China and the Arab Awakening
China’s active involvement in the MENA region is a relatively new phenomenon. Indeed, perhaps it is the speed at which China has emerged as an important external actor in the region from a relatively peripheral position that explains at least some of the concern about what this might mean for existing powers. That China is not only competing with others (including major western powers) economically in the region, but also takes a (relatively) firm stance on non-infringement of sovereignty probably explains the rest of the concern. Within the region itself, however, China’s emergence has been largely welcomed. Lacking the historical baggage of previous colonial powers and not promoting a preferred normative basis for international relations and/or domestic economic and political governance, China’s presence in the region seems to have been largely welcomed – not least as a counterweight to American power and an antidote to a militarily backed superpower presence. China has even managed to develop extensive ties with Israel, particularly in the latter’s provision of military hardware and equipment to the former, without losing its image as being essentially pro-Palestinian. The Arab Awakening might not have derailed Chinese policy, but it has resulted in some important changes in both thinking and strategy. Immediately, and most clearly, this was more to do with domestic Chinese politics than politics within the region itself, and concerns about potential spillovers of discontent into China. Over the longer term, crises within the region have highlighted potential tensions between the underlying principles that supposedly inform Chinese diplomatic positions and a more pragmatic approach that takes into account Chinese commercial interests overseas. It also perhaps suggests that while China clearly has interests in the region and is a regional actor, it seems primarily focused for the time being on its own Asian regional concerns than on extra-regional and/or global leadership
