Post-NAFTA North America: Three Scenarios for the Near Future
As Henry Kissinger correctly stated, the major difference between Europe and the United States (US) in terms of the scope and vision of their respective foreign policies is that Washington has traditionally neglected the balance of power as a normative principle for grounding its action in the international arena. By contrast, since the signature of the Treaty of Westphalia at the end of the 17thcentury, a balance of power amongst the principal European nations, understood as no single nation-state dominating the European landscape, has remained a major strategic objective in European international affairs (Kissinger, 2001:25; 32-82). Protected by two vast oceans, and with no major power counterweight north or south of its borders, the US has positioned itself, since the early stages of its nationhood, to accomplish a so-called “manifest destiny” to protect and expand democratic values as a condition for guaranteeing international peace. This American exceptionalism was translated into territorial expansionism at the turn of the 19th century, and in periods of either isolationism or unilateralism during the 20th century. Moreover, since the Monroe Doctrine at the beginning of the 19th century, one strategic tenet of US foreign policy has been to sustain its leadership in the Western Hemisphere by neutralizing the influence of out-of-area powers in the region.
This historical difference in the tenets of foreign policy interests between Europe and the US explains, in my opinion, the current differences existing between the European integration project and Washington’s commercial and political initiatives for its two neighbors and the rest of the Americas. In contrast with Europe, where there has been no “natural hegemon” since the creation of the integrative experiment but rather a shifting power “balance” and a coalition of interests between “big” and “small” members (i.e. the Benelux), in North America (NA) this balance and coalition of interests has been almost impossible since the early stages of what we could call a process of regional integration. This integration started perhaps in the mid sixties when Washington signed bilateral deals with two of its neighbors for stimulating the integration of its automotive industry with Canada and establishing in-bond industries (maquiladora) along the Mexican border in order to benefit from cost advantages. The regionalization process became a regionalism project when the three NA countries moved towards the creation of an integrated economic space through the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA.
Even though Canada and Mexico share the same challenge of being neighbors of a powerful country, their respective bilateral agendas with Washington do not necessarily converge, and have thus far avoided building up temporal coalitions for balancing US positions. On sensitive issues such as migration and border security, Canadians and Mexicans have different perspectives and priorities, which have prevented them from coalescing and heading a common agenda vis-a-vis Washington. This pervasive asymmetric imbalance existing in the NA space explains why the regionalism experience in the northern part of the Western Hemisphere has remained subordinated to the changing strategic interests of Washington at the global and regional levels.
This major difference explains the origins, nature, and evolution of the respective integrative projects taking place on the two sides of the Atlantic. Stemming from this structural difference, the purpose of this paper is to assess three possible scenarios for the future of NA now that the creation of a free trade area among the participants is a reality. Each of the scenarios will analyze the intertwining of politics, policies and polities which are currently at stake in each of them and will highlight the differences or analogies, where possible, with the European project.
