Constructing Crises, (In)securitising Terror: the Punctuated Evolution of EU Counter-Terror Strategy

The European Union’s (EU) counter-terrorism strategy has been particularly dynamic, developing as a result of ‘crises’ and subsequent post-crisis narrations. The events of 11 September 2001, and the Madrid and London bombings have proved to provide moments of punctuation from which policy evolution and institutionalisation has followed. As a result of such crises, the EU has increasingly regarded terrorism as a direct challenge to the Union’s role as a security actor and sought to institutionalise a diverse range of security governance technologies across its multiple pillars. Such an approach is noticeable for its qualitative difference compared to EU strategy pursued throughout the end of the twentieth century, and demonstrates an increased willingness for the EU to assert its role in the world. Yet, what is highly noticeable from the EU strategy and the proliferation of security governance technologies is the manner in which the EU has securitised ‘terrorism’ in the pursuit of internal, external and  normative objectives. As a consequence, the EU has inflated the threat posed by terrorism, and increasingly attempted to ‘Europeanise’ its  response. Evident in such a strategy however, is the manner in which counter-terrorism practices can generate greater insecurity inside and outside of the Union.