. Hereby, I hold that it is beneficial for this study to pick interviewees from two backgrounds:

- Practitioners in the field, to give a precise insight into their working environment. It has been a conscious choice to include practitioners from the first level of sub-state division, as well as urban areas. With the exception of one interviewee, those practitioners stem from the EU.
- Scholars, to inquire conceptual disparities and to get secondary information on specific regions and cities. One of the observations I made was that scholars might help in cases where contacting local authorities proved to be more difficult. Moreover, it has the advantage of pluralizing the opinions on paradiplomacy, statehood and its capacities, given possible biases of the researcher due to personal experiences and convictions.

Both kinds of interviewees shall reflect the nature of this work: While some knowledge, deriving from the literature and personal experiences is present, and can therefore be formed into a set of questions, the eventual outcome is still reliant on the expert's point of view (see Wellington & Szczerbinski 2007, 74). What should not be forgotten, though, is that conducting interviews also poses logistic and access problems. When it comes to selection procedures, then what is feasible and who actually is willing to partake should not be underestimated. Therefore, I suggest that an equal gender and territory balance is an ideal for which to aim, but that cannot always be ensured. Instead, as it turned out in this case, my selection rationale might be biased, but I decided to aim for parity between well-researched examples of paradiplomacy, and/or entities with relatively high autonomy (e.g. Flanders, Québec, Scotland, South Tyrol) and those that have only recently (or not at all) come to scholarly attention, or are at least less prominently featured (Polish voivodeships, South African paradiplomacy, i.e. Johannesburg, Baltic Sea networks, or examples of the successful instrumentalization of city twinning).

Thereby, I did not intend to introduce parameters of territorial distinction, or set geographical limits. However, one outcome of my getting in contact with paradiplomacy practitioners was that mostly those practitioners willing to partake were from the EU. One could attribute this to being an outcome of the relatively high degree of institutionalization of subnational actors within the European levels of decision-making. The EU shall therefore serve as main scope when it comes to practitioners in the field, because the shared circumstances (institutionalization, funding, and programs) allow for greater comparability. This is not to say that this is supposed to be an EU study but rather that the majority of narratives remain European ones. As hinted at earlier and with regard to the representativity of the selected interviewees, this thesis shall serve as a pilot study to paradiplomacy in relation to questioning state autonomy and centrality. This requires awareness that the spatial, temporal and personal scope of interviewees might be expanded. Yet, the chosen

interviewees for this project already allow to draw significant conclusions due to their different geographical and academic backgrounds.

All of the interviewees agreed to be named within the following data processing works and gave consent of openly displaying their opinions and experiences. The informational core of this thesis hence stems from interviews with the following experts (enlisted in alphabetical order of the respective surnames):

Practitioners:

Interview#1: Evens, Freddy; Staff Director, Government of Flanders, Department of Foreign Affairs, Belgium (Interview in November 2019),

Interview#2: Kompatscher, Arno; Governor South Tyrol, Italy (Interview in November 2019),

Interview#3: Dr. Oddone, Nahuel; Head of Promotion and Exchange of Regional Social Policies Department, MERCOSUR Social Institute (ISM), Paraguay (Interview in December 2019)[12],

Interview#4: Schmidt, Wolfgang; Head of International Relations of the City of Kiel, Germany; Chair of the Smart and Prospering Cities Commission of the Union of the Baltic Cities (Interview in January 2020),

Correspondence#1: Wilson, Hazel; Team leader "International Futures", Scottish Government, Directorate of External Affairs, (primarily relying on secondary data, February 2020)[13].

Scholars:

Interview#5: Dr. Kaminski, Tomasz; University of Lodz, Poland (Interview in November 2019),

Interview#6: Dr. Koschkar, Martin; Policy Officer at the CDU parliamentary group in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Germany, formerly University of Rostock; Dissertation on the foreign relations of two German Baltic Sea *Länder* (Interview in November 2019),

Interview#7: Prof. Dr. Lecours, André; University of Ottawa, Canada (Interview in November 2019),

Interview#8: Dr. Nganje, Fritz; University of Johannesburg, South Africa (Interview in December 2019),

Interview#9: Prof. Dr. Paquin, Stéphane; Université nationale d'administration publique, Canada (Interview in November 2019).

The transcripts of each interview can be found in the annex of this thesis.

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[12] Dr. Oddone is enlisted as practitioner due to him having work experience in the field of paradiplomacy, notably for the Argentinian border city Monte Caseros and within the cross-border-cooperation network "Fronteras Abiertas". However, his most recent works are of an academic nature, so that his current occupation is the one of a scholar, as well. I consciously classified him under "practitioner" for reasons of parity between both groups of participants. Dr. Oddone's academic work is also cited in this thesis, so that I aim at focusing on his more practical role within the data analysis.

[13] Mrs. Wilson provided the information I was enquiring without that taking place in an interview context, but via email.

IV.3 Qualitative Content Analysis as a Method

Kuznetsov, after having criticized quantitative accounts of paradiplomacy argues that only case studies can properly replicate the individuality of regional or municipal foreign policy, and its embedment in local contexts (2015, 15). This claim, however, leads me to recall current developments within the body of literature on foreign policy analysis. Thereby, I hold with Herborth (2015, 119f.) that there is no need of theorizing the foreign policy of every single country, but rather that there needs to be a tendency of finding shared patterns which can (but do not always need to!) comply with context peculiarities but having certain generalizable appeal.

This must hence be the aim of any chosen method for this thesis. Therefore, I am opting for Qualitative Content Analysis to work with those interviews. The aim of this method is to preserve benefits of quantitative ways of analysis, namely its systematics and reliability, but to transform them into more interpretive means (Mayring 2000, 1). Thus, it is not only the manifest content of, e.g. an interview transcript that matters, but also its latent context (ibid., 2). In that light, Qualitative Content Analysis differs from other qualitative approaches by being more concerned with meaning being generated by communication, both open and hidden, than with the forms of this communication (Drisko & Maschi 2015, 82). This, for instance, separates Qualitative Content Analysis from Discourse Analysis (ibid.). It can therefore come close to those methods being labeled as "thematic analyses" (ibid., 83).

Qualitative Content Analysis is mainly associated with the work of psychologist Philipp Mayring, who is said to have developed the method during the course of the 1980's (Drisko & Maschi 2015, 85). As Mayring describes it (2000, 8), the analytical process takes places as follows:

- inductive category development,
- summarizing,
- context analysis,
- deductive category application.

Hence, pre-existing literature engagement (contextualization) is used for an inductive category building (Mayring 2000, 3f.). This is of use considering the researcher's own positioning, as described before: When dealing with qualitative data, some categories are already known, both from literature as well as from personal experiences, while others are meant to derive during the actual source analysis (Wellington and Szczerbinsky 2007, 74). Corbin and Strauss would refer to this as "theoretical sensitivity" (1998, 78). Not only does this enable one to compare and adjust the different consolidated units, but also to take steps of critical thought, especially when adding complementary information. Important is, however, that categories can still be subject to re-negotiation and to dynamic processes themselves, if they prove to be divergent from previous assumptions (Mayring 2000, 4).

However, Qualitative Content Analysis in the sense of Philipp Mayring requires pre-fixed coding rules (2000, 3). While this can be interpreted as a means of adhering to scientific standards, it does also show a certain momentum of favoring method over meaning and input. Hence, one could say that this fashion of qualitative content analysis nurtures into a hidden positivism and relates back to Kracauer's description of shrinking significance of whether to use quantitative or qualitative data (1952, 631). Although I argued against quantitative data before, this shows that the actual divide is more of an epistemological nature. My choice is to employ Qualitative Content Analysis in a more interpretive sense,

now deviating from Mayring (which is sometimes also being labeled as "Interpretive Content Analysis", see Drisko & Maschi 2015). At this point, I wish to recall claims that categories and coding rules should rather correspond to the data that are giving meaning to them, different from being imposed (ibid., 3; Elliot & Timulak 2005, 154). While I then still want to employ Qualitative Content Analysis, I also want to consider Strauss' argumentation of maintaining a reflexive spirit to being able to adapt the categories to dynamic processes, since the object of research is not static (Corbin & Strauss 1990, 5). I intend to preserve this dynamic procedure, in which changes of conditions nurture into the method itself (ibid.).

It is probably for that reason that such processes as Grounded Theory's open coding can also be applied in Qualitative Content Analysis, although it is rather meant in a substantive than in a conceptual manner (Drisko & Maschi 2015, 104). When coded, the consolidated information then forms the categories that serve as pillars for insights into paradiplomacy's relationship with statehood, its capacities, and whether it can be employed as a means of local and regional solidarity providers. Any changes, as well as preliminary conclusions, shall be noted in memos. These memos shall also be found in the annex of the thesis.

What still needs to be mentioned is that Qualitative Content Analysis is sometimes reduced to only being of descriptive nature (see Drisko & Maschi 2015, 83f.). This can be related to the method's focus on substantial themes, often enough resulting in pure accumulations of buzzwords and codes within the texts at hand (Drisko & Maschi 2015, 84). If employed in an interpretive fashion, though, Qualitative Content Analysis can gain greater analytic rigor by making inferences with latent contexts (Drisko & Maschi 2015, 59).

> *„For the content analyst, the systematic reading of a body of texts narrows the range of possible inferences concerning unobserved facts, intentions, mental states, effects, prejudices, planned actions, and antecedent or consequent conditions. Content analysts infer answers to particular research questions from their texts. Their inferences are merely more systematic, explicitly informed, and (ideally) verifiable than what ordinary readers do with texts. Recognizing this apparent generality, our definition of content analysis makes the drawing of inferences the centerpiece of this research technique*" (Krippendorf 2003, 25).

Hence, this is probably the reason for authors Drisko and Maschi (2015, 58) reading Krippendorf as follows:

„Interpretative content analysis, to Krippendorff, goes beyond descriptive questions of 'what' and 'how' and continues on to inferences about 'why', 'for whom' and 'to what effect.

Therefore, I want to replace frequential counting by open coding and making contextual inferences, thereby tying the analysis back to the previous conceptual chapters. However, every inference that is meant to be assembled into a larger picture must be grounded in empirics and hence validated and explained, as well (ibid.). This way of analysis therefore requires a high degree of transparency by which it aims at adhering to scientific validity and reliability. At the same time, I am well aware that there might be alternative interpretations. Choosing this method is explicitly meant as an investigation of patterns and recurring themes, and has not the goal of finding an overarching generalizable response. Rather, it aims at enriching discourses on paradiplomacy, sovereignty, solidarity and welfare. Qualitative Content Analysis, as I hold, can make a contribution at this point.

With regard to Mayring's scheme of how to use Qualitative Content Analysis, I propose the following:

- inductive category development (stemming from previous literature engagement, resulting in the thematic interview cornerstones mentioned before)
- open coding (with regard to both manifest and latent contexts)
- inferences, to be noted in memos
- deductive application and display of codes and inferences

This way, my approach sticks to a certain taxonomy without being too reductive or prescriptive but still allowing for interpretive freedoms.

V. Data Analysis

Having clarified both the theoretical-conceptual input, as well as Qualitative Content Analysis being the preferred way of empirical analysis, this chapter turns towards the replication of insights resulting from the series of expert interviews I conducted. With regard to the three focal questions raised at the beginning of this thesis, the interviews specifically asked for the relationship of paradiplomacy with sovereign statehood, as well as for the impact and capacities paradiplomacy can have. They also targeted the state of societal coherence within a given entity, recalling that federalism used to be treated as one of the main variables of paradiplomatic behavior, though it is not always applicable.

Generally, as will be demonstrated in the following pages, the interviewees understood paradiplomacy as a need in times of widespread internationalization in which a categorization in "foreign" and "domestic" does not hold true anymore (which is also reflected within the body of scholarly literature, see Keating 1999, 1). Yet, this does not imply that paradiplomacy and internationalization are the same. Instead, several interviewees made a distinction between the two and rather explained the need for paradiplomacy with growing internationalization.

Furthermore, paradiplomacy is heavily contingent upon both the respective legal framework in which it operates as well as on local leaders being invested in fostering international contacts. Its capacities are therefore always subject to constraining elements and dynamics being situated within state jurisdiction. This does not only influence paradiplomacy's effectiveness and aims but also the forms and shapes it takes. Consequently, while broader generalizability was never the aspired outcome of this thesis, this also shows again that case peculiarities and subjective experiences must be taken seriously and into account. Despite the fact that paradiplomacy is primarily contingent upon local conditions (both structurally and agent-related), there are nevertheless overlapping themes that were grouped and will be displayed according to the five interview categories mentioned in the previous chapter. Thereby, the frequency of thematic appearances will be displayed. Overlapping and recurring patterns are important for this thesis but this does not imply categorial discrimination against singular opinions or experiences. Sometimes, it is exactly a singular opinion or experience that is thwarting and constraining the majority opinion, thereby enabling to paint a more coherent and valid picture. Nevertheless, all of these efforts must be based in the premise of 10 interviews, and can therefore only represent a starting point for further inquiry.

V.1 Case Peculiarities

For a start, I hold that there is a need to demarcate the backgrounds of the experts that were interviewed. In order to situate their statements and narratives, this section will briefly depict the respective surroundings and specifics of each case. This can be of interest to further give an applicatory character to the analysis, without necessarily making this a collective case study. The display will be oriented along the states that the respective interviewee comes from, in order to depict the legal and constitutional standing within:

Country	**Entity**	**Case Peculiarities**
Belgium	Flanders	➢ Education as one domain of Flemish/Walloon competences ➢ sending diplomats for regionalized domains, no more Belgian ministers for some ➢ own agreements with UNESCO and ILO ➢ Flemish diplomatic posts, both multi- and bilaterally, from "diplomacy", to trade and tourism agencies as well as development cooperation ➢ Special constitutional rights (co-sovereign)
Italy	South Tyrol	➢ No constitutional mandate for paradiplomacy ➢ always in need of state approval (in questions of autonomy) ➢ territorial dispute between Italy and Austria after WWII, topic of two UN resolutions, agreements between Italy and Austria in 1992 ➢ No *de jure* permission, but *de facto* conducting paradiplomacy ➢ bridge between German-speaking and Italian-speaking communities
Argentina/ Mercosur	City of Monte Caseras	➢ Latin America witnesses big asymmetries between no use of paradiplomacy at all, to active rural communities and metropoles ➢ Continuous engagement in international organizations as crucial ➢ Regional integration as access point (e.g. Mercosur)

Germany	City of Kiel	➢ City twinning process took place in several waves, each of them reflecting contemporary interests (from WWII peace, to geographic orientation, to East-West divide, own minorities, topical needs to learn and gain access) ➢ Topical and ceremonial paradiplomacy ➢ Less constrained by legal framework due to being an urban entity ➢ Weak interplay between *Land* and city ➢ Making use of Baltic Sea location
	Mecklenburg-Vorpommern/ Schleswig-Holstein	➢ Baltic Sea institutions provide easy access to paradiplomacy ➢ Historical connections to e.g. USA open channels of exchange ➢ Official state guidelines of how to conduct paradiplomacy ➢ Partially cautious approaches (also in wording: information office" instead of representation)
United Kingdom	Scotland	➢ Embedment into Brexit circumstances ➢ Scotland considers itself to be a nation ➢ Special constitutional rights
Poland	Lodz	➢ Legal freedoms in democratic countries are rather big in as long as it is in order with the constitution ➢ Increasing partnering with China ➢ Involvement of local stakeholders ➢ Bottom-up incentives (e.g. logistics company) ➢ Political umbrella needed in China
Canada	Québec	➢ Canadian provinces to conduct paradiplomacy for 200 years ➢ Québec to have delegations in Paris and London in 1910

		➢ Québec driven by nationalism ➢ being part of *francophonie* and enjoying special relationship with France ➢ Idea of weilding power domestically and represent it internationally (e.g. education) stems from Québec, but is fullest achieved in Belgium ➢ Strong support for Québec's paradiplomacy by state if it's about economic interests
South Africa	Johannesburg	➢ historical circumstances matter! Due to apartheid legacy, very cautious paradiplomacy ➢ Dissent can be expressed, but cautiously ➢ Parks Tau as mayor of Johannesburg, rose to UCLG president, but lost mayorship at home (distancing from local conditions) ➢ decentralization in 80s/90s, hence more competences in economic development, environmental protection ➢ Individual politicians and visions matter ➢ Example Porto Alegre: paradiplomacy to make communities experience an alternative globalization in which everyone benefits (and not only big business) ➢ Wealth is not welfare! E.g. Parks Tau to create bike lanes (recommended by IOs) whilst there were more pressing issues ➢ Paradiplomacy can serve elites only and can be connected with corruption ➢ In need of democratization (transparency & accountability)

Table 1: Open Coding Display "Case Peculiarities" [14]

First and foremost, these codes display that any paradiplomatic endeavor needs embedment within political and institutional cultures. Paradiplomacy can have differing forms and impacts which depend, next to the aforementioned, on historical developments, as well. For instance, the case of South African entities' paradiplomacy shows well that a

[14] For this section, I refrain from displaying the frequencies of codes since case peculiarities are especially meant to give an individual, contextualizing nature to paradiplomacy narratives.

developmental focus can be very beneficial but anything more political must be treated with caution against the background of the *Apartheid* regime (see Interview#8 Nganje). Thus, what paradiplomacy intends to achieve, the impact it can have and how it relates to statehood is primarily to be related to internal dynamics. It must always be seen as the behavior of a constituent within a sovereign configuration rather than to approach the issue with a focus on the international behavior of subnational entities only.

> *"I should also qualify that in addition to the legal framework we should also look at the political and institutional culture. Because what we observe across the continent now, is that the law may say one thing, but if the political and institutional context permits, sub-national governments can do what they want as long as they do not step on the toes of the political principles at the national level. They can explore in whatever they want to engage in."* (Interview#8 Nganje)

> *"I was invited by the Dalai Lama to be a key note speaker at the Tibetan government in exile in Dharamshala, India. I was talking about autonomy, obviously with regard to South Tyrol, as well. Shortly after my speech, I received a phone call from the Italian foreign ministry because China officially complained in Rome although I was talking about autonomy, not secessionism. Nevertheless, those representative tasks are happening de facto, but are not constitutionally grounded."* (Interview#2 Kompatscher[15])

This is also decisive for whether paradiplomacy is used at all. While the general trend is to see an increase in paradiplomatic activities, it remains asymmetrical with regard to geographical appearances. Again, this can be interpreted as an outcome of political and institutional cultures in which constituents enjoy more or less sovereign rights, and is also to be related to societal coherence and the positioning of the sovereign state vis-à-vis global challenges and economic dynamics (e.g. Is it capable of dealing with those issues alone, or does it increase efficiency and well-being by employing more actors or granting certain freedoms to subnational actors?). Moreover, paradiplomacy is not necessarily a new phenomenon, but something that has only recently gained attention and therefore requires more scrutiny. This is clearly an outcome of the perceptual level but is nevertheless leading to an understanding in which sovereign statehood has always been a fragile construct (as argued by Werner & de Wilde 2001), whilst subnational actors have often simply not received as much attention as they might deserve within both national and international spaces:

> *"Due to our high degree of autonomy, nearly everything we do is perceived as foreign policy by Rome."* (Interview#2 Kompatscher[16])

> *"Yes, there is a rise. In my mind, this started in the 1980's, but it depends on the area that you are looking at. For example, the Canadian provinces were internationally active close to 200 years ago. So, it is not necessarily something entirely new. The governor of Québec had a delegation in Paris, but also in London in 1910. It is not a new phenomenon."* (Interview#9 Paquin)

> *"I do not know if paradiplomacy has changed, but the attention given to paradiplomacy has changed. (...) I know about another argument made by my friend Noé Cornago. (...) His most recent work is basically historical and is consistently showing that paradiplomacy has always been there, and it has always been important,*

[15] Author's own translation
[16] Author's own translation

but we have never paid attention to it. Hence, his work is going back to ancient Greece and so on." (Interview#7 Lecours)

Consequently, as this section has shown, inner dynamics and embeddings play a crucial role for paradiplomacy. One can hence infer the following:

- The legal framework, closely resulting in inner state structures and the allocation of competences (e.g. federalism) is the most important enabler. The state hence plays an initiating role for paradiplomacy.
- Historical legacies, institutional cultures and individuals determine paradiplomacy's effectiveness.
- Paradiplomacy is not necessarily new, but the attention given to it has changed.
- Internationalization and regionalized competences interact (in a way in which the subnational entity reacts to international developments immediately).

The historical experiences of paradiplomacy clearly also play a role in determining what it ought to be. Thereby, one can distinguish between state-mimicry, and those claiming for paradiplomacy to become a bottom-up exercise that brings citizens closer to decision-making processes, representing communities and having the potential to be a democratizing effort.[17] In order to delineate those different conceptions at work, the following category will reflect upon the different definitions of paradiplomacy at play.

V.2 Definition

Ensuing, there can be different understandings of paradiplomacy. This ultimately influences the relationship of sub-state entities and sovereign statehood because it reflects both a certain self-understanding (by practitioners) and a general idea of what competences and capacities sub-sate actors ought to have. Therefore, this analysis now turns towards how paradiplomacy is understood by different actors in different settings.

The definition of paradiplomacy that was introduced in Chapter II dates back to the two authors Soldatos and Duchacek, describing the foreign relations of subnational entities that either run in an integrated or parallel way to a state's foreign policy, to then again take either a harmonious or dis-harmonious shape (Soldatos 1990, 35ff.). Paradiplomacy can hence be an integrated part of a state's foreign policy apparatus (e.g. Chinese provinces), or it can be an independent endeavor that works alongside or against the sovereign state.

Quite interestingly then, the definitory dividing line vis-à-vis paradiplomacy is none that is reflected within the two interview groups, practitioners and scholars, but rather a contextual one relating to the background of the interviewees and their object of reference. That is to say, how narrow or how broad paradiplomacy is understood seems to be dependent on the socialization and experiences with the specific entities the respective interviewee is acquainted and concerned with. The two primary understandings of paradiplomacy are presented subsequently:

[17] In line with Carlsnaes (1981, 99f.) calling for a democratization of foreign policy processes in the 1980's already.

"Paradiplomacy as a distinct practice of regional governments" (Interview#7 Lecours)	***"Paradiplomacy as the foreign relations of any subnational entity"*** (Interview#5 Kaminski)
➢ Specific and clear mandate	➢ Any sub-state government's foreign endeavors, whether it is urban, rural or regional
➢ Requirement of a certain foreign policy apparatus	➢ Paradiplomacy to be part of internationalization processes
➢ Sharp distinction to "pure" internationalization	➢ Form of political communication
➢ Hierarchical understanding (e.g. different qualities)	➢ Pragmatic way of addressing local concerns

Table 2: Open Coding Display "Definition of Paradiplomacy"[18]

The distinctive element in this definitory question is hence the one asking for which actors to include. More specifically, the understanding of paradiplomacy is divided between the inclusion of cities, provinces, regions, *Länder*, *départments* etc., and the strict adherence to considering first-level sub-state division (further to be called "regions"). Exemplary for this divide stand the following two answers to the question "How do you define paradiplomacy?":

> *"It describes the international relations of regional governments (...) For me, I understand it primarily to be at the meso-level. I know that there is some work on cities, but I guess that cities still do not have the type of apparatus that regional governments have. The regional government mimics more the state, with a legislation, an executive, a court and so on."* (Interview #7 Lecours).

> *"I do recognize that the dynamics of the internationalization of cities are to some extent different from those of other sub-national governments, in a sense of second tier of government like provinces or states. But I think that the concept of paradiplomacy as it was put forward by Soldatos and Duchacek speaks to the broader gamut of the internationalization of sub-national governments, be it at the level of cities or at the level of regions. That is why I have tended to use the concept, of course with some nuances when you are making a distinction between regions and cities."* (Interview #8 Nganje).

As stated before, I do want to refrain from this analysis relying to starkly on pure accumulation. Nevertheless, the different approaches to paradiplomacy become especially interesting against the background of representativity of the considered experts. Hence, whom do they represent or which entity are they concerned with according to their respective positioning within this discourse?

[18] These are recurring themes that have been coded. Therefore, I am mainly going to juxtapose opinions and narratives at this point to be as inclusive as possible and to be capable of contextualizing those discourses. After all, the benefits of this method lay in generating and questioning meaning, and to use coding procedure in a substantial way (although coding always implies procedures of consolidation).



Graph 1: Interviewees' understanding of paradiplomacy against their geographical background (out of 10)

As the table attempts to show, there is less coherence between the different groups of experts but rather between those cases that have also served as selection rationales: Well-established, well experienced examples of paradiplomacy, and rather new or at least less-researched ones. Thereby, the experts have been more or less explicit about their conceptualization of paradiplomacy. For instance, while the Scottish case did not provide a specific definition, drawing from the context and wording one was capable of deducing the specific requirements and mandate that would suit the Scottish foreign endeavors, and hence its stance on the issue. The Flemish case remains an exception, because both kinds of actors were acknowledged. However, regarding the very specific constitutional design of Belgium and Flanders, a state-alike external service is engraved in the understanding of paradiplomacy (explaining the scores of 4.5 and 5.5 respectively). Consequently, the table shows that cases with constitutionally engraved foreign competences understand paradiplomacy in a state-alike manner (though, possibly, with reduced possibilities to act), whereas those examples from urban areas or with less IR competences employ more inclusive conceptions.

How is this now of further help for the questions regarding paradiplomacy's capacities and tasks in relation to statehood?

First of all, it is vital to be capable to recognize what paradiplomacy ought to be within the further investigations that follow. Moreover, one can already deduce a more traditional understanding of paradiplomacy, deriving from long years of practice (as in Québec, Flanders, Scotland or the German *Länder*) in comparison to a group of actors (especially urban entities) whose external action has only recently come to greater attention in light of internationalization procedures. As will be shown repeatedly throughout this chapter, the actual divide of interview participants is less about being a practitioner or a scholar, but rather about the entity(/ies) that serves as object of reference. While all of the interviewees had a clear governmental focus when talking about paradiplomacy, the discrepancy lays in whether to consider second tier governments only, or whether paradiplomacy can include more sub-sections. Now, exclusively considering representative capacities but also budgetary possibilities, this already depicts what paradiplomacy might be capable of achieving: One understanding of paradiplomacy is reliant on whole apparatuses of

subnational regions of which one can at least assume to being small-scale states in their institutional structure. Rather obviously, federalism is an important condition for this understanding. That is not to say that it is a necessary requirement for it but that it serves as implicit foundational element with regard to the institutional set-up that is expected. Thereby, this view produces an imagery in which state constituents are well-equipped themselves, and can hence decide whether their foreign relations are conducted harmoniously or in rivalry with the state. Especially the discourses of Scotland and Québec replicated the term "nation" several times in this context. To put it in more metaphorical terms, from this understanding, one either finds sovereign statehood's right hand in achieving its strategic goals, or Werner & de Wilde's postulated "throne pretenders" (2001, 306f.). This conception more or less automatically favors the sovereignty discourse by its second-tier governmental focus.

The more inclusive view has a rather functional rationale engraved in its conception. Here, paradiplomacy is an expression of an ongoing internationalization of challenges and policy sectors. Local entities are subject to immediate impact by those challenges and sectors; hence these entities start orienting themselves beyond borders and start solution finding and expertise exchange on their own. Paradiplomacy is thereby not reduced to those patterns, it might well include sovereignty rationales ("protodiplomacy") and well budgeted and experienced external services. Nonetheless, it is not exclusive to more topic-specific cooperation from different contexts in which statehood and questions of sovereignty only play sub-ordinate roles. Paradiplomacy's capacities can then also be investigated along local preferences and policies. What this shows is that how subnational foreign relations are defined is much dependent on the actors at play.

Actors	**Codes**	**Total**
	➢ Local stakeholders as part of interest forming process	8/10
	➢ Paradiplomacy as bottom-up process (by civil society)	4/10
	➢ Private sector to play an active role in conducting paradiplomacy	4/10
	➢ Exclusive focus on the governmental level	6/10

Table 3: Open Coding Display "Role of different actors in paradiplomacy"

Notably, and building upon the definition question, the involvement of local stakeholders and the private sector within the formation of foreign policy lines has witnessed another argumentative opposition, which is however equally to be related to the local conditions at hand. Most interview experts acknowledged the importance of involving stakeholders such as private businesses and universities to form interests, and hence to give motives to paradiplomacy. Yet, the greater divide was between those that saw an active role of the private sector in accompanying and sometimes even conducting paradiplomacy, and those that rather favored local governments as the representatives of civil society. Thereby, most European narratives assigned a crucial role to the private sector and universities in opening channels of communication, exploiting existent links and being vital in interest formation so that paradiplomacy is beneficial for local businesses in a job- and growth-related way, and *vice versa*:

> *"When we analyze the connections between European and Chinese regions it becomes clear that in almost every region cooperation with China is engaged by at*

least two actors: local business and local universities. We can talk about a golden triangle between self-government, local businesses and universities that make these connections possible and efficient. It comes very close to the well-known concept of the triple helix model: This is connected with innovation development, so it is a triangle between government, business and academia in which the best environment for innovation development is generated. I think it is quite the same in paradiplomacy, so that we can also talk about the triple helix model, but with 'self-government' instead of 'government'. The role of local business and the private sector is crucial from my understanding." (Interview #5 Kaminski).

"The private sector has a fundamental role. There are reasons for the fathers of the European idea to primarily have imagined the EU as an economic community, as in the European Community for Coal and Steel. (...) But next to the private sector, non-profit organizations, as in volunteering work, NGO's or cultural associations can also have an impact into developments of Realpolitik." (Interview #2 Kompatscher[19]).

The participants from South Africa and Argentina have, on their behalf, been more critical about the role of the private sector in saying that either big companies do not need additional support in their internationalization efforts, or there are significant struggles in internationalization processes in which political responsibilities are still to be clarified, but overall the private sector would not be as helpful (Interview #8 Nganje & Interview #3 Oddone). While the expert for two German *Länder* adopted an exclusively governmental view, the two scholars from Québec well-acknowledged the role that the private sector can play, however they differentiated it from their experiences with Québec (see Interview #6 Koschkar, Interview #7 Lecours, Interview #9 Paquin). Hence, what one can draw from it here is a distinction of paradiplomacy between the purely political and the economic, and cases where both overlap and nurture each other. This is, among others, also a question of having a veritable foreign policy apparatus and a permissive legal framework at hand, or whether paradiplomacy is rather conducted in a bottom-up manner in which the private sector is also crucial in installing political links, as the following example demonstrates:

"I am based in Łódź. (...) Our local and regional governments cooperate quite intensively with Chengdu and the Sichuan province in China. This is an interesting case, because the local government was incentive to establish this international link by business. There was a need from the bottom: A logistics company established a joint venture with a Chinese company and wanted to have a permanent trade connection between Łódź and Chengdu. To realize it, they needed a political umbrella from local and regional governments, because this how it works in China." (Interview#5 Kaminski)

What one can deduct from this section is the following:

- Paradiplomacy is either understood as a distinct practice of second-level governments in a state-alike manner, or as an inclusive form of different entities and their external relations.
- This shows already that paradiplomacy can be conceptualized as state-mimicry (although it might be used to support the state), or in alternative fashions that stretch the traditional understanding of diplomacy.
- Local stakeholders are conducive to forming interests and strategies.

[19] Author's own translation

- The defining dividing line between which kind of entity is engaging in paradiplomacy does not reflect upon how non-governmental actors are included in conducting paradiplomacy. Rather, this can be explained with cultural and ideological accounts (e.g. capitalism critique).

Different definitions can in turn lead to different approaches to paradiplomacy. The third category therefore targeted the different forms that paradiplomacy may take.

V.3 Forms

Now private sector involvement alone does not describe the forms of paradiplomacy in a systematic way. It does help to relate to the main explanatory grounds of how paradiplomacy is conducted. The different forms of paradiplomacy, which have been grouped and presented with regard to Tavares' categorization in chapter II, now have the potential to move from the mere conceptual towards the more empirical level, focusing on capacities and impact of paradiplomacy but also on its relationship with statehood. Thereby, how this type of political communication is conducted is of course highly case-specific, however there are several overlapping patterns that one can identify (notably with help of Tavares' classification). Moreover, the respective forms can be said to build on the approach to paradiplomacy (V.II) that was chosen by each interviewee, hinting at an institutional culture within a certain area or entity. The open coding process now resulted in the following:

Form	**Codes**	**Total**
Ceremonial Paradiplomacy	➢ City twinning	4/10
	➢ Traditional (unpolitical) means of cooperation	1/10
	➢ Partner Regions	4/10
	➢ Opening channels of communication	4/10
	➢ Following state orientation in foreign policy matters	3/10
	➢ Cultural cooperation (e.g. event organization)	3/10
Topic-Specific Paradiplomacy	➢ Local conditions as incentive for cross-border cooperation	7/10
	➢ Climate change mitigation	2/10
	➢ Attracting tourists	3/10

	➢ Attracting Students ➢ Promoting exports ➢ Attracting Foreign Direct Investment ➢ Business Missions ➢ Developmental Paradiplomacy ➢ Membership in issue-specific NGOs/IOs ➢ European Networks & Projects ➢ Mercociudades ➢ Macro-regional Strategies ➢ Representations to Brussels ➢ Permanent bilateral presence/agreements ➢ Education cooperation ➢ Lobbying for Funding	4/10 6/10 6/10 5/10 4/10 6/10 7/10 1/10 5/10 4/10 5/10 4/10 3/10
Global Paradiplomacy	➢ Membership in International Organizations and NGOs ➢ Active leader role and visibility on global stage ➢ Requirement of certain capacities in size or wealth ➢ Representations in key areas ➢ Development aid	5/10 4/10 4/10 4/10 3/10
Sovereign Paradiplomacy	➢ Nationalism as main driver for internal and external dynamics ➢ Most communication from sub-state to state (asymmetrical), most sub-state to sub-state communication with a few other strong partners ➢ Own foreign policy apparatus (foreign offices, trade missions and agencies, development aid)	2/10 4/10 4/10

Qualitative Differences/ Hierarchies	➢ Clear blueprint and strategy ➢ Problem-oriented, non-hierarchical paradiplomacy ➢ distinction between diplomacy and the mere ceremonial and economic forms ➢ Complementary to state ➢ Contrarian to state (both are possible) ➢ Geographic limitations (continental dimension)	3/10 4/10 3/10 6/10 4/10 6/10

Table 4: Open Coding "Forms, Quality & Priorities of paradiplomacy" (Mode of display categorized after Tavares 2016, 29ff.)

At this point, I refrain from citing every international office or endeavor named during the interviews. Consequently, those codes display consolidated information about different ways of conducting paradiplomacy. There might clearly be more ways. On a first glimpse, though, they do re-affirm Tavares' classification scheme which is also why I decided to use it as a means of display (with my adding the sections of "Qualitative Differences/Hierarchies" reconnecting to what has been discussed under V.II).

In cases of a permissible legal framework, and/or specific representative populace or economic strength, private companies are less employed for political purposes. Rather, it enables entities to cooperate on larger scales and to represent their interests with own apparatuses, such as foreign offices and trade missions. Thereby, these forms can cover all four of Tavares' types. I, however, would like to emphasize their capability to being independent players and thereby engage in global paradiplomacy (e.g. California in climate change mitigation efforts, Flanders as being a legal subject and hence being an independent member of UNESCO and ILO), or even sovereign paradiplomacy (e.g. Flanders putting effort into having physically distinct offices from the Belgian embassies, see Interview#1 Evens).

Smaller or legally more constrained entities, though, can take different paths. The aim of addressing local concerns stands at the forefront of international efforts, and hence more examples are to be found within the category of topic-specific cooperation. Here, geographical circumstances play an important role in how this cooperation takes place. In the EU, offices and representations in Brussels are key elements of regional interest communication and lobbying for funding (as has been a recurring pattern, named by 4 of the 10 interviewees). At the same time, the EU already offers an institutionalized space for subnational engagement, notably the Committee of Regions (CoR). Moreover, macro-regional strategies by the EU, or European projects and networks offer cooperation patterns and funding that enable those actors to tackle and improve issue-specifically, all in line with principles of subsidiarity (named by 70% of the interviewees, hence there is even acknowledgements outside the EU). The underlying rationale here is an activation of subnational entities in areas where states, or EU organs, do not have the capacities to act or refrain from doing so. As multi-level governance postulates, this is a layered approach of problem-solving (Marks & Hooghe 2004). Beyond the European scope, a common feature was to make use of business missions to key areas, e.g. China (named in 50% of cases). The continental scope remains the main object of reference though.

In Latin America, individual efforts are less common. Rather, paradiplomacy here is more concerned with rallying subnational actors in networks such as *Mercociudades*, to hence create the spaces of exchange in the first place. Moreover, the considered actors are often cities. For the African case, the example of Johannesburg was displayed as follows:

> *"I make an argument portraying the international activities of its former mayor, Parks Tau, who was quite active internationally. (...) You may not have an economic muscle, but through your network and how you leverage you can still command significant power and influence at the global level. But I also show the limitations to this dimension of power: It was a good ride to the top level of city networks, being the president of the UCLG.*[20] *Johannesburg might not have the same economic resources as London or New York, but to see its mayor rise up to that level and to being able to play a significant role is quite impressive. But I also make the argument that there is a limit to this because for the most part, such a path evolves around the personality of the mayor and it is also quite a move from the reality of the city itself. It was quite impressive but at the same time that Parks Tau was elected president of the UCLG, he was losing the mayorship at Johannesburg. So that is also quite an interesting dynamic."* (Interview#8 Nganje)

Membership in international organizations and NGO's hence equally plays an important role in gaining an access point to international activity (5/10). Generally, while I do not intend to introduce a scale of activities, what is observable is that the local setting determines the form of paradiplomatic endeavor, as much as whether subnational entities remain amongst themselves in their political communication, or whether this communication also takes an "asymmetrical" way from sub-state entity to state within the international space. Stéphane Paquin ensuing describes this relationship and way of communicating with regard to James Rosenau:

> *"He used to say that there are two types of actors in international relations: The state actors who are related to international law and that are predictable, and there are NGOs and other private actors. I believe that sub-national governments are situated in-between. There are not subject to international law, so that most of them cannot sign international treaties or become members of international organizations, which means that they cannot act like states. Therefore, they sometimes act like NGOs or pressured groups; they try to mobilize together to have an influence on a specific outcome."* (Interview#9 Paquin).

Sovereign paradiplomacy, having nationalism as the main driver and building upon a veritable foreign policy apparatus has been named several times (4 out of 10). While it was sometimes treated as the most accomplished form due to its state diplomacy resemblance, it was also always called to being one, but not the only option for paradiplomacy. The most common forms have had a clear economic focus (e.g. attracting foreign direct investment and promoting exports, both scored 6/10). Moreover, networking and organizing in (geographically constrained) organizations appeared as a common feature. This leads me to infer the following:

- There is a sort of path-dependency regarding the way of how paradiplomacy is conducted. This, in turn, is largely based in the (self-) understanding of actors involved, as well as in the institutional and historical setting of the respective actor.

[20] Author: United Cities and Local Governments (international organization)

- The majority of activities have an economic purpose, only a few are linked to taking an active role within global politics or to promote rivaling sovereignty claims (although those might be seen as the most accomplished cases). Different forms of paradiplomacy hence serve different purposes.
- International organizations and regional frameworks offer an important access point to paradiplomacy. They constitute the spaces for cooperation given that not all entities can draw on the required capacities for an independent foreign policy machinery. Nonetheless, (issue-specific) bilateral representations are important means to establish presence and channels of communication.

Do forms and understanding of paradiplomacy now have different consequences on one of the central questions of this thesis, namely which capacities paradiplomacy has and how this relates to statehood?

V.4 Impact

All aforementioned categories, case peculiarities, definitions and forms, now influence which impact paradiplomacy can have. Rather obvious is that matured paradiplomatic practices stem from both, relative permissive legal standings and institutional cultures fostering this form of political communication. Should this now be employed for purposes of identity promotion, paradiplomacy can easily lead to rivaling the sovereign state a specific entity is a constituent of. As was established before, it is much likely that the state would react in a centralizing or nationalizing manner. Otherwise, paradiplomacy can simply be interpreted as a way of re-allocating competences to ensure efficiency vis-à-vis tasks of growth, welfare and solidarity. What is paradiplomacy capable of achieving in this regard? Moreover, should paradiplomacy prove to be a useful tool for these tasks in the long run, would the re-allocation of competences, followed by probable successful external efforts by constituents, not lead to the very same mechanisms of rivalry? I hold that whether competence re-allocation proves to be a long run prerequisite for questioning sovereignty is much dependent on what paradiplomacy can achieve, given the aforementioned status of subnational governments who are generally recognized as hybrid state actors at best.

For the sake of visibility, the presentation of codes is now oriented along the division of political, economic, and cooperation impact (after Lecours 2008, 4ff.).

Impact Category	**Codes**	**Total**
Economic Impact	➢ Job Creation	3/10
	➢ Increasing Trade	5/10
	➢ Location advertisement	4/10
	➢ Economic Growth	9/10
	➢ Sustainability Impact	5/10
	➢ Increased well-being	10/10
	➢ Potential to increase welfare	10/10

	➢ Increased competitiveness ➢ Does not necessarily decrease inequality	8/10 4/10
Cooperation Impact	➢ Developmental impact ➢ Countering shared geographic concerns ➢ Issue-specific cooperation can lead to sectorial improvement ➢ Best-Practice sharing ➢ Contributing to internationalization ➢ Being conducive to international understanding	4/10 7/10 6/10 4/10 7/10 7/10
Political Impact	➢ International treaty-making power (few) ➢ Constitutional constraints (more) ➢ Paradiplomacy can act as an addition to state foreign policy in a still primarily state-composed system ➢ International recognition ➢ Addressing local needs ➢ Subnational interest representation ➢ Being closer to the citizens ➢ Include citizens stronger in decision making ➢ Bridging communities ➢ Sovereignty claims ➢ Promoting cultural distinctiveness ➢ Influencing decision making processes on an international scale ➢ Represent regionalized jurisdictions internationally ➢ Acting in cases were the state has too limited capacities	3/10 7/10 10/10 4/10 10/10 10/10 6/10 2/10 3/10 4/10 5/10 3/10 4/10 5/10

Table 5: Open Coding "Sectorial Impact of Paradiplomacy"

Once again, most of the impacting elements should not surprise the acquainted reader, given that a categorization within Lecours' functional scheme is possible. In that light, paradiplomacy has the potential to increase local well-being by employing the mere economic forms, like the attraction of foreign direct investment, companies, or talents, which in turn will lead to growth and create jobs (Interview#4 Schmidt). This is clearly a very liberal way of thinking and demonstrates a certain adherence to capitalist paradigms of competition. According to Lecours, as he expressed both in his academic work and in the interview, this economic-purpose paradiplomacy is now supposed to stand diametrically to sovereign paradiplomacy, in which the promotion of cultural distinctiveness and international recognition as an independent player are the core incentives.

> *"If you have read my work a little, one of the things that I did was to make distinctions between the political and the strictly economic. Then of course you can add cooperation agreements. This needs to be sorted out, too, but I think that those relationships that are more political - again, that would require a definition of what that means -, but they are more akin to state-to-state relations. So, they are qualitatively of a different nature than just the search for foreign investment or opening external markets."* (Interview#7 Lecours)

While I was using this distinction for visualization purposes, contextualizing the interviews and paying attention to both manifest and latent contexts can offer a more nuanced understanding, in which the conceptual insights into sovereignty, welfare and solidarity re-appear. For instance, especially those entities with strong foreign policy institutions (e.g. Flanders, Québec, Scotland) have the aim of international recognition engraved in their paradiplomatic endeavors (reoccurred in 4 of 10 interviews). Cultural distinctiveness is then promoted by installing bilateral relations but also by joining international organizations independently. While this is of course dependent on the legal possibilities an entity has, an opinion expressed during the interviewing process was that certain legal freedoms are constitutionally manifested due to nationalist movements' lobbying and pressures in the first place (see Interview#7 Lecours). Paradiplomacy could hence be interpreted as a way for internal and external recognition, and hence solidarity in the sense of Axel Honneth. Especially in its external dimension, this solidarity is aimed for in a reciprocal way: By contributing to the development and sustainability of the international community or individual states, the entity hopes to receive support at least for its distinctiveness within state configurations.

> *"For nationalist movements like in Flanders, in Scotland, or in Catalonia, so especially in places where there is an active secessionist movement, it is very important. This is due to an independence plan does not come without a look at the international sphere: If you want to be independent, you need recognition! There are statehood aspects to paradiplomacy."* (Interview #7 Lecours)

However, is this to be strictly separated from the functional, economic perspective? I hold that rather, strong economic capacities are a prerequisite for this kind of paradiplomatic practice. Using the example of Flanders, its number and funding for business missions and its trade agency exceed the actual political work.

> *"I would think that regions that are more powerful in economic terms, or that have more inhabitants, competences, income, etc. have much more possibilities in developing their own foreign policy. That gives you the means of thriving for this development. When you are a poor region, let's say in Bulgaria, then it is something that is nice to have, but you rather focus on internal affairs."* (Interview #1 Evens)

This leaves one with the impression that next to cultural distinctiveness, it must be economic self-sufficiency and a sense of welfare that nurture into sovereignty ambitions. The idea that paradiplomacy can increase well-being, and at least has the potential to lead to improved welfare, has been confirmed by all the interviewees. Consequently, it aligns with the afore-made idea that sovereignty, or, to a lesser extent, autonomy, has a certain provisionary character. It is hence a combination of sovereignty ambitions, welfare aspirations and internal and external solidarity mechanisms that seem to be vital for identity-based paradiplomacy. The Scottish government's external service's aims stand exemplary at this point:

Depiction 1: Scotland's envisioned impacted areas
(Source: Scottish Government)

However, in a majority of cases paradiplomacy is not employed with a focus on the sovereignty paradigm, but is said to be a pragmatic way to achieve growth and sustainability (named 9/10 and 5/10 respectively). In that light, paradiplomacy can for instance take over in domains where the state does not have sufficient capacities or is not willing to make use of it (score: 5/10):

> *"If we look at greater patterns of cooperation, as for example the Council of the Baltic Sea States, it is the Northern German Länder that are actively doing the groundwork for the foreign ministry, or take over specific tasks within this cooperation. The reason for it is that it has little relevance from Berlin's perspective. The Länder, however, can channel their own interests in an advantage of expertise. Sub-state actors can add know-how, resources and staff which the foreign ministry cannot do alone."* (Interview#6 Koschkar[21])

Hence, paradiplomacy can be said to work in a complementary fashion, or in conjunction with the state. Next to cooperation patterns of regional concern, as stated above, it can take various shapes such as being conducive to development (e.g. in the South African context). While the legal framework thereby sets the space for maneuvering, and can be rather constraining, those activities that are concerned with maintaining solidarity locally and

[21] Author's own translation

internationally and that are conducive to the local populace's welfare are easily justifiable and hardly deniable from the state's perspective (Interview#8 Nganje). Intrinsically, though, it shows (again) that states and sovereignty are fragile constructs and that such a term like "national interest" is hardly defendable vis-à-vis a variety of partially distinct local concerns and interests. Paradiplomacy is then an effective tool to represent those local interests and to counter those regional concerns, which has been confirmed by all the interviewees. An oft-made argument was for example the regionalization of policy domains like education or agriculture, which should subsequently also be represented by regional actors within the international space (e.g. Interview#1 Evens, score 4/10). In that light, paradiplomacy can also serve to give a voice to local communities and bring decision-making processes (even in the international space) closer to the citizens (named 6/10 times). There is hence potential for a bottom-up dimension in politics in paradiplomacy. I then hold that this kind of self-sufficiency can of course be in line with state policies and work in conjunction with the sovereign. Nevertheless, while it does not necessarily need to do so, it can very well lead to a desire for recognition and an emancipatory process of distinctiveness in the long run. The impact paradiplomacy can have therefore has five dimensions:

- International recognition for the sake of claiming sovereignty.
- Following the neoliberal growth paradigm (and by these means appeal to a certain level of welfare).
- Taking over state tasks where the state cannot or does not want to act, hence maintaining solidarity within an entity and beyond.
- Topic-Specific problem-solving on an international scale, thereby equally pertaining to a certain level of solidarity and welfare.
- Political Representation of the local populace, including different communities and potentially in distinction to prevalent systems/orders.

As was argued several times before, the exact intent, form and impact is much dependent on local conditions, leaders and contexts. The next section will now intend to shed light on paradiplomacy's enablers, notably those external influences that lead to a state's possible in-coherence in the first place.

V.5 Systemic Influences

While it was argued before that paradiplomacy has probably existed for a long time and simply not received sufficient attention, all interviewees agreed upon a rise of paradiplomatic practices, to differing degrees and with different starting dates. Assuming that paradiplomacy has become a "matured political practice" (Duran 2016, 2), and the impact it might have as stretching state coherence with different degrees regarding the label of sovereignty, it is conducive to this thesis to find answers to what has led to this increase in the first place. This can, again, be very much context-dependent. By looking at the systemic level, though, there might be shared patterns. Internationalization, neo-liberalization, or constitutions all already appeared more or less explicitly in the previous explanatory accounts. Therefore, and in order to reflect upon the three spheres that are discussed in this thesis, the codes will be displayed following dynamics at the local, national, and international level.

Systemic Influences	Codes	Total
Local Dynamics	➢ Paradiplomacy with potential to counter agenda-setting by capitalist interests ➢ Increasing complexity of challenges ➢ Global developments with immediate impact on local level (e.g. climate change) ➢ Local conditions important enabler (e.g. politicians, parties, locations) ➢ (Micro-) Nationalism as most signifacnt driver	2/10 8/10 8/10 10/10 2/10
National Dynamics	➢ (De-) Centralization/ Federalism ➢ State Structuring ➢ Allocation of Competences ➢ Foreing Policy remains mainly state preserve (e.g. South Africa, Nigeria, Argentina) ➢ Legal framework most important, sets the framework for paradiplomacy ➢ Brexit ➢ Political Climate ➢ Institutional Culture ➢ Historical Circumstances	10/10 10/10 10/10 2/10 10/10 1/10 10/10 3/10 5/10

International Dynamics	➢ Restructuring of global economy to put more weight onto cities as international actors in 70s/80s ➢ Removal of trade barriers / Free Trade Agreements ➢ Neoliberalization ➢ Economic Globalization ➢ Globalization has improved means of communication and mobility ➢ geographic "network of opportunities" ➢ EU has specific role due to its institutions and networks that incorporate local authorities ➢ EU's demand for actors to deal with regional policies, programs and funding ➢ Internationalization of every policy domain ➢ Internationalized challenges (e.g. migration, climate change) ➢ Actor Pluralization in the international space ➢ SDG implementation	1/10 2/10 4/10 10/10 5/10 6/10 7/10 2/10 4/10 6/10 8/10 1/10

Table 6: Open Coding Display "Systemic Influences"

As has been pinpointed at by all of the interview participants, the most important systemic influence on paradiplomacy are national constitutions and the allocation of competences. This reflects upon how permissive states are with regard to their constituents, whether they perceive paradiplomacy as a threat or want it to work in conjunction with the state's aims.

Thereby, giving greater autonomy and competences to constituents does not necessarily imply a weakening of the sovereign state but it well leads to a greater empowerment of its subnational entities. In that light, national stances can also be contested with help of paradiplomacy. Competence re-allocation always moves in a field of tension between increased efficiency by diversifying actors with specific know-how, and emancipatory processes in which those actors can turn against the state. This is clearly case specific, and is linked to longer processes of identity-building, recognition and self-sufficiency. The Scottish government, for example, understands Scotland to be a nation within a country that, in light of Brexit, turns away from the EU due to strong populist movements. The Scottish government describes its self-imagery as well as its paradiplomacy in stark contrast to the United Kingdom, as being an open and progressive society that wants to remain part of European programs and projects in a spirit of solidarity (for instance, due to shared norms). Brexit has clearly led Scotland to foster its international contacts, open more international offices, with the wish to be recognized as a distinct actor from the United Kingdom (see Correspondence#1 Wilson).

Zooming in into local conditions, size, composure, stakeholders and local politics equally matter for the creation of paradiplomacy. As was argued before, internal dynamics create a certain path dependency for how and where paradiplomacy is conducted. Notably, political vision and agenda, often connected to individuals in charge, are a prerequisite for successful paradiplomacy:

> *"I mean the will or vision of a mayor or a leader of a region which is a very important thing. I did research in Europe; I did research in Asia, in cities in Southeast Asia, in almost every case the people I talked to stressed that this (author: paradiplomatic activity) is due to the mayor or the leader, because he or her has a vision and wants to develop international links . But the personal factor is also important on the lower level; I mean on the senior managerial level. These international contacts between cities and regions are based on the day to day contacts between senior staff within partner institutions."* (Interview#5 Kaminski)

Eventually, the impact and capacities paradiplomacy can have are politically contingent. Whether it gives a voice to communities that are rather silenced or less prominent within national schemes, and hence takes a path of an emancipatory and solidarity-/well-being guided process remains subject to the understanding of national and international configurations of individuals, or groups of individuals:

> *"My second experience was to work as the director of the office of international relations of the city of Monte Caseros in Argentina. (...) I was working there for four years but after the change of the local mayor, the new mayor completely changed the view of international relations and his support of cross-border cooperation processes. This was sad for us, as well as for civil society, because there was a huge commitment of the community for cross-border cooperation to collaborate with Uruguayans and Brazilians. The change of the mayor was very drastic."* (Interview#3 Oddone).

At the same time, localities become more and more affected by international developments (as was named 8/10 times). Challenges like climate change or migration movements are ultimately dealt with at the local level, whilst the complexity of those challenges increases (equally scored 8/10). Generally, it is widely accepted that globalization and paradiplomacy are related in the sense that the former has had a widely enabling effect on the latter (e.g. see Keating 1999, Hocking 1993, Tavares 2016). More specifically, it is the multitude of

socio-economic processes that globalization has set in motion that work in an accelerating fashion:

> *"I think that at the most basic level, the removal of the barriers to trade is significant. Technological change has facilitated international contacts. Even the broader understanding of globalization as the compression of time and space can be counted. The free trade agreements of all sorts, although they have receded now, were an element that has been in the literature a lot in the 2000`s."* (Interview#7 Lecours)

Finally, increased patterns of interconnectedness have brought forward high degrees of internationalization in every aspect of daily life (named 4/10 times). Since subnational actors deal with those aspects their international presence has increased.

> *"There is no policy domain anymore that is being excluded from the impact of international tendencies and challenges have on your home front. There is not one sector that is not involved in digitalization, climate change, migration, Industry 4.0, energy challenges, circular economy - all these things are internationalized and need to be looked at from an international perspective. There is no excuse for any level of power to not being concerned with these international challenges."* (Interview#1 Evens)

At least from a functional or sectorial point of view, statehood, viewed as primary institution in dealing with those challenges, cannot ensure equal success and mitigation. While one of the research questions at the beginning of this thesis was asking for a system of quasi-federalism, this analysis shows that local conditions and state structuring are to be taken into account, but there is also a certain need for internationalization and self-governance within the international space. This does not imply a quasi-federal system, since states remain the point of reference in setting the framework for maneuvering. It does explain, though, why the inner structure of a state is only decisive for the kind and degree of external action but not the external action appearing in the first place. The EU remains an exception, since its policies and programs actively target and include local actors. There are spaces for institutionalization like the Committee of Regions, and with most regions having their own representations in Brussels, one could be inclined to speak of a quasi-federalist system within an EU context.

Other programs and policies, like the Sustainable Development Goals by the UN, also tend to include local actors without having the same degree of institutionalization. Rather, international organizations and NGO's have become places for exchange and common interest pursuit. This is, however, a way of finding a voice within the international space, employed for purposes of well-being and issue-specific solidarity, and thus recognition. While the engagement of subnational actors within those organizations is also mirroring its standing within national schemes (either in line and trying to foster activities, or countering national stances), the existence of these organizations is not dissolving state structures towards a global federalism. It is rather an actor pluralization within the international. For the interplay between the state and the constituent, this means the following:

- Interactions between the international space and localities create windows of opportunities and needs to act. Sometimes, this can be mediated or taken up by the state. The broader trend is that subnational actors are active themselves.
- Whether subnational entities conduct paradiplomacy, though, is highly dependent on inner state structures, constitutional freedoms, competences, and individuals in charge.

- A state's organizational, historical and political set-up creates the space for maneuvering for subnational actors. In turn, paradiplomacy can then also help to signify the state of the state.
- On the international scale, broader developments like globalization, the wide-spread of capitalism (sometimes even neo-liberalization), common challenges (e.g. climate change) and programs and organizations that are directed towards local actors have created incentives for paradiplomacy.

V.6 Axioms

Concluding this chapter, the data has shown that paradiplomacy is in its essence political. Even if it is employed for more functional purposes, it is mirroring the state of coherence within a state. Different from what was assumed at the beginning of this thesis, this does not necessarily need to threaten sovereignty. Paradiplomacy can well be used to claim sovereignty, and to get internationally recognized (e.g. Flanders, Québec). Wording plays a big role here, regarding the example of South Tyrol's Governor's key note speech about autonomy at the Dalai Lama. Even without using the term "sovereignty", it caused sufficient confusion about possible spillover effects that the Chinese government would complain in Italy. This was, however, not open rivalry regarding sovereignty claimed by South Tyrol vis-à-vis Italy. Rather, it unravels a certain incoherence within the Italian state due to South Tyrol's high degree of autonomy.

This analysis rather provokes a re-interpretation of statehood as a construct and what it is supposed to be. The inner coherence of "nation-states" has been stretched without means of abolishing the state. Systemic influences on several levels and emancipatory movements by the state's constituents vis-à-vis those influences lead to moving away from nationalization and centralization. The paradox, then again, is that paradiplomacy which openly rivals statehood might well cause those efforts again.

The impression to be drawn from this discussion rather sees the state in an ordering function, confederation-alike (recalling Krasner 1999, 11), in which it gives a voice to its constituents on scales where membership should be limited for simplification purposes and where it generally sets the space for maneuvering of its constituents.

With regard to the concepts of solidarity and welfare, non-sovereignty-related paradiplomacy must be seen as a reaction to an internationalization of challenges and economics that creates an actual need for substate involvement. Whilst some interviewees envisioned paradiplomacy to counter dynamics of neo-liberalization and unjust mechanisms of distribution for the good of the local populace (coming close to the Neo-Gramscian solidarity notion discussed earlier), most examples are simply part of those schemes trying to secure benefits for themselves (e.g. see Rioux Ouimet 2015 "subnational competition states"). Is this now due to failing state mechanisms? I rather hold that internationalization is inevitable, and, referring back to Werner & de Wilde, that absolute state autarky is a myth (2001, 287). Ensuing, the state is not failing in that regard, but its entities need to become active in a changing world given that they are immediately impacted by global developments. Nevertheless, this creates spaces of tension and incoherence caused by struggles for recognition – of roles, problems and identity.

A strict functional separation between the economic and the political is hence not possible. Both nurture each other, while subnational entities are constrained within national

configurations. Achieving welfare and pertaining to solidarity are mechanisms of orientation for paradiplomacy if one adopts a bottom-up view. Given the ideological perspective one adheres to, this can happen in a counter-systemic way (capitalism critique), or as a way of being yet another competitor. Ultimately, it can well lead to higher degrees of self-sufficiency and self-governance:

> *"First and foremost, paradiplomacy can lead to gaining more autonomy and probably to gradually acquire more legal competences."* (Interview#2 Kompatscher[22])

This, in turn, is likely to set the stage for those movements that employ paradiplomacy in a way that rivals state sovereignty. Again, it is those entities that also make excessive use of business missions and trade agencies that have the most outstanding legal position and identify themselves to be culturally distinct.

VI. Concluding Remarks

How do the conceptual and empirical inquiries now relate to our understanding of statehood and traditional means of diplomacy? Is paradiplomacy (intrinsically) endangering the state?

With regard to the research questions asked at the beginning of this thesis, one can deduce the following:

1) Has federalism as main variable become less relevant, or have growing patterns of interdependence and interconnectedness installed a quasi-federal system (though, unofficially) upon the globe?

Globalization has not installed a quasi-federal system globally. Using paradiplomacy as a lens shows that its appearance is still unevenly distributed over the globe. What it has brought upon people, though, are multiple processes that on the one hand simplify mutual exchange and on the other hand collectivize at least awareness of internationalized problems. National federalist structures remain the most important enablers, since they signify a certain degree of autonomy and competences. The EU remains an exception since its incorporation of local actors in projects, strategies and institutions actively grants certain rights of participation and activates those entities in partaking in international politics on a continental scale (see for instance Tatham 2008 on the EU's opportunity structures for subnational actors, or Kuznetsov 2015 on the importance of regionalization). It is at this point that the conceptual use of multi-level governance, designating several layers of decision-making processes, is to be applied. This, however, remains a merely European phenomenon. Generally, globalization has rather fostered sub-state entities to join international organizations or NGO's to be internationally present and to work on pressing issues in their fields of concern. This is mostly reliant on un- or less mediated interactions between global phenomena (e.g. climate change) and the local level. Subnational actors engage on the international stage out of different degrees of need and concern. Yet, this does not imply that globalization signifies the demise of the sovereign state.

2) Even if paradiplomacy and statehood work in conjunction, what does it mean for statehood? Has the state become obsolete regarding its provisionary tasks if it

[22] Author's own translation

needs to employ its constituents for it? How does this, in turn, relate to the notion of national interest?

Approaching statehood through the lens of paradiplomacy makes clear that the state acts as a sort of umbrella organization. Acknowledging this role of the state, one still feels inclined to conclude that there is no homogeneity amongst the constituents as the concept of the "nation-state" might suggest. Sovereignty claims will be accepted if the broader average of the populace feels represented, however a "national interest" is very questionable: Paradiplomacy signifies incoherence and the external pursuit of local and regional interests. Even with regard to China, an example often cited by the different experts to describe paradiplomacy as a tool to achieve state goals, the choice of partners and the areas of cooperation are reliant upon choices within regional and municipal entities. Additionally, if paradiplomacy is employed to reach a certain state of self-sufficiency (in welfare and solidarity), it can become a prerequisite for protodiplomacy and rivaling sovereignty claims. This, in turn, will lead the state to re-centralize and re-nationalize. The two hence always operate in a field of tension in which paradiplomacy is regarded as beneficial to wealth/welfare until it nurtures into more political and cultural distinctiveness (the application of any artificial separation between the political and the economic/cooperative, as employed by Lecours but also by many practitioners, seems hence flawed).

3) Is paradiplomacy capable of taking over some of those state tasks?

Paradiplomacy's capacities are largely dependent upon the framework set by the state. Moreover, it is reliant on inner dynamics such as individual politicians or party dynamics. Given the material and ideological capacities an entity then has, paradiplomacy's impact can reach from acting state-alike within global politics to representing the silenced, countering international struggles and democratizing foreign policy. Whether paradiplomacy is used to increase well-being or whether it is yet another machinery of wealth accumulation is largely dependent on the ideological stance of subnational governments.

This has, of course, implications for the wider field of international relations (IR). First and foremost, this analysis can be used to add another point of critique towards state centrality in IR. Again, the intention is not to overcome or abolish the state but rather to acknowledge that states are not homogenous entities and that treating them as such within the international space is highly reductive. Rather, subnational entities can play alongside within the international, or even make use of international contacts to oppose state stances. Regarding the two narratives of Chapter II – a communitarian, state-composed worldview that emphasizes the intrinsic value of statehood, and the cosmopolitan view that is rather concerned with individuals in a borderless world – paradiplomacy showcases the simultaneous existence of both explanatory accounts. The state remains the predominant organizational unit within the international space. Nevertheless, this does not mean that states should be treated as "black boxes" or that they hold the prerogative of international communication and activity.

Rather, as has been emphasized frequently, one witnesses an actor pluralization and a re-allocation of competences to different actors in order to counter new and ever more complex challenges around the globe. This clearly reminds of Rosenau's "fragmegration" (1992, 281; 1997, 38ff.; 2003, 11), describing the momentum of fragmenting competences while humans make use of increased mobility, facilitated transport and witness growing interconnectedness. As was displayed by the experts that were interviewed, this is more

than a simple observation but has become a necessity due to global challenges being capable of having immediate impact on local realities.

For the field of paradiplomacy, this analysis' added value is to contradict Kuznetsov (2015) in saying that only case studies are appropriate ways of approaching the issue. As has been shown, there are ways of paying attention to case peculiarities with the potential of abstracting common patterns. Being capable of doing so must clearly be seen in the frame of the small quantity of interviews analyzed for this thesis. While the formulated axioms might not hold true for every single case of paradiplomacy, I think that even larger numbers would have led to similar outcomes. Primarily, I base this assumption on the number of instances that have been mentioned in the interviews without being the primary case of reference. Moreover, while European narratives have been predominant here, a certain geographical spread within the interviewee selection cannot be denied. The considered participants that were not from Europe knew about or were involved in paradiplomatic endeavors in various countries and forms and used them as comparative grounds. There is hence already a solid empirical background against which the interview experts stated their opinions. Additionally, this thesis has not only collected data of different entities, but it has attempted to find shared patterns at the meso-level, underlining paradiplomacy's contingencies, capacities and relationships. At the same time, I acknowledge that there is significant room for further studies including either more focused, or more balanced temporal and spatial dimensions into the selection rationales. As mentioned earlier, I understand this thesis to be of an exploratory nature, coming close to a pilot study.

Paradiplomacy's potential vis-à-vis challenges like migratory movements, mitigating the consequences of climate changes, or even during and after the current Covid-19 pandemic can thereby not be stressed enough. It can also offer spaces of counter-systemic rallying, coming close to what Cox (1999, 13) has termed to be an orientation towards local well-being in distinction to the state or international economic configurations, such as:

> *"In my view, they remain the last layer of defense for ordinary communities if they are also to benefit from these global processes. If we have our cities and different regions being captured by transnational capital interest, then ordinary people do not have any policy of records. It is only when they are able to organize around various local or sub-national governments that they can have some hope to be able to try to change the form of globalization to make sure that it works for them as well. So, I definitely see a very strong link between paradiplomacy and welfare. (...) The international relations of cities like Porto Alegre had to do with how to create an alternative form of globalization that will benefit everyone and not those who control the means of production."* (Interview#8 Nganje)

Thus, paradiplomacy pertains to a certain ideal of providing welfare. Which exact understanding of welfare is used is, as stated before, dependent on the political actors in charge. Welfare can be seen in the classical welfare state-manner, in which state failures are balanced out by local and regional safety nets. Welfare can also be interpreted in a much wider sense as "well-being". This can in turn lead to addressing local concerns being perceived as welfare provision (probably depending on how pressing an issue might be). It can, and does in most cases, also adhere to the neoliberal paradigm of welfare being expressed in job creation and economic growth. This welfare idea is, irrespective of the underlying political or ideological rationale, a form of institutionalized solidarity with paradiplomacy being its tool to guaranteeing effectiveness. To further stick to Honneth's notion of solidarity as a means of recognition, paradiplomacy is firstly a means of internal, communalized recognition and can, in some cases (mostly in those that are less

neoliberally, economically driven) establish a momentum of recognition of actors, problems and communities beyond the own field of jurisdiction. At this point, I would not want to equate those recognition procedures internally and externally given that a lot of subnational foreign policies are first and foremost self-centered and interest driven. While this should not come as a surprise, there is however the potential of at least issue-specific recognition (as in: shared strong sectors of economy), or, as in a few cases, an understanding of being part of a global community in which solidarity is not restricted to borders.

While this analysis now mostly had a governmental focus, I am aligning with the idea of paradiplomacy as a societal force. Even within the interviews, it has been partially described as a bottom-up procedure. Again, this is no argument that seems to be generalizable for all cases but alone by representing a more concentrated populace and the involvement of local stakeholders paradiplomacy can have immediate impact into the lived realities of people. This becomes interesting against the background that the state, who has been partially criticized here, is *a priori* dependent on society (Bartelson 2001, 115). In that light, it makes sense to imagine the state's (perceived) coherence as an outcome of the dominant interests of a specific class (ibid., 145f.). While these assumptions now turn towards a more Marxist stance, it could explain paradiplomacy sometimes being used in conjunction, sometimes being used in dis-harmonious ways, as well as the definitory divergence between state mimicry and being actor-inclusive. With paradiplomacy being ever-more present within the international space, the state's coherence is now visibly undermined even though most examples do not necessarily act in a contrarian fashion. In his historical account of the concept of statehood, Jens Bartelson (2001, 116) further displays that a pre-dominant assumption over the course of the 20th Century has been to imagine *"that sovereign authority is profoundly conditioned by the constellations of interest within a society which in turn is supposedly historically or logically prior to the state."* Recalling Werner & de Wilde (2001), this now explains both, the persistence of sovereignty as an accepted speech act, but also the (increased) appearance of paradiplomacy in times where problems are not alone locally or nationally manageable anymore. Local conditions, forms of politics, interests and distinctiveness might precede the state construction, and are now capable of being communicated externally thanks to more and more internationalized spaces of articulation:

> *"If you look at the past few decades, especially with the spread of neoliberal economic policies, we have seen the nation-states fall out to the extent that it has somehow left different constituents of the state exposed to global forces. I do not think that we can restore that cohesive and compact nation-state anymore. So, we have seen a process of disintegration, where now different agencies within the state or different entities and, from a territorial perspective, different regions and cities now happen to play the role of protecting communities or constituencies."* (Interview#8 Nganje)

The state has been constructed as overarching umbrella and serves a dominant constellation of interests without reflecting every peculiarity. Any notion of national interest then seems not only reductive from an analytical point of view, but also discriminating regarding the plurality of actors and voices whose concerns are not included, and ultimately not communicated. Therefore, the concept of national interest, as it was introduced in chapter II, should be relativized to dominant class interests within the state structure.

Sovereignty, as this analysis has shown both empirically and conceptually, then rather serves as an internationally recognized layer of defense for statehood as an expression of this hegemony of interests. As such, it is a claimed status that, if accepted, protects the

interests of those in power by establishing legitimacy, which is in its stead recognized by other sovereigns (Werner & de Wilde 2001, 287f.). Nonetheless, this does not mean that sovereignty is unrivaled or uncontested. Albeit it was argued that paradiplomacy can be used as a signifier for constituent coherence, and hence being intrinsically political, this label of sovereignty does not need to be threatened by it. Rather, it is only threatened where constituents attempt to create this very same state umbrella for themselves, turning paradiplomacy's societal aspect into smaller-scale state constructions. It then seems suiting and ironic at the same time that it is the state, understood as a constellation of dominant interest with a certain desire of continuity, that is setting the framework and constraints for those entities to maneuver within the international space, given that the international system is dominated by states.[23]

Diplomacy, traditionally a state privilege, however changes. Against the background of statehood as a dominant class interest, diplomacy can be seen as the external signaling of those interests (Trager 2017). As some authors argue, diplomacy as an exclusive and centralized state privilege has only come into being with the Peace of Westphalia (Constantinou & Der Derian 2010; Cornago 2010, 89; Cornago 2014, 126; Tavares 2016, 10). To this date, most of the international bodies and institutions remain state-composed. Entities like Flanders, who enjoy sovereign rights of representation within specific policy domains, have to be treated as an exception:

> *"We can enter international agreements without the consent of the federal level. We are autonomous here and can sign treaties with other countries without the Belgian federal state being involved. Hence, we are sometimes dealing with the same matters that other regions do as well, but sometimes we also enter traditional state domain, which are normally only dealt with by states. (...) It will hence be a regional diplomat who would be present on behalf of Belgium. But this needs to be explained, as well, because it is not the normal image people have of diplomacy, so that regions would have such far reaching competences in developing their own diplomacy."* (Interview#1 Evens)

Increased patterns of interconnectedness, though, have enabled alternate forms of cooperation (Cornago 2010b, 103). Arguments suggesting that there have always been interdependencies between states and societies are manifold in disciplines such as IR or sociology, postulated by for example Durkheim's notion of organic solidarity (see Fenger & van Paridon 2012, 51), Karl Marx and Max Weber (Klüver & Klüver 2008, 400; Lottholz & Lemay-Hébert 2016, 1477, also argued by Werner & de Wilde 2001). Yet what is new is the nature of challenges and problems that create spaces of continental to global concern, thereby showcasing that artificial constructs such as statehood and sovereignty are not capable of coping with those issues. National concerns have not vanished, but have relatively lost in importance against the background of such border-transcending challenges towards which cities and regions are positioning themselves, and hence contribute in their own way of political communication (Constantinou & Der Derian 2010, 3). Thereby, recalling Honneth's recognition theory approach, paradiplomacy should be seen as a way of recognizing actors and (common) problems, acknowledging their role and specificities and, different from centralized machineries, be used for inter-societal exchange and encounter (Cornago 2010b, 89). Accordingly, diplomacy should be more than a form of political communication: Its value stems from being a virtue of common and

[23] For a discussion of the ways in which states have developed different tactics of containment of paradiplomacy see Cornago (2010a) on the normalization of paradiplomacy

intercultural encounter (Constantinou & Der Derian 2010, 4; Cornago 2010b, 89; Cornago 2013, 82). This, in turn, is how mutual recognition, and ensuing solidarity, can be achieved and aligns with Der Derian's theory of diplomacy as a means of mediating estrangement (1987, 93ff.). Paradiplomacy can appeal to this ideal in providing the means, subjects and spaces to ensure that solidarity is pertained without it being constrained by state borders, although this clearly impacts on the state as such. Despite this aspect, paradiplomacy then falls in line with what has been termed as "homo diplomaticus" by Constantinou, stressing the inter-personal dimension of exchange and contact (2006, 352ff.).

Finally, this leads me to believe that neither cosmopolitanism nor communitarianism are congruent approaches. Rather, we witness emancipatory processes within an international system inheriting a legacy of being primarily state-centered. Growing complexity and growing intertwinement put pressure on this state system in the sense that constituents that were simplified into states, act against those means of uniforming and render loud what used to be silenced (Cornago 2010b, 90). Thereby, paradiplomacy is but one type of this pluralization of actors that seek to be present on the international stage. Both within national and international spheres, pluralization and individualization are driving societal forces and rather lead to incoherence than to uniformed national positions. William Connolly, in his explanatory framework on pluralism therefore states:

> *"The project is to generalize partiality for democracy and to fold agonistic respect between different constituencies into the ethos of sovereignty. A launching pad for that project is the understanding that positional sovereignty is both indispensable to the rule of law and constitutively insufficient to itself."* (Connolly 2005, 147).

Paradiplomacy, in its stead, seems to be the adequate expression of this agonistic respect, and hence pluralism in a territorial manner within the internal space. To conclude this thesis, I want to refer to Cornago in saying that

> *"Beyond its functionality, paradiplomacy is symbolically meaningful. To reiterate, its forms and contents are significant expressions of values that precisely question those other values that sustain the current centralization of diplomacy as optimal. (...) The most salient difference would be, however, that in the case of paradiplomacy the negotiation and manipulation of ambiguous identities that Sharp aptly identifies as the core of diplomatic culture takes place not only among states but also within and across them."* (Cornago 2010b, 103)

Not only is paradiplomacy in its essence political, it is *a priori* a means of connecting societies and communities by local governments irrespective of state borders, yet at the same time being constrained by and possibly challenging state legislation. After all, this renders paradiplomacy into an indicator for coherence within and between societies. This, in turn, always has implications for the state, even though paradiplomacy's intention does not need to rival sovereign statehood *per se*. Necessary to move the study of paradiplomacy forward, however, are greater efforts of abstracting common patterns as well as more relational approaches vis-à-vis statehood and paradiplomacy. Moreover, accounting for the unbalanced nature and appearance of paradiplomacy and the re-thinking of international bodies in a way that subnational actors could be more included are pathways which require more elaboration. After all, recalling the interview content, it is only recently that paradiplomacy attracts the attention it might have deserved before.

Maps, Graphs & Tables

Map 1 (p. 37): NUTS2 regions in the European Union (2016). Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/de/web/nuts/statistical-regions-outside-eu

Map 2 (p. 37): Germany and its 16 *Länder* („Bundesländer Deutschland"). Retrieved from: https://www.bundeslaenderdeutschland.de [12/05/2020]

Depiction 1 (p. 64):

Scottish Government (28/08/2019). *International offices: Strategic objectives*. Retrieved from: https://www.gov.scot/publications/international-offices-strategic-objectives/pages/introduction/ [10/06/2020].

Graph 1 (p. 53): Interviewees' understanding of paradiplomacy against their geographical background (out of 10), Author's own depiction

Table 1 (p. 47): Open Coding Display "Case Peculiarities", Author's own depiction

Table 2 (p. 52): Open Coding Display "Definition of Paradiplomacy", Author's own depiction

Table 3 (p. 53): Open Coding Display "Role of different actors in paradiplomacy", Author's own depiction

Table 4 (pp. 57/58): Open Coding Display "Forms, Quality & Priorities of paradiplomacy" (Mode of display categorized after Tavares 2016, 29ff.), Author's own depiction

Table 5 (p. 62): Open Coding Display "Sectorial Impact of Paradiplomacy", Author's own depiction

Table 6 (pp.66/67): Open Coding Display "Systemic Influences", Author's own depiction

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