Mediterranean Lasagne of Migration Governance: What is the Way Forward for the Regions in Governing the Euromestic Sphere? An EU-Centric Perspective

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Abstract

The European migration crisis is a resourceful case for analysing the evolution of complex-interregionalism. The Mediterranean turbulences shed light on the challenges associated with the existing modes of multilateral cooperation. The strengths, deficiencies and challenges of the multi-layered migration governance identified amidst the European migration crisis should be considered valuable empirical developments for further academic reflection on the evolution of multi-level, multilateral and issue-specific governance. An initial exploration of interregional interactions proves that each multilateral setting creates unique dynamics, issue framing and perceptions of viable solutions which do not complement neat and hierarchical multi-level governance. If a single Mediterranean space is a subject of discussions and joint actions for more than ten multilateral constellations with similar-yet-distinct membership composition, what does it say about interest articulation and representation towards the United Nations in the context of ongoing reflections on the best modalities for the neo-Westphalian world order?

Keywords: Mediterranean, European migration crisis, complex-interregionalism, comparative regionalism
List of Acronyms:

AII Adriatic-Ionian Initiative
AL League of Arab States
AMU Arab Maghreb Union
AU African Union
BSEC Black Sea Economic Cooperation
CAEU Council of Arab Economic Union
CCTS Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States
CEFTA Central European Free Trade Agreement
CEI Central European Initiative
CEN Community of Sahel-Saharan States
SAD
CoE Council of Europe
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CORDIS Community Research and Development Information Service
ECO Economic Cooperation Organisation
EU European Union
G-24 Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development
IIASA International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
ILO International Labour Organisation
IOM International Organisation for Migration
MENA the Middle East and North Africa
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OAPEC Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
OIC Organisation of Islamic Conference
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
RCC Regional Cooperation Council
REC Regional Economic Community
RIKS Regional Integration Knowledge System
SEECPR South-East European Cooperation Process
SESRIIC Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Centre for Islamic Countries
SPC Pacific Community
TURKPA Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-Speaking countries
UfM Union for the Mediterranean
UN United Nations
UNU-UNU-IRIS United Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies
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Introduction

This explorative study provides a comparative, qualitative analysis of the trends in de facto integration of regional organisations across the Mediterranean littoral territories, with a thematic focus on mixed migration flows. The selected time frame of 2014-2017 marks a post-volatile phase following the Arab Spring. It incorporates the time frame of the ‘refugee and migrant crisis’ faced by Europe throughout 2014-2016 (Migali et al., 2018, 13) that is said to have “reached its apex in the second half of 2015 during Luxembourg’s presidency” (Auers & Rostoks, 2016, 85). Regional and subregional organisations and arrangements that have Mediterranean littoral countries among the members are analysed to explore the diverse measures to address various dimensions of mixed migration flows.

The importance of studying the topic in greater detail is based on a scholarly description that the European migration crisis revealed “the incoherencies of Mediterranean transregional governance, which remains underdeveloped and maladjusted to the current international protection needs of refugees as well as migrants” (Wolff, 2015, 168). The gravity of the issue is captured by the Mediterranean being referred to as “the world’s most dangerous migratory region” (Cogolati, Verlinden, & Schmitt, 2015, 59).

An examination of the dialogue and coordination platforms would provide more nuanced information about the deficiencies in the existing governance, monitoring and management structures. These shortfalls are relevant for a better understanding of the challenges affecting the European Union (EU) and emanating from its neighbourhood.

It should be borne in mind that, if viewed from a historical perspective, the ‘refugee and migrant crisis’ is far from unique. The migration governance and management structures that existed before the recent migrant influx in Europe are legacies of measures adopted in response to the previously heightened attention towards migration dynamics in the 1920s and 1990s. Back then, international consultations led to the acknowledgement that internationally comparable migration statistics and better-shared knowledge are prerequisites for sound regulation of migration and better cooperation between administrative authorities of different countries (Migali et al., 2018, 14). As subsequent sections demonstrate, it is a complex work in progress mired with challenges of obtaining reliable and accurate statistics.

Coming back to the contemporary specifics, the same study concludes that due to the persisting “income gap between large masses of population in different countries”, the incentive to migrate will not fade away (Migali et al., 2018, 75). Likewise, the shrinking and ageing European population will require further immigration to sustain its welfare systems and demographic structure (Pascouau et al., 2016, 90). Thus, a need to understand migration patterns and the complex drivers of these patterns to design adequate policy tools for effective management of mixed migration flows will persist beyond the recent influx in Europe. Research regarding the recent migration episode will form an important basis for understanding the motivations that defined the earlier selected multilateral solutions and the contextual factors that should be kept in mind about the effectiveness of these chosen responses and monitoring measures.

This Working Paper contributes to the growing body of literature on comparative regionalism and insights about the EU’s increasingly complex interregional strategies across the world (Hardacre & Smith, 2014, 93). The Mediterranean is treated as a complex and densely layered space. On the one hand, from the perspective of the Southern
Neighbourhood, it is examined as a space shaped by a ‘composite policy’ that combines both foreign policy and sectoral EU policies (Gstöhl, 2016, 6-7). On the other hand, it is considered a Euromestic sphere - a space shaped by a combination of domestic (national or sub-national) and European policies and initiatives (Gidlund, 2000, 254; annex I). The role of full-spectrum multi-level governance is acknowledged. However, this Working Paper does not address all the layers of governance, but only the ones above the national level.

The Mediterranean should be taken into consideration in the global discussions on the future of multilateralism and the place and role of regions in it. The Mediterranean setting remains highly topical not solely due to its historical connotations captured by *Mare Nostrum* (Roman name for the Mediterranean Sea), Adam Smith’s argument that it became “the cradle of civilisation because of the ease of navigation between nations” (Albrow & Bradford, 2008, 234) or “the Mediterranean analogy discourse” with this region giving other regions their claim to region-ness (Acharya, 2014, 478). The contemporary Mediterranean developments can be a valuable source of lessons learnt about the practical developments capturing the evolving “neo-Westphalian world order” and “the transformation of a world of states into a regionalised world” (Van Langenhove, 2011, 5, 128). A process with its unique traits, strengths and shortfalls.

The first part of this Working Paper outlines the chosen heuristic concept (Rüland, 2014, 20), a compact variant of multilateral interregionalism. The second part indicates the research design and methodology. The third part discusses the integration trends and absence of such interlinks among the examined regional and subregional organisations and arrangements. The fourth part recaps the main findings and conclusions. The fifth part indicates suggestions to facilitate further research on this overall multifaceted topic that is of high relevance not solely for further exploration of the role of regions in multi-level governance but also for policymakers and experts reflecting on the future modalities of governance and coordination mechanisms within the structures of the United Nations (UN).

**Literature Review**

**1.1 Multilateral Interregionalism**

This section defines the key items of the chosen heuristic framework for this Working Paper and unpacks key terms. Complex interregionalism refers to “the changing interlinkages of bilateral, regional, interregional and transregional relations” (Söderbaum, 2016, 184). Whereas interregionalism is understood as “as a situation or a process whereby two (or more) regions interact” (Söderbaum, 2016, 175). While complex interregionalism has been used to describe the multifaceted relations between the EU and other regions across the world, this Working Paper does not adopt such a restrictive focus solely on the EU. Instead, it maps the full diversity of regional arrangements that have an intellectual footprint and adopted administrative solutions, which cover or take into consideration parts of the Mediterranean littoral countries. Such an approach respects the criticism that many previous studies touching upon the chosen geographical area have been overwhelmingly “state-centric, formalistic and concentrate either on inter-state (macro-regionalism) or sub-national (micro-regionalism) developments” (Söderbaum & Taylor, 2008, 14).

Various layers of governance (definitions indicated in annex 1) and the configurations established on these levels are taken into consideration when exploring region-building
(annex 2) and forms how authority ‘travels’ across the levels of governance (Söderbaum, 2016, 195). A multi-level governance lens allows deriving conclusions, not simply by treating the Mediterranean region as a unique context but as a generic intermestic and, more so, Euromestic sphere (definitions of the key terms indicated in annex 1). It demonstrates the complexity of effective governance and issue management in the context of the existing density of collaborative and coordination initiatives, frameworks, structures and platforms. This observation applies to the domain of migration governance (Nita, Pécoud, et al., 2017, xv).

Two culinary terms serve as helpful simplified points of departure before elaborating the complexities embraced in this Working Paper. The dense layering of trade and investment rules earlier referred to by Rugman as a ‘lasagne’ is one of them. It has a vertical dimension. ‘Lasagne’ resonates in the migration context and strengthens the argument in the sense that, it is an area subject to multiple layers of collaborative engagements with a mixed record of practical relevance and impact.

‘Spaghetti/noodle/needle bowl’ is the second term. It has a horizontal dimension. It is a simplified way of how to depict overlapping membership across a selection of countries (Šime, 2020; Woolcock, 2008, 135). It corresponds to the complexity and multiplicity of bilateral, regional, plurilateral and multilateral initiatives in the domain of migration governance (Nita, Pécoud, et al., 2017, xv).

Despite the value of simply understandable arguments captured by both terms, these should be treated as ideal types that do not capture the real-world complexities. Looking beyond the hauteur of perfectly aligned and neatly ordered theoretical models developed in an armchair academic manner (Lequesne, 2015, 363), a schematic depiction of multi-level governance of mixed migration flows across the Mediterranean via a simple ‘lasagne’ or ‘spaghetti bowl’ would be insufficient due to the following four factors.

Firstly, as Graham (2008, 182) rightly points out: “The regions themselves remain at different stages of institutional development and of different political perceptions and persuasions, and this must be respected.” Based on earlier empirical findings, Tavares draws attention to the trend of weak and developing states preferring to regionalise but not to integrate due to their preoccupation with sovereignty (Tavares, 2012, 133). Thus, an establishment and operation of a regional arrangement does not in itself capture a major leap in integration among a specific grouping of member states. Furthermore, Söderbaum points out that the lack of harmony in the overall region-building process stems from the diversity of interests, goals and identities of actors involved (Söderbaum, 2016, 220). Thakur and Van Langenhove (2008, 17) echo these real-world irregularities with such terms as ‘crazy quilt’ and ‘patchwork of authority’. This is where a qualitative examination of the agreements and their implementation progress gains importance for further theory building.

Secondly, certain design and implementation pitfalls, such as ones related to the lack of adequate administrative capacity or political support for joint actions, result in policy experts and administrators wrestling with a routine ‘lasagne’ of multilateral governance structures. These challenges of facing layers of mixed performance record must be identified and taken into consideration to avoid mere bubbling of coordination formats and risks of ending up with less integration, more ‘forum shopping’ (Hanau Santini, 2014, 84) and ‘paper tigers’ (Van Langenhove & Macovei, 2013). A denser layer of multilateral
arrangements does not automatically translate into better regulated and more effective management of the issue at hand.

Thirdly, mixed migration flows are not treated uniformly across all multilateral forums and by all stakeholders involved in the consultations and actions. The term ‘mixed migration flows’ “refers to both forced migration and economic migration which follow similar migratory routes” (Wolff, 2015, 182). One way how regionalism literature attempted to address this panoply of approaches and meanings attached to migration is its contextualisation in the comprehensive security framework. Caballero-Anthony’s observations demonstrate that “there is increasingly a tendency by several actors - regional organisations, national governments, policy communities and civil society organisations – to designate and treat a growing list of national and transnational issues as security concerns” (Cabarello-Anthony, 2008, 187). Migration is one of the items on this growing list (Nita, Pécoud, et al., 2017, xii).

Fourthly, a ‘spaghetti bowl’ fails to capture the diversity of EU instruments and frameworks employed across the Mediterranean area. For example, while Northern African countries are not EU member states, they have a close and highly regulated relationship with the EU due to a diversity of EU instruments tailored for and directed towards them. A strict demarcation between the EU member states and Southern Neighbourhood does not correspond to the complexities of such ties and dense interactions.

Scholars have outlined a much broader geographic span of the EU outreach. “Spurred by the dynamic external migration policy of the EU and its member states, Europe, West Africa, Southern Africa, plus—to a lesser extent—Central and Eastern Africa, increasingly form a transregional “super-region” addressing migration governance. It is in this “super-region” that the relationship between the regional integration drivers and the international facilitator organisations (mostly the International Organisation for Migration (IOM)) “is strongest” (Lavenex, Givens, Jurje, & Buchanan, 2016, 13-14). Bearing in mind this wide geographic outreach, it is obvious how much more complex and in schematic terms challenging to illustrate with simple areal are EU relations - described as “trans- or inter-regional form of migration governance” (Lavenex et al., 2016, 15).

Regional and subregional organisations and arrangements are two types of regional formations distinguished in this Working Paper. Both belong to a broader group of supra-national and international regions (definitions in annex 1). A clear distinction should be made that between the national and supra-national levels, instead of the previously indicated, singular “intermediate layer of governance” (Nita, Pécoud, et al., 2017, xvi), there are two distinct levels of governance. Due to their differences in the geographic scope and uneven layering across the Mediterranean area, they unleash distinctive dynamics. Regional organisations refer to geographic areas that comprise a majority of or the entire continent. Whereas subregional organisations are formed among a certain group of countries that neighbour or are relatively closely situated in a specific area of the continent or at the intersections of continents. These multilateral forums are not big enough to cover most of a continent. The importance of such distinction stems from an observation that the geographical breadth and scope of membership shapes the joint agenda and considerations deemed valid for discussions. A schematic depiction is outlined in annex 2.
1.2 Regional Actorship

This section explains the forms of EU actorship towards other parts of the world recognised in the existing body of literature. It explains which components of EU actorship are incorporated in this Working Paper and the ones suggested for future research.

European regionalist scholarly circles agree that the EU has proven itself as the leading region-builder. Adoption of a range of strategies and alignment of instruments in a tailored fashion for each of the addressed geographic areas demonstrates this leadership (Hardacre & Smith, 2014, 93; Söderbaum, 2016, 147). Hettne introduced the term ‘regional actorship’ to refer to “a summary concept for a region’s ability to influence the external world, and for instance engage in interregionalism” (Hettne, 2014, 57). It is an appropriate approach for studying the EU’s relations with a range of other comparably weaker and less consolidated regional arrangements (Hettne, 2014, 60). Africa-based regional arrangements are among such examples where the EU has a dominant role (Baert, Scaramagli, & Söderbaum, 2014, 179). Furthermore, “the EU’s institutionally driven approach and its pre-eminence as an aid donor to Africa have hugely influenced African notions of regionalism” (Bach, 2008, 174-175). This is another argument strengthening the ‘euromestic’ stance adopted in this Working Paper.

Due to the acknowledged EU actorship in region-building, it is worth exploring regionalisation and integration not only as a process that may shape state behaviour. The same effect might be explored in the relations between the EU and other parts of the world with a focus on the addressed regional organisations and arrangements. Thus, this Working Paper adjusts the definition of regionalisation. The altered definition refers to “an explicit, but not necessarily formally institutionalised process of adapting participant” organisation “norms, policy-making processes, policy styles, policy content, political opportunity structures, economies and identity (potentially at both elite and popular levels) to both align with and shape a new collective set of priorities, norms and interests at the regional level, which may itself then evolve, dissolve or reach stasis” (Warleigh-Lack, 2008, 51). In such a manner, the EU’s potential as a region-builder is not restricted to the traditional focus on countries in other parts of the world but shifts the focus on other multilateral actors operating in the respective geographic areas.

Such a focus on engagement with multilateralist formats is also aligned with the earlier reflections tied to the norm diffusion studies that see the EU as a normative power reproducing itself “through external projection of internal solutions” (Rüland, 2014, 28). In various parts of the world, a receptiveness towards such export of institutional solutions is generated due to the prestige attached to the adoption of the most advanced forms of integration (Rüland, 2014, 28). What is important to acknowledge and pay more attention to in the future analysis is that, the EU export of home-grown multilateralist solutions is not exerted solely by the European Commission (Hardacre & Smith, 2014, 99). The list of promoters is rather long and diverse because several EU institutions have specific roles assigned to shaping external relations.

While a notable number of studies on regionalism have centred around the role of the executive branch, the legislative one is not completely neglected in this research project. The legislative branch is mapped bearing in mind that the central organisation of this Working Paper consists of the European Parliament – an institution recognised in the academic literature as having a central role in interregional dialogues (Söderbaum, 2016, 188). In order to not confuse the external ties of the legislative branch with the diplomatic
actions taken by the sub-national entities (referred to as ‘paradiplomacy’), the term ‘parliamentary diplomacy’ is selected to refer to this form of international role (Costa & Dri, 2014, 131, 137).

The academic literature appraises the role of think tanks as important actors in enriching the debates about the future of Europe and as agents of ‘second track diplomacy’ or ‘track 2 diplomacy’ (Van Langenhove, 2011, 90). This acknowledgement is not restricted solely to the ties of think tanks to the EU, but also other organisations established in Europe.

Concerning the earlier promoted perspective on the study of regions as “a cooperative environment where regions are not competing block-to-block but becoming building blocks of a reformed new multilateral governance system” (Baert, Felício, & De Lombaerde, 2012, 8), this Working Paper provides further food for thought on the existing patterns of interactions characterising the complex interregionalism.

Research Design and Methodology

This explorative study is based on qualitative desktop research. The methodological point of departure of this macro scoping study is the single case design with the Regional Integration Knowledge System (RIKS) generated list of organisations and arrangements being treated as embedded units of analysis.

2.1 Research Questions

This section explains the rationale behind the chosen research questions. In line with traditional practice in the panoramic analysis of regional developments (Genna, 2017, 179; Panagiota, 2014, 13; Schüle & Kleisinger, 2016; Urso & Hakami, 2018, 23), the Mediterranean littoral space should be viewed as a thick ‘lasagne’ with a strong component of expanded ‘variable geometry’. Traditionally, the term is used to refer to the member states or a regional integration model that bundle forces for more in-depth cooperation than what is expected from the mere membership status (Bhatia, 2017, 269; Bonomi, 2019, 4-5; Gidlund, 2000, 254). It is employed with the EU as the central element. Since several mapped multilateral forums span beyond the EU member states, the reference to an expanded ‘variable geometry’ is indicated.

Following a slightly adjusted framework of the complex interregionalism, the Working Paper addresses the following research questions:

1) What modes of multilateral consultations and coordination the regional and subregional organisations and arrangements have chosen to monitor, analyse, manage mixed migration flows?

2) How regional and subregional organisations and arrangements relate to or contribute to the international management of mixed migration flows pursued by the EU, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the IOM?

3) What does the diversity of the measures taken by the regional and subregional organisations and arrangements reveal about the duplication, overlaps, fragmentation
and complementarities of multi-level migration governance that should be taken into account when reflecting on the future role of regions in the UN governance structures?

Bearing in mind the saliency of the overall topic discussed in the introduction, cooperation with ILO and IOM is incorporated in the research design due to the considerable role both organisations play not only as international institutions but also as collaboration partners of regional and subregional organisations and arrangements. Moreover, ILO is known as an important EU partner in its external actions (Van Langenhove & Macovei, 2013, 246-248).

As it has been already acknowledged earlier, “[a]s much as the study of regionalism has long been Europe-centered, the study of European regionalism and the theories of European integration have centered on the EU, its organizational growth and performance” (Schimmelfennig, 2016, 1). The research questions establish that this Working Paper goes down that road.

This Working Paper is based on secondary literature. Thus, one of the limitations is a lack of consultation with the representatives of the analysed organisations and arrangements. This is a reason why an earlier examination of a feasible hypothesis has been abandoned due to the lack of sufficient data to make definite testing. Also, the Working Paper employs a heuristic tool without an additional section dedicated to a theory that would be employed to test a hypothesis.

An absence of hypothesis also excludes a more nuanced examination of rival explanations (Yin, 2009, 160-161), such as treating the Mediterranean littoral member states not as being part of organisations and arrangements that form a single case with a single context. Instead, depending on their continental affiliation, they might be clustered in several contexts with their corresponding cases among which each has several embedded units of analysis.

2.2 Data

This section clarifies what data items are analysed or excluded from the scope of this Working Paper. This descriptive study explores patterns of collaboration in migration governance. The research questions are examined by obtaining basic data about the regional and subregional organisations and arrangements from the RIKS database created and managed by the United Nations University Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS). As shown in annex 3, 23 organisations and arrangements were identified that cover at least one of the Mediterranean littoral states, namely, stating clockwise, Spain, France, Monaco, Italy, Malta, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, West Bank and Gaza, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco.

RIKS search engine of regional organisations and arrangements offers not only the list of 23 organisations, but also the founding documents of each of the identified organisations and arrangements. The documents give preliminary guidance on whether migration is among the core areas of responsibility of each of the organisations/entities and, if so, in what way the mandate is defined.

20 out of 23 identified organisations and arrangements are subject to an examination according to the single-case embedded design with 20 embedded units of analysis (Yin, 2009, 46). Thus, the explorative study captured in this Working Paper concerns a single
experiment (Yin, 2009, 47) attempting to identify the de facto integration of regional and subregional organisations and arrangements across the Mediterranean.

23 identified regional and subregional organisations or arrangements have a different level of prioritisation allocated to migration matters (annex 4). Roughly half of them have addressed migration or labour force-related topics in their founding documents. To provide a more nuanced insight, all 23 regional organisations and arrangements are classified according to four categories depending on how central migration-related topics are to their work. The full list is outlined in annex 4. Even if there are no explicit references to the migration affiliated matters in the founding documents, many of the multilateral organisations and arrangements have developed either their initiatives related to this portfolio or are partnering with other international or regional organisations or initiatives to address the matter.

Considering the earlier identification that RIKS entries can be distinguished between regional and subregional organisations and arrangements, it is plausible that beyond this exploratory Working Paper a more nuanced analysis could be conducted in taking regional organisations as multiple-case design with embedded multiple units of analysis where subregional organisations and arrangements are the embedded units of analysis of each of the regional organisation’s case (Yin, 2009, 59) along the lines of European, African groupings (and perhaps Asia too) displayed in annex 5. However, due to the compact size of this Working Paper and no complementary research techniques (such as semi-structured qualitative interviews) employed, such a level of nuance has not been adopted within the scope of this exploratory study.

The research design takes into full consideration the earlier criticism outlined by Söderbaum: “Much of the problem arises because interregionalism is analysed through the prism of narrow and particular understandings of state-led regional organisations and the secretariats.” (Söderbaum, 2016, 14) Consequently, the earlier elaborated definition of the regionalisation process addresses this aspect. It is employed to investigate, firstly, how (if in any way at all) the EU has established certain consultative or collaborative frameworks with a focus on migration with other organisations that have littoral states among their membership. Secondly, it allows identifying whether the EU has funded any migration-related initiatives pursued by the mapped organisations and arrangements. Such links are treated as indications of de facto integration.

To understand the overall role played by the EU support, a comprehensive picture of the discussions and activities included within each of the identified organisations regarding migration is required. Therefore, the review of secondary literature and desktop research comprising online resources and publications addressing the first research question give a basic contextual understanding on whether ties to the EU (if any) have a decisive or less important role in migration-related developments pursued by the specific arrangement.

It should be kept in mind that RIKS is not an exhaustive database of regional consultative and collaborative formats. RIKS includes the most important and relatively highly or very highly institutionalised regional (and subregional) organisations and arrangements (Šime, 2020). Looser intergovernmental and expert consultative forums are left outside of RIKS’ scope. Thus, similar considerations should be borne in mind when reading the analysis of regional organisations and arrangements elaborated in consecutive paragraphs. The analysis does not capture the full scope of consultative formats influencing the collaborations among the Mediterranean littoral territories and beyond. Instead, the
analysis is restricted to the most advanced formats captured by RIKS. For example, RIKS does not include the Regional Consultative Processes (Nita et al., 2017, xviii), such as the networks of the Budapest, Rabat and Khartoum Processes, the 5+5 Dialogue on Migration in the Western Mediterranean and the Mediterranean Transit Migration Dialogue, the Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement (Lutterbeck, Wohlfelf, & Sammut, 2014, 19; Ovádek & Wouters, 2017, 14; Wolff, 2015, 173-174).

2.3 Limitations

This section briefly discusses the limitations that should be kept in mind when reading the findings of this Working Paper. Many EU entities are engaged in the consultations and joint actions related to mixed migration flows with other regional and subregional organisations and arrangements - far too many to be addressed in this Working Paper. This leads to the first limitation of this research project. The complex understanding of the EU actorship towards other regions and the role played by other less studied institutions like the Court of Justice, the European Court of Auditors and the EU specialised agencies (Baert, Scaramaglì, & Söderbaum, 2014b, 4) is excluded from the scope of this exploratory study. However, it must be acknowledged that further research on the role of these EU entities is of great importance for a comprehensive understanding on how the EU develops its working-level relations with other regional arrangements both within its neighbourhood and across the world.

Additionally, there is a range of other institutions shaping the EU external relations with allocated task-specific funding. Many EU initiatives have no clear-cut distinction between internal and external dimensions. Erasmus+ and Framework Programme’s funded international consortiums being two such examples. The coordinating institutions serve not only as technical managers of the project, but often-times act as ‘tacit ambassadors’ or promoters of the EU’s goals, values and modes of collaboration among international partnerships and audiences worldwide. To properly respond to the earlier new regionalist identified “multiplication of actors” (Van Langenhove & Macovei, 2013, 242), there is ample space for future scholarly examination in greater detail beyond the limited scope of this Working Paper.

A basic search on the Community Research and Development Information Service (CORDIS) database gives a clear picture that the complete number of such consortiums and the number of their interactions with non-EU Mediterranean entities is way too vast to be fully structured and analysed within the scope of this Working Paper. Thus, this research project does not aim to deliver a complete overview of ‘second track diplomacy.’ Instead, it pays attention to the think tank initiatives funded by other regional organisations than the EU to carry out specific supportive actions beyond their routine research engagements.

Secondly, the founding documents displayed on RIKS vary in their general content. These documents are taken as the key point of departure to judge whether an organisation has a role to play in migration-related matters or not. It depends on the way the founding document has been prepared and the overall nature of its contents. Some founding documents have a ceremonial character where the spirit of the organisation is elaborated upon in greater detail, with relatively less attention paid to specific operational details, structural nuances and prioritised thematic portfolios. Other founding documents have a working-level character where the goals of the organisation are presented in concise terms
and additional details are provided on the roles and responsibilities of engaged parties, structural elements and operational rules. That is why the websites of each of the regional and subregional organisations and arrangements, publications by the UN and key players in the field - the IOM and the ILO - were valuable information resources to judge with more certainty how each of the listed entities approach this broad domain.

As a result of the conducted desktop research and review of secondary literature, this Working Paper is built on an uneven amount of literature and online resources available on the examined regional organisations and arrangements. The lack of an existing body of literature about certain RIKS entries is further exacerbated since not all identified regional organisations and arrangements have proper functioning and resourceful websites. All in all, the information offered by each of these regional formats differs significantly.¹

The Working Paper covers governance levels situated above the national governance level, namely: regional, interregional and transregional dimensions of the monitoring, analysis, consultations and management of the mixed migration flows. Likewise, the tailored research approach leaves out the fourth dimension of the definition of complex interregionalism - the bilateral relations. Thus, such items as the EU association agreements established with specific non-EU member states or country plans, policies of subnational entities, such as Catalonia and Île-de-France (Tavares, 2016, 168, 180), are not included within the scope of this research project. Altogether, the limitations listed in this section should be treated as opportunities for further research and areas that would provide a more comprehensive overview of the multi-faceted developments shaping complex interregionalism.

Results

3.1 Expanded Variable Geometry

This section sums up the contemporary geopolitical influences that should be considered when analysing multilateral migration governance across the Mediterranean region. The mapping of regional organisations and arrangements via RIKS was comprehensive, included all organisations that were officially operational throughout 2014-2017 and where littoral territories hold a membership status. It was done specifically to see the entire scope of multilateral dynamics that may have left a certain intellectual footprint on the various forums comprising Mediterranean littoral territories among their membership structure collaborative engagements. It was a conscious decision to avoid a siloed perspective and restrictive selection criteria. The identified risk was that it would result in rather narrow-minded conclusions centred around the EU positioned as ‘Eldorado’ (Garson, 2019, 4; Lehtinen, 2008, 121), in other words, the only attractive destination of mixed migration flows. Firstly, by casting the net widely, previous suggestions to promote a transregional approach, which would recognise the role of adjacent regions to the Mediterranean, including “the arc of crisis in the Sahel-Sahara”, are respected (Wolff, 2015, 189).

¹The availability of information ranges from CEN-SAD which has no functioning website that would serve as a nodal point for the most up-to-date information, up to the EU that offers an outstanding amount of open access databases ranging from press releases, official documents to statistical databases and research reports on a great variety of topics.
Secondly, siloed focus on the ‘Eldorado’ phenomenon would pay lip-service to the discourses and intensity of collaboration in the wide thematic scope of migration (Bardak, 2015, 24). Not only Italy but also Morocco and Turkey should be singled out as dynamic national contexts. Over the past years, these countries have experienced a shift from concerns about emigration to pressing challenges related to unprecedented immigration and a role as a transit country or gateway to the destination country (Bardak, 2015, 24; Pedroza, 2020, 8). Beyond the decades-old movements of labour from less affluent Arab countries to the wealthy oil-producing ones (Valbjorn, 2016, 7), Egypt being the second-largest recipient of remittances from the Arab region (ILO, 2017, 13) might be one example to briefly illustrate the multi-vector migration and interdependencies emanating from/affecting the coasts of the Mediterranean (Lesser, Brandsma, Basagni, & Lété, 2018, 9).

Furthermore, the emerging multipolar gravity affects the geopolitical orientations and the solutions seen as preferable and feasible for migration governance. China’s strategic partnerships, Maritime Silk Road, ports and industrial parks create an economic chain spanning across the Gulf, the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean (Lons, Fulton, Sun, & Al-Tamimi, 2019, 12). Turkey has been pointed out as “a noteworthy example of a Mediterranean country leaning strongly toward Asian opportunities” (Walker, 2015, 2). An analysis published by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Defence College acknowledges that “[m]ulti-polarity, in short, is gradually beginning to assert itself and the Middle East and North Africa are the arenas where this is being most explicitly demonstrated” (Joffé, 2017, 12). It is mirrored in the intensity of foreign aid to North Africa with the EU and US assistance being outstripped by the assistance from the Gulf States and Turkish aid being substantially increased (Dessì, 2015, 7). Thus, the study benefits from an acknowledgement of multi-vector orientations characterising the capitals of the Mediterranean littoral territories. Continental considerations influencing the collective thinking of the selected regional organisations and arrangements are displayed in annex 5.

3.2 Diversity of Forums

Before exploring answers to the research questions, this section explains the factors of heterogeneity shaping multilateral migration governance across the Mediterranean. Among the 23 organisations identified via RIKS are both, “formal alliances or cooperative security frameworks”, such as NATO, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the AU, and “multi-purpose regional organisations” which, besides their role in economic and political domains, have acquired certain security-related responsibilities, one such example being the EU (Kacowicz & Press-Barnathan, 2016, 4). Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) excels with its exceptional size and geographical spread. OIC is the largest inter-governmental organisation after the UN with a membership spread across four continents and all five UN regions (Kissack, 2012, 52). The membership within OIC comprises member states of the AL, the Council of Arab Economic Union (CAEU), the AMU, the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) and the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States (CCTS) (Bağış & Yurtseven, 2017, 17). Unlike organisations based on joint interest in a specific functional set-up for joint work, such as free trade zone, OIC assembles countries with an Islamic orientation (Albrow & Bradford, 2008, 243; Baugmart-Ochse, 2015, 6).
Several identified organisations and arrangements, namely, Council of Europe (CoE), Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) and AMU, have not put in place any specific operational measures to facilitate the free movement of people within their territories (Nita, 2017, 27). Nevertheless, that does not mean migration and its implications are left outside the thematic scope of discussions facilitated by some of these organisations.

Not all the mapped organisations focus on the migration in a Mediterranean-wide geographical scope. The Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) is an example. Some even have no explicit affiliation to the Mediterranean at all, such as the Pacific Community. Since some of the identified regional and subregional organisations and arrangements have limited or no relation to migration issues, they are not addressed in this explorative study (annex 3). Among such cases is the ECO. Its founding document – the Treaty of Izmir – and its later amended editions do not state responsibilities in the migration and labour force domain. Earlier overall assessments that ECO’s “concrete achievements are considerably less impressive than its declaratory record” (Cummings, 2014, 9) further justify the absence of a separate elaboration on this organisation in the evidentiary base (Yin, 2009, 173) of the Working Paper. Another special case is CAEU that is a part of the League of Arab States (AL) “family” of specialised agencies. However, since its membership differs from the AL, it is treated by RIKS and correspondingly, this Working Paper as a separate regional arrangement.

While some of the mapped organisations have a distinct mandate and approach of addressing migration, such a trait is not a general characteristic across the whole spectrum of identified regional and subregional organisations and arrangements. Several of the identified forums suffer from a duplication of efforts. The African Union (AU) has a difficult relation to the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) since it is perceived as slow and even a rival to the RECs (Taveares & Tang, 2013, 228).

Not all of the identified data gathering, and analysis techniques are fully implemented. Some multilateral forums suffer from a lack of capacity or resources constraining certain member states. It results in a gap between the ambition envisaged by the organisations and its actual deliverables. These findings confirm conclusions of an earlier report affiliated to UNU-CRIS and RIKS. Although it studied a different set of organisations and arrangements, it touched upon several mentioned in this Working Paper. “The future for the regional management of the movement of people is therefore mixed. While some regions are advancing, others are stalling, while a few appear to have ground to a halt.” (Gartland et al., 2017, 433) Beyond the cited publication, a review of secondary literature demonstrates that among the forums lagging behind their initial aspirations are Arab Maghrebian Union (AMU) and CEN-SAD (Bach, 2008, 173; Daniel & Nagar, 2014, 29; Nita, Segatti, et al., 2017, 16-17).

Overall, the varied level of engagement with migration issues is one of the factors for an uneven level of integration among the mapped regional and subregional organisations and arrangements. Thus, regional integration is a matter not solely of political will but also compatibility between the multilateral mandates provided to various membership constellations. A functional ‘lasagne’ would require a collaborative interaction between the

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2Since desktop research findings did not generate any convincing evidence that the Pacific Community would be in any substantial form preoccupied with the mixed migration flows of the Mediterranean region, it was left outside of a more nuanced examination in the subsequent sections of the Working Paper.
layers vertically, and the notional noodle rings of a ‘spaghetti/noodle/needle bowl’ horizontally. The subsequent sections clarify why such ideal constellation types are not mirrored by the existing multilateral migration governance and the implications such trends have on complex interregionalism practices and future studies of comparative regionalism.

3.3 Varied Levels of Integration

This section discusses the research findings on the diverse solutions adopted by the examined regional and subregional organisations and arrangements, as well as initiatives pursued by the EU in cooperation with certain RIKS registered forums, in the context of the European migration crisis. It testifies to the diverse EU actorship. During the exploratory phase guided by the first research question, it became clear that the parliamentary dimension presented some distinct dynamics. Therefore, this aspect has been addressed separately in the subsequent section.

The Working Paper does not turn a blind eye to the diverse dynamics put in action by the multitude of membership compositions characterising several Europe-based organisations, such as the regional forums with the most numerous membership - “OSCE-Europe”, “CoE-Europe”, “EU-Europe” and “NATO-Europe” (Schimmelfennig, 2016, 3). Graham (2012, 207) has criticised these four organisations for having competing and duplicative mandates. Such an assessment runs the risk of oversimplifying the complex dynamics and niche expertise developed and delivered by these organisations, especially bearing in mind the implications of four different constellations assembling the ‘great powers’ and ‘regional or pivotal states’ (Kacowicz & Press-Barnathan, 2016, 18) in relations with the rest of the membership. These are far from the sole considerations captured in the analysis.

Having a dense layer of memberships is not a Europe-specific characteristic. Northern Africa has a thick ‘lasagne’ of regional arrangements as well. Libya is a good example being a member of eight organisations registered within RIKS. Not all of these multilateral forums are judged to be highly operational. In fact, earlier assessments offer no appraisal due to the duplication and scattered, resource-wise inefficiently managed intersections (Dalleau & van Hove, 2013; Tavares & Tang, 2013). However, the thickness of Africa-based regionalist constellations is still a factor worth taking into consideration when exploring the multilateral considerations that might play a role in shaping the countries’ multilateral engagements and collective commitments.

The analysis of the regional and subregional organisations and arrangements as units embedded in a single case has encouraged further reflections. It is plausible to explore whether a regional organisation treated as a multiple-case study, which “may consist of multiple holistic [...] or of multiple embedded cases” (Yin, 2009, 59) understood as subregional arrangements, are the ultimate level of nuance. Especially bearing in mind previous scholarly studies on the micro-regions (Söderbaum & Taylor, 2008, 13), the multiple-case design with embedded multiple units of analysis might be a more conducive research design for further studies of regiopolarity and the role of hegemons shaping the

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3Migration-wise, Libya was estimated to be the main point of transit towards Europe in 2016-2017, “accounting for more than 90 percent of arrivals in Italy” (Abderrahim, 2019, 6).
regions (Van Langenhove, 2011, 129) beyond the earlier acknowledged role of the EU as a region-builder.

One of the persisting challenges identified during previous discussions on migration is a lack of a comprehensive data acquisition and monitoring systems. “There is no uniform template that drives regional migration regimes. This creates a situation where migration remains a policy area lacking in uniform measures that would provide coherent policy options or international norms for both sending and receiving countries.” (Lavenex et al., 2016, 20)

One of the main challenges standing in the way of conducting detailed worldwide migration studies is a lack of data on short-term mobility and return flows and problematic data quality in most sending and transit countries, linked to the general low capacity of the institutions in these areas (Migali et al., 2018, 18). As it is demonstrated in annex 6, a burgeoning of various international data repositories and measurement approaches pose a risk of further diluting efforts to consolidate the statistical management approach.

As the review of secondary literature shows, such variations in approach stem from the diversity of the most immediate and pressing challenges faced among different configurations of multilateral formats engaging the Mediterranean littoral territories. Likewise, the diversity of institutional practices established by their respective founding documents and working-level methods results in prioritisation of different evidence gathering and assessment techniques. Developments in Europe testify to the fact that the migration crisis has triggered interest among policymakers of various regional arrangements in acquiring more information and analysis about the specific impacts of migration patterns in Europe. This is vividly demonstrated by the launch of the Centre of Expertise on Population and Migration by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). Furthermore, in certain areas of Europe, it is demonstrated by initiatives such as the Central European Initiative (CEI) financially supporting Western Balkans Migration Network (WB-MIGNET) scholarly encounters and an ESPON tendered analysis “Territorial and Urban Potentials Connected to Migration and Refugee Flows” (Bianchini, Borraccetti, Zoppi, & Cavanna, 2018). It confirms that unprecedented developments may trigger greater demand for specific types of data, evidence and analysis among the policymakers.

Overall, even if some of the regional and subregional organisations and arrangements have established ad-hoc or more regular consultation and collaboration ties, those are not links, that would contribute towards a more unified approach to migration data acquisition, management and analysis. Instead, such interactions are tailored to the specific common interests and agreed on cooperation initiatives on specific, and rather localised pressing challenges.

The EU regional actorship should be seen not solely as a mode of engagement freely chosen by the leading EU institutions to export their favoured modes of governance and management. It is also a consequence of the institutional foundations of multilateralism and regionalism and collaborative practices (or lack of those) governing a specific area. The tailored approaches chosen for the EU-AU and EU-AL strategic partnerships are the best examples in this respect.

In the African context, the dense layers of both operational and defunct regional and subregional organisations and arrangements shape the feasible modes of engagement for the EU. A more efficient complex-interregionalism constellation across the Mediterranean is of vital interest to the EU and a wider pool of regional and subregional organisations and
arrangements among their membership Mediterranean littoral countries. The European migration crisis clearly shows the interdependencies between regional and subregional organisations in tailoring effective response measures. While Europe has a strong tradition of working towards complementarities of its multilateral constellations, Africa displays a limited track record in this regard. Thus, in further EU efforts directed towards the capacity building in Africa, it is worth considering to not solely promote regionalism. Instead, the European examples might help Africa craft its vision to make its existing constellations of multilateral formats into a complex-interregionalist structure that seeks to explore the full potential of complementarities, curbs unhealthy rivalries and delivers more. Perhaps it would help to minimise the risks of wasteful ‘forum shopping’ and ‘paper tiger’ routines.

3.4 Parliamentary and Second Track Diplomacy

In response to the first research question, particular attention was paid to the parliamentary and second track diplomacies of the analysed organisations and arrangements. Since not all of the mapped organisations and arrangements have a legislative dimension integrated into the structures, parliamentary diplomacy has no decisive role in the overall integration between the analysed organisations and arrangements. Nevertheless, the impetus given by certain circles of parliamentarians to address the migration issues deserves more attention.

The Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (All) parliamentarians initiated discussions on migration within this arrangement (Croatian Parliament, 2020). This call for more attention, resonated among the executive branch by prioritising the topic (Italy, 2017). Whereas the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-speaking countries (TURKPA) consulted with IOM on potential future projects, as well as engaged in cooperation on the migration issues in Central Asia with the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE (Asanov, 2015). Thus, TURKPA is identified as one of the most active legislative forums in terms of outreach on migration issues. The Central Asian role is further supported by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s consultations on bringing Central Asian countries to the table to address extremism threats (Corbin, 2017, 4). Allied parliamentarians see it as a comprehensive issue spanning across large territories.

The CoE Parliamentary Assembly and its Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons has been one of the active discussants of the migrant crisis as well. It is mirrored by the diverse challenges raised in the issued recommendations (Chope, 2014; Mignon, 2016; Strik, 2014, 2015; Voruz, 2014). The enthusiasm of the CoE Parliamentary Assembly reached a notable point with a suggestion to establish a European migration and intercultural development observatory (De Sutter, 2017). It is a good example of how the burgeoning of centres of expertise on migration matters is promoted not solely by executive forums but also parliamentarians inspired by the model institutional solutions adopted by the EU. Due to the brevity of the CoE recommendation suggesting the establishment of the observatory, it is judged with additional caution how mature and considerate the overall suggestion was. The feasibility of such a new institution is questionable amidst the dense layer of migration-related centres of expertise already established in Europe and research consortiums funded by the EU Framework Programmes to address various aspects of the mixed migration flows. “Regional Migration Governance” (R_eMigra) project implemented throughout 2015-2017 by Stichting Katholieke Universiteit is an illustrative example (CORDIS, 2019).
Similar enthusiasm for launching new initiatives to better address the migration challenges was demonstrated by the BSEC parliamentarians. BSEC Parliamentary Assembly’s Declaration issued on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the organisation confirms that the European migrant crisis has gained political attention as a fundamental aspect of socio-economic development and integration of the Black Sea region (PABSEC, 2017). The Turkish input to the parliamentary discussions allowed to familiarise with the developments that immigration has put in motion around the Turkish-Syrian border (Ozturk, 2016). The organisation of debates on the refugee issues, consideration of establishing more efficient mechanisms for information exchange and knowledge sharing, the establishment of the Council of Migration Bodies, strengthened cooperation between international and regional organisations were recommended by the Assembly for further consideration among representatives of the BSEC executive branch (PABSEC, 2016, 25-26). The reviewed publicly accessible documentation online did not show significant progress reached in the translation of the parliamentarian guidance into practical joint actions.

Discussions held by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly clarify expert-level thinking on mixed migration flows and threats of terrorism and extremism that come along as long-term challenges and require comprehensive approach (Cook, 2017, 1; Corbin, 2017, 3). The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly is another example of an autonomous legislative body (Herman & Wouters, 2017, 8, 10). It has the ambition to maintain ties with several other parliamentary formats affiliated to, for example, the CoE, NATO, the European Parliament and the Interparliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 1991; Herman & Wouters, 2017, 13). Such wide outreach has the potential to further a comprehensive long-term oriented discussion on migration, especially in light of the resolute and concise judgement of the leading voice of the Ad Hoc Committee on Migration that “balanced, legal, guided migration can be beneficial for all sides; sudden, illegal and unmanaged migration cannot” (Lombardi, 2017, 2). However, it should be noted that the practical impact in terms of specific policy measures adopted in alignment with the parliamentary guidance was not identified.

Further examination on whether the parliamentarian guidance has been integrated into the policy measures adopted by the executive side would require a more extensive qualitative analysis, especially comprising the acquisition of more information via semi-structured interviews with the parliamentarians or their support staff to trace further sources of information and threads to follow the developments of the 2014-2017 legislative discussions, conclusions, recommendations and implementation in the recent years.

The New-Med research network, coordinated by the Istituto Affari Internazionali and supported by the OSCE Secretariat, serves as an explicit example of a second track diplomacy initiative (Kamel et al., 2015). It is not surprising that among the mapped organisations and arrangements this is the sole distinctive second track diplomacy initiative. OSCE is built on informality and community building whereas many other organisations and arrangements mapped in this Working Paper have a tradition of a more formalised work mode. Another reason why New-Med is worth pointing out as a notable initiative is, its focus on multi-level governance constellations, including multilateral and subregional organisations, intending to examine what adjustments would help to better address the existing challenges. To place New-Med in a broader context, it should be added that it is not the sole form of engagement of the OSCE with think tanks. The OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions and the Human Dimension Seminars serve as two
examples of facilitated (more routine) encounters between academics, scholars and policy experts, administrative staff (Herman & Wouters, 2017, 7).

Overall, the parliamentary outreach contributes to the diversity of approaches recommended and pursued by various regional and subregional organisations and arrangements. Although some parliamentarians have engaged with their peers from legislative forums of other regional and subregional organisations and arrangements, the migration crisis has not triggered increased focus on establishing more regularised discussions with potentially positive implications on future inter-parliamentary driven integration among organisations or arrangements.

Second track diplomacy has not been a widely prioritised means for advancing regional consultations. Only OSCE has displayed a propensity to launch an additional initiative to explicitly empower think tanks as enablers of a dialogue on migration issues. Thus, think tanks play a very limited role as endorsed drivers of regional consultations and coordinated approaches to migration. However, that does not mean that scholarly expertise does not have a role within the regional and subregional organisations and arrangements. This expertise is tapped into via routinised encounters. References in this Working Paper to the reports issued by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre are examples of routinised practices of analysis’ dissemination.

All in all, this section and the previous one, which elaborated on the varied levels of integration, demonstrate that (among the 20 organisations and arrangements studied) consultations and coordination are pursued in a variety of ways to monitor, analyse and manage mixed migration flows. There is no single or widespread pattern that would characterise joint consultations and coordinated actions. Instead, on certain occasions voices gathered by one organisation take inspiration from the most integrated model – the EU – to suggest certain measures for competence building. It raises doubts about the resource efficiency and thoroughness of analyses supporting the suggestion. The integration patterns are most pronounced among Europe-based organisations and arrangements. However, it is doubtful whether all newly suggested initiatives are presented on the basis of a thorough examination of the existing dense layer of competence centres and collaborative relations between these hubs of expertise. The overall drive to address the migration crisis sparked not only more vibrant interactions among the mapped organisations and arrangements - it also resulted in new joint initiatives.

Less interaction and coordination were identified among organisations and arrangements whose major membership countries are located in other continents. Such observation should be red with caution, especially bearing in mind that there is incomparably more information available online and publications produced on the European organisations and arrangements than on the rest of the examined ones. Bearing in mind that some of the mapped organisations and arrangements have displayed a limited operational capacity and impact, it further decreases their potential to deliver certain integrationist dynamics over the studied period of time.

3.5 Cooperation with ILO and IOM

This section displays the findings guided by the second research question. Some remarks before elaborating on the research findings generated in response to the second research question on the engagements with ILO and IOM. The gravity of the “humanitarian crisis”
with an influx of asylum seekers and refugees into Europe and Turkey has led analysts who are aware of the existing statistical tools and monitoring programmes maintained by regional and international organisations, such as EU’s Eurostat and OECD’s Continuous Reporting System on Migration, to suggest to such EU strategic partners as the AL an establishment of a new monitoring tool to acquire data on migration for employment (Garson, 2019, 4). It is a good example of how a salient issue might have driven the expert debate away from a thorough review of how the existing monitoring resources and their encountered challenges in optimal performance (if any) might be used or tailored to serve the pressing needs of evidence-based or -informed policymaking beyond ad-hoc urgencies. Instead, it gives way to framework suggestions to add a new component to the existing array of statistical, monitoring and analytical capacities maintained by various multilateral bodies. Namely, this initiative for an establishment of a new monitoring tool would benefit from acknowledging the AL members as members of the OIC. OIC maintains and expands a considerable administrative capacity via the Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Centre for Islamic Countries (SESRIC) with its OIC Statistics Database and the upcoming OIC Labour Centre. This is not an attempt to downplay the role of the Arab Observatory for International Migration. Instead, it is a call for a broader look at various peer initiatives related to the migration data management and a more comparative examination of whether competence centres of a broader multilateral forum might not be better suited to the EU’s interest in gaining a more comprehensive view of migratory patterns.

This is a call for caution towards resource efficiency and potential duplication or overlaps between the newly suggested and already pursued initiatives, especially keeping in mind also the on-going work of the ILO’s International Conferences of Labour Statisticians. This forum among other matters has touched upon the need “to overcome the main obstacle to the production of consistent and quality statistics on labour migration, namely the lack of harmonization across countries, and even within countries from different official agencies/sources, regarding data on labour migration” and has raised the ambition to reflect on the best joint approaches in maintaining statistics on international labour migration in the medium-to-long term (International Labour Office, 2018, 4, 8-9). Such goals do not mean that it is mirrored in the interactions with the regional and subregional organisations and arrangements.

On a declaratory and principled level, several Europe-based organisations and arrangements have established ties with two key international organisations. The OSCE founding document – the Helsinki Final Act –, its section “Economic and social aspects of migrant labour” establishes a link between the work of OSCE and the ILO as a key reference point for international agenda on the topic. Among the examined organisations and arrangements, this is an exceptional example of the level of explicitness in prioritising certain international cooperation partners. Besides this, the annual Tripartite high-level meetings are held among OSCE, CoE, the EU, the IOM and the International Committee of the Red Cross (Herman & Wouters, 2017, 16). A subregional example is CEI. The 2015 migrant crisis triggered closer cooperation between CEI and IOM mirrored by the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding with a focus on IOM’s Migration Governance Framework (CEI, 2020).

On a more practical level, IOM assisted the National Focal Points and National Monitoring Committees on the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Free Movement Agenda and the trainer’s manual “Free Movement of Persons in the Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa” published in 2017 is the most tangible output prepared for this capacity building exercise (IOM, 2020). On the European side, among more intense liaison in practical cooperation the EU operation “Sophia” should be mentioned. “Sophia” established contacts with Frontex, Europol, the UN Mission, the UNHCR, the IOM, Interpol and NATO (Tardy, 2017, 3). As an example of project-based activities is the Employment and Social Affairs Platform – a project launched in 2016 and financed by the EU (RCC, 2017). It was implemented by the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) and the ILO.

Overall, the findings prove that ties to the ILO and the IOM are issue-based and issue-specific. There is no unified pattern of engagement that would characterise the way the international expertise on migration and labour affairs is sought after by various regional and subregional organisations and arrangements. It echoes earlier findings that “there are perhaps as many different approaches to the issue as there are regions” (Gartland et al., 2017, 428). Moreover, amidst the European urgency in addressing the migration crisis, this complexity is further reinforced by research inputs encouraging further burgeoning of migration monitoring tools and approaches. Understandably, it is based on goodwill to induce the EU-AL strategic dialogue with some issue specific collaborative engagements. However, from a comprehensive perspective of specialisation and activities characterising the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, it can be questioned in terms of resource efficiency and risks of duplicating some of the efforts already pursued by the OIC.

3.6 Overlaps and Complementarities

This section elaborates on the conclusions drawn during the examination of the third research question. The diversity of approaches adopted by the examined regional and subregional organisations and arrangements provide a better insight into why despite various monitoring initiatives, data platforms and attempts to adopt a regionally unified manner for data collection are failing to provide a coherent picture. It echoes earlier findings. “Summing up, existing evidence yields at best ambiguous results on the effects of regional migration governance. It should, however, be noted that studies assessing these effects are still very rare and are often constrained by the lack of pertinent data.” (Lavenex et al., 2016, 19) The comparative examination of 20 organisations, which form the basis of this Working Paper, shows the collaborative patterns within organisations and between regional organisations, their peers and international organisations. It reveals how international discussions on a unified approach are not finding fertile ground in regional constellations and their immediate agendas dedicated to the mixed migration flows.

The European Agenda on Migration of the EU identifies the AU as a cooperation partner for developing a common approach towards irregular migration and the protection of people in need (European Commission, 2015, 2). The African RECs, which are supposed to support the overarching work of the AU, have a mixed record and varied approaches to migration issues. Henceforth, it does not seem feasible to take the subregional organisations and arrangements as a strong reference point for the EU-AU joint efforts. This examination renders clear the importance of the EU exerted regional actorship via various frameworks and instruments of engagement. A lack of a solid grouping of regionalist stronghold on the African side makes the importance of EU thoroughly evidence-based or -informed and capacity-wise more resourceful initiatives of engagement, such as the Africa-
EU Migration, Mobility and Employment Partnership, even more important to seek more effective ways for addressing various challenges faced by the countries of origin, transit and destination. Among the areas suffering from inefficiencies in joint efforts, the Maghreb countries should be singled out where “the growth of competing and sometimes redundant regional institutions” (Lebovich, 2017, 3) have led to critical appraisals of AMU and CEN-SAD.⁴

One of the promising developments that hold potential to mitigate further duplication and overlaps and instead direct regional organisations towards a focus on complementarities is the CCTS observer status of the OIC. In 2016, the CCTS concluded the Memorandum of Understanding with SESRIC, an affiliated organisation of the OIC (CCTS, 2020). Although these extended ties do not have a pronounced thematic orientation towards the flow of labour, future intersections cannot be ruled out with potentially positive effects on building complementarities among issue-specific initiatives pursued by various multilateral forums. Besides, contacts have been established also between CCTS and BSEC (Hasanov, 2015, 2). Thus, the CCTS stands out as one of the mapped subregional organisations and arrangements with a strong orientation towards outreach to the relevant peer organisations. This pronounced outward-looking orientation is a characteristic of both Turkic executive and legislative branches.

The Joint Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)-RCC-Education Reform Initiative of South Eastern Europe (ERISEE) Working Group on Recognition of Professional Qualifications focuses on the Regulatory Frameworks for Professional Qualifications and the requirements for opening the negotiations on mutual recognition agreements of professional qualifications for the medical doctors, dentists, architects and civil engineers (CEFTA, 2020). It is an example of subregional organisations pooling forces to address systemic issues that are of common interest and would benefit from a unified approach well beyond the confines of each subregional grouping. It clarifies that amidst the European migration crisis there were other migration-related topics addressed beyond the significant influx (Abderrahim, 2019; Cook, 2017, 10) of immigrants heading towards Europe.

Furthermore, RCC was one of the Europe-based subregional forums whose facilitated expert-level work drew attention to the gaps and duplications among interventions implemented by international donors and civil society in the domain of radicalisation and violent extremism. It is a good sign that the Council is looking for the most optimal approaches in addressing the challenges without encouraging further dilution of efforts and bubbling of potentially overlapping initiatives.

Likewise, complementarities in expert-level consultations are demonstrated via the OSCE-CEI High-Level Panel Discussion “Beyond the Emergency: Improving the International Response to Large Movements of People” organised as part of the Austrian Chairmanship of the OSCE and Belarussian CEI Presidency. The Global Compact on Migration and the EU-Belarus Joint Declaration on the Mobility Partnership were some of the international initiatives noted by the speakers (Belta, 2017).

Besides the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, the Alliance is engaged in the OSCE Mediterranean Dialogue, the 5+5 Dialogue and Egypt’s Mediterranean Forum (Joffé, 2017, ____).}

⁴One example of such duplication is the yet-to-be-implemented CEN-SAD Free Trade Area which overlaps with the envisaged customs unions of ECOWAS, ECCAS and COMESA etc. (NEPAD, 2015, 4; Nita et al., 2017, 120).
In addition to the consultative encounters, NATO launched the operation “Sea Guardian” in the Aegean Sea. “Sea Guardian” complemented the efforts of the EU operations “Sophia” and “Triton” in addressing the migrant flows commuting via sea (with geographic approximations indicated in annexes 7 and 8) (Lesser et al., 2018, 16). The EU and NATO staff regularly explore modalities to enhance cooperation during the gatherings of the mechanism on Shared Awareness and De-Confliction in the Mediterranean. The mechanism is one of the components supporting the practical implementation of the EU-NATO strategic partnership (EEAS, 2019).

All in all, the dense layer of interactions and complementarities sought after and practically implemented on the European side demonstrate that there is not only an issue-specific expertise that the EU and other Europe-based organisations and arrangements could share with the African counterparts. Equally, bearing in mind that the AU was modelled on the basis of the EU example (Hettne, 2014, 61), European experts are well placed to offer a more nuanced insight to the African side on the European integration tradition. Namely, the strong European focus on steering multifaceted, multilateralist forums in a complementary manner and constant efforts to keep an eye on potential overlaps or duplication are noteworthy.

Perhaps it might serve as a source of inspiration for the African counterparts to structure its multilateral efforts in a leaner and resource-efficient manner. It is not simply a matter of revising the inventory of existing regional and subregional organisations and arrangements but having a more thorough collective reflection and joint vision on how the multi-layered multilateral architecture for Africa should be structured in the long-term to serve not just certain long-cherished aspirations for unity. Capacity-wise, it would also help to take a more feasible joint approach towards the particularities of certain areas of Africa, such as its Mediterranean coasts as an integral component of the African development agenda.

The current risk that existing practices of regional dialogues and cooperation have a certain ‘forum shopping’ trait is damaging not only to the African interests. It harms a wider Mediterranean space and its adjacent areas directly affected by volatilities emanating from Africa. The lessons learnt from the European experience, including utmost vigilance and continuous attentiveness towards potential duplication and unnecessary bubbling of resource-wise questionable initiatives, such as the ones discussed in this Working Paper, should be considered in this overall collective learning-by-doing journey.

Surely, Europe does not have all the universal answers on how to structure complex interregionalist governance modes. Considering complex interregionalism is such a multifaceted and evolving phenomenon, Europe is also consistently engaged in learning. On certain occasions, Europe is potentially coming close to making certain decisions or actions which can be questioned in terms of the situational awareness about the existing institutional solutions and implemented collective efforts. However, this process and the dynamic intellectual interactions within it should be taken as a valuable resource for learning from European achievements and mistakes.

**Conclusion**

Comparative regionalism and complex regionalism call for more innovation in terms of the choice of actors to be studied. In the context of a neo-Westphalian world order, a
A failure to address this gap in the existing literature would result in a simplistic or somewhat ‘sanitised’ notions of transnational and supra-regional traits of ‘actorness.’ It may lead to a simplistic replication of state-like features and assumptions of modes of operation on to the regional and subregional organisations and arrangements. Such neglect of earlier new regionalist calls to pay attention to the multiplication of actors in the regional integration would fail to explain the complex real-world dynamics of multi-stakeholder driven initiatives in which the authority has travelled from the national to the other governance levels in quite diverse ways. Consequently, such neglect would slow down further advancement of the theoretical thinking on the full-spectrum multi-level governance, the complexities of the EU forms of regional actorship that come along with certain influential and resourceful subnational, transnational, supranational and non-state entities exerting their full ambitions and aspirations via an enthusiastic engagement on various governance levels beyond the national one and beyond the EU territory.

Second track diplomacy has played a limited role in the discussions and actions taken regarding the European migration crisis. This can be explained by the following factors: Firstly, as outlined in the previous two paragraphs, there is a lack of scholarly attention paid to analyse the role and impact of EU funded research initiatives on the EU actorness beyond its borders. Secondly, OSCE has assigned a specific role to the New-Med as an initiative explicitly tasked to perform second track diplomacy activities. It is an exceptional example, not a widely practiced approach to facilitate multilateral discussions on migration governance.

This exploratory study paves the way for a more in-depth examination of the validity of whether multiple-case design with embedded (multiple units of analysis) would serve as a more conducive research approach to determine various regionalisation dynamics affecting the Mediterranean. The complex interregionalism of the Mediterranean area and its multi-level governance dimension should be further examined in greater detail as the space shaped by compound cases waiting to be unravelled. Many of the initiatives identified in this exploratory study would be a good subject for a more detailed examination, especially through interviews with engaged professionals to counter intensive reliance on secondary literature.

Migration is a topic of primary (enshrined in the founding document) or secondary (mirrored in the contemporary collaborative structures and initiatives) interest to most organisations and arrangements engaging with the Mediterranean littoral territories. Even organisations which do not address (mixed) migration as one of the core components of their mandates, are occasionally involved or supporting discussions on migration-related matters. Thus, the overall policy and scholarly thinking on the topic of migration is
characterised by variable geometry with several Mediterranean littoral states being preoccupied with diverse implications caused by the migratory routes directed towards Europe.

The diversity of solutions applied by the regional and subregional organisations and arrangements in addressing the movement of people, additional analytical entities suggested by the parliamentarians of certain organisations (BSEC, CoE), multiple consultative frameworks and multilateral partnerships established with other international or regional organisations or initiatives testifies to the remarkable complexity and multifaceted implications of the issue. Each regional arrangement comes with its dynamics, defined not only by the founding mandate of the grouping but also by the way certain geographic locations are exposed to the European migrant crisis and the dynamics these developments trigger among the political and senior levels of national decision-makers.

Obviously, less operational and impactful forums plagued by either limited administrative capacity or geopolitical stalemate had a relatively limited role in overall intellectual consultations and actions taken to counter the adverse effects on the peace, welfare and sustainability of the corresponding geographical areas of responsibility.

A comparative look at the EU and Europe-based subregional organisations (CEFTA, CEI, RCC) and the African RECs (AMU, CEN-SAD, COMESA) prove that centralised steering of data acquisition, monitoring and analysis would be essential for a comprehensive understanding of the pull and push factors, socio-economic implications of the contemporary migration patterns. The way discussions on migration have unfolded in each of these forums testify that these are not the best-placed entities to shoulder the key functions for data acquisition, monitoring and analysis. For a good oversight of these integration measures, the EU should continue maintaining and expanding its centralised oversight. It is worth considering if the AU can draw some lessons from EU practices and experiences on how to keep an optimal centralised approach towards the monitoring capacities, avoid duplication or being too reliant on insufficient capacities housed by the RECs. Subregional forums are well-placed to discuss the unique challenges faced within a certain area of the continent. However, since the mixed migration flows heading towards Europe span across vast geographical areas, a comprehensive picture for resource-efficient management is essential. This is where continent-wide organisations are much better placed to employ their data acquisition, analysis capacities and solution development.

Multi-stakeholder partnerships convened throughout 2014-2017 to discuss migration-related matters, bring a certain value to the overall understanding of the multifaceted implications of the European migration crisis. However, it is also a call for caution on whether or not burgeoning such initiatives has caused certain damage to the progress in overcoming the key challenges and reaching substantial progress in the data acquisition, monitoring and unified technical assistance. This calls for a re-examination, bearing in mind the challenges associated with ‘forum shopping’, ‘paper tigers’, limited administrative capacities and existing shortfalls of data management systems operated by several littoral countries of the Mediterranean. Amidst the diversity of multilateral solutions and approaches chosen to tailor migration governance and monitoring of mixed migration flows, the value of focusing on key forums working towards a unified approach on statistical measures and resource allocation to tackle persisting challenges in international monitoring and management of migration, should not be neglected.
Due to the urgency of the European migration crisis felt in various corners of the Mediterranean littoral countries, researchers, parliamentarians and executive branch might have been easily swayed into a so-to-say 'something-must-be-done' mode. The identified suggestions of new initiatives raise questions whether they have been proposed based on a comprehensive analysis, which would allow detecting potential duplication or overlaps with the existing competence centres, their managed programmes and development strategies. This episode is an important learning experience not just for Europe about its current state of complex interregionalist governance mode and practices. It is also a valuable lesson to other parts of the world, such as Africa or MENA. It highlights the importance of being fully aware of the multilateral resources and solutions at hand and how they should be masterfully combined to deliver envisaged results. The EU and NATO complementarities in the Mediterranean and Aegean waters is a telling example in this respect.

Likewise, the European migration crisis episode calls for continuous vigilance and peer pressure towards preparing and suggesting well-informed initiatives with thoroughly examined implications on the existing implemented solutions and expert-driven initiatives. The zest of certain parliamentarian circles to suggest a list of new measures should warn Europeans that there is room for more informed recommendations for further action. However, more certainty about this observation and initial assessment would benefit from in-depth research beyond this review of publicly accessible online resources.

Many of the mapped organisations and arrangements consult and cooperate with ILO and IOM. However, the modes of engagement are diverse and far from unified. This mirrors the diversity of mandates of these forums, as well as issue-specific motivations and reasoning that guide the organisations and arrangements to engage with both international bodies in a non-unified manner. These engagements do not necessarily support such efforts as the ILO’s aims to establish a unified approach via the International Conferences of Labour Statisticians. Instead, it mimics the propensity towards the scholarly coined ‘patchwork of authority’. Various responsibilities have been dispersed across several regional and subregional organisations and arrangements to a varying degree depending on three factors: a) the level of ambition of integrated approach towards migration enshrined in the founding document b) the scope of outreach towards other multilateral forums to discuss and coordinate migration-related matters c) the capacity of each arrangement in terms of whether it is operated as an impactful forum, which lives up to the expectations enshrined in its founding document, or its routine work is hampered by geopolitical rivalries, lack of capacities or other challenges.

As the evolution of the regional monitoring systems and analysis initiatives maintained or supported by the regional and subregional organisations and arrangements demonstrates, the statistical and econometric overviews and monitoring systems developed by various UN bodies, international and regional organisations should be seen not only as technical elements installed to promote evidence-based or -informed policymaking. These are also testimonies of the sentiment and policy agendas of their time. While economists lament the lack of longitudinal data repositories and lack of continuity of the acquisition of data in a unified manner, this trend is the best example of how migration monitoring responds to the whims of the day, political moods and high-level guidance issued often-times to respond to a certain issue that has gained saliency at a specific point in time in the political or public debate begging for a more nuanced response within a specific geographical context.
Future Research

There is one very simple and obvious explanation of why the studies on the European integration with a focus on the EU have been flourishing while other regional and subregional organisations and arrangements have benefited from less analytical attention - it is the availability of information. It is incomparably easier to research the EU than several other regional and subregional organisations and arrangements listed on RIKS. The EU offers an unprecedented amount of open-access online databases to academic researchers while other regional organisations and arrangements identified in this Working Paper have scarce information offered online (annex 9). Thus, one of the great challenges for a more even and inclusive examination of various aspects of the regional integration, especially its governance components well beyond the usual role model, the EU, is facing a critical shortage of initial open-access information. The bibliography of this Working Paper and its evidentiary base are the best examples. The bibliography displays quite clearly what resources have been identified to compile at least some minimal insights about some less studied regional and subregional organisations and arrangements. A lack of freely accessible information online correlates also with the disbalances in the existing volumes of academic outputs dedicated to the examined regional organisations.

Consequently, many regional organisations and arrangements are invited to rethink their public outreach and public communication strategies. It would help make their work more understandable, transparent and conducive for future research projects on regional integration and its governance components. Without more extensive learning from best practices of leading organisations, these entities run the risk of being further marginalised not solely due to certain political or geopolitical considerations. Equally, they will continue to remain out of the academic radar, thus diminishing their role in shaping the overall understanding of regional integration and the diversity of multi-level governance practices even further.

The limited amount of the existing body of analysis and online information threads on several regional and subregional organisations and arrangements leads to an acknowledgement that not only the European Neighbourhood Policy studies would benefit from more input and interactions between academic and policy experts (Schunz, 2016, 278). More publications based on field research of activities undertaken by the regional and subregional organisations and arrangements, as well as more voluminous inputs from policy experts and cooperation administrators engaged in several organisations and arrangements listed on RIKS would help address the critical gap in the literature on the evolution and developments of the regional integration and complex interregionalism. One of the promising initial developments in this direction was demonstrated by the United Nations University Series on Regionalism. More precisely, the 3rd volume “The United Nations and the Regions” features a concise contribution of the AL Secretary General. Consequently, the 7th and 13th editions among the authors included policy experts. These examples encourage to think optimistically that the identified gap can be bridged in the future.
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ILO. (2017). Common interests, shared goals: Promoting decent work from Asia and Africa to the Middle East (Background Paper to the Interregional Consultation on Labour Migration and Mobility from Asia and Africa to the Middle East). Available from https://www.ilo.org/beirut/WCMS_578736/lang--en/index.htm


Annex 1: Theoretical Background

The Working Paper is prepared with full acknowledgement of the scholarly reflections that the comparative regionalism as the third phase in the regionalist debate (after the old and new regionalisms (Warleigh-Lack, 2008, 45)) has come (Söderbaum, 2016, 33). It is understood as “an academic activity aimed at performing scientifically sound comparisons of regional integration processes (or regionalisms or regions) across the globe and across time” (Van Langenhove, 2011, 141-142). This Working Paper is aligned with the aspirations captured by the first of three areas of comparison defined by the founding director of UNU-CRIS that is aimed at “comparing processes of region-building” (Van Langenhove, 2011, 143). However, instead of a lengthy elaboration on the history of gradual transformations and respecting the compact format of a standard UNU-CRIS Working Paper, this exploratory study provides a snapshot of one rather recent episode of interactions between supra-national regions taking place across the Mediterranean which has a potential to leave a long-lasting imprint on the way the Mediterranean region is constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed via social practice and discourse (Hettne, 2014, 55) by reflexive actors (Söderbaum & Taylor, 2008, 21).

Governance is understood in Rosenau’s terms (also selected by Söderbaum) as “spheres of authority at all levels of human activity that amount to systems of rule in which goals are pursued through the exercise of control” (Söderbaum, 2016, 196). Multi-level governance, understood as power-sharing and multiple layers of authority which form policy networks for collaboration and interdependence on each other’s resources (Thakur & Van Langenhove, 2008, 18; Van Langenhove, 2011, 53), is the structuring pattern. It is taken as a point of departure for a comprehensive intellectual reflection on the Mediterranean multilateral frameworks.

The definition of region-building derives from Van Langenhove’s “Building Regions”: “[A] step-by-step process that has its internal dynamics but that is also related to a much broader set of geopolitical and economic factors.” (Van Langenhove, 2011, 47) By opting for this definition the research project benefits from a comprehensive perspective on the multilateral influences shaping the Mediterranean.

Intermestic sphere refers to “the intermingling of domestic, regional and international factors that overlap or intersect and that can transcend traditional state-centric (realist) notions of sovereignty” (Stubbs, 2005, 77). Following the chosen research questions, in this specific Working Paper the use of the term gravitates closer to the complexities of the ‘Euromestic’ sphere, meaning, a space shaped by a combination of the EU and national (and sub-national) decision-making (Awesti, 2007, 5-6; Gidlund, 2000, 254; Rose & Trechsel, 2014, 17).

Acknowledging the diversity of regions existing in the world and academic literature (Van Langenhove, 2011), it is important to provide specific definitions what terms are adopted in this Working Paper when examining regions above the national governance level. ‘Supranational regions’ is a term employed by Van Langenhove (2011, 54) to refer to formations based on “a limited number of states linked together by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence”. ‘International regions’ is a term used by Söderbaum (2016, 2) to refer to “units or subsystems larger than the ‘state’ but smaller than
the ‘global’ system’. The Working Paper does not favour one definition over the other because both of them are indispensable to capture the multi-faceted character of items included in the RIKS repository and analysed in the subsequent paragraphs.
Annex 2: Regional Organisations and Arrangements from a Multi-level Governance Perspective

Global governance level refers to the layer on which the United Nations is operating. It serves “an additional layer of consultations and decision-making of governments and intergovernmental organizations” (Van Langenhove & Macovei, 2013, 235).

World or international regions “are large territorial units or subsystems that exist between the ‘state’ and ‘global’ levels” (Söderbaum, 2016, 109).

Regional organisations and arrangements are close to a continental geographic size.

Subregional organisations and arrangements cover areas smaller than a continental-size or certain areas of continental intersections.

Micro-regions are cross-border regions covering a certain part of at least two states. These regions are considered as spaces of governance below the national level. (Söderbaum & Taylor, 2008, 13)
Annex 3: Regional and subregional organisations and arrangements listed on RIKS in which Mediterranean littoral countries are members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AII</td>
<td>Adriatic-Ionian Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AL</td>
<td>League of Arab States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSEC</td>
<td>Black Sea Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAEU</td>
<td>Council of Arab Economic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCTS</td>
<td>Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEFTA</td>
<td>Central European Free Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEI</td>
<td>Central European Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEN-SAD</td>
<td>Community of Sahel-Saharan States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoE</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECO</td>
<td>Economic Cooperation Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-24</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAPEC</td>
<td>Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organisation of Islamic Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCC</td>
<td>Regional Cooperation Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEECP</td>
<td>South-East European Cooperation Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>Pacific Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UfM</td>
<td>Union for the Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Included in the analysis. Left outside of the scope of the analysis due to specific considerations elaborated in the main body of the Working Paper.
Annex 4: Groupings of the regional organisations and arrangements according to the way migration-related matters are prioritized

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migration as one of the core priorities addressed in the founding document</th>
<th>Migration addressed as a relevant topic (e.g., via sub-divisions of the organisation)</th>
<th>Migration addressed on ad-hoc basis</th>
<th>No interest in migration detected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMU</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>CCTS</td>
<td>CEFTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td></td>
<td>G-24</td>
<td>ECO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAEU</td>
<td></td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>OAPEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEI</td>
<td></td>
<td>RCC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEN-SAD</td>
<td></td>
<td>SPC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEECP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UfM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 5: Types of regional organisations and arrangements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continent-wide organisations</th>
<th>Europe-based organisations</th>
<th>Africa-based organisations</th>
<th>Asia-based organisations</th>
<th>MENA-based organisations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CoE, EU, NATO, OSCE</td>
<td>AU, G-24</td>
<td></td>
<td>AL, OAPEC, OIC, CAEU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisations based in the continent’s sub-regions with a strong affiliation to the EU/AU</td>
<td>CEFTA, CEI, RCC, AII</td>
<td>AMU, CEN-SAD, COMESA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continent’s neighbouring sub-regional organisations</td>
<td>UfM, SEECP</td>
<td></td>
<td>BSEC, ECO, CCTS,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 6: Migration monitoring approaches adopted by the regional organisations and arrangements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Chosen approach to the migration monitoring and management of statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>No monitoring capacity identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AL</td>
<td>Arab Observatory for International Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMU</td>
<td>No monitoring capacity identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>Takes into consideration the developments of the IOM 2015 Migration Governance Framework which entails Migration Governance Indicators. Discusses a common approach towards the Labour Market Information Systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSEC</td>
<td>Data acquisition from the Member States for comparative statistical analysis captured in the periodic reports. The role of the Coordination Centre for the Exchange of Statistical Data and Economic Information as an affiliated centre to BSEC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAEU</td>
<td>Central Bureau of Statistics tasked to collect statistics, provide analysis and produce publications when deemed necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCTS</td>
<td>No monitoring capacity identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEFTA</td>
<td>No monitoring capacity identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEI</td>
<td>No monitoring capacity identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEN-SAD</td>
<td>No monitoring capacity identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoE</td>
<td>CoE monitoring bodies and fact-finding mission reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Implementation of the Common Market entails Art. 4, 6. (a) harmonisation of &quot;the methodology of collection, processing and analysis of information required to meet the objectives of the Common Market&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECO</td>
<td>No monitoring capacity identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Comprehensive monitoring, acquisition of statistics and analysis performed by various EU institutions and EU funded initiatives. EU Mediterranean operations displayed in annex 7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-24</td>
<td>No monitoring capacity identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Monitoring and management of statistics related to a specific Operation Sea Guardian. NATO operation in the Agean Sea displayed in annex 8.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAPEC</td>
<td>No monitoring capacity identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>OIC Statistics Database (OICStat) managed by SESRIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Reporting from the field operations. A new field mission tailored specifically to report on migration was discussed but was not established. Upon request, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights also designs and implements projects on the collection of migration data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCC</td>
<td>Outsourced monitoring and analysis capacity maintained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEECP</td>
<td>No monitoring capacity identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>No monitoring capacity identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UfM</td>
<td>Project-based monitoring and reporting to the funding authority</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 7: EU Mediterranean Operations (Council of the European Union, 2020)

Starting date of each operation

- **Operation Sophia:**
  - 01/06/2015

- **Operation Themis:**
  - 01/02/2018

- **Operation Poseidon:**
  - 01/01/2016

- **Operation Indalo:**
  - 03/05/2017
Annex 8: Map of operational areas of NATO’s deployment in the Aegean Sea, EUNAVFOR Operation Sophia and Frontex Joint Operation Triton (Dibenedetto, 2016, 6)

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Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States ................................................................. 51
Central European Free Trade Agreement .......................................................................... 52
Central European Initiative ............................................................................................... 52
Community of Sahel-Saharan States ................................................................................ 53
Council of Europe .............................................................................................................. 53
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa ............................................................ 55
European Union ................................................................................................................ 55
Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development ................................................................................................................. 58
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation .................................................................................. 59
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Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe ...................................................... 63
Regional Cooperation Council .......................................................................................... 66
South-East European Cooperation Process ...................................................................... 67
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Adriatic Ionian Initiative

The 2000 Ancona Declaration is the founding document of the AII. Migration is not among the prioritised areas of cooperation. However, the document leaves room for the incorporation of new topics in the organisation’s work which has resulted in enough space for introducing migration issues in the context of the European migration crisis. In 2016, such consultations on the topic were commenced by the parliamentarians during their annual gathering organised ahead of the first Annual Forum of the European Union Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region (EUSAIR) (Croatian Parliament, 2020).

Consequently, in 2017, the Italian chairmanship placed migration on the AII agenda. As a result of this thematic guidance, the All Secretariat convened a meeting of the member states’ ombudsman “with a focus on cross-cutting issues, such as non-accompanied children crossing the borders of the Region” (Italy, 2017, 2). Italy identified the European Structural and Investment Funds as a relevant source of financial support for strengthening capabilities of the EUSAIR “in coping with the challenges deriving from the migration and refugees challenges in the Adriatic-Ionian region” (Italy, 2017, 3). Italy aimed at creating a specific platform for projects oriented towards the reception and inclusion of migrants (Italy, 2017, 3). These discussions resulted in confirmation in 2018 of the need to proceed with consultations on migration (EUSAIR, 2018). The discussions commenced within the examined time frame between 2014-2017 and were continued during the subsequent year.

Arab League (League of Arab States)

Due to its strict non-intervention norms, AL has been associated with the “sovereignty boosting regionalism” (Kacowicz & Press-Barnathan, 2016, 6). AL does not indicate that the migration would be among the priorities of the organisation. However, this thematic domain is not left outside of the scope of the routine work of the organisation. “The Population Policies and Migration Department of the League of Arab States (PPMD/LAS) launched the Arab Observatory for International Migration (AOIM) in 2004 and since then, it has worked on filling the gap in migration data for Arab countries and updating such data continuously […]” (UNDESA, n.d.) Thought with certain challenges (Kacowicz & Press-Barnathan, 2016, 16), this regional organisation facilitates a multilateral dialogue and maintains domain-specific monitoring capacities.

Over the past years, AL has been in regular interaction with other regional organisations and UN-affiliated bodies on the migration-related matters. The IOM’s supported Arab Regional Consultative Process on Migration and Refugees Affairs, established in 2015, is chaired by AL. The secretariat of the Process is housed by AL (IOM, 2020a). The Arab Regional Consultative Process on Migration has been instrumental in forming a position towards the earlier stages of the revision of the European Neighbourhood Policy where migration had a prominent role (League of Arab States, 2015). The Strategic Dialogue between the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States and the European External Action Service was launched in 2015. Among the range of topics discussed is migration (Council of the European Union, 2020a).
Arab Maghreb Union

AMU is among the organisations that address migration as a prioritised thematic area. It is demonstrated in the Art. 2 of the instituting treaty: “The Union aims at: [...] Working gradually towards achieving free movement of persons and transfer of services, goods and capital among them” (Arab Maghreb Union, 1989, 162; Nita et al., 2017, 7). Earlier examinations indicate overall progress in reaching this goal has a mixed record among the member states (Urso & Hakami, 2018, 35) with Algeria being acknowledged as the front runner (Africa Regional Integration Index, 2016, 35). Due to a political impasse and enduring disagreements between the member states AMU has been characterised as ‘moribund’ (Daniel & Nagar, 2014, 28), ‘dormant’ (Nita et al., 2017, 16) and ‘inoperable since 1994’ (Barth, 2019, 12), thus having little importance in the overall regional integration processes, including migration in the Mediterranean context. Besides, the earlier analysis points out that the importance of AMU is further weakened by the fact that “competing economic cooperation initiatives, such as the Community of Sahel-Saharan States, have been established, involving AMU states” (Daniel & Nagar, 2014, 29). All of AMU member states are part of AL and AU (Barth, 2019, 23-24). Therefore, within the scope of this study, AMU is treated as one of the many “ineffective or dormant arrangements” (Bach, 2008, 173) characterising the dense layers of regional groupings and multilateral arrangements in Africa.

African Union

Among the core objectives indicated in the Constitutive Act of the African Union is to “coordinate and harmonize the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union” (African Union, 2000, 5). A considerable share of progress towards the implementation of AU aims depends on the achievements of regional organisations and arrangements (AMU, ECOWAS, ECCAS, CEN-SAD, EAC, COMESA, IGAD, SADC) (Chané & Killander, 2018, 9).

This vertical constellation of governance layers has encountered significant challenges. “While there have been improvements in the flow of information between the RECs and the AU, coordination of policy and decision-making has been difficult. First, the development of RECs as vehicles for sub-regional integration has been uneven [...]” (Nagar & Nganje, 2016, 26-27) These complexities and variations in adopted solutions and approaches result in a lack of real progress in jointly implemented steps shown in greater detail in the subsequent paragraphs dedicated to the regional organisations and arrangements spanning across Northern Africa.

“Second, because RECs are legal entities in their own right and are not bound by the Abuja Treaty in the same way that AU member states are, their commitment to continental integration has sometimes been compromised by the dominant national interests that drive Africa’s sub-regional organisations.” (Nagar & Nganje, 2016, 26-27) It should not be forgotten that not only the varying political will but also uneven administrative capacity among member states leads to divergencies in the implementation of development processes and engagement in institutional reforms of economic integration (Hartmann, 2016, 16). Besides, resource-wise both the AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) “remain heavily dependent on donors, in particular the EU and its member states” (Chané & Killander, 2018, 18). The EU is not solely one of the key donors but also the main source of inspiration for the overall set-up of the AU (Hettne, 2014, 61).
Among areas of the AU-EU cooperation is migration. It is captured in the Africa-EU Migration, Mobility and Employment Partnership reviewed during the 5th African Union-European Union Summit. The event was held on 29-30 November 2017 in Abidjan. Among the positions expressed during this high level meeting was “strong political commitment to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement” (The Africa-EU Partnership, 2020). The Act also tasks the AU Executive Council with responsibilities in the domain of nationality, residency and immigration matters (African Union, 2000, 7). It is a clear indication that migration is among the prioritised areas of work structured under the helm of AU. AU Protocol on freedom of movement is noted for promoting intra-African mobility (Urso & Hakami, 2018, 38).

Consequently, in 2001, the development of a migration policy framework was suggested. It resulted in the AU Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA) adopted in 2006 and revised in 2016 with an introduction of eight key pillars (African Union, 2018, 10). AU’s approach to migration is aligned with the SDGs. Particular attention is paid to the mainstreaming. Explicit references to migration are made in six of its 17 goals of the Agenda 2030 (African Union, 2018, 24). A Common African Position is coordinated and presented to the Global Compact for Migration (African Union, 2018, 24). AU MPFA pays attention to the IOM 2015 Migration Governance Framework (African Union, 2018, 29), which is operationally supported by the Migration Governance Indicators.

In 2015, the AU adopted the Joint Labour Migration Programme which includes the development of an African Qualifications Framework (African Union, 2018, 33). To aid labour mobility the JLMP is also working on Labour Market Information Systems, skills forecasting and labour migration statistics which collectively support market-driven skills development and skills pooling across the continent. However, current policy-making suffers from a “lack of reliable sex-disaggregated migration data” and unified methodological approach, as well as political reservations towards an exchange of migration-related information (African Union, 2018, 70).


**Black Sea Economic Cooperation**

The title of BSEC clarifies that the focus of this regional arrangement is other than the Mediterranean. However, due to the membership of Albania, Greece and Turkey, which comprise the littoral territories of the Mediterranean Sea, it is not left outside of the scope of the analysis.

The BSEC Charter does not define migration as one of the core areas of its work. It does not provide visa exemptions (Nita et al., 2017, 16). However, earlier studies have identified that “simplification of visa procedures […] of businesspeople and professional lorry drivers” (Nita et al., 2017, 7) has been on the agenda. Furthermore, among the areas of cooperation defined in the Art. 4 “exchange of statistical data and economic information” (BSEC, 1998, 4) is included. It might entail also statistics on the flows of people. The goal 13 “Harmonization and Exchange of Economic and Social Statistical Data and Information” of the BSEC Economic Agenda “Towards an Enhanced BSEC Partnership” comprises two
corresponding actions. The first action addresses an exchange of comparable data for periodic reports on the economic performance of the BSEC Member States. The second action strengthens the role of the Coordination Centre for the Exchange of Statistical Data and Economic Information (BSEC, 2012, 11). One of the signs that this area of work has not benefited from a noteworthy dynamism is the fact that active cooperation of the BSEC Working Group on Harmonization and Exchange of Economic and Social Statistical Data and Information has been suspended (BSEC, 2020).

Furthermore, the BSEC Charter’s Article 20 introduces the BSEC Parliamentary Assembly as the legislative arm, which supports the BSEC objectives. Its Declaration, dedicated to the 25th anniversary of BSEC, confirms that the European migrant crisis has gained political attention as a fundamental aspect of socio-economic development and integration of the Black Sea region (PABSEC, 2017).

Before publishing the Declaration, the Assembly held consultations on the European migrant crisis. Its report captures one of the most detailed insights about how Turkey, among other BSEC member states, faces new opportunities and risks due to the influx of Syrian refugees. The report does not have a distinct Mediterranean angle. Instead, it offers information about socio-economic developments taking place closer to the Turkish-Syrian border, such as the rising housing rental, food and services’ prices, tensions arising between the locals and Syrians from an influx of low-paid labour force, the increased trade prospects with the Middle East due to the incoming traders from Aleppo, increase of illegal trade between border villages etc. (Ozturk, 2016, 21)

The reported developments are integrated into the Assembly’s recommendation: “[…] the Member States harbouring a massive number of refugees face many challenges, including significant economic problems associated with the need to accommodate refugees and ensure their integration at their host societies. The increasing flow of refugees leads to a corresponding increase in social and economic tensions. Moreover, addressing complex economic issues such as support and protection of competition, employment, wages, rents, price policy, inflation, investment and trade, becomes further complicated.” (PABSEC, 2016, 24) The organisation of debates on the refugee issues and consideration of establishing more efficient mechanisms for information exchange and knowledge sharing, the establishment of the Council of Migration Bodies, strengthened cooperation between international and regional organisations was recommended by the Assembly for further consideration among representatives of the BSEC executive branch (PABSEC, 2016, 25-26).

To conclude, BSEC does not serve to the littoral Mediterranean states as a potential source of best practices how to progress in the regional multilateral consultations towards mutually agreeable statistical methods and definitions based on internationally recognised classifications. The BSEC legislative branch has given considerable input for further work to address the implications of the European migrant crisis in the Black Sea region. However, this input is not yet translated in substantial progress measures jointly adopted by the executive authorities.

Council of Arab Economic Unity

“[S]imilar to the United Nations, the Arab League has its own “family” of specialized agencies and regimes” (Pinfari, 2016, 4). These entities do not have the same composition of member states as the AL. CAEU is one of such examples. Among the key goals of CAEU stated in the Economic Unity Agreement Among States of the Arab League stated in the
Art. 1 is to guarantee to the Member States and their nationals the freedom of residence, work, employment and exercise of economic activities. It touches upon many aspects of migration. Attainment of this goal is facilitated by the Common Market Accord. It supports free movement of capital, good and people among members (UIA, 2020). The Art. 6 of the Agreement establishes the Central Bureau of Statistics tasked to collect statistics, provide analysis and produce publications when deemed necessary.

**Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States**

The Nakhchivan Agreement on the Establishment of the CCTS does not list migration or flow of labour to be among the prioritised areas of cooperation. Kazakhstan’s sustained demand for workers and remittances forms roughly 10% of the GDP in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (Gstöhl et al., 2016, 214-215). Therefore, it is not surprising that over the last years the experts working for the CCTS have not deferred from expressing certain positions regarding migration during public gatherings. For example, during the OSCE Security Days 2016, Deputy Secretary General of the CCTS Mr. Abzal Saparbekuly described migration as a global challenge with direct implications on the CCTS Member States. He expressed the readiness of the CCTS to contribute to the OSCE Secretariat’s efforts in addressing it (CCTS, 2020b). In 2019, based on the Azerbaijani initiative the 2nd Capacity Building Training Programme for the Turkic speaking diasporas was held in New York. It was moderated by the CCTS Deputy Secretary General Gismat Gozalov (CCTS, 2020c).

The legislative branch has been a considerable promoter of the consultations on migration between the CCTS and other regional and international organisations. Migration has been discussed during the meetings of the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-speaking countries (TURKPA) (CCTS, 2019, 36-37). TURKPA has consulted with IOM on potential future projects (Asanov, 2015), as well as engaged in cooperation on the migration issues in Central Asia together with the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE (Asanov, 2015, 27).

Overall, the CCTS engagement with migration matters is organised on ad-hoc basis. Recent calls for CCTS to address uncontrolled migration via active cooperation and development and implementation of initiatives to prevent deterioration of the situation (CCTS, 2019, 110) remain to be addressed with more systematic joint measures.

CCTS is an observer of the OIC. In 2016, CCTS concluded the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Centre for Islamic Countries (SESRIC), an affiliated organisation of the OIC (CCTS, 2020a). Although these extended ties do not have a pronounced thematic orientation towards the flow of labour, potential future intersections cannot be ruled out. Contacts have been established also with BSEC (Hasanov, 2015, 2).

**Central European Free Trade Agreement**

CEFTA and the Agreement on Amendment of and Accession to the Central European Free Trade Agreement do not prioritise migration or flow of labour among the core areas of consultations and cooperation. However, that is not an obstacle to organising public debates and launching joint initiatives together with other international and regional partners. In 2014, the CEFTA Secretariat in co-operation with the World Bank organised the Dialogue on Regional Mobility of Professionals in Brussels (CEFTA, 2020b). Another form of multilateral engagement in matters related to the labour flow is engagement in the Joint CEFTA-RCC-Education Reform Initiative of South Eastern Europe (ERISEE) Working Group.
on Recognition of Professional Qualifications. It focused on the Regulatory Frameworks for Professional Qualifications and the requirements for opening the negotiations on mutual recognition agreements of professional qualifications for the medical doctors, dentists, architects and civil engineers (CEFTA, 2020a).

Central European Initiative

The Guidelines and Rules of Procedure of Central European Initiative do not explicitly task the regional organisation to engage with migration matters. However, the Art. 3 defines aspirations towards cooperation with the EU, the CoE and the OSCE, the Art. 5 states support to the European integration and the Art. 6 draws attention to the cross-border and interregional co-operation. Thus, the Initiative benefits from a vast scope of thematic coverage. The free movement of people is among one of the core freedoms of the EU. Labour flow is an intrinsic component of the Initiative's thematic scope. As an illustrative example of the implementation of the initially envisaged multilateral partnerships is the OSCE-CEI High-Level Panel Discussion “Beyond the Emergency: Improving the International Response to large Movements of People” organised in 2017 as part of the Austrian Chairmanship of the OSCE and Belarus’ CEI Presidency (Belta, 2017). The Global Compact on Migration and the EU-Belarus Joint Declaration on the Mobility Partnership were some of the international initiatives noted by the speakers.

The 2015 migrant crisis triggered closer cooperation between CEI and IOM. It is mirrored by the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding with a focus on IOM’s Migration Governance Framework (CEI, 2020b). Besides, receptiveness to the migration issue is demonstrated by the maintenance of an institutional position of a CEI Focal Point for Migrations (CEI, 2020d). CEI Cooperation Fund was allocated to support the organisation of the conferences of the Western Balkans Migration Network (WB-MIGNET). It is an initiative that develops an observatory of the region (CEI, 2020a, 2020d). Likewise, CEI has financially supported an ESPON tendered analysis “Territorial and Urban Potentials Connected to Migration and Refugee Flows”. It investigates “the qualitative and quantitative features and the driving forces of the geographical distribution of the migrants (e.g. attractiveness of specific regions and cities to migrants and refugees) and its impact on the current socio-economic scenarios” (CEI, 2020c). All in all, CEI demonstrates a diverse occasional engagement with international and regional organisations, their affiliated bodies and scholarly circles. Such an outreach facilitates the overall reflection process of how the 2015 refugee crisis has affected the CEI Member States.

Community of Sahel-Saharan States

“The Original Treaty states as a main objective ‘the removal of all restrictions hampering the integration of the member countries through the adoption of necessary measures to ensure (a) free movement of persons, capitals and interests of nationals of Member States (…)’.” (Nita et al., 2017, 8) Among the core objectives, the CEN-SAD Treaty states implementation of measures which would support freedom of residence, work, ownership and economic activity (University of Notre Dame, 2020). Earlier scholarly analysis indicates that migration topics are not as important to this regional organisation as the immediate pressing issues related to agriculture, natural resources management, crisis and dispute reconciliation in Libya and Darfur conflict (Urso & Hakami, 2018, 28).

CEN-SAD is among the regional economic cooperation communities recognised by the AU (NEPAD, 2015, 4). Further encouragement to judge CEN-SAD as having a limited role
stems from “the growth of competing and sometimes redundant regional institutions” established amidst the political rivalries of Maghreb states (Lebovich, 2017, 3). Among other academic circles, CEN-SAD was named among the ‘dormant (or inactive)’ organisations (Nita et al., 2017, 17). One example of such duplication is the yet-to-be-implemented CEN-SAD Free Trade Area. It overlaps with the envisaged customs unions of ECOWAS, ECCAS and COMESA etc. (NEPAD, 2015, 4; Nita et al., 2017, 120).

Council of Europe

The CoE Statute defines both the format of assembly of the executive and legislative branches. “The CoE possesses supranational powers in the area of human rights protection only: the Strasbourg-based European Human Rights Court receives individual complaints and makes binding decisions.” (Schimmelfennig, 2016, 13) It has issued several judgements on cases breaching migrants’ rights that were committed by several countries (Council of Europe, 2020). The CoE Statute is not elaborating on the role of this organisation in addressing the movement of people. However, the migrant crisis has not been left unaddressed by various CoE entities.

The importance of the migration issues is demonstrated by the institutional position of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on Migration and Refugees established in 2016 as a “response to the unprecedented number of migrants and refugees who arrived in Europe over the course of 2015” (Special Representative of the Secretary General on Migration and Refugees, 2018, 1). The Special Representative is responsible for the scope of activities dedicated to protecting refugee and migrant children in Europe, engagement in the discussions on the Global Compact on Refugees, human rights aspects of immigrant and refugee integration policies. The Special Representative relies on traditional CoE monitoring methods and fact-finding mission reports.

The CoE Parliamentary Assembly’s Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons is the format which engages most actively with the issues related to the European migrant crisis. The Assembly has issued several recommendations elaborating on the actions needed to be taken to address troubling developments of the European migrant crisis captured in the recommendations on the ‘left-to-die boat’ (Strik, 2014), large-scale arrival of mixed migratory flows (Chope, 2014), resettlement of refugees through greater solidarity with a special focus on supporting Malta (Voruz, 2014), externalisation by member States of their migration policy and border control to third countries (Strik, 2015), the situation in Aleppo (Mignon, 2016), migration as an opportunity for European development with a suggestion to establish a “European migration and intercultural development observatory, which would assist Council of Europe member States in the development of strategies, legal frameworks, action plans and specific projects in the field of migration” (De Sutter, 2017).

The suggested observatory is an interesting episode of integration in two respects. Firstly, it builds on the earlier practice of the EU to assemble multi-stakeholder partnerships to examine certain issues in greater detail, such as the European Observatory on Health Systems and the European Observatory on Homelessness. Secondly, the De Sutter recommendation might demonstrate the comprehensive way parliamentarians look at the European migration crisis. Namely, institutions and initiatives organised by the EU are taken into consideration as best practices. Thirdly, it is an intriguing example of how the legislative body of one regional organisation issues a recommendation to establish new entities with the assistance of another regional organisation. The non-binding character of the CoE
Parliamentary Assembly’s recommendations or a lack of progress achieved in the inter-parliamentary consultations on the initiative between De Sutter and the representatives of the European Parliament is mirrored in the fact that the establishment of a special observatory under the envisaged title has reached little progress. Perhaps this initiative is pursued in the form of another title unknown to the author of this exploratory study. The author has not contacted De Sutter support staff to clarify further details on the progress achieved since the publishing of the recommendation.

CoE has contributed to the promotion of overall awareness about the issues related to the migrant crisis. It is done by issuing analysis, such as the Issue Paper “Human Rights Aspects of Immigrant and Refugee Integration Policies” (Carrera & Vankova, 2019). Such a publication has no binding character and no implications on the integration processes. It allows the CoE to promote awareness about certain complex issues and national practices.

CoE is a useful assisting forum in the EU’s efforts to steer regional integration. Decisions of the European Human Rights Court, more precisely, references to these court decisions are integrated in the recommendations of the CoE parliamentarians’ commissioned studies on certain aspects of migration management in Europe. However, the overall nature of the organisation and relations between its entities have incentives-oriented rather than a binding character. All in all, CoE is a forum which facilitates the integration of Europe by promoting shared awareness of the implications of the European migrant crisis. However, its limited supranational role offers scarce tools to promote more jointly coordinated actions among its member states.

Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

The COMESA Treaty states that the movement of people is among the priorities of joint work (Nita et al., 2017, 8). Art.4, 6.(e) indicates that in the field of economic and social development the member states shall "remove obstacles to the free movement of persons, labour and services, right of establishment for investors and right of residence within the Common Market". UNECA clarifies further details: “There are two primary legal instruments governing the free movement of people in COMESA, the Protocol on the Gradual Relaxation and Eventual Elimination of Visa Requirements, and the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Labour, Services, the Right of Establishment and Residence. […] In order to meet national implementation challenges, the regional economic community set up the COMESA Model Law on Immigration to harmonize national laws and practices of member States, yet domestication is still slow.” (UNECA, 2020) The Regional Integration Support Mechanism covering both COMESA and the East African Community is tailored to offer resources which would help throughout the liberalization process. Free flow of people is addressed via the Mechanism’s Indicator 12 “Gradual relaxation and eventual elimination of visa requirement” (COMESA, 2020a).

IOM assisted the National Focal Points and National Monitoring Committees on the COMESA Free Movement Agenda and the trainer’s manual “Free Movement of Persons in the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa” published in 2017 (IOM, 2020b) is the most tangible output prepared for this capacity building exercise.

COMESA works towards a joint data system developed by the COMESA Committee on Statistical Matters. However, the Statistics Unit of the COMESA Secretariat does not monitor data on migration (COMESA, 2020b). Overall COMESA is one of the examples of the uneven implementation of jointly approved measures which stems from the earlier
identified differences in the “member states’ integration status within the region and their special circumstances” (Bhatia, 2017, 274). Such uneven dynamics result in the diverging track record towards reaching the AU-set goals.

**European Union**

Recognising the earlier academic analysis on the free movement of people that distinguish differences between the EU Member States’ citizens and third-country nationals, this section builds on de Bruycker’s work (Nita et al., 2017, 287-311). “Among the regional integration frameworks, the EU has the most comprehensive migration regime addressing mobility, social rights, security, and providing for supranational enforcement mechanisms. In terms of mobility liberalization, the free movement of workers (later “people”) was included from the start, with capital, goods, and services as one of the four fundamental freedoms of the European single market (Article 18 EC).” (Lavanex et al., 2020, 7) The de facto integration is steered by legally binding documents and a unified approach to migration first and foremost captured in the EU treaties (Nita et al., 2017, 9), regulations and directives. However, the migrant crisis has demonstrated certain limitations of the EU body of laws and regulations to facilitate joint responses (Pascouau et al., 2016, 21).

The elaborate character extends also to the external dimension with “a common visa policy; a harmonized system of external border controls; common standards for dealing with asylum claims; and directives on legal migration including the rights of long-term resident third-country nationals in the EU, family reunification, and common rules on the admission of highly skilled workers, researchers, students, and intra-corporate transferees (ICTs).” (Lavanex et al., 2020, 7-8) The free movement of workers has encountered some challenges in a smooth implementation. The European Court of Justice and academic institutions have played an important role in identifying and analysing them (Nita et al., 2017, 37).

The ‘refugee crisis’ triggered the adoption of the European Agenda on Migration which expresses a strong commitment to exploring the reasons, drivers or root causes of migration and points out the crises faced by North Africa as worthy of further examination (European Commission, 2015, 2). The Agenda specifies AU as a cooperation partner for developing a common approach towards irregular migration and the protection of people in need (European Commission, 2015, 5). Likewise, it presents estimates of a sharp increase in shortages of highly educated staff. It will require labour upskilling and mobility solutions (European Commission, 2015, 14). The Agenda does not raise any issues related to statistical data quality or data availability. Instead, it is written with a focus on the EU’s internal security and multi-faceted ways how information and communication technologies can assist in introducing complementary techniques for tracing and putting an end to harmful practices towards migrants.

The European Neighbourhood Policy is a framework facilitating the relations between the EU and Northern Africa. “The principle of differentiation, introduced by the ENP primarily through the so-called Action Plans, has merely reinforced the perception that bilateralism takes precedence over multilateralism and regionalism in Euro-Mediterranean relations.” (Ovádek & Wouters, 2017, 7) Mobility Partnerships are the specific tools designed by the EU to structure long-term cooperation with the countries of the European Southern Neighbourhood (Ovádek & Wouters, 2017, 14). This is the most vivid caption of the complex interregionalist dynamics evolving across the shores of the Mediterranean.
Due to the comprehensive approach EU demonstrates an unparalleled diversity of data acquisition, monitoring and analysis approaches. These are hosted not only by the EU institutions and their affiliated bodies but also maintained with a case-by-case basis allocation of funding from the Cohesion Policy funds and the EU Framework Programmes for Research and Innovation.

Among the EU institutions that perform data acquisition and analysis are Eurostat responsible for the European Statistical System and the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, its Knowledge Centre for Migration and Demography. The centre hosts an online metadata catalogue. The Publications Repository managed by the Joint Research Centre demonstrates the diversity of approaches taken and data sources used to analyse various dimensions of migration. Among its latest findings are reports assessing the current gaps in quantitative data repositories and suggestions to proceed with more qualitative examination and foresight exercises (Migali et al., 2018, 11).

In 2016, the Joint Research Centre in cooperation with the World Population Programme of the IIASA launched the Centre of Expertise on Population and Migration to analyse future developments of the EU population and how various migration flows might affect it in the future (IIASA, 2020). The EU competence building in migration and demography foresight is developed in close and selective partnership with some of the internationally leading, EU-based centres of expertise.

European Spatial Planning Observatory Network (ESPON) offers comparable and systematic territorial evidence covering the EU member states and Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland to reinforce the effectiveness of various EU policies and programmes. Data managed by ESPON are structured in the Database and Data Navigator. Among a wide spectrum of themes, it includes data on population, living conditions and labour market. Besides these repositories, ESPON commissioned a study on the Balkan migratory route via the Territorial and Urban Potentials Connected to Migration and Refugee Flows (MIGRATUP) contracting. The study confirmed basic data gaps among some of the examined countries, as well as a lack of information about the migrants – who they are, for what reasons they migrate, level of education and skill-set (Bianchini, Borraccetti, Zoppi, & Cavanna, 2018, 7-8). It would be very helpful for finding the most convenient means to integrate them in certain European urban or rural settings.

The European Strategy Forum on Research Infrastructures (ESFRI) conducts a regular review of the European research infrastructures with a unique nature. ESFRI has identified the Consortium of European Social Science Data Archives (CESSDA) European Research Infrastructure Consortium (ERIC), the European Social Survey (ESS) ERI and the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) ERI as noteworthy distributed infrastructures (ESFRI, 2018). These infrastructures serve as valuable sources of information for analysing various aspects of migration. This is an interesting example of how regional integration of migration explored comprehensively allow to discover the diversity of European integrationist initiatives that contribute to the maintenance of the multifaceted research on migration conducted in Europe and elsewhere.

Among the projects funded by the EU Framework Programmes “Regional Migration Governance” (R_eMigra) (CORDIS, 2019c), “Inclusive Growth Research Infrastructure Diffusion” (InGRID) (CORDIS, 2019a) and “Integrating Research Infrastructure for European expertise on Inclusive Growth from data to policy” (InGRID-2) (CORDIS, 2019b) projects serve as examples. InGRID is a network of distributed research infrastructures. It is a project-
based initiative tailored to study the social inclusion and exclusion and a list of other issues related to the labour market policies in Europe. The wider accessibility to the 16 data centres assembled by InGRID is facilitated by the offer of visiting grants, week-long academic training schools and other types of events organised across Europe (InGRID, 2020). Earlier efforts to ensure comprehensive outreach and strive for complementarities among migration and labour force-related initiatives implemented in Europe provided an opportunity to InGRID experts to acquire a first-hand insight into a great diversity of thematically aligned processes and collaborative platforms, such as the Cohesion Policy funded initiatives as the Baltic Science Network. This network has chosen among its three thematic specialisations welfare state (Šime, 2018, 2020). Thus, over the past years, the EU has invested in a multi-faceted and densely layered research ecosystem characterised by a diversity of approaches adopted to develop and maintain statistical databases and explore the progress and risks associated with the overall migratory patterns characterising the continent and specific parts of it.

Recognising the distinct role, the EU plays in supporting multilateral ties and integrationist dynamics in the selected geographical area, the specific operational measures tailored for the Mediterranean for the 2014-2020 planning period via the Interreg Vb Mediterranean Programme, the Interreg Adrion Programme, the EU Strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian Region should be mentioned. These instruments address the cooperation in the domain of a free flow of people. As it has been indicated earlier (Šime, 2020, 4), the EU Strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian Region offers various options for a skilled labour force to identify opportunities for professional advancement. Keeping in mind these instruments, which stem from the Cohesion Policy, is also helpful in terms of departing from the often-times one-sided debate on the Mediterranean as a hotspot of the EU refugee and migration crisis.

Last but not least, this comprehensive and extremely concise overview would not be complete without mentioning the role of Common Security and Defence Policy in addressing the European concerns related to the migrant crisis in a concerted and unified manner. In November 2014, the EU launched the Joint Operation “Triton” (Dibenedetto, 2016, 4; Kamel, 2015, 77). In 2015, the Operation EUNAVFOR Med “Sophia” was initiated “to respond to the surge of migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea from Libya, it has de facto become a police - and also rescue - operation, while also generating added-value as a maritime security instrument.” (Tardy, 2017, 1) EUNAVFOR Med “Sophia” resulted in the arrest of suspected smugglers and rescue of migrants. In 2016, “Sophia’s” mandate was amended to include also capacity-building and training of the Libyan coast guard and navy, as well as implementation of the UN arms embargo (Tardy, 2017, 2). As displayed in the map in Annex 7, in 2016, Operation “Poseidon” and the subsequent year Operation

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5 Although Baltic Science Network focuses on the Baltic Sea Region, not the Mediterranean area, its Welfare State Expert Group took a rather comprehensive approach to the migration topic and explored the key European initiatives addressing certain aspects of migration: “As highlighted by the European Agenda on migration, “migration flows need to be managed […] Research should help improve our capacity to foresee and address the challenges of (legal and irregular) migration and to develop effective policies for integrating migrants in our society and economy.” (European Commission, 2017b, p. 13) The BSN Welfare State Expert Group bears in mind that during the 2018-20 time frame migration will be addressed as a pressing challenge not via a specific focus area, but as a common thread running through several thematic areas, in other words, “through an integrated and interdisciplinary approach to issues such as root causes” of migratory patterns (European Commission, 2017b, pp. 15-16).” (Šime, 2018, 17)
“Indalo” was launched for more complete coverage of the Mediterranean⁶ (Council of the European Union, 2020b).

“Sophia” received mixed evaluations. With regards to the migration, there was “little evidence that the presence of Operation Sophia has helped stem the flow of migrants across the central Mediterranean Sea. FRONTEX data on the number of migrants arriving in Italy through this route do not indicate any tangible reduction over time” (Tardy, 2017, 3). EUNAVFOR Med Sophia established contacts with Frontex, Europol, the UN Mission (UNSMIL), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the IOM, Interpol and NATO. It is an example of collaborative ties among the key international and regional organisations.

As an institution engaged in the Ordinary Legislative Procedure or ‘co-decision’, the European Parliament is an integral part of the policy development towards the Mediterranean. Besides, its Mediterranean specific role is demonstrated by a role in the revision of the European Neighbourhood Policy, consultations with the Mediterranean civil society (Cofelice & Stavridis, 2017, 21), its think tank regularly publishing analysis on various Mediterranean affiliated topics. The report “Migrants in the Mediterranean: Protecting Human Rights” (Cogolati, Verlinden, & Schmitt, 2015) is a good example. The Delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean is another form of engagement.

The EU represents an unprecedently nuanced regional integration process which cannot be all captured in a single subsection of an evidentiary base (Yin, 2009, 173) of the Working Paper. However, the examples of diverse EU instruments and funded initiatives which contribute to a better understanding of migration, joint positions, as well as concerted actions to monitor and address various aspects of skilled and mixed migration demonstrate what an advanced regional integration model is formed of and how functionalities of its components ensure their distinct role in understanding the migration patterns characterising Europe and addressing them through an outstandingly diverse panoply of measures.

Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development

G-24 coordinates a joint position of developing countries on monetary and development issues concerning the Bretton Woods Institutions. Migration is not addressed by the founding document or core coordination structures of this arrangement. Thus, the overall role of G-24 in facilitating regional integration in the migration domain is limited.

However, it would be misleading to argue that G-24 has made no efforts to address this matter. G-24 facilitated expert gathering has contributed to G-24 dissemination of certain research findings which address some of the aspects related to migration. The Growth and Reducing Inequality Working Paper Series published in an open access format on the G-24 website capture policy-oriented analysis authored by participants of a workshop held in Geneva in September 2017. This event assembled ILO, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and G-24

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⁶Operation “Themis” launched in 2018 is left outside of the scope of the Working Paper due to the overall focus on the developments taking place during the time frame of 2014-2017.
Technical Group Meetings (G-24, 2020). Most of the published papers address traditional thematic domains covered by G-24, namely, trade and financial governance. However, as an exception, “Economic Growth and the Pursuit of Inequality” should be outlined. One of the sources used in this report is the UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Dataset. It draws reader’s attention to the high inequality in Africa, formality and growing concerns about the ability to offer jobs to the increasing youth population that translates in increasing rates of youth unemployment. The Working Paper displays a somewhat static perspective on labour force. It expresses concerns that a failure to provide appropriate jobs for a young and skilled workforce will result in “worsened living standards and developmental outcomes” (Bhorat & Naidoo, 2018, 12). Namely, the migration of young Africans is not kept within the scope of prospects for the labour force. Thus, even an ad hoc expert input to the G-24 debates does not raise the issue and implications of future migration patterns and how those might affect the African economies.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO is not a typical regional organisation but “a collective self-defence mechanism” (Bhatia, 2017, 119). The North Atlantic Treaty does not foresee NATO’s involvement in the management of migration. It is a military alliance with an integrated military command headquartered in Belgium (Schimmelfennig, 2016, 13-14). Nevertheless, NATO has been engaged in the Mediterranean multilateral dialogue well before 2014 via, first and foremost, its own established Mediterranean Dialogue, its engagement with the OSCE Mediterranean Dialogue and the Five-plus-Five Dialogue and Egypt’s Mediterranean Forum (Joffé, 2017, 11). NATO Science for Peace and Security programme’s training has been extended to Northern African countries which have implications also on the commonly faced migration challenge (Lesser et al., 2018, 23). Likewise, Morocco and Tunisia participate in the Partnership Interoperability Initiative aimed at ensuring “that the connections built up between NATO and partner forces through operations in the Balkans and elsewhere will be maintained and deepened” and certain courses of the NATO Defence College are open to Partnership for Peace countries (Lesser et al., 2018, 23).

Earlier analysis confirms the broad implications of the developments in the Mediterranean that influence the policy-making in more distant geographical areas starting from Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, Britain and up to the United States and Canada (Lesser, Brandsma, Basagni, & Lété, 2018, 4). NATO assets are deployed in the Mediterranean waters. The Allied ballistic missile defence architecture is one of the such elements (Lesser et al., 2018, 10; NATO, 2016, 2).

NATO had a notable role in addressing the European migrant crisis. The Alliance faces an increasing risk of terrorist activities on the NATO territory (Joffé, 2017, 2; King, 2016; Lesser et al., 2018, 28; Samaan, 2015, 4). Analysis published by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (Manciulli, 2017, 4), as well as the NATO Defence College specify: “Most of the Islamic State militants involved in the attacks carried out in Paris in November 2015 and in Brussels in March 2016 entered the EU by crossing the Mediterranean Sea hiding among Syrian refugees.” (Dibenedetto, 2016, 4) This is one of examples of the multifaceted negative implications stemming from the mixed migration flows heading towards Europe.

In February 2016, the Alliance deployed Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 in the Aegean Sea for reconnaissance, monitoring and surveillance of illegal crossings. It sends the collected information to Greece, Turkey and Frontex. (Dibenedetto, 2016, 5) Born out of
Operation “Active Endeavour”, which was launched in 2001 against terrorism threats and included Morocco among the engaged countries (Lesser et al., 2018, 23), “Sea Guardian” complemented the efforts of the EU operations “Sophia” and “Triton”. Besides conducting complementary operations in the Mediterranean and Aegean waters (Lesser et al., 2018, 16), EU and NATO staffs regularly explore modalities to enhance cooperation during the gatherings of the mechanism on Shared Awareness and De-Confliction in the Mediterranean that is one of the components supporting the practical implementation of the EU-NATO strategic partnership (EEAS, 2019).

Through “Sea Guardian” NATO operationalised the Allied Maritime Strategy (Dibenedetto, 2016, 14). An additional component relevant to the regional governance was the training of the Libyan forces to be better prepared to address the irregular migration (Dibenedetto, 2016, 14).

NATO Parliamentary Assembly is an independent consultative body of national members of parliaments. It is not an integral component of the overall institutional structure of the Alliance. Its “Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group (GSM) provides a forum for parliamentarians from NATO countries and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region to discuss political and security issues and to enhance cooperation” (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2020). In 2017, parliamentarians visited Israel, West Bank and Gaza. This is a good example of what an important role migration plays in parliamentary considerations on security. The report of the visit states: “The level of unemployment throughout the Arab world stands at 30% and youth unemployment is significantly higher. Demographic trends and poor governance promise no improvement in the situation, virtually ensuring a future of instability and political upheaval. In light of demographic trends, the region’s economies need to generate an additional 60 million jobs over the coming years to lower this figure substantially and this seems very unlikely.” (Cook, 2017a, 1) The issues brought along with migration are raised in several NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s published documents: “The West needs to recognize the degree of suffering many of these migrants have undergone. Mass migration could trigger new social tensions and these must be properly managed.” (Cook, 2017b, 8) These are two of the documents that clearly outline to the European Allied circles the long-term dynamics and implications of migration trends.

During a seminar focused on the Western Balkans, one of the mentioned potential future destabilising factors was a return of radicalised fighters from the conflict-ridden areas: “The return of fighters from Syria and Iraq poses another set of risks and the collapse of the Islamic State could mean an even greater influx of radicalised individuals who represent a danger to stability.” (Cook, 2017b, 7) This example reveals the diverse composition of mixed migration flows. In the Western Balkan context, the mixed migration flows heading towards the EU have been called ‘double migration crisis’ due to Balkans being not only a transit route for the migrants from more distant conflict-ridden areas, but also Balkan-born individuals seeking a better life in the EU (Cook, 2017b, 9). On top of these flows comes the destabilising return of foreign fighters who steer confrontation by lending support to nationalistic movements (Manciulli, 2017, 5). Equally alarming is the estimation that “national and European institutions still need to come fully to terms with the possibility that migratory flows and reception centres might be transformed into incubators of radicalisation” (Manciulli, 2017, 7).

In terms of regional integration, the NATO engagement in irregular migration management in the Mediterranean shows that, if willing, organisations can reach mutually beneficial
complementarities. EU-NATO coordination demonstrates it rather clearly. As confirmed in an earlier analysis, “[t]he blend of hard and soft, conventional and unconventional security challenges in the Mediterranean offers fertile ground for cooperation” (Lesser et al., 2018, 16). One example of joint consultations are gatherings organised by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (Corbin, 2017, 5-6).

An elaboration on the role of NATO and considerations for engagement in the refugee and migrant crisis allows broadening the overall understanding of what risks are posed to the destination populations by irregular flows of people. It is not only an unprecedented strain on the welfare systems and institutional capacities but also a risk of terrorism (Manciulli, 2017, 5). The suggestion to bring to the discussion table several Central Asian countries to properly address the threat posed by Daesh (Corbin, 2017, 4) further strengthens the research design selected for the preparation of this Working Paper. Since the scope of the challenge touches upon wide territories well beyond the shores of the Mediterranean, it is vital to look at the multilateral debates and joint actions taken in a broad manner.

Organization of Islamic Conference

OIC is an exceptional unit among the mapped regional and subregional organisations and arrangements due to the following characteristics. Firstly, it has exceptional size and geographical spread. OIC is the largest inter-governmental organisation after the UN. It consists of 57 states located in four continents. It has member states from all five UN regions (Kissack, 2012, 52). Among its members are member states of the AL, the CAEU, the AMU, the ECO and the CCTS (Bağış & Yurtseven, 2017, 17). If the EU’s extended ties to various parts of Africa have been called a “super-region” (Lavanex et al., 2016, 14), the geographical scope of OIC might be a candidate of a similar description. Secondly, unlike organisations based on joint interest in a specific functional set-up for collective work, such as free trade zone, OIC assembles countries with an Islamic orientation (Albrow & Bradford, 2008, 243; Baugmart-Ochse, 2015, 6).

Although the Charter does not specify migration as a prioritised area of cooperation, the OIC work encompasses migration issues. In 2015, OIC approved the establishment of its Labour Centre and its operational functioning is expected to commence in 2020 or later (OIC, 2019, 8). Among the responsibilities of this specialised entity most relevant to the Working Paper are (OIC, 2015b):

- “4.2.8 Promote creating and developing of a sustainable protection system towards vulnerable groups and migrant workers”;
- 4.3.11 “Provide support to Member States for the implementation of international agreements relating to labour, employment, social protection and labour migration”
- 4.3.17 “Establish information system, network and platform on labour, employment, labour migration and social protection issues”;
- Art. 6 2. “All Member States shall also send to the Executive Board and the Secretariat statistical, technical and other information published or otherwise issued or made available by government bodies except information protected by their national legislation”.

The listed functions of the OIC Labour Centre touch upon issues which have been raised and discussed among the scholarly community. The Islamic understanding of social justice has been examined to explore how this line of thinking should address the protection of
migrant workers, especially construction and domestic workers who are exposed to more precarious working conditions (Reda, 2016, 201-202). References to the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalisation are used to argue for the international applicability of decent working conditions (Reda, 2016, 203). Such concerns have been incorporated in the OIC Labour Market Strategy 2025 adopted in 2018 (OIC, 2018, 4).

While the OIC Labour Centre is still in its inception phase, the Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Centre for Islamic Countries (SESRIC) is a working OIC subsidiary organ. SESRIC provides crucial insights about the labour market trends of the OIC member states. It is the main entity responsible for OIC data and monitoring management via the OIC Statistics Database (OICStat) which hosts 838 socio-economic indicators under 24 categories for the 57 OIC Member Countries, dating back to 1985. The data inputs are provided by the member states. OICStat includes data on labour and social protection.

SESRIC offers not only data but also analysis in the form of the OIC Labour Market Reports. It is a centre of expertise offering a panoramic analysis to a wider readership about the trends and challenges characterising the OIC labour market. Dissemination of such analytical overviews is judged to be an enabler for de facto integration among OIC member states because it promotes a common issue framing and serves as a joint food for thought what concerted measures might be worth putting in place to address common challenges. For example, the OIC Labour Markets Reports capture statistics on vulnerable employment, meaning “working under inappropriate conditions and having limited or no access to social security or secure income” (OIC, 2017a, 15). It is a good point of departure for the future work of the OIC Labour Centre on its promotion of sustainable protection systems.

Besides these entities of the OIC support staff, OIC convenes the OIC Labour Ministers. This high-level forum supported the OIC Labour Market Strategy and several other framework documents paving the way for promotion of common approaches to jointly faced issues. A more expert-level driven is the OIC Public Employment Services Network (OIC-PESNET). It assembles National Focal Points. The Network has a broad and multifaceted agenda that among other matters include the promotion of “technical cooperation with the Specialized Agencies of the UN on common issues, including informal employment, labour force participation of women, labour market information systems, information technologies, youth unemployment, labour migration, vulnerable employment and child labour” (OIC, 2017, 6).

The importance of labour force issues is shown by the OIC Secretariat’s observations that “the unemployment rate in OIC member states as a group fluctuated between 7.4% and 9.1% during the period 2000-2017 and creating decent job opportunities still continue to be priority for absolute majority of OIC countries” (OIC, 2019, 7). Further broadening of engaged parties in the OIC consultations on labour matters stems from earlier recommendations to work towards common Islamic Labour Standards elaborated in cooperation with national Islamic universities of the OIC member states, as well as the establishment of a Forum which would promote joint research among labour research institutions of the OIC member states (OIC, 2017b, 8). This is a preliminary sign of interest to build multi-stakeholder partnerships to advance the OIC set goals.

Despite the overall young populations of many OIC member states, they have overall small populations which OIC consider addressing with tailored policies for smooth integration into the labour market (Ghoul, 2015, 303; OIC, 2015a, 5, 2017a, 5). These might be judged
to be of specific relevance to Egypt which has been outlined by SESRIC as being among the OIC member states with most acute problems of precarious employment of youth, having more than 80% of youth employed in an irregular job (OIC, 2015a, 51). Elderly and people living in rural areas are two other groups which are distinguished as requiring special strategies for skills development (Statistical, Centre, & Countries, 2015, 29).

Furthermore, the OIC Labour Market Report helps to better understand the OIC faced unparalleled intensity of brain drain. It is integrated among the pressing issues also in the OIC Labour Market Strategy 2025 (OIC, 2018, 26-27). “OIC member countries, as other developing countries, are facing a big challenge in terms of net labour migration especially when it comes to the migration of skilled labour force.” (OIC, 2015a, 84) ILO standards (among other measures) are referred to in SESRIC recommendation as one of the enablers to address brain drain and increase good job opportunities in the countries of origin (OIC, 2015a, 85). Diaspora initiatives, gaining inspiration from the UN’s “Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nations” and establishing trade associations are suggested by SESRIC as means to maintain ties with the emigrants (OIC, 2015a, 86).

The Parliamentary Union of the OIC Member States is not treated as an integral legislative branch of the organisation first and foremost because it does not have the same member state composition. Some OIC member states are not represented by their parliamentarians in the Parliamentary Union. Besides, the OIC founding document doesn’t foresee the parliamentary dimension as an inherent component of the organisation.

Overall, OIC work on migration and labour force matters shows clear orientation towards addressing common challenges via joint consultative formats and actions. This is not to argue in very ambitious terms that OIC has succeeded in gaining a unified voice and stance on these matters. Instead, issue-based cooperation is seen as a way how to increase the incremental integrationist dynamics among the wide membership. Interest in establishing additional expert and advisory forums on certain issues is seen as one of the promising signs of an orientation towards enriching the intergovernmental working mode of OIC with additional collaborative components. Such OIC support bodies as SESRIC are clear proponents of joint approaches captured in its analysis on the OIC labour market developments and recommendations for specific issues. Further growth of OIC competencies and technical expertise in this domain via the launch of the operational phase of the OIC Labour Centre might provide additional support to the development of coordinated actions among OIC member states.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

Integration-wise, unlike other major European organisations discussed earlier, namely the CoE, the EU and NATO, OSCE has no supranational features (Schimmelfennig, 2016, 14). The wide range of issues addressed by the OSCE are dealt with through a political dialogue displaying strong characteristics of informality and flexibility, less those of a formal international organisation (Herman & Wouters, 2017, 4; Kacowicz & Press-Barnathan, 2016, 11). Such modalities ensure a “direct dialogue among academics, military officials, and bureaucrats, leading to “community-building practices” […]”. The OSCE has been a pioneer in championing a comprehensive notion of security […]” (Kacowicz & Press-Barnathan, 2016, 11) The OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions and the Human Dimension Seminars serve as two examples of facilitated encounters (Herman & Wouters, 2017, 14-15).
OSCE Helsinki Final Act, which is a non-binding and not treaty type of agreement (Herman & Wouters, 2017, 7), is one of the most explicit reviewed founding documents in terms of its elaboration on migration matters. It has a separate section titled "Economic and social aspects of migrant labour". This section clarifies not only the main approach of the OSCE towards migration but also establishes a link between the OSCE work and the ILO as a key reference point for international agenda on the topic (OSCE, 1975, 33).

OSCE’s unique role towards the Mediterranean is captured in a separate section of the Helsinki Final Act titled “Questions relating to Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean”. However, migration is not among the prioritised topics for cooperation related to this geographical area. The Mediterranean section is the initial reference point for setting up the OSCE Mediterranean Partnership for Co-operation. It is an informal group “that meets periodically to facilitate the exchange of information and the generation of ideas. The annual OSCE Mediterranean Seminars facilitate an exchange of views and contribute to further developments in the relationship between the OSCE and the Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation” (Lutterbeck, Wohlfelf, & Sammut, 2014, 11). The Partners are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. The Special Representative on Mediterranean Affairs (Oliver, 2005, 6) is another institutionalised role which supports the organisation’s engagement in the region.

The EU is represented in the OSCE by the delegation of the country holding the Presidency of the Council of the EU and by the European Commission. The annual Tripartite high-level meetings are held among OSCE, CoE, the EU, the IOM and the International Committee of the Red Cross (Herman & Wouters, 2017, 16).

Earlier expert assessments point out the relevance of further consultations on closer cooperation with the Alliance: “The NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme, which spans a range of new security challenges and strives to bring together scientists, experts, and policy makers from NATO and partner countries to address emerging security challenges, could be the framework for OSCE-NATO joint activities on" transnational threats-related issues (Simonet, 2018, 303). While earlier OSCE-NATO cooperation was mainly focused on Central Asia, the Mediterranean area holds the potential for future consultations and collaboration (Simonet, 2018, 307). This potential is supported by the overlapping membership, namely, “[t]he geographical scope of the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, launched in 1994” by the North Atlantic Council “with the aim of contributing to regional security and stability through improved mutual understanding, corresponds to the OSCE Mediterranean Partnership, with one exception: Mauritania, which is included in the NATO initiative, is not an OSCE Partner for Co-operation.” (Simonet, 2018, 308) However, the feasibility of this suggestion for closer cooperation faces certain reservations among some OSCE member states (Stepanova, 2018, 105).

Beyond the region-specific efforts of the OSCE, other initiatives contribute to the safe and orderly management of migration. It helps to take a comprehensive look and identify various negative implications of the migration crisis, such as an upsurge in intolerance, hate, xenophobia (Liechtenstein, 2017, 215). Liechtenstein (2017, 213) outlines: “Besides the management of labour migration, the OSCE has developed numerous commitments and activities that are directly or indirectly contributing to managing migrant- and refugee-

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7Libya’s applications for membership in the Partnership submitted in 2013, 2016, 2017 were rejected (Morana, 2020, 11; Stepanova, 2018, 107, 109).
related challenges. In this context, particular attention should be paid to the OSCE’s human dimension and the activities of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). ODIHR bases its work in this context on OSCE commitments on migration, freedom of movement, and tolerance and non-discrimination, particularly the 2003 Maastricht Ministerial Council Decision No. 3/03 on Tolerance and Non-Discrimination.”

When requested the Office collects and presents data on migration. These activities seem to be in close alignment with the overall OSCE traditional pattern of offering regional assistance for economic, social and political development to promote regional stability (Pascual & Holly, 2012, 19).

Besides support staff located at the OSCE headquarters in Vienna, field operations offer information about the developments on the ground. OSCE reporting from the field missions located in South Eastern Europe helped to highlight the deteriorating situation in the Balkans: “With the closing of the Balkan route, smuggling and trafficking activities, already thriving at the onset of the crisis, have intensified in the region, and crimes related to illegal migration have become a real problem. Refugees and economic migrants, making up the mixed flows of migrants entering or transiting Western Balkan states, are indeed highly vulnerable to exploitation and human trafficking.” (Marciacq, Flessenkemper, & Boštjančič Pulko, 2017, 245) OSCE has been a good source for the European governments to obtain information about the situation of specific routes frequently used by people determined for various reasons to reach Europe.

The Helsinki Final Act does not elaborate on the Parliamentary Assembly as an integral component of the OSCE. The Assembly is an “autonomous OSCE body” (Herman & Wouters, 2017, 8). It is not part of the OSCE decision-making (Herman & Wouters, 2017, 10). The Assembly was established at a later stage and interacts with different strands of OSCE on a consultative basis (CSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 1991). It has a separate secretariat and an ambition to maintain ties with other parliamentary formats affiliated to, for example, the Council of Europe, the European Parliament and NATO, Inter-parliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 1991, 1; Herman & Wouters, 2017, 13; Oliver, 2005, 6). The high engagement of the Assembly in debating the Mediterranean crisis is mirrored by the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Migration and the Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorism (Chepurina, 2017, 254; Morana, 2020, 8). Its conclusions and suggestions for further action are not neglected within the scope of this Working Paper. The parliamentarians take into consideration both advantages and harm, such as brain drain, caused by the unprecedented mixed migration flows. A conclusion that a “balanced, legal, guided migration can be beneficial for all sides; sudden, illegal and unmanaged migration cannot” (Lombardi, 2017, 2) captures the essence of the parliamentary discussions. The OSCE parliamentarians look well beyond the curbed peak of the migration crisis. They are committed to addressing the root causes and long-term engagement with the matter (Lombardi, 2017b, 2017a).

The report “Migration Crisis in the OSCE Area: Towards OSCE Engagement” calls for closer cooperation between OSCE and the UNHCR, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the IOM, the CoE, the EU. Members of the parliaments submitted several proposals for improving OSCE’s response to the crisis (Froehly, 2017, 228-229). In 2015, the parliamentarians “passed a resolution calling for urgent action to address the tragedy of migrants dying while attempting to cross the Mediterranean” (Marciacq, Flessenkemper, & Boštjančič Pulko, 2017, 235). The General Committee on Democracy, Human Rights and
Humanitarian Questions has been distinguished by analysts as taking the most active role in the Mediterranean affairs. In 2016, this committee issued a new report highlighting that integration of refugees is a matter of avoiding waste of their intellectual capacities (Marciaq, Flessenkemper, & Boštjančič Pulko, 2017, 237). However, none of the Assembly’s issued documents are binding to OSCE or its specific entities (Herman & Wouters, 2017, 11). A follow-up with practical measures is rather challenging to detect without interviews with the relevant actors.

OSCE’s discussions on the European migrant crisis is enriched also by projectized activities, such as New-Med. It is a research network of the “Mediterranean experts and policy analysts with a special interest in the complex demographic, cultural and strategic dynamics that are unfolding in the Mediterranean region”. It was established in June 2014 as a second track diplomacy initiative. New-Med is coordinated by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), in cooperation with the OSCE Secretariat, the Compagnia di San Paolo of Turin, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the German Marshall Fund (GMF). At the core of the New-Med activities stands the need to rethink the role of multilateral, regional and sub-regional organisations, to make them better equipped to respond to fast-changing political, cultural, economic and security-related conditions and to address the pressing demands coming from Mediterranean societies all around the basin.” (Kamel et al., 2015, 15) New-Med is not a monitoring initiative. By and large, it is a qualitative analysis-driven scholarly debating forum.

Overall, the migration crisis brings destabilising risks. It jeopardises regional security and hampers post-conflict transition (Marciaq, Flessenkemper, & Boštjančič Pulko, 2017, 238). It poses a risk to further exacerbate the negative security implications via a “narrow preoccupation with border control, detention, and the criminalization of migrants” (Grech & Wohlfeld, 2016, 317). Such approach holds a potential to put in motion a vicious circle of supply and demand for security (Grech & Wohlfeld, 2016, 324). The list of international and regional organisations (which have been referred to during the OSCE discussions on the migration crisis) demonstrates the heterarchical nature of security governance in Europe (Kacowicz & Press-Barnathan, 2016, 15) and support for further close collaboration. NATO has a distinct role to play in the form of “new military missions of crisis management operations” (Kacowicz & Press-Barnathan, 2016, 15). The OSCE acts as a secondary order-producing forum with a comprehensive approach to human security (Kacowicz & Press-Barnathan, 2016, 15). Due to its institutional structure and internal dynamics, the OSCE has not emerged as a pivotal forum for facilitating regional integration and its monitoring. But the organisation has gained a new interest in the historical mandate over the Mediterranean affairs. Scholarly analysis facilitated by the organisation, as well as consultative sessions offered to both representatives of national governments and parliaments on the migration crisis should not be underestimated. These encounters allow European political leadership to broaden the situational awareness and map multi-faceted factors which should be taken into consideration in further work of managing the migration crisis.

Regional Cooperation Council

Statute of the RCC does not indicate a special role for this regional arrangement in the area of migration. However, due to the following two aspects migration has not been left completely outside of the scope of topics addressed by the RCC throughout the examined time frame. The following factors motivate continuous discussions on various aspects of migration. Firstly, the outmigration of labour force towards the EU, also known as the ‘brain
drain’ (Čeperković, Gaub, Emini, Nechev, & Stakić, 2018, 13) has continuously shaped the overall discussions on migration in the region, especially in light of a dire unemployment situation in the region (Bonomi, 2019, 7; Lange et al., 2017, 12; RCC, 2017b; Vračić, 2019, 2, 4). As the 2017 Balkan Barometer confirms: “Emigration in pursuit of work and better quality of life continues to be desired by almost half of the population.” (GfK, 2017, 22)

Secondly, the Western Balkan route as one of the most used passages by mixed migration flows attempting to reach the EU shaped the perceptions of the authorities about the migration as a pressing challenge.

Various aspects of migration are addressed by several RCC Working Groups. For example, Skills and Mobility Working Group addresses such matters as the mobility of professionals, the South East Europe Military Intelligence Chiefs’ Forum, belonging to the Security Cooperation cluster, focuses on security cooperation and the European and Euro-Atlantic integration with military expertise in migration, radicalisation and terrorism, violent extremism, cybersecurity (RCC, 2020c). Among joint analytical work accomplished by the military intelligence forum was the open-source intelligence assessment “Migration crisis, roots of radicalisation and violent extremism leading to terrorism in South Eastern Europe” (RCC, 2017b, 11, 2017a, 40).

In 2017, the RCC published the Report on the Activities in the Area of Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism. It reiterated some of the earlier RCC commissioned findings that there were certain gaps and overlaps in various interventions implemented by international donors and civil society (RCC, 2017c, 5). Amidst the migration crisis, the Migration, Asylum and Refugees Regional Initiative (MARRI) was highlighted as “the only existing coordination mechanism in the region that should provide strategic direction in migration management” (RCC, 2016, 31). Thus, RCC holds the potential to facilitate further discussions on how to transform duplication into tailored complementarities.

As an example of project-based activities is the Employment and Social Affairs Platform (ESAP) – a project launched in 2016 and financed by the EU and implemented by the RCC and the ILO (RCC, 2017b). Besides the gatherings of Working Groups, RCC organised or facilitated conferences dedicated to the migration issues. The conference on “Migration on the Balkan route - donor coordination and humanitarian challenges” held in Skopje on 18 December 2015 testified to the urgency of challenges faced by the region (RCC, 2016, 32). The introduction of ad-hoc solutions amidst the closures of certain borders for the transiting refugees reinforced the saliency of the issue (Lange et al., 2017, 102-103). The 6th Western Balkans Civil Society Forum held in 2017 addressed “the role of civil society organisations in promoting sustainable growth and employment, migration in the Western Balkans, freedom of expression and media, as well as rights and empowerment of women” (RCC, 2020b). Among the RCC cooperation partners in this area is the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (RCC, 2014, 21). During a presentation of the RCC to young diplomats the migration emanating from more distant parts of the world, an increase of violent extremism and radicalisation were among the outlined security challenges (RCC, 2020a).

The South East Europe Regional Platform for Countering Radicalisation and Violent Extremism Leading to Terrorism and Recruitment of Foreign Terrorist Fighters hosted by the RCC is connected to the EU-supported Western Balkans Counter-Terrorism Initiative. Among its tasks is the development of radicalisation monitoring tool.

The RCC does not have a parliamentary counterpart. However, the RCC is in contact with the South-East Europe Cooperation Process (SEECP) Parliamentary Assembly. This
A legislative forum was established in 2014 (De Vrieze, 2015, 147; RCC, 2016, 35-36). It would benefit from extended ties with the European Parliament (De Vrieze, 2015, 147-148). At this nascent point in time, it is hard to make any definite conclusions about the relations between the RCC and the SEECP Parliamentary Assembly in the context of regional integration in the domain of migration.

The Balkan Public Barometer as the most statistically intensive initiative overseen by the RCC is an outsourced service commissioned by the RCC and provided by the market research institute “Growth from Knowledge” (GfK). Besides the radicalisation monitoring tool and the Balkan Public Barometer, the RCC facilitated interaction results in the exchange of opinions, assessments and drafting of suggestions for joint actions. The basic statistical services are lagging in such less advanced data acquisition as the Western Balkan diaspora among others (Judah & Vračić, 2019). Eurostat has been suggested as a partner for a substantial capacity building (Vračić, 2019, 14). In this context, the capacity of RCC to maintain a high quality and comprehensive radicalisation monitoring tool is doubtful. RCC is a consultative forum with specific activities implemented in the form of EU financially supported projects. The primary integration drivers towards closer ties with the EU are the instruments employed during the pre-accession talks (Čeperković et al., 2018, 19).

South-East European Cooperation Process

From its inception or the Sofia Declaration on Good-Neighbourly Relations, Stability, Security and Cooperation in the Balkans, SEEPC has identified migration issues as a domain for closer collaboration: “The Ministers underlined the importance of strengthening border controls and called for joint action against illegal and irregular migration. They proposed a semestrial review of the cooperation in this field.” They encouraged agreements between States of the region concerning the readmission of persons, illegally residing in each State’s territory. (SEECP, 1996, 8)

As earlier indicated, the legislative format of the SEEPC was established rather recently in 2014. Its General Committee on Justice, Home Affairs and Security Cooperation is the specialised sub-division which discusses migration-related matters in greater detail. In 2015, in a rather concise form and, in 2017, with a more nuanced elaboration, it acknowledged the importance of ensuring the international protection for those in need, respect towards the dignity and human rights of migrants, the need to work towards curbing the migration pressure in Europe via effective border management, access to legally safe and efficient asylum procedures among other matters (SEECP Parliamentary Assembly, 2015, 2, 2017, 2). This position was expressed amidst the growing pressures on South East Europe posed by the incoming migrants. As elaborated by Dr Darko Laketic, the rapporteur of the Committee: “It has been noticed that since certain measures started being implemented, irregular migrants have no longer been trying to leave the first countries they arrive to on the western Balkans route, but stay in the reception centres, and a large number of them have been applying for asylum. The migrants that continue their journey via the Western Balkans route are facing more difficulties in leaving the territory of the Southeast Europe and in continuing towards Western Europe, which is why it has been noticed in past several months that irregular migrants stay longer in some parts of the SEE countries and they are in the numbers that burden the existing accommodation capacities.” (Laketic, 2017, 2) Likewise, the rapporteur notes the threat of terrorism expansion in the Middle East and North Africa which has direct implications on the neighbouring areas (Laketic, 2017, 4).

This regional format does not act as a pivotal driver of the integrationist dynamics. Instead,
it is a platform for the exchange of information. It enhances situational awareness about area-specific challenges related to the European migrant crisis.

**Union for the Mediterranean**

The UfM stems from an EU effort to revitalise its ties with the neighbourhood (Baert, Scaramagli, & Söderbaum, 2014, 3). The Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit of the Mediterranean confirms that migration is a jointly faced challenge. The UfM should play a role in addressing it. Likewise, the Declaration states a “commitment to facilitate legal movement of individuals” and support to “orderly managed legal migration in the interest of all parties concerned, fighting illegal migration and fostering links between migration and development are issues of common interest which should be addressed through a comprehensive, balanced and integrated approach” (Union for the Mediterranean, 2008, 12). Furthermore, the Annex of the Declaration recognises that migration is among areas where increased cooperation is needed.

The reason why a more detailed analysis of the UfM work on migration-related matters is not presented in the Working Paper’s evidentiary base is the limited availability of freely accessible information, documentation and a relatively thin body of earlier scholarly findings. Some researchers have already raised the issues hampering a smooth working-level operation of the consultative formats of the UfM (Delputte & Bouckaert, 2019, 5). The UfM online resources offer very little information about the discussions, conclusions reached, and actions taken by such dialogue platforms as the Med4Jobs Advisory Board, the High-Level Working Group on Employment and Labour, the regional dialogue process on “Higher Education Internationalisation and Academic Mobility in the Euro-Mediterranean region”. A more substantial dissemination of information about the ongoing activities of the UfM would contribute to raising the profile of this forum among broader audiences. It would help to promote the UfM beyond the concise marketing material offered on the forum’s website.
References (Annex 9)


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