South American Regionalism and the Liberal International Order: An Ambivalent Relationship

South American states have traditionally developed a complex relationship with liberal political principles, both advocating for them and contesting their implementation in the framework of the post-World War II Liberal International Order (LIO). Despite not being a core member of the Western bloc of liberal democracies, the region has been an active participant in shaping the LIO, supporting international principles like human rights, equal sovereignty, and international law. Yet, the relationship between South American countries and the LIO has been marked by tensions and, at times, open resistance. These tensions come to the fore in South America's regionalism, where the drive to consolidate liberal norms has often clashed with the desire to protect national sovereignty and resist interference from international institutions. In our article “The ambivalent relationship between South America and the liberal international order: Regional counter-institutionalization in the fields of migration and election monitoring,” and in this blog post, we dig into the reasons behind South America’s ambivalent relationship with the LIO. More specifically, we address the following question: Under what conditions do South American states create regional institutions that consolidate or undermine the LIO?

South America’s Complex Relationship with the LIO

South American countries have engaged with the LIO in both supportive and undermining ways. On one hand, they have embraced the LIO’s core liberal values—particularly, the promotion of human rights and international law—by actively participating in the creation of multilateral institutions at the hemispheric and global level. On the other hand, South American states have expressed dissatisfaction with the inequalities (i.e., power asymmetries) and hypocrisy (i.e., inconsistent implementation of core principles) embedded within these institutions, which they accuse of having failed to live up to their liberal aspirations. South American states have also resisted the intrusiveness of international institutions in domestic affairs, balancing their commitments to liberal values with the need to protect national sovereignty and domestic autonomy.

Regionalism: A Tool for Cooperation and Contestation

Regionalism offers a key lens through which to understand the ambivalent relationship between South American states and the LIO. South American countries have used regional institutions such as the Organization of American States (OAS) or the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) to advance liberal political principles at a regional level. At the same time, South American states have used regional institutions such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) to push back the LIO’s interference, watering down liberal norms in the process. This dual role of regionalism—acting as a tool for both promoting liberal principles and resisting liberal international institutions’ external pressure—embodies the intricate relationship between South American states and the LIO. Such a relationship has not been static: It varies according to the issue at hand and the prevailing political and power dynamics in the region.

Regional Counter-Institutionalization: Two Case Studies

To better understand the logic of South America’s relationship with the LIO, we can focus on two case studies: migration and election observation. These are two areas directly tied to the core political principles of the LIO and provide contrasting examples of how South American states have both consolidated and undermined liberal international norms through the creation of regional institutions.

Under the leadership of Argentina, South American states established the South American Conference on Migration (SACM) to counter the restrictive, security-driven migration policies promoted by the U.S. and other Western powers at the regional and global levels. Emphasizing migrants' rights and freedom of movement, the SACM promoted a liberal intra-regional migration regime that aligned regional norms with the core values of the liberal international order (LIO). This initiative of counter-institutionalization positioned South America as a normative leader advocating for a more inclusive, less unequal, and –ultimately– more liberal global migration framework. By contrast, in the field of election observation, South American states used regionalism to challenge liberal international norms. Under the leadership of Venezuela’s authoritarian regime, South American states created the UNASUR Electoral Accompaniment Missions (UEAMs). The missions were designed to protect the autonomy of incumbents and compete with the OAS’s independent election observation missions. Deployed in contested elections, UEAMs lacked legitimacy due to their political nature (they were composed of South American states’ officials) and lack of autonomy (they could not publish an independent report on the quality of elections), weakening a key component of the LIO, like the international norm of independent election observation.

Understanding the Ambivalent Relationship

The variation in outcomes of regional counter-institutionalization—consolidating vs. undermining the LIO—can be understood through the interplay of two main factors: the source of dissatisfaction with the LIO and the preferences of the state leading the counter-institutionalization process.

When dissatisfaction with the LIO stems from its hypocrisy and inequity—as its failure to protect human rights— leading states with liberal preferences are more likely to push forward the establishment of regional institutions that align with the LIO’s core principles. This is evident in the case of migration, where Argentina’s leadership pushed for implementing a liberal migration region in South America to counter the restrictive policies promoted by Western powers at both the domestic and global levels. Conversely, when dissatisfaction arises from the external intrusiveness of the LIO’s norms and institutions—as in the case of election monitoring— leading states with illiberal preferences are more likely to promote the creation of regional institutions that deflect the pressure of liberal international institutions and seek to weaken the LIO’s core norms and principles. This was seen with Venezuela’s leadership in promoting a regional electoral monitoring mechanism that aligned with the interests of incumbent governments.

Implications and Contributions to the Literature

Our comparative analysis of South America’s regional counter-institutionalization efforts provides several contributions to the literature. First, it sheds light on the conditions under which South American states create regional institutions that consolidate or undermine the LIO’s norms and institutions. In so doing, we contribute to a deeper understanding of South America’s relationship with the LIO, highlighting how liberal and illiberal tendencies can coexist within the region. Second, our article contributes to the broader debate on the contestation of the LIO, particularly in the Global South. While much of the literature focuses on how illiberal states use regionalism to weaken liberal norms, this study shows that contestation in South America is not one-dimensional. We reveal that South American states contest the LIO not only to challenge liberal norms but also to reinforce them in certain policy areas. We hold that South America is far from being an exception, and that scholars interested in the future of the LIO need to dig deeper the relationship between regionalism and the LIO in other regions of the Global South —especially as the LIO faces increasing geopolitical rivalry and normative contestation on a global scale.