(Don’t) Fear The Regional Organization: Unraveling the Interconnections of Institutional Power in Regional Organizations

This study investigates the institutional design of Regional Organizations (ROs) through the prism of power distribution and checks-and-balances. Analyzing 75 ROs over seven decades, we examine the interplay between decision-making power, scope, and power concentration. Our objectives are twofold: to lay the groundwork for an institutional checks-and-balances theory in RO design and to develop quantitative measures for these concepts. 

Our findings reveal a temporal trend of expanding scope and increasing decision-making power in ROs, coupled with a more dispersed power distribution among their organs. This pattern persists even in the European Union, where power concentration has progressively declined with each treaty revision. Regression analysis yields three key results: (1) a significant negative correlation between decision-making power and concentration; (2) a positive association between scope and decision-making power; and (3) a complex relationship between scope and concentration, suggesting mediation by both decision-making power and organ quantity. 

These findings support our checks-and-balances hypothesis: as organizational scope broadens, decision-making power increases but becomes more dispersed among multiple organs. This research contributes to the understanding of RO institutional evolution and provides quantitative tools for further investigation into power dynamics in international organizations, offering implications for both theory and practice in global governance.